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Introduction
The future is contested. What are the implications of the different
social models that might come into being? What is progress? Is it
being richer, living longer, reduced inequality, or more human
rights? What is modernity? Is modernity over, or is the project of
modernity not yet completed? Social theory is challenged to take
account of complex inequalities beyond class: how can they be
included so that they are central, not marginal? Globalization chal-
lenges the notion of separate societies: how do global processes
change social relations? What difference does the inclusion of com-
plex inequalities and global processes make to the analysis and to
social theory? What difference does the inclusion of complex
inequalities make to our view as to what constitutes progress? The
aim of this book is not only to produce better accounts of social
change in a global era, but also to rethink core concepts and theo-
ries. A key aid here is the development of complexity theory.
‘Progress’ is an essentially contested project. There are vigorous
disputes over what the proper goals of global policy should be, over
the priorities for action by governments and international bodies. The
meaning of ‘progress’ is far from obvious, ranging from economic
development to human well-being, equality and human rights.
Protagonists vigorously disagree about which is more important, with
implications for the goals of global as well as national public policy.
How are such contestations conducted? Are they so rooted in values
that are so deeply held that to debate is a challenge to fundamental
aspects of people and cultures, or are they amenable to rational scien-
tific debate over priorities? In practice, even deeply held values are
challenged by appeals to internal inconsistency and empirical evidence
about their effects when implemented. This book aims to clarify the
1 Introduction:Progress And Modernities
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alternative framings of the notion of progress and to identify their
implications. Does the evidence support or contradict deeply held con-
victions as to the best way forward? Which project emerges best, when
subjected to social scientific Scrutiny?
Modernity has been a key concept in classic Sociology, used to
address large-scale social transformation. The transition to moder-
nity preoccupied many of the major social theorists, from Marx and
Weber to Durkheim and Simmel. But is modernity still the best way
to understand contemporary social relations? Or are we now living
in a postmodern era? Challenges to the concept of modernity are
aimed at its apparent assumption that there was a single unilinear
process of development, and that it was good for everyone. Such a
notion is clearly untenable, in view of the horrors of the descent
into war and ‘ethnic cleansing’, the diversity of paths of develop-
ment, and the uneven position of different social groups in the same
country. Are we not yet modern, rather than postmodern, or are
there multiple varieties of modernity?
Globalization is a challenge to social theory. It demands a re-thinking
of the notion that there are societies constituted as separate bounded
entities. It raises questions about the taken-for-granted equation of
society and nation-state. Is globalization merely Westernization or
Americanization, or does it hybridize all cultures, creating new com-
monalities? Is it eroding differences between cultures producing con-
vergence? Globalization requires the analysis of new types of global
processes, and the re-framing of many ostensibly local or national pro-
jects within a global landscape.
Social theory is challenged to address the multiplicity of social
inequalities, not only that of class. The significance of diverse
inequalities for social life is recognized, but building this insight into
the core of social theory rather than remaining in specialist sub-fields
has proved more difficult. Traditional social theory addressed class
inequality, but had difficulty when trying simultaneously to address
gender, ethnicity, age, religion, nation, sexual orientation, and dis-
ability, and even greater difficulty in addressing their mutual consti-
tution at points of intersection. Further, these social relations are
more complex than class in that they involve not only inequality but
also difference, thereby problematizing notions of a single standard
against which to judge inequality. The challenge then is to include
intersecting complex inequalities within the core of social theory.
In order to insert globalization and complex inequalities into the
heart of social theory it is necessary to develop new concepts and to
rethink how theories are put together. There is a need both to capture
the distinctions, differentiations and nuances of complex inequalities
that have been part of what has been driving the postmodern turn,G
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and to simultaneously keep the global horizon in sight. There is also
a need to retain the conception of inter-linkages so as to be able to
analyse the global level, while not falling into the mistaken simplici-
ties of over-generalization across cultures. Developments in complex-
ity theory offer a new vocabulary on which social theory can usefully
draw in developing concepts to meet these new analytic challenges.
These offer the opportunity to build a more complex theoretical
framework that enables the theorization of both large-scale connec-
tions and of sudden ruptures and non-linear processes. Complexity
theory enables the re-thinking of the concept of social system to
address, without reductionism, multiple systems of social relations.
This chapter addresses first, the contested issue of what progress
might be; second, the challenge of theorizing multiple complex
inequalities simultaneously; third, the conceptualization of plural
forms of modernity; fourth, the challenge of theorizing global
processes; and fifth, the usefulness of complexity theory in address-
ing these challenges in social theory.
What is Progress?
More money or a longer life?
Is it better to have more money or to live longer? People in the
United States of America have more money but die sooner than
those in the European Union. Americans have over 40 per cent
more income than these Europeans, but live on average for two
years less (World Bank 2006c).
Is increasing income a measure of progress? Or is living longer a
better indicator? There are different ways of thinking about progress,
so how should they be evaluated?
What kind of social arrangements produce progress, however it is
defined? Is it the greater freedom of the market in the USA as com-
pared with greater state regulation in Europe? Is it the greater inequal-
ity in the USA as compared with Europe? Or the more violent nature
of the USA than Europe?
The two divergent goals of money and longevity are associated with
two quite different conceptions of progress. The first takes the eco-
nomic, especially money, as an effective summary indicator of progress
and of what is good and desirable; it is often used by national and
international bodies of financial governance. The second is focused on
the outcome for human well-being, of our capacities and capabilities,
of which longevity is an indicator. Further, framings of progress include
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‘equality’ and ‘human rights’. Indeed many social and political projects
have their own distinctive accounts of what constitutes the best social
arrangements to produce the ‘good life’.
Different social systems have different levels of success in con-
verting economic resources into human well-being. The EU social
system is more effective in this than the USA. It is the differences in
social systems that are crucial to understanding the implications for
individuals. The EU and US social systems link economic resources
to human well-being in different ways as a result of differences in
how their social systems have developed.
Different cultures prioritize different values. What is meant by
progress and what are the preferred goals of public policy? Can
there be a single notion of progress in the context of varying val-
ues? What kinds of social arrangements achieve progress?
Progress as a contested project
There is no simple answer to the question of what is progress. Rather,
it is an essentially contested concept. Indeed, so contested that some
will give up all hope that it is a useful project to engage with.
There are three main approaches to the concept and project of
progress. First, that modernity is progress. For classical sociologists,
analysing the transformation of society that is associated with indus-
trialization and urbanism, modernity was progress, but a develop-
ment that many saw as double-edged, with a down side as well (as
discussed in the next section). A second response is to deny the use-
fulness of the concept and project of progress: it is too simple, falsely
universalistic, and ethnocentric. Rather than a universal ‘one size fits
all’, there are a potentially infinite number of particular ways of think-
ing about what constitutes the ‘good life’ and how to get there that
are rooted in different cultures. A third position sees progress as a
contested project: there are alternative conceptions, but not an infinite
number; it exists as a notion that is highly contested; it is argued over
in politics and policy, philosophy and theory, data, and analysis.
Within this third approach four key alternative goals of progress
can be identified – economic development, equality, human rights,
and human well-being – though there are others, including a respect
for traditional or fundamental practices. The first is that human wel-
fare is best advanced by economic growth and high levels of eco-
nomic development. The second prioritizes equality. The third is
human rights. The fourth has a focus on human well-being, which is
more than just a high standard of living but includes education,
health, and longevity.G
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These goals of progress are embedded in projects that are rooted
in civil society. Sometimes these projects will become the founda-
tion of governmental programmes. Finally, they may become
embedded in practices in social formations. Today, two major com-
peting projects claim in quite different ways to take forward some
of these goals: neoliberalism and social democracy. They claim in
varying ways to produce economic development, aspects of equal-
ity, human rights, and human well-being.
Economic development
The first framing of progress focuses on economic development
and economic growth. Economic development is expected to
increase the average income of a person and thereby their standard
of living. While this approach appears to treat economic develop-
ment as an end in itself, it usually rests on the implicit assumption
that economic development is a means to the delivery of an
improved standard of living and a further additional assumption
that this is a popular policy goal. The higher the rate of economic
growth, the faster will the standard of living increase. Improved
economic performance is assumed to mean a more effective uti-
lization of resources to deliver goods and services. The approach
claims to be neutral as to the way in which this income is spent by
people and regards this neutrality as positive. Economic growth
and development is defended as the best approach to progress, on
the basis that this constitutes an indication of the average standard
of living of people in a country and that this is what people want
because governments are repeatedly democratically elected on a
mandate that prioritizes economic growth.
This approach to progress is embodied in many national finance
ministries and in some parts of the global institutions of financial
governance, such as the International Monetary Fund. It underpins
the ‘Washington consensus’ on economic policy (Stiglitz 2002).
Within social science there is much debate as to the type of social
arrangements that best deliver economic growth. A major focus of
the discussion has been as to whether countries with the markets that
are most ‘free’, or where markets are carefully regulated and subor-
dinated to other social institutions, actually deliver on this. In partic-
ular, this involves analysing the contrasting nature and implications
of different types of production, welfare, and regulatory regimes
(Barro 1998; Hall and Soskice 2001; Kenworthy 2004). However,
there are several challenges to this conceptualization of progress.
These include whether untrammelled competition has social costs
Walby-3874-Ch-01:Walby-3874-Ch-01.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 5
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that need to be set against the benefits of rapid economic growth,
and whether it leads to happiness (Oswald 1997; Layard 2005). Is
human well-being, equality, or human rights more important?
Equality
An alternative approach to progress is viewed through the lens of jus-
tice. This approach prioritizes justice, equality, and human rights
rather than material improvements in living conditions and welfare.
Various traditions articulate this issue in slightly different ways, includ-
ing: justice (Sandel 1998; Rawls 1999); equality (Phillips 1995; Holli
1997); rights (Paine 1984; Kymlicka 1991, 1995); human rights (Peters
and Wolper 1995; Woodiwiss 1998); citizenship (Marshall 1950); equal
opportunities and equity (Acker 1989; Shaw and Perrons 1995); free-
dom and capabilities (Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2000); democracy, politi-
cal rights and civil liberties (Gastil 1982); and recognition (Taylor et al.
1994; Honneth 1996; Fraser 1997). While there are many approaches
to the notion of progress that have a justice framing, it is possible to
group many of them into two categories – equality and rights.
The framing of progress as equality is a key part of the socialist and
social democratic tradition (Bobbio 1997). This is a more collective
and less individualist framing of justice than the others, according less
priority to the individual and more to groups and collectivities. There
are variations within this frame including: whether equality is con-
ceptualized as an opportunity or an outcome; which domains and
practices are included; whether it is limited to ‘excessive’ inequality;
and how difference is addressed.
Equality may be understood either as an outcome or as an oppor-
tunity. Equality of outcomes is the stronger programme; equality of
opportunities addresses processes and procedures which may possi-
bly, but not necessarily, lead to greater equality in outcomes. For
example, the attempt to increase equality of opportunity by equal
treatment laws may reduce discrimination but may also be insuffi-
cient to produce an equality of outcome in the absence of structural
change (Hoskyns 1996). This equality of outcome usually requires
the transformation of both social systems and legal processes.
The principle of equality is often selectively applied. This equality
may be regarded as a legitimate outcome in matters of longevity,
where class and ethnic differences are often considered unjust. It is
more commonly discussed in the economic domain (for example, in
the debates over narrowing the gender and ethnic pay gaps) than in
civil society where diversity is more often preferred. Further, there
are some issues for which equality is considered marginal rather than
Walby-3874-Ch-01:Walby-3874-Ch-01.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 6
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important (Phillips 1999). Some forms of inequality are regarded as
illegitimate because they are ‘excessive’. For example, social exclu-
sion and poverty may be regarded as unjust because they are
extreme or ‘excessive’, but not inequality in all its forms; social exclu-
sion is a weaker understanding of inequality (Lister 1998).
Inequalities are often complexly entwined with differences.
There is a question as to whether equality requires sameness and
the use of a single standard, or equal recognition and the valuation
of different contributions, or a larger and more profound transfor-
mation (Fraser 1997; Rees 1998). The equal valuation of different
contributions is a step away from traditional interpretations of
equality that involve a single universal standard. The notion of cos-
mopolitanism requires mutual respect for different ways of life
rather than the adoption of a single universal standard as to what
is best (Held 2004; Beck 2006).
Equality is potentially the most radical of the framings of progress.
In practice, its application as a principle is often hedged with
caveats and limited to specific processes, domains, and practices.
Human rights
In the rights-based approach to justice, every individual is regarded
as having inviolable rights, the realization of which constitutes a just
society. Each person has an equal entitlement to a specific set of rights.
The tradition is predominantly individualist, with the valuation of the
rights of individuals positioned as more important than the average
welfare of the society as a whole. It ranges from a relatively narrow
focus on civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, and political rights,
such as free elections (Gastil 1982), to a wider concept of citizenship,
which involves socio-economic as well as political and civil rights
(Marshall 1950). In its privileging of the individual over society, rights
can be interpreted as representing a Western, rather than a universal or
global, approach to justice, although this is contested (Woodiwiss 1998).
The notion of rights itself has several variants, including human
rights and civil rights (Ferree et al. 2002a), though today human rights
predominate in political discourse. There are many theoretical and
philosophical interpretations of the longstanding rights-based tradition
of justice (Banks 1981; Paine 1984; Wollstonecraft 1992 [1790]).
According to Rawls (1999), justice is the overarching framework for
all conceptions of progress and the first virtue of social institutions.
He considers that each individual has an inviolability that overrides
everything else, including the average welfare of the rest of society.
Rawls’s approach to justice involves a rejection of utilitarian theory in
Walby-3874-Ch-01:Walby-3874-Ch-01.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 7
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which the justice of a larger number of people can outweigh the injus-
tice and disadvantage of a few individuals. His approach requires that
every individual receives the basics as an underpinning of justice. In
this way Rawls’s ‘social contract’ approach to justice prioritizes an
equal minimum level for all over the welfare of a whole society.
In the current wave of globalization, the human rights interpreta-
tion of justice is becoming increasingly important. This draws on a
longstanding rights tradition (Banks 1981; Paine 1984; Wollstonecraft
1992 [1790]; Berkovitch 1999) as well as on some components of the
equality framework (Peters and Wolper 1995; Woodiwiss 1998). The
most important current statement on human rights is that issued by
the UN after the end of the Second World War, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948). This claim, endorsed by all
governments in the world, states that these rights are in principle uni-
versal and not particular. However, this early UN statement on human
rights has since been reinterpreted, extending and clarifying its con-
tent. The implementation of a rights-based (especially a human rights)
approach to justice and progress is often made via a juridical frame-
work. It is through the law, courts and lawyers that human rights are
made available to individuals and groups of individuals.
Although there is a component of equality within the human rights
approach, not least equality in accessing these rights since they are
regarded as universal, this is a limited conception of equality. It is a
minimalist and threshold conception – a relatively low threshold is set
and must be passed. Beyond that, the framework has nothing to say.
However, the framing of human rights as universal and measured
against a single standard is contested by notions of group rights, the
equal valuation of different contributions, and by cosmopolitanism.
Rights are not always and only linked to individuals: they may also
be constituted as group rights, or as the right to a way of life, which
intrinsically involves a group or community (Kymlicka 1991, 1995).
This implicitly recognizes that there are different standards in rela-
tion to which rights can be claimed. The example used by Kymlicka
is that of the First Nation, or aboriginal Indians, in Canada, and their
collective rights to the use of certain tracts of land that differ from
those belonging to the rest of Canada’s citizens. A parallel issue is
articulated in theories of equal rights in relation to gender, where the
concern to respect difference leads to such formulations as the equal
valuation of different contributions. However, there is a question as
to whether such respect implies an acceptance of practices that
might be considered harmful to certain minorities. There is a tension
between universalism and particularism in the specification of equality
and human rights, even though the traditional interpretation of these
has tended to imply a single universal standard.
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Human development, well-being
and capabilities
A further project, variously named human development, well-being or
capabilities, challenges a focus solely on economic development and
growth, but is equivocal about equality. This approach to progress
replaces a focus on income with a broader conception of human
development and well-being. The intellectual inspiration underpin-
ning this approach is the work of Amartya Sen (1999), while broader
support comes from practitioners in the international development
community and more recently from academics. There is an increasing
divergence within this approach between an outcome-oriented
project rooted in the international development community and a
philosophically-oriented project focused on the concept of capabil-
ities which is separated from that of functionings.
When embedded in the United Nations Development Project (1990),
this alternative approach to development promoted an approach to
human well-being that required more than just income; outcomes of
longevity and education were the preferred form of development. This
challenge to the narrowness of the goal of economic growth that
had been held up by the institutions of global financial governance
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
was at least partly successful. The adoption of the UN Millennium
Development Goals, which offer a synthesis of human and economic
development, by the IMF, the World Bank and OECD among others,
represents a modest global political success on the part of this chal-
lenge to neoliberal conceptions of economic growth.
Capabilities are the ‘substantive freedoms’ to ‘choose a life one has
reason to value’, while functionings are ‘the various things a person
may value doing or being’, according to Sen (1999: 74–5). The dis-
tinction between capabilities and functioning parallels the distinction
between opportunities and outcomes. One of the strengths of the
capabilities approach (that it is open to democratic attempts to name
and prioritize capabilities) is also a weakness. The flexibility and
openness to political pressure in the definition of the list of capabili-
ties mean that a wide range of interpretations of capabilities is pos-
sible. The focus on capabilities rather than on functionings
deliberately opens the door to choice, but thereby makes possible a
choice of inequality as a way to obtain a difference. Opportunities,
conceptualized as substantive freedoms and capabilities, are hard to
operationalize and to measure. Because the door is deliberately
opened to choice, it is thereby opened to the possibility that people
may choose inequality through their choice of a form of difference
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that is linked to inequality. Choice is prioritized over equality. By
contrast, the UNDP approach to capabilities problematizes choice:
‘Real opportunity is about having real choices – the choices that come
with a sufficient income, an education, good health and living in a
country that is not governed by tyranny’ (UNDP 2006). In this way,
certain contexts are taken as key to providing capabilities. The focus
shifts to outcomes (rather than opportunities) which are easier to
measure against a common standard. The interpretation of this school
of thought as developed by the UNDP, with its focus on a wide range
of outcomes that are relevant to human development and well-being,
is the one preferred here.
Competing projects: neoliberalism
and social democracy
The different conceptions of progress – high personal income,
human well-being, equality, and human rights – do not necessarily
contain accounts of the means to reach these goals. Sometimes they
are implied, but in many cases the means to reach these ends are
contested. Would prioritizing economic growth raise incomes most
effectively, even if at the expense of lesser equality or human
rights? Would deepening democracy most effectively promote
equality and human well-being, but at the expense of more rapid
economic growth? Are there trade-offs between the different goals,
or not? How are these combined in different projects in the world?
While there are many projects to reach these goals, neoliberalism
and social democracy are the most comprehensive in vision and the
most relevant today (Giddens 1998; Held 2004; Harvey 2005). While
neoliberalism and social democracy presume modernity, and disagree
over the form that modernity should take, other projects promote
some aspects of premodernity, as is often the case in religious funda-
mentalisms. Other projects include human rights. Some have partial
rather than comprehensive visions, for example feminism, cos-
mopolitanism (Beck 2006) and environmentalism (Yearley 1996;
Cudworth 2003). Some are hybrid projects – for example, the US
Bush Presidency, 2001–2009, combined neoliberalism with Christian
fundamentalism – while the ‘cosmopolitan universalists’ combine social
democracy with human rights (Held 2004), and the anti-globalization
movement combines anti-neoliberal capitalism, environmentalism
and feminism. This book focuses on the contrast between the two
major projects, neoliberalism and social democracy.
These projects sometimes become embedded in governmental
programmes and sometimes in actual social formations. The extent
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to which these visions are institutionalized and implemented varies
significantly. Projects can be primarily located in civil society, or
may become embedded in governmental policy programmes or in
actually existing social forms, both large and small. A civil society
project usually aims to become the dominant state programme in
order to shape actual social relations and institutions, although with
varying degrees of success.
Neoliberalism elevates the notion of market effectiveness into a
guiding principle for action and attempts to reduce the level of state
intervention into the economy, prioritizing the individual over col-
lectivism (Brenner and Theodore 2002; England and Ward 2007). As
an intellectual project its current forms draw on the work of Hayek
(1960) and Friedman (1962), which argued that freeing the market
from state controls was the best way to ensure economic growth,
which in turn was believed to deliver human well-being, freedom,
democracy, and civil liberties. The project grew in strength during
the 1980s, but has a much longer heritage; here the term neoliberal
is extended back in time. In the 1980s the neoliberal programme
was taken forward by the US and UK governments under Reagan
and Thatcher and by global financial institutions, becoming known
as the ‘Washington consensus’, and then spread globally as a result
of International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions on loans to poor
countries including ‘structural adjustment’. The policies included
cutting back state welfare expenditure; the reduction in or deregu-
lation of worker protections and benefit payments for those out of
employment; the privatization of publicly owned industries, utilities
and services; the expansion of the market into previously non-
marketized arenas of the global commons such as the genome; and
the substitution of the market as an alternative form of governance
to democracy in specific areas, for example welfare provision
(Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 2003, 2005; England and Ward
2007). In practice, the record of neoliberalism on economic growth
is contested (Stiglitz 2002). The drive to increase incentives to work
shifts the balance of power, leading to increased inequalities which
then compromise human-well-being (Oswald 1997; Wilkinson 2005).
Social democracy aspires to govern societies democratically, avoid-
ing excessive inequality, promoting human as well as economic
development, and enabling minorities as well as majorities to enjoy
their human rights. Social democratic projects commit to the provi-
sion of education, health and care for those in need, in order to
deliver human well-being for all, whether employed or not (Esping-
Andersen 1990). There is a commitment to developing policies across
a wide spectrum in order to deliver social justice and to reduce
inequality. It is considered appropriate for the state to intervene in
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the running of the economy through regulation not only to prevent
market failure, but also to engage in redistribution; the state legiti-
mately taxes and spends in order to deliver its policies.
Social democratic projects vary significantly in the extent to which
they promote state or collective ownership as mechanisms to gov-
ern the economy, whether they adopt Keynesian macro economic
management to reduce the severity of recessions or merely aim for
stability. There has been both a retreat (Callaghan 2000) and a trans-
formation (Kitschelt 1994) of social democratic projects into new
forms as a response to the reduction in the traditional base of elec-
toral support in male manual workers in manufacturing industries
(Przeworski and Sprague 1986), dealignment in class voting prac-
tices (Crewe et al. 1977), and changing external circumstances such
as globalization (Held 1995). There has also been a slow transition of
the social democratic project towards the full inclusion of the con-
cerns of gender and other minorities which is ongoing. Some forms
of the project now include full employment for women and an end
to discrimination against women and minorities, though a full engage-
ment with ethno-national issues of citizenship and migration is far
from complete. Neoliberal critics consider that state intervention
compromises economic growth and thereby other goals.
This description of the projects of neoliberalism and social
democracy has so far been a summary of ideal types and aspira-
tions. The implications of the projects as they enter governmental
programmes and become embedded in diverse social formations
can be quite different.
While the self-description of neoliberalism focuses on diminish-
ing governmental interventions into the economy in contrast with
social democracy, in practice neoliberalism is associated with the
greater expansion of state interventions in other domains than
social democracy. In particular, neoliberalism is associated with the
greater development and deployment of state violence and associ-
ated forms of coercion than is social democracy, for example, in the
propensity to go to war, the build up of military capacity, and the
use of prisons to contain criminality and maintain social order. So
while neoliberalism appears to laud a small state, this is only in
relation to the economy; in practice neoliberal governments simul-
taneously develop a large coercive state to maintain the domestic
social order and position in the global state system. In comparing
neoliberalism and social democracy, it is important not to confine
the analysis to the intersection of the polity with the economy, but
also to include other domains including violence.
While there is widespread consensus that the USA is a major example
of the neoliberal project and Sweden of the social democratic, the
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boundary between neoliberalism and social democracy is contested,
with some arguing that Britain’s New Labour government since
1997 constitutes a new form of social democracy (Giddens 1998)
and others arguing that the extent of its use of the market principle
means that it is effectively neoliberal (Arestis and Sawyer 2005). The
debate concerns a number of issues regarding the state’s role in secur-
ing social justice. These include the shift away from state ownership of
industries and services; away from direct provision of public services
by the state to being merely guaranteed by the state but delivered by
the market; the development of active labour market policies, such as
compulsory counselling and targeted training, to achieve full employ-
ment; and away from a goal to reduce inequality to that of reducing
social exclusion and the provision of equal opportunities. The move
away from state ownership and the provision of goods and services to
their regulation by the state (Majone 1996) is not necessarily inconsis-
tent with a social democratic tradition, though the reduction in the role
of the state is considered by some to be a move towards neoliberal-
ism. The emphasis on the employment and education of individuals
may be interpreted either as a shift to a neoliberal accommodation to
global capital (Taylor-Gooby 1997; George 1998; Brine 2006), a shift
from a Keynesian welfare state to a Schumpeterian workfare state
(Jessop 1999), or in keeping with a social democratic tradition that pri-
oritizes full employment (Giddens 1998, 2001; Crouch 1999), where an
appropriate response to globalization is to invest in people’s human
capital through state initiated training and education (Reich 1993;
Quadagno 1999; Esping-Andersen 2002). These changes may well be
an accommodation to a changing global environment, but full employ-
ment under decent conditions for all without coercion and state
ensured access for all to education, health and care and a decent liv-
ing standard, are among the hallmarks of social democracy. The shift
in the conceptualization of the goal of ‘equality’ to that of ‘social inclu-
sion’ (Giddens 1998) potentially softens the core principles of the
social democratic project (Lister 1998), as does reduced concern with
increased inequality caused by the growth in high level earnings and
wealth from housing capital, and the evasion of taxation and regula-
tion by private equity forms of capital (Murphy 2007), although the
attention to poverty somewhat mitigates this. On this range of con-
cerns, the UK is best considered to be situated on the boundary
between social democracy and neoliberalism.
A similar debate addresses whether the EU is best considered
neoliberal (Young 2000) or social democratic, which is complicated
by the narrower remit of this polity, which excludes welfare pay-
ments and the different construction of its democratic processes
(Majone 1998). The conclusion of this debate drawn here is that the
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major division in the world today is one between a more neoliberal
USA and a more social democratic EU. The contest between the
varieties of modernity of these two global hegemons is crucial for
the future of global arrangements.
Contesting conceptions of progress
How is it possible to adjudicate between these contesting conceptions
of progress: economic development, human well-being, equality and
human rights? Are these issues to be determined by philosophers, or
is it a matter of politics, with the strongest forces winning, or a matter
of rational argumentation and evidence-based research? Is there a
single universal standard, or will there always be particular standards
for different cultures and communities? The tension between univer-
salism and particularism runs through all of these framings of progress:
between a concept of progress that is universally applicable and one
that always varies by social location. Is universalism merely a disguise
for new forms of imperialism, colonialism, or Westernization? The
postmodern critique of modernity argues that a universally relevant
concept of progress is inherently impossible. However, it can also be
argued that universal standards are needed, since exceptions can be
manipulated by the powerful. How, in an emergent global era, might
all voices be involved in determining what global standards should be?
Is there a philosophical grounding of the decision between either
a universal or community-based grounding? On the one hand, lib-
eralism and universalism appear to offer a plea to a free-floating
form of reason that is universal, drawing on a Kantian heritage
(Rawls 2005). There is a claim to universally valid truth, though this
usually assumes a coherent individual as the seeker/knower. On
the other hand, communitarianism appears to offer grounding in
the particular standards of a specific community (Taylor 1994;
Sandel 1998). The latter implies that truth is always partial and sit-
uated, that we are limited by the communities in which we are
located, and that there is always social situatedness and a particu-
larity of values and knowledge (Haraway 1988). In place of the
Enlightenment tradition that made universal claims to knowledge,
has emerged a postmodern scepticism of the validity and usefulness
of the grand ‘metanarratives’ linking the knowledge and progress
that constituted its core components (Lyotard 1984).
Of course, both polar extremes are untenable. Many have sought a
resolution or compromise, either by refining the procedures for an
assessment of justice claims (Habermas 1989, 1991; Benhabib 1992), or
by integrating the concerns of the individual and the community
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(Kymlicka 1991, 1995). Habermas (1989, 1991) seeks a resolution by
attempting to establish universally valid procedures by which truth
may be established, utilizing the dynamics within an assumed desire
to communicate to drive the process, and locating it within an ideal-
ized situation of equality of contribution. However, by such a location
Habermas, despite his intentions, situates rather than universalizes the
conditions for truth, since the conditions of free and equal contribu-
tion are actually socially specific, not least in their presumption of the
implications of democratic involvement. Benhabib’s (1992) attempt at
overcoming the same dualism by demanding a focus on the other has
similar strengths and weaknesses to that of Habermas despite her
attempt to move further on (Hutchings 1997). Benhabib seeks to avoid
commitment to the communitarian stance, by making an appeal to the
ostensibly universally valid criteria of judgement of recognizing the
standpoint of the other. But the process of recognizing the standpoint
of the other is not natural and automatic, but depends upon socially
variable conditions. Thus, Benhabib merely displaces the problem of
universalism onto these new procedures for judgement, which are not
sufficiently universal to be adequate to the task demanded of them. The
act of ‘recognition’ requires a social process of assessment as to what
constitutes the same as or different from oneself. By contrast, Bauman
(1991, 1993) simultaneously rejects both poles and with them the search
for certain foundations for contemporary ethics and political projects.
But despite the philosophical angst, there are nonetheless many
projects that promote alternative conceptions of progress. How
should they be understood? Are they best understood as predomi-
nantly political? There are protestors who oppose the priorities for
globalization as proposed by the world’s financial institutions, who
are met with organized state and police power, as in the Seattle riots
(Klein 1999). There are political struggles within global institutions,
for example, coalitions of poor countries preventing the World
Trade Organization from adopting certain types of liberalization of
world trade that they consider would adversely affect the poor.
Today, many projects engage simultaneously with both knowledge
and power, drawing on and deploying scientific research within and
alongside political engagement. This can be understood as the devel-
opment of ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas 1992) or ‘public Sociology’
(Burawoy 2005). ‘An epistemic community is a network of profession-
als with recognized expertise and competence ... an authoritative claim
to policy-relevant knowledge ... a shared set of normative and princi-
pled beliefs ... shared causal beliefs ... derived from their analysis of
practices ... shared notions of validity ... and a common policy enter-
prise’ (Haas 1992: 3). Burawoy (2005) refers to the practice of public
Sociology, in contrast to professional Sociology, critical Sociology and
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policy Sociology. This is a Sociology that engages with contemporary
issues, researching questions that emerge in civil societal struggles,
which draws on the other three Sociologies, not least professional
expertise, and is engaged in projects of social transformation, the pur-
suit of progress. There are many examples of the intermingled nature
of politics and science, in which findings from research are central to
the struggles over the pursuit of competing projects, including the best
way to invest for development (Stiglitz 2002) and the dangerousness
of emerging genomic technologies (Winickoff et al. 2005). These draw
on the notion that truth is never permanently established even if it tem-
porarily appears to be (Latour and Woolgar 1979), but is instead con-
stantly subject to challenge and to doubt (Habermas 1987 [1981]).
In global arenas there have been several significant and successful
challenges to the standards against which global progress is to be
measured and in more than one direction. A change from economic
growth towards a capabilities understanding of progress has been
occurring within global institutions as a consequence of this mix of
intellectual and political struggle. In the 1980s the clear goal of the
world’s financial institutions was economic growth. By 2000, in the UN
Millennium Declaration, the World Bank, IMF and OECD additionally
supported a capabilities approach. The eight Millennium Development
Goals were to: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve univer-
sal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women;
reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS,
malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental stability; and develop
a global partnership for development (UN 2005). A change in the list of
UN-recognized human rights occurred in 1993 as a result of a similar mix
of political agitation and research-based evidence (Peters and Wolper
1995). This was to include violence against women as a violation of
women’s human rights. The potent mix of a global feminist coalition
and research on the extent of violence against women was crucial to
this change in what were ostensibly ‘universal’ human rights.
With globalization, the definition of the good life and the policies
to promote it are increasingly contested at a global level. Global insti-
tutions and the political and civil societal spaces they generate con-
stitute an increasingly important terrain on which these struggles take
place. There are appeals to both scientific evidence and to democra-
tically expressed popular priorities as bases for the legitimacy of argu-
ments. Global institutions around the UN have revised their stated
goals as a consequence of these processes. There has been a shift in
emphasis from a framing of progress as an increase in income to one
of capabilities, while the definition of universal human rights now
involves explicit reference to women’s human rights. At the same
time, in a perhaps contrary direction, global financial institutions have
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promoted economic growth, and military force has been deployed by
some polities in pursuit of particularistic goals.
Conclusions
One of the aims of this book is to adjudicate rival claims about
progress on the basis of evidence and theory that go beyond phi-
losophy. The concept of progress is not outmoded, as alleged by
some postmodern critics. Yet there is no single and universally
agreed upon definition of progress, rather there are many com-
peting framings of the project. Thus, a search for a foundational
basis for a detailed list of the characteristics of the good life would
be in vain. While there is no single foundation for standards of
progress, the formulation, encoding and institutionalization of
concepts of progress in international conventions and agreements,
especially those orchestrated by the UN, proceed apace. This is
not the same as a global or universal agreement. Nevertheless,
these activities do have consequences. There are active processes
of claims-making about what constitutes progress and the proper
goals of public policy. In a global era there is renewed interest in
claims pitched at the level of the universal. In an era of global-
ization and increasing valuation and practice of democracy the
contestation over the content of the concept of progress is taking
new and more global forms. The contested choice of economic
growth, or capabilities and well-being, or justice-based consider-
ations of equality or human rights, affects public policy at both
global and national levels.
Here, a complex realism is adopted, in which each knowledge
claim is underpinned by a set of theoretical and empirical compo-
nents, each of which is part of a network of knowledge claims. It
is a knowledge claim rather than a value claim because of this
underpinning. This is not a foundationalist claim, since the theo-
retical and empirical underpinning is contestable and challenge-
able. The ‘real’ can never be known for certain; not even if the best
scientific procedures are followed. The concept of complex real-
ism building on critical realism combines the notion that there are
procedures by which knowledge claims are contested (subject to
refutation) and can be improved with that of uncertainty, in that
they can never be known absolutely. In complex realism, the test-
ing of knowledge claims against a network of theories and empir-
ical evidence can lead to a reduction in the errors in knowledge.
Many issues ostensibly posed as ones of value often make
implicit claims as to how phenomena are interconnected. Many
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claims made about the good life, progress, and human well-being
are testable to a considerable degree by empirical evidence because
they are claims about associations and connections between phe-
nomena. One of the aims of this book is to assess the processes
and types of social system that best realize the good life, according
to different formulations, addressing its framing as economic
growth, human development, equality, and human rights. When do
they map onto each other? When do they diverge? What forms of
social organization and social development, which varieties of
modernity, are associated with each? How general a set of argu-
ments can be made, universal or particular? This book provides
evidence of the implications of one dimension of social life inequal-
ity for another, thereby reducing the speculative element in some
of the debates. Chapter 9 in particular uses comparative data to
measure progress in a range of countries according to the different
definitions identified here.
Multiple Complex Inequalities
Introduction
Equality matters not only because it is a major contemporary fram-
ing of justice and progress, but also because inequalities affect the
different forms and speed of economic and human development.
Key issues include: how to theorize multiple and intersecting social
inequalities in addition to class; how to theorize the relationship
between difference and inequality; and the implications of multiple
complex inequalities for the analysis of progress and modernity.
Why multiple inequalities? Class is not the only significant
inequality. Inequalities are also associated with gender, ethnicity,
racialization, nation, religion, able-bodiedness, sexual orientation,
age, generation, linguistic community, and more. These inequalities
affect the differences between forms of modernity as well as the
key dynamics of social change.
Why complex inequalities? Unequal social relations involve dif-
ference as well as inequality. Some aspects of the different activi-
ties may be positively valued, while others will be regarded as
unjust. It is this complicated combination of inequality and differ-
ence that the concept of ‘complex inequalities’ is intended to cap-
ture. Complex inequalities are here defined as constituted by the
simultaneity of difference and inequality, going beyond the con-
ventional treatment of these as alternatives.
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Multiple and intersecting inequalities
While class has traditionally been seen as the main axis of social
inequality, this is insufficient. Gender and ethnicity are also impor-
tant forms of inequality, as can be the case with disability, religion,
age and sexual orientation (it is illegal to discriminate on grounds
of gender, ethnicity, disability, faith, age, and sexual orientation in
the EU: see the European Commission 2007a). While the diversity
of social inequalities is widely documented, they are infrequently
integrated into macro level social theory. Specialist areas of social
science have produced extensive descriptions and analysis of spe-
cific inequalities, for example, in the sub-disciplines of gender
studies, ethnic and racial studies, and disability studies; however,
these have not yet been fully integrated into social theory.
In order to include multiple complex inequalities in addition to
class at the centre of social theory, several theoretical developments
are needed. The conceptualization of each of the main institutional
domains of economy, polity, violence, and civil society needs to be
re-thought so as to include and make visible complex inequalities
in addition to class. Each of the complex inequalities needs to be
theorized as a separate system of social relations, as a regime of
inequality spelling out the ontological depth of these regimes. Class
is not reducible to economics, nor ethnicity to culture; rather each
regime of inequality involves the economy, polity, violence, and
civil society. The theorization of multiple regimes of inequality is a
further challenge – to go beyond reducing one form of inequality
to another, or restricting the account to description.
The concept of the economy, which is often restricted to marke-
tized monetized activities, needs to be widened to include non-
marketized non-monetized work if it is to capture gender and ethnic
relations. If it is not broadened in this way, then other forms of
economic activity, such as unpaid domestic care-work that is an
important part of the constitution of gender relations (Oakley 1974;
Becker 1981; Delphy 1984) and slavery that was an important part
of the constitution of ethnic relations (Walvin 1992), will be omitted
from the analysis. If the unit within which inequality is considered
is widened from one country to the whole world and inequalities
between generations are included, then new forms of inequalities
become visible, such as global warming, which has had stronger
effects on the poor South rather than the rich North of the world
(Roberts and Parks 2007) and on future generations.
The inclusion of non-marketized economic sectors causes problems
for some of the most frequently used measures of economic inequality,
in particular income inequality. Comparing the income of employed
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people is relatively straightforward, generating accounts of class,
gender and ethnic economic inequality among workers, with mea-
sures of the wage spread and the gender and ethnic pay gaps. But
how is an unpaid domestic care-worker, often but not always a
woman, to be treated in such an approach to economic inequality? Is
she to be ignored since she does not have her own earned income?
Such an approach is obviously unsatisfactory but is implied in the
quite common practice of comparing the income of households rather
than individuals, thereby making invisible any gender inequalities
within the household (as in most of the studies of economic inequal-
ity reported in Chapter 3). Is her domestic care-work left out of focus
by centring the analysis on her earned income, asking what propor-
tion of men’s earnings are earned by women (a measure used by the
UNDP), thereby explicitly treating the lack of income from domestic
care-work as a component of gender inequality? Should unpaid
domestic care-work be treated as a positively valued activity in its
own right? Or is it a key part of gendered economic inequalities?
The conventional concept of the state is too narrow to grasp
some key forms of institutionalized politics and governance con-
cerning gender and ethnicity. The broader concept of polity
includes a wider range of entities, including transnational polities
such as the European Union, and also organized religions, which
can be important in the governance of gender and ethnic relations.
The conventional operationalization of the concept of democracy
focuses on free elections, free political parties, free association,
free speech, and the right to bodily integrity such as the right of
habeas corpus (not to be subject to arbitrary detention). Using
these criteria most, though not all, countries can be considered
democratic today. However, effective access to power requires a
presence in the key arenas of decision making, such as in parlia-
ment. If a presence in parliament were to be added to the opera-
tionalization of the concept of democracy, then women and
minoritized ethnic groups do not have political equality as yet. If
the right to bodily integrity were to make visible gender issues,
such as women’s freedom to control their bodies in sexual and
reproductive matters such as abortion and contraception, then
there is not yet political equality for women.
Violence needs to be added to the conventional set of institutional
domains of economy, polity and civil society, since it is so impor-
tant in the structuring of gender, ethnic, national, and religious
inequalities. Violence is not merely an instrument of power, but can
also be constitutive of social relations. The processes of deployment
and regulation of violence in both collectively organized and inter-
personal forms have important implications. These forms include
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not only the armies of the state but also domestic violence, sexual
assault, harassment, lynching, ‘ethnic cleansing’, and terrorism.
The use of violence by dominant groups against women and minori-
tized ethnic, sexual, and religious groups is a further indicator of
inequality.
Civil society is a domain of social creativity, where there is a
development of new ideas and social practices, including various
forms of association, non-governmental organizations, social move-
ments, and non-state forms of power struggle (Gramsci 1971) and
intimacy. It includes but is not confined to issues of culture, includ-
ing the media, the arts, sport, and knowledge creation. Whether dif-
ferent participation in these activities constitutes inequality or a
valued difference is again an issue in these areas. Nevertheless, the
imbalance between social groups in decision-making activities in
civil society may often be considered an inequality. Who decides
what constitutes news, which leisure activities are to be funded and
put on prime-time television, and who makes decisions in trade
unions and other associations?
Complex inequalities: difference,
inequality and progress
In deciding what counts as inequality there is a troublesome com-
plication: when is something a positively valued difference and when
is it inequality? This issue lies at the heart of many disputes about
what constitutes progress; what to some is a reduction of a negatively
valued inequality, to others might constitute a reduction in a posi-
tively valued practice. Rather than forcing a choice, it is better to rec-
ognize that most social relations contain both inequality and valued
differences. The term ‘complex inequality’ is used here to signify this
simultaneous presence of inequality and positively valued difference.
Complex inequalities potentially constitute a challenge to the
concept of progress insofar as there are multiple standards to evalu-
ate what is progress. There are three ways of thinking about equal-
ity in this context. First, is to identify a single standard against which
inequality is measured. A second position entails equally valuing dif-
ferent contributions. A third approach is that of transformation,
whereby the whole system is changed, with all groups and the stan-
dards attached to them restructured.
The first position argues that there is or can be a single agreed
standard against which to identify inequality. The UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which declares that equality in
accessing these rights should be universal, exemplifies this position.
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A single standard of equality is often implied in monetary economic
inequality, where differences in income and wealth are considered
to be inequalities. It is implied in the concept of democracy, where
the equality of each vote is considered important. Such a conception
of equality measured against a single standard is common in the
analysis of class relations, where matters of economic and political
equality are often at the forefront of the analysis. The feminist vision
of de-gendering (Lorber 2000, 2005) implicitly endorses this position,
even though a question remains as to its universal application. In
practice, the legal dimension of the equality strategy of the EU is
based on ‘equal treatment’ thereby endorsing agreed standards.
Indeed some standards, such as equal pay for women and men, may
constitute standards that are already held by women as well as by
men. While the identification of inequality may appear obvious
through the lens of class analysis in relation to inequalities in income
and wealth, in the case of complex inequalities other than class, such
as ethnicity and gender, where inequality and difference are more
obviously present simultaneously, this is not so simple. Some forms
of variation are open to alternative interpretations as either difference
or equality: for example, a segregated pattern of labour between
domestic care-work and waged labour may be a valued difference or
an unwelcome inequality or both.
The second position positively values difference (Spellman 1988;
Young 1990) and diversity, and assumes the possibility of equally
valuing different practices (Taylor et al. 1994). In the desire to
move beyond the over-simplifying notion of a single standard
against which to measure inequality, there has been a move to rec-
ognize and value difference (Young 1990; Taylor 1994; Tronto
1994; Calhoun 1995; Hobson 2000). Young (1990) argues for the
recognition of cultural difference – the denial of respect for those
who are culturally different and for their ways of life is a problem
that needs a political remedy. She argues for the recognition of
groups as the bearers of these cultures within the political system,
rather than recognizing only the individual of liberalism. This the-
ory of justice ontologically privileges groups over individuals. In
contrast to Lorber’s (2005) call for de-gendering, Young argues for
the deepening of institutions that promote respect for group dif-
ferences. There are two main problems with this approach. First,
in practice, the institutionalization of difference has often entailed
inequality in some way. An example here is that of the perfor-
mance of unpaid domestic care-work by women. This may be a
highly valued activity (Tronto 1993), however, it can be inconsis-
tent with the activities necessary to obtain equal pay under cer-
tain circumstances (Joshi and Paci 1998). Second, the strategy of
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‘recognition’ has a problematic tendency to lead to the reifying,
essentializing (Ferree and Gamson 2003), or ontologizing (Felski
1997) of difference. It can embed differences ever more firmly. The
focus on specific identities makes it difficult to engage with change
and cross-cutting inequalities. The dilemma becomes how to rec-
ognize difference while avoiding the trap of essentialism (Ferree
and Gamson 2003).
There have been many attempts to reconcile, merge, hybridize,
or otherwise go beyond the dichotomization of sameness and dif-
ference approaches to equality (Scott 1988; Kymlicka 1995; Fraser
1997; Holli 1997). One resists a settled focus on identity (Braidotti
1994); a second focuses on sameness in some domains and differ-
ence in others (Council of Europe 1998); a third posits a process
of transformation of existing standards and their associated institu-
tions (Fraser 1997; Rees 1998). In the first approach, Braidotti
(1994) emphasizes the fluidity and changeability of cultural forms
by utilizing the metaphor of the ‘nomadic’ subject to resist settling
into established modes of thought and behaviour. She prefers the
perspective of difference in order to avoid simply embracing exist-
ing identities. However, such a distancing from actually existing
social practices runs the risk of rendering the position too abstract
to have much practical substantive meaning (Felski 1997; Squires
1999). A second approach allows for equality through sameness in
one domain and equality with difference in others (Council of
Europe 1998; Verloo 2001). Equality through sameness is specified
in the ‘equal participation of women and men in political and
public life’ and ‘the individual’s economic independence’, and
education, while equality through equal valuation of different con-
tributions is specified for the family and care-work. However, this
is only possible if the links between different domains are loose.
If the gender practices in different domains are coupled tightly, it
may not be possible to have common standards in one domain
and different standards in another.
The third approach to equality requires transformation (Fraser
1997; Rees 1998; Squires 2005). In this perspective, a transition from
inequality to equality implies the transformation of the social
institutions and standards in which the groups are involved.
Transformation entails new standards agreed across diverse social
groups that are themselves restructured. As social relations are
transformed, then new standards develop. This is an approach that
is classically adopted in socialism. There can be no significant prac-
tical restructuring of inequalities without the transformation of the
social relations that themselves produce the standards against
which equalities are measured.
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Modernity? Postmodernity?
Not yet Modern? Varieties
of Modernity?
Introduction
Are we now postmodern, rather than modern, or still premodern in
some respects? Are there stages to modernity, so that we are now
in high or late modernity (Giddens 1991), reflexive or second
modernity (Beck 1992) or liquid modernity (Bauman 2000)? Are
there multiple modernities, with quite different principles of moder-
nity (Huntington 1998; Eisenstadt 2002)? Or varieties of modernity,
sharing key features but with different paths of development (Hall
and Soskice 2001; Schmidt 2006, 2007)?
The answers to these questions depend on the definition of
modernity, whether complex inequalities are brought into focus, and
whether different types of modernity can be distinguished. The def-
inition of modernity used here draws on the classics, from Marx and
Weber to Durkheim and Simmel, inflecting them with contemporary
social theory. Bringing complex inequalities, and especially gender,
into focus challenges conventional accounts of modernity. Rather
than a singular modernity, varieties of modernity are identified.
It is necessary to reconsider the definition of modernity, to rebuild
from its classic origins, and to address forms of inequalities that the
classics did not fully consider. Five components of modernity are
considered: free wage labour; the state monopoly of legitimate vio-
lence; rationalization; individuation; democracy and human rights.
Modernity or postmodernity?
Is the concept of postmodernity more appropriate than that of moder-
nity for the twenty-first century (Lyotard 1974; Harvey 1989; Kumar
2005)? Does postmodernity imply that knowledge is so situated and
contextualized by particular social groups that no general social the-
ory is possible? Does the inclusion of multiple complex inequalities
and cultural diversity mean that the concept of modernity should be
rejected as too simplistic and replaced by that of postmodernity? Does
recognition of the divergent values and preferences of particular
social groups and cultures challenge the vision of a universal con-
ception of modernity (Taylor et al. 1994; Calhoun 1995; Felski 1995;
Bhambra 2007; Schmidt 2007)?
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Is it appropriate to link modernity with progress, or is the
‘Enlightenment’ confidence in the possibility of progress misplaced
(Lyotard 1984)? Modernity is accused of bringing the Holocaust
(Bauman 1989), the destabilization of the environment, high levels of
inequality, and the threat of nuclear annihilation. Is it better to reject
any link between modernity and progress, and prefer instead an eth-
ical position of distance from such a commitment, articulated as post-
modern ambivalence (Bauman 1991)?
However, it was rare that classic social theorists simply equated
modernity with progress. They were almost always ambivalent, aware
of the negative as well as positive potential of any changes. The dou-
ble-edged nature of modernity, providing both freedom and also new
forms of disciplinary constraint, runs deep in much classic sociologi-
cal theory (Wagner 1994). For example, Marx saw increased poverty
before revolution and socialism, with free wage labour providing both
freedom from personal bondage as well as increased discipline, while
Weber saw rationality as not only the development of the human
capacity for knowledge but also as an iron cage of bureaucracy which
narrowed the human range of action. The conceptualization of
progress is highly contested and should not be equated with moder-
nity; but classical social theory did not make this mistake.
The recognition of multiple forms of inequalities and differences
has been absorbed into postmodernist criticism of modernist analy-
sis. There are potentially many different baselines against which to
measure equality. But it does not follow that postmodernism is the
best answer to this analytic challenge. The multiplicity of inequali-
ties is not new to a global era, indeed in Simmel’s work individu-
ation resulting from diverse webs of affiliations was central to his
understanding of modernity. The standards against which inequality
and progress are measured are contested, but that is not the same
as abandoning such a project as if there were incommensurability.
The challenges posed to social theory and to the simpler forms of
modernization theory need to be answered, but there are other ways.
One is to re-work the concepts of modernity, moving beyond a false
singularity, recognizing the still existing premodern, and theorizing the
varieties of modernity. The challenge to the simpler concepts of social
system needs to be addressed; the conceptual tools needed to do this
can be drawn from complexity theory, as will be shown later.
Late, second or liquid modernity?
Also going beyond modernity is a series of writers who think we have
reached not postmodernism, but a late stage in the development
of modernity – late or high modernity (Giddens 1991), reflexive or
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second modernity (Beck 1992, 2002) and liquid modernity (Bauman
2000). These writers have introduced issues of choice and reflexivity,
intimacy and family, into the analysis of modernity.
According to Giddens and Beck, we are now more reflexive, more
able to knowingly make the decisions that shape our lives. Rather
than fixed traditional patterns, there is choice. This analysis is led
from an interpretation of the changes in intimacy (Giddens 1992) and
the family (Beck 1992, 2002), which are positioned more centrally to
social changes than has been common in social theory. Giddens and
Beck are right to name intimacy and the family as areas of significant
social change, but their analysis of this abandons the approach that
they have used for other social relations, neglecting much of the con-
siderable social science work on gender relations that explains these
changes in the same way as changes in any other set of social rela-
tions. Their move into the language of choice and reflexivity leaves
behind much of the heritage of social theory. This is a mistake.
Bauman (2000) similarly focuses on change for individuals, but is less
focused on the family and intimacy, suggesting that in liquid modernity
there is a change from solidly structured social relations to fluidly
changing social relations. Bauman goes beyond Giddens and Beck
in noting explicitly that the appearance of choice for individuals is
not really choice in an unequal society. He is right to point out that
choice is better addressed as a personal experience, a superficial
appearance, rather than as a reduction in constraints.
All three, Giddens, Beck and Bauman, write as if there were a
single modernity. There is no reference to differences between
countries. In particular, there is no reference to the differences
between the social democratic reorganization of gender and family
relations and those in more neoliberal countries. Bauman writes as
if all of modernity is becoming neoliberal. But there are differences,
with the social democratic version of modernity different from that
of neoliberalism. This book explores these differences rather than
treating the West as if it were one.
Multiple modernities?
A further response to the challenge of diverse social forms and
inequalities to the paradigm of modernity is that there are several
forms of modernity, not just one. Much early work on modernization
assumed that there was a single form of modernity, in which varia-
tions were minor and theoretically insignificant. The presumption of
a singular form of modernity can be challenged without abandoning
the concept of modernity. There are two ways of conceptualizing the
Walby-3874-Ch-01:Walby-3874-Ch-01.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 26
In
tro
d
u
ctio
n
27
diversity of forms of modernity: multiple modernities (Huntington 1998;
Eisenstadt 2000) and varieties of modernity (Schmidt 2006, 2007).
The concept of multiple modernities rejects the notion of a single
path of modernity (Huntington 1998; Eisenstadt 2000), rather there
are multiple alternative modernities each with its own distinct set of
values and practices. Modernity is not the spread of Westernization
during processes of globalization, but instead is autonomously devel-
oped in different locations around the world. The multiple moder-
nities approach assumes a radical dissimilarity between the forms of
modernity. These differences are seen to lie especially in the realms
of culture and religion, with an incomparability of value systems
between different cultures (Eisenstadt 2000) and different civilizations
(Huntington 1998). These approaches aim to overcome a perceived
ethnocentric bias in traditional analyses of modernity as emanating
and derivative from Western social practices. However, in compen-
sating for Western bias these authors postulate such radical disconti-
nuities that they erode any common basis for the concept of
modernity. This position articulates a relatively thin conceptualization
of modernity, rooted in cultural values at the expense of economic,
political and scientific processes where greater commonalities in tra-
jectories of change might be found (Schmidt 2006). The theorists of
multiple modernities rely rather too much on the cultural dimensions
of different modernities, neglecting commonalities such as the devel-
opment of science and market economies (Schmidt 2006). This poses
the question of the precise definition of modernity – how should it
be characterized and distinguished from premodernity?
Not yet modern?
Some of the social forms that have recently come to be interpreted
as variously postmodern or aspects of multiple modernities are
instead better conceptualized as not yet modern. This is made clear
when complex inequalities are brought into focus.
Many of the classical sociologists, including Marx, Weber, Durkheim
and Simmel, constructed dualisms of before and after modernization,
the pre-modern and the modern. This dualism was centred on indus-
trialization and its associated transformations in the organization of
society. The transition to modernity was located variously with the
development of the mode of production (Marx 1954); rationalization
(Weber 1948, 1968); differentiation (Durkheim 1984); and the increased
complexity of the web of social relations (Simmel 1955). Modernity
involves free wage labour (Marx), the monopolization of legitimate
violence by the state (Weber), rationalization (education, scientific
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development and secularization) (Weber), individuation (Simmel),
and democracy and human rights (Therborn).
In some important respects we are not yet modern, the project of
modernity is not yet complete. This is because in several critical
domains, for some sets of social relations other than class, the tran-
sition to modernity is not yet complete. When complex inequalities,
especially gender, are brought into focus, no country is yet fully
modern, but rather a mixture of premodern and modern elements.
Where there is not yet free wage labour, as for example where there
is domestic labour or forced labour, there is not yet modernity in the
economy. When significant numbers of women are dependent
housewives, there is not yet modernity. When the state does not
have a monopoly of legitimate violence in a given territory, as when
there is uncriminalized violence against women and ethnic and other
minorities, then the state is not yet modern. No country as yet has
free wage labour for all of women’s work, the effective criminaliza-
tion of gender-based and ethnic-based violence, and secularization,
though many are in the process of transformations leading in these
directions. The argument that modernity has been achieved or sur-
passed rests upon the false assumption that there is one dominant
axis of social inequality. Taking complex inequalities seriously chal-
lenges the classic approach to modernity. The simultaneous exis-
tence of modern and premodern social forms in the same country
challenges conventional forms of social system analysis.
Varieties of modernity
Classic social theory, from Marx to Durkheim to Simmel, was often
centred on a single transition to industrialization and modernity. The
debate on this issue has continued, both backward looking to these
processes historically in the North and forward looking to these
processes today in the South (Kerr et al. 1960; Lipset 1960), though
with many refinements in the most recent texts (Inglehart 1997;
Inglehart and Norris 2003). While the impact of modernization
occurs across the whole range of social life (Wilensky 2002), from
human development (Sen 1999) to citizenship (Marshall 1950), a key
issue has been whether economic development leads to democracy.
By contrast, a quite different sociological tradition has considered
political events as key to the divergence between different paths of
development (Esping-Andersen 1999), although it has not always
been theorized using the concept of path dependency (Moore 1966;
Skocpol 1979; Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990). In this perspec-
tive, the nature of industrial societies is critically shaped by political
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processes especially involving states, which lead to different paths
of development. Rather than one unfolding process of moderniza-
tion, there are several paths to and through modernity. Indeed, it
has been argued that there is no inevitability that economic devel-
opment will necessarily lead to democracy, but rather that the form
of political governance depends upon the balance of political, espe-
cially class-based, forces during industrialization (Moore 1966).
This type of approach is used in the ‘varieties of capitalism’
approach to differences in the organizational form of market
economies (Hall and Soskice 2001; Yamamura and Streeck 2003). It is
also implicit in analyses of the implications of different political events
in the transition to industrialization, as in the work of Moore (1966)
on the different implications of the balance of class forces during
industrialization for outcomes of either democracy or dictatorship,
and subsequent scholarship on the implications of states and revolu-
tions for the nature of class society (Skocpol 1979), and class alliances
at critical moments for the form of welfare state (Korpi 1983; Esping-
Andersen 1990). Different routes through industrialization generate
different balances of social forces that can lead to divergent outcomes –
temporality and sequencing make a difference. These may be the
alternatives of dictatorship or democracy (Moore 1966), or different
forms of welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen 1990). Rather than one
unfolding process of modernization, there is more than one path to and
through modernity. In this perspective the nature of industrial societies
is seen as critically shaped by non-economic processes, often political
ones. The theorization of this range of forms was taken forward by
analyses of path dependent rather than unilinear forms of development
(Moore 1966; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000). The question of the sig-
nificance of the distinctiveness and nature of the different varieties of
modernity can then be addressed more clearly. This question is posed
anew in the context of globalization, as to whether the differences
between paths of development are eroded by global processes.
There is more than one way of identifying varieties of modernity.
Within the varieties of capitalism school, Hall and Soskice (2001)
distinguish between liberal market economies and coordinated mar-
ket economies. Within the welfare state literature, Esping-Andersen
(1990, 1999) makes a three-fold distinction between liberal, conser-
vative corporatist, and social democratic forms of welfare state
regimes. Within the gendered literature on welfare states, Lewis
(1992) makes a distinction based on the extent to which men are the
breadwinners and women are the main carers. These typologies are
based on different institutional locations: industrial relations, welfare
state, gender relations. A more comprehensive typology needs to
integrate not only these three, but also violence.
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Here, the major varieties of modernity are neoliberalism and
social democracy. In addition some social relations are not yet mod-
ern, so there is a need to retain the distinction between modern and
premodern.
Defining modernity
In order to proceed further in the analysis of modernity, postmodernity,
premodernity, multiple modernities, and varieties of modernity it
is necessary to more precisely delimit what is meant by modern
in each of the main areas of social organization: economy, polity,
violence, and civil society.
Free wage labour
The development of free wage labour is a key aspect of modernity.
Transforming labour power into a commodity that is sold on the mar-
ket is a critical part of the development of capitalism (Marx 1954).
The commodification of labour power is a key component of the
transition from a feudal to a capitalist mode of production. The rela-
tions of production between serf and lord in feudalism were more
personal in nature, embedded in a web of obligations and power,
than those between proletarian and bourgeoisie.
The transformation of labour power into the commodity form
involved a double-edged process of both increased discipline
and increased freedom (Wagner 1994). It required increased dis-
cipline in following the routines of mass labour in the factory, for
example longer hours of work increased the relevance of time-
keeping (Thompson 1963). It increased and polarized social and
economic inequality. Yet it increased some forms of freedom by
narrowing the bonds tying the worker to the governing class to
those of the sale of their labour power, releasing them from the
personal bonds of servitude under feudalism.
The reduction in personal bonds to an employer increases work-
ers’ potential for the development of political consciousness and
action. Workers have the civil societal and political space to develop
alternative ideas and form the associations that underpin the devel-
opment of various forms of collective action. Marx saw the devel-
opment of capitalism as progressive, partly in itself and the new
forces of production that were unleashed, and partly because of its
potential for the next transformation of social relations to socialism
and communism. The link between capitalist economic develop-
ment and political action postulated by Marx is widely supported by
contemporary social science (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). There have
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been many nuances and subtle theoretical developments as to the
nature of the link and the conditions under which it takes different
forms (Gramsci 1971; Habermas 1989).
However, Marx restricted this analysis to class relations, leaving
out of focus forms of inequality such as slavery and other forms of
forced and non-marketised unfree labour together with the impli-
cations of the entry of women into free wage labour. Free wage
labour is a hallmark of modernity, not only for class relations but
also for gender relations and other complex social inequalities.
Until labour is free wage labour, we are not yet modern.
State monopoly of legitimate violence
Weber’s (1947) definition of the modern state is a body that has
a monopoly over legitimate violence in a given territory. The
modernization of the state is a process during which the state
accrues this form of power to itself, concentrating decisions over
its utilization in its increasingly centrally organized body, shifting
away from the dispersal of this form of power among feuding
barons and roving militias.
This definition of a modern state is widely adopted in contem-
porary social science (Giddens 1985). Indeed the development of
states in Europe over the last thousand years can be described in
terms of the de facto concentration of power, especially violence,
in the state (Tilly 1990). This analysis runs parallel to Elias’s (1994)
theory of the civilizing process, in which there is a decreasing use
of violence in civil society and a developing state monopoly as the
civilizing process proceeds. Foucault (1997) goes further, suggest-
ing that the use of brute force by the state is replaced by disciplin-
ing in the modern world.
However, the state does not have a monopoly over legitimate
violence or all violence in the contemporary era. When complex
inequalities, such as gender and ethnicity, are brought into focus
it becomes clear that there are considerable amounts of violence
over which the state neither has a monopoly nor seeks to have a
monopoly. The existence of a considerable amount of gender-
based violence, from domestic violence to rape (Krug et al. 2002),
and ethnic-based violence, from racial harassment to ethnic
cleansing (Mann 2005), which the state condones by failing to
effectively criminalize it, contradicts the notion that contempo-
rary states are modern. While the state does not have a monopoly
of legitimate violence by its non-criminalization of significant
amounts of gender-based and ethnic-based violence, the state is
not yet modern.
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Rationalization
Rationalization is key to Weber’s (1948, 1968) conception of moder-
nity. Through this process, traditional and charismatic forms of author-
ity give way to rational, legal, and bureaucratic forms. There is a
process of disenchantment; a turning away from religion to secularism,
an increase in education and in scientific knowledge.
Education is the field in which the process of rationalization has
occurred to the greatest extent around the world. The massive
increase in educational institutions, the proportion of the population
who are educated, and the length of time spent in education have
been marked features of the last century. Increased education is a
global phenomenon, even though there are significant differences in
the content and amount between countries. The narrowing (and in
some countries reversing) of the gender gap in education is a major
reduction in one kind of complex inequality, though class and ethnic
differences remain.
The development of scientific modes of knowledge production
might be regarded as the best expression of the process of rational-
ization in the modern world, as the most quintessentially modern
way of thinking, but there are caveats. The constant critique and
rejection of previous forms of knowledge are hallmarks of scientific
method and this involves challenges to existing scientific claims as
well. It is a form of rationalization that takes a near global form
(Schmidt 2006) and possesses enormous authority (Haraway 1997).
The contemporary public questioning of science has been inter-
preted as a form of reflexive modernization (Beck 1992); it is not a
simple rejection of rationalism, but rather the bringing to bear of a
range of forms of knowledge on the output of institutions dedicated
to scientific development (Wynne 1996).
The decline in religion associated with secularization has occurred
in many developed countries, but not all (Bruce 1996; Norris and
Inglehart 2004). While Europe has in general seen a decrease in reli-
giosity, a decline in attendance at churches and an increase in secu-
larism, this is not uniform (Gorski 2000). The USA by contrast, while
developing an advanced economy and sophisticated institutions of
education and science, has seen little fall in the religiosity of its pop-
ulation (Inglehart 1997). In some places there has been a shift in the
content of beliefs away from traditional religions towards New Age
spirituality rather than to conventional forms of secularism (Heelas
and Woodhead et al. 2004). Further, the rise of various forms of fun-
damentalism within Christianity (especially in the USA), Islam,
Hinduism and Judaism, likewise contradicts any simple rationalization
thesis (Marty and Scott 1993). The tenacity of religious belief systems
raises serious challenges to the notion that contemporary Western
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countries are all modern, if secularism is taken as a key feature of
modernity. Nevertheless, despite the exceptions, there has been a
decline in religiosity in developed countries. The difference between
the USA and the EU in their levels of and trends in religiosity consti-
tutes a significant divergence in trajectories within the West.
Individuation
Increasing individuation was seen by Simmel (1955) as the key to
modernity. Simmel’s understanding of difference and inequality was
not restricted to the great social cleavage of class. Rather, he envis-
aged modern social relations as highly complex and differentiated –
instead of one dominant set of social relations there is a multiplicity.
This gives rise to a highly individuated social order. However, this
does not mean anarchic individualism. Instead there are complex
webs of affiliation, with people connected to many others in myriad
ways. Social life is conceived as a web of group affiliations.
Simmel differentiates between primitive and advanced thinking
and forms of sociality. In the former the circumstances and affili-
ations due to family and kin are dominant, while in the second
‘each individual establishes for himself contacts with persons who
stand outside this original group-affiliation, but who are “related”
to him by virtue of an actual similarity of talents, inclinations,
activities, and so on. The association of persons because of exter-
nal coexistence is more and more superseded by association in
accordance with internal relationships’ (Simmel 1955: 128). It
becomes a matter of choice as to with whom one is affiliated. It
becomes possible for intellectual and educational interests to
bring together a new community. He suggests that while before
the Renaissance social differentiation was based on either self-
interest or emotion, afterwards intellectual and rational interests
came to be the more common basis of groups. Higher, more mod-
ern, forms of association are those based on rationality rather than
simple external characteristics. The modern person belongs to
many groups (as compared with earlier times), this being a hall-
mark of culture. These groups include family, occupation, citi-
zenship, social class, clubs, and many more. The more groups
with which a modern person is affiliated, the more individuated
this person becomes, because few if any other people are likely
to have the same patterns of affiliation. The more groups of which
a person is a member, the more attributes they possess. This gives
rise to uncertainty rather than to the security of the previous
mode. Conflicts between those groups of which an individual is a
member encourage that individual both to make adjustments and
also to become assertive.
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While Simmel sees individuation as a general characteristic of
modernity, some have seen this as restricted to Western modernity,
while other modernities place the state, community, and family
above the individual, though this is perhaps most usually seen as
the instrumentalization of culture to defend political authoritarian-
ism (Thompson 2000; Barr 2002).
Simmel (1955, 1984) notes that women are in the process of
becoming modern, just reaching the point of experiencing the cross-
roads of affiliations at which individuality begins. The analysis of
individuation is developed in the work of Giddens (1992) and Beck
(2002), including the development of reflexive biographies as a con-
sequence of changes in the economy and family, with implications for
gender relations. But individuation for women is not yet complete.
Democracy and human rights
Democracy is not included in the classical texts of social theory; as
since it was not fully developed at the time that they were writing,
it is unsurprising that it was not regarded as a marker of modernity.
But in the twenty-first century, when democratic practices are wide-
spread and the aspiration to democracy near-universal, democracy
is widely regarded as a hallmark of modernity. A significant part of
modernization studies empirically investigated the links between
economic development and social and political development, often
finding a close association (Kerr et al. 1960; Lipset 1960; Inglehart
1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2004) although
sometimes it was seen to be mediated by other factors such as the
level of inequality (Bollen and Jackson 1995; Muller 1995a, 1995b)
and the direction of the causality from economic to political has
been challenged (Ersson and Lane 1996; Leftwich 1996, 2000).
However, the definition of what counts as democracy is highly con-
tested, in particular the relationship between procedural practices and
the representational outcome for social inequalities (Held 1995;
Phillips 1995; Markoff 1996; Potter et al. 1997; Pitkin 2004). The con-
ventional approach focuses on formal procedures, especially voting,
rather than the outcome, such as the proportionate presence of social
groups in parliament. Since the presence of women in parliaments
makes a difference to the policy outcome (Thomas 1991; Norris
1996a; Wängnerud 2000), the conventional definition of democracy is
in need of revision to include their parliamentary (or congressional)
presence.
Human rights are likewise not included in the classical texts of
social theory as markers of modernity for similar reasons, though
they are noted in many texts on political philosophy from the
eighteenth century onwards (Paine 1984 [1791]; Wollstonecraft
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1992 [1790]). Human rights became a marker of modernity in the
period after the Second World War, in the European rejection of
the Holocaust and nationalist militarism that had overridden the
interests of individuals in the name of the purity of ethnic-nation-
hood (Therborn 1996). These are encoded in the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a fundamental princi-
ple of all civilized nations (UN 1948). The interpretation of
human rights is highly contested. Are they merely specific to
Western countries with their individualistic ethos, or have they
become hybridized so as to include Asian and other cultures that
are traditionally less individualistic (Woodiwiss 1998)? Is their
early formulation gendered, not universal (Nussbaum 2000)? Do
they become inclusive of gender inequality insofar as they
include sexual and reproductive rights and the right to be free from
gender-based violence (Peters and Wolper 1995)? Today, democ-
racy and human rights are markers of modernity, albeit that their
meaning remains highly contested.
Globalization
Introduction
What is globalization? Are the distinctiveness of local social arrange-
ments and the capacities of nation-states to act democratically being
eroded? Is the world being homogenized into a single US-led
modernity? Or are some political institutions resilient to these pres-
sures? How does making multiple complex inequalities visible
change the analysis?
The conceptualization of globalization demands an engagement
with the changing implications of spatiality and temporality, with
space-time compression, an increased rate of flows of people,
objects and symbols around the world, and the non-linearity of
these processes. It requires re-thinking the concept of society, its
boundedness and processes of formation, and the relationships
between social systems in the world. Definitions of globalization are
diverse and often encompass many different social processes.
Globalization has been identified and conflated variously with inter-
nationalization, universalization, Westernization, supraterritoriality
(Scholte 2000), Americanization, and neoliberalism. In particular,
‘globalization’ has often been treated as if it were effectively the
same as the expansion of capitalist markets (Crouch and Streeck
1997). The conflation of globalization and capitalism is unhelpful
Walby-3874-Ch-01:Walby-3874-Ch-01.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 35
G
lo
b
al
iz
at
io
n
an
d
In
eq
u
al
iti
es
36
because it does not allow for the significance of any social relations
other than capitalist ones and, further, precludes analysis of the
political actions that might be facilitated by the increased global
inter-linkages that might be in opposition to the growth in power of
global corporations. It is better to have a definition that is minimal-
ist in the sense that it does not include the causation nor name the
processes involved. This is helpful in that it avoids conflating the
causation of globalization with its definition and allows for the pos-
sibility of more than one wave of globalization with different causes.
Globalization is here defined as a process of increased density
and frequency of international social interactions relative to local or
national ones. This definition closely follows the definition of
Chase-Dunn and colleagues (2000: 78): ‘changes in the density of
inter-national and global interactions relative to local or national
networks’. A more fulsome, though similar, definition of globaliza-
tion is that used by Held et al. (1999: 16) ‘A process (or set of
processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organi-
zation of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of
their extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact – generating transcon-
tinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction,
and the exercise of power’. Globalization is a transformative
process in which the units within the process change as well as the
overall environment. Several dimensions can be distinguished: the
extent of networks of relations and connections; the intensity of
activities and flows through these networks; a temporal dimension
of the speed of the interchanges; and the impact of these phenomena
(Held et al. 1999).
While many focus on globalization as a predominantly economic
or politico-economic project, it is important to consider violence
and civil society as well. Rather than seeing globalization as a sin-
gle process, it is more appropriate to distinguish between different
types of global processes, including the global flows of capital,
trade and people, the development of global institutions, networks
and hegemons, and global civil societal waves.
One simple difference in approaches to globalization is between
those who think that there is such a process and those who do not
(Held and McGrew 2002). However, there are further important dis-
tinctions. Those who do not think that globalization is a useful fram-
ing of analysis include both those who think that there is already a
global system and those who think that existing social institutions are
effective in resisting such processes. There are four main approaches
to globalization. First, that global processes are eroding the differ-
ences between societies and exacerbating inequalities. Second, that
there are still separate societies that remain resilient in the face of
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global pressures. Third, that the world is already global, and has
been for a long time. Fourth, that global processes restructure social
relations and coevolve with trajectories of development. It is the last
position that this book adopts and develops.
Globalization as the erosion
of distinctive and separate societies
Globalization is frequently viewed as a process that is sweeping
away differences between societies, thereby creating similarity or
homogeneity. This is often seen as a negative process that corrodes
culture and political autonomy and increases inequality (Martin and
Schumann 1997), although there are some exceptions that see glob-
alization as a positive force associated with economic growth and
development (Ohmae 1990, 1995).
For Castells (1996, 1997, 1998) the development of globalization
is associated with the rise of the information society, which he dates
as appearing from the 1970s onwards. The origins of globalization
lie in increasing global interconnections that are often linked to new
information and communication technologies, such as computers
and the internet (Castells 1996, 1997, 1998). These new forms of
information flows change the nature of the world through their
effects on the economy and the way that politics is organized.
Globalization changes the balance of power between capital and
labour – capital is more mobile and can go ‘regime shopping’, poten-
tially moving to whichever country offers the best opportunities,
often seen as low taxation and low regulation (Traxler and Woitech
2000). As a consequence, democratic states can lose their power to
globally mobile capital, leading to a reduced capacity to set regula-
tory and welfare regimes in keeping with democratically expressed
priorities. In this way, globalization is understood as a corrosive force
that erodes and changes the nature of existing social and political
entities, such as societies and states, and especially nation-states
(Crouch and Streeck 1997). Globalization erodes, undermines, and
reduces the capacity for the autonomous action of nation-states,
especially over the provision of welfare, and hence their democracy
(Cerny 1995, 1996; Held 1995; Martin and Schumann 1997), through
the corrosive power of global financial markets (Strange 1996), and
the new balance of power between capital and labour. Globalization
exacerbates inequalities within and between countries.
Neoliberalism is a global wave of ideas, politics, and policy prac-
tices. This project, which promotes free markets and opposes state
regulation of the economy in the pursuit of economic growth, has
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come to dominate the powerful global financial institutions (Stiglitz
2002). It is a doctrine that favours private over public ownership,
promoting the privatization of public services and utilities such as
water and private ownership of the information about genetics that
underlies modern biotechnology, summarized by Harvey (2003,
2005) as ‘accumulation through dispossession’.
Globalization undermines some aspects of local and national cul-
tures. Large multinational companies promote their products and
associated cultures and undermine the distinctiveness of cultures and
the authority of traditional ways of acting. For example, McDonalds
spreads its fast food and associated unhealthy practices at the expense
of local cuisines (Ritzer 1993). Hollywood shapes our cultural values.
Globalization is here understood as a process that impacts on
economies, polities, and cultures; although they might resist or be
resilient to this process.
While providing a powerful critique of recent changes, there are
a number of limitations to this perspective. It tends to overstate the
newness of these developments, which have a long history; it also
tends to overstate the extent to which all polities are undermined;
and it tends to underestimate the significance of political and civil
societal responses to these processes.
Resistance to globalization
A contrasting approach suggests that political institutions and
cultures can be resilient to global processes and that their paths of
development have not always been significantly affected. This the-
sis has been articulated at the level of whole societies, and also at
the level of specific political institutions.
It has been argued that the particularity of societies (Eisenstadt
2002), nation-states (Mann 1997) and civilizations (Huntington 1998)
is resistant to erosion by globalization. Modernity does not take
merely one form, there are multiple modernities with quite different
forms. Neither industrialization nor globalization need lead to the
erosion of differences (Eisenstadt 2002). Huntington (1998) argues
that cultural and civilizational differences are durable, that rather than
a homogenization of the world by economic development and
increased communications, we are experiencing a ‘clash of civiliza-
tions’. There are several distinct civilizations whose basis is cultural
and religious, with associated core states: Western, Latin American,
African (possibly), Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist
(barely), and Japanese. Huntington argues that while most civiliza-
tions are seeking to modernize, they are not necessarily seeking to
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Westernize; that it is possible to have modern technology without
social patterns that are perceived as Western, and that cultures deeply
rooted in civilizations are robust enough to be able to resist
Westernization as they modernize. Controversially, he identifies a fis-
sure between the West and Islam, as a result of differences in core
civilizational values. There are empirical weaknesses in his argument
related to inconsistency in the application of his principles of the
classification of civilizations. For example, he considers that the EU
and the USA belong to the same Western civilization, but that Latin
America does not because of its political culture even though it
shares a Christian religion, compromising his classification system
that is based on religion. Further, there are many countries that are
economically and politically successful while having several ethnici-
ties and religions, further undermining his argument about the cen-
trality of civilizational divides.
A different approach to resistance to globalization is based on the
resilience of some economic and political institutions. There are
some forms of services that must be locally provided, so are not
subject to pressures to send jobs abroad (Hirst and Thompson
1996). In some countries, the configuration of institutions including
the democratic system, nature of group representation, structure of
policy making, and structure of welfare provision mean that there
is less change under pressure from global forces than in other
countries. In the countries that are already more liberal, there have
been further changes in that direction with a reduction of regula-
tion and state welfare, while in the more social democratic coun-
tries of Europe there has been less change (Swank 2002). Further,
in some countries there is an active building of new forms of part-
nerships, pacts, and coalitions in response to global pressures
(Hanké and Rhodes 2001).
Already global
The thesis that the world is newly undergoing globalization is chal-
lenged by the view that the world became global a long time ago.
This is not a challenge to the idea that we live in a global era, but
only to the notion that this is new. This has been argued in differ-
ent ways using world-systems theory and the world society thesis.
The global expansion of capital was described by Marx (1954;
Marx and Engels 1967) in the mid-nineteenth century. The drive by
capital for new terrains where commodities can be produced and
sold has been a feature of the world capitalist system since its ori-
gins. Wallerstein (1974) argues that there has been an expanding
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world capitalist system since the sixteenth century. Here capitalism
is theorized as a world-system, in which states are merely nodes
constituted by that system (Wallerstein 1974; Robinson 2001). The
analysis centres on the world-system of capitalism as a whole
(Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989). This system has had a global reach
since the sixteenth century, although the process of saturation of all
the economic and social relations in the world is still ongoing. States
are nodes within this world-system. There can be no concept of
autonomous, free-standing societies here, since all social relations
are inter-connected through the capitalist world-system, though there
are social formations with varying degrees of differentiation from each
other. This is both an ontological and empirical claim about globality.
This is a theory that privileges the role of capital in explaining social
relations and, since capital is global, the analysis of local social for-
mations must also take into account the global formation. This is a
theoretical approach that has never lost sight of the need to explain
processes of development in the poorer and less industrialized coun-
tries of the world, conceptualizing such core-periphery relations as an
integral part of the explanation of social relations anywhere.
There are several nuances within world-systems theory, especially
in the relationship between the economy and states and the extent to
which they are independently causal. World-systems theory started
from the position that there was the possibility for a mobility of states
up and down the hierarchy of an otherwise stable world-system
(Wallerstein 1974). Dependency theory considers that there is no
mobility of states within the world system but rather the reproduction
of inequalities between the metropolitan and peripheral social forma-
tions, that is, the development of underdevelopment (Frank 1975).
Robinson (2001) argues that globalization has already produced a
developed global capitalist polity beyond specific states, while Chase-
Dunn (1998) differentiates global hegemons within the world system.
Global commodity chain analysis of the material inequality in a global
system focuses on the micro level of the transactions that make up a
global capitalist chain. The analysis is of the transfer of value through
goods manufactured and distributed through the chain (Gereffi and
Korzeniewicz 1993). The concept of a chain can be applied to care-
work in the concept of ‘global care chains’ (Hochschild 2000), where
the focus is on mobile caring labour (Yeates 2005), involving the
mobility of people as well as the transfer of care.
There are variations in the extent to which different forms of cap-
ital are globalized. Finance capital is more globalized than industrial
capital, because there is an electronic global marketplace for capital
that is different from the relatively more fixed industrial capital.
However, even finance capital has a territorial component in the
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servicing of its workforce, often in global cities (Sassen 2001).
Polities are not reducible to a world system; political processes
involve pressure from locations in addition to capital; the competi-
tion between polities has consequences (Bornschier and Chase-
Dunn 1999); globalization comes in historical waves linked to the
rise of hegemons (Chase-Dunn et al. 2000).
World society theory also conceives of the world as already
global, but, unlike world-systems theory, globalization is here seen
to be led by culture. The dating of world society, around the 1930s
or immediately post-war, is earlier than Castells’ globalization, but
later than that of Wallerstein. The focus is on the similarities between
societies, even though they are separate and independent. They
note the increase in newly independent countries, and that each
bears a stunning similarity to other countries in the organizational,
governmental, educational, citizenship forms that they take. This
includes, for example, the differentiation of government ministries,
the form and notions of appropriateness of education, the conduct-
ing of a census, and the granting of citizenship to women. These are
not driven by endogenous development, but rather by a world-
culture which already exists. New independent nation-states replicate
the same form as already existing societies. The similarities are too
great to have been due to chance, and since the countries are at dif-
ferent levels of economic development this cannot be the cause
(Meyer and Hannan 1979; Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer et al. 1997;
Ramirez et al. 1997; Lechner and Boli 2005).
However, while there are some striking similarities between
countries there are also major differences (Eisenstadt 2002). Not all
countries have the same system of governance: there are non-
democratic countries; not all countries allow women access to the
vote; human rights are not universally achieved. There tends to be
a missing component in the world society thesis – the mechanism
by which the transfer of culture is accomplished. This might be a
diffusion of ideas, or some form of pressure or coercion to align
(Dobbin et al. 2007).
The most important critique of the thesis that the world is already
global is that this varies significantly between social institutions.
Some are already global, others are not.
Coevolution of global processes with
trajectories of development
Here I shall show that globalization is not a single causative process,
which might be more or less successfully resisted, nor irrelevant, nor
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an already completed process. Rather, there are several uneven
global processes. There is a mutual adaptation of complex social
systems within a changing global fitness landscape. The following
components of global processes are proposed:
1. There are uneven global flows of capital, trade, and people, an
uneven development of global institutions, networks and hege-
mons, and global civil societal waves – not a single uniform
process of globalization.
2. These flows, institutions, and waves involve the coevolution of
economies, polities, violence, and civil societies – there is no
simple one-way impact of the economic on the rest that might
be successfully or unsuccessfully resisted.
3. There is the restructuring rather than the annihilation of space.
4. There are emergent forms of global civil societal practices as well
as glocalization in which cultures are framed by the global – not
the homogenization of culture.
5. Globalization has occurred before – it is neither only new nor
only old, but it is taking new and deeper forms.
6. While some polities, especially states, are losing power to larger
forces, this is not uniform – there are contesting global hege-
mons, especially the USA and the European Union, as well as
the emergence of global institutions.
7. There are global civil societal waves – including neoliberalism,
socialism, human rights, feminism, environmentalism, and reli-
gious fundamentalisms.
8. Neoliberalism is a powerful global project that has become embed-
ded in some governmental programmes and social formations – it
is not the same as globalization, nor is it fully hegemonic.
9. There are competing projects of societalization on a global scale,
but none has overwhelmed the others – currently the most
important are the contesting projects of modernity associated
with the hegemons of the USA and the EU. Global societaliza-
tion projects cannot be understood without their gender, ethnic,
national, and religious components.
There are different kinds of global processes, involving economies,
polities, violence, and civil society. There are flows of capital, trade,
and technologies (Castells 1996), of free and unfree workers (Cohen
1997), tourists (Urry 2002), students, refugees, and others, often along
already established networks. There are global institutions, such as
the UN, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, as well as more subtle forms of interna-
tional regimes that depend upon mutual multi-lateral adjustments of
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states (Keohane 1989; Ruggie 1998; Risse 1999). There are emerging
and contesting global hegemons that dominate the rules of the global
fitness landscape, such as the USA and EU. There are waves of polit-
ical and civil societal practices (Berkovitch 1999; Moghadam 2005).
Rather than a simple one-way impact, social entities coevolve in a
changing fitness landscape. Globalization involves complex interac-
tive effects between economies, polities, violence, and civil societies.
Globalization does not simply erode or undermine, produce resis-
tance or resilience, but is a process of coevolution between a variety
of entities. Current changes in the configuration of spatial relations
are complex rather than simple and are not well captured by con-
cepts of ‘impact’, ‘erode’, or ‘resist’. Rather the notion of a ‘coevolu-
tion’ of complex adaptive systems, drawn from complexity theory
(Kauffman 1993), better captures the mutual effects of these changes.
The concept of coevolution enables us to include the specific phe-
nomena within the wider concept (Krasner 1983; Keohane 1989;
Robertson 1992; Ruggie 1996, 1998; Held et al. 1999). Coevolution
includes competition and hostility as well as more cooperative forms
of relations; there is a competition and contestation to establish the
nature of the rules of the global landscape within which all operate.
There is a restructuring of the implications of space for social activ-
ities, rather than the annihilation of distance. Globalization involves
a decline in the time and resources needed for travelling, transport-
ing, or communicating over distance. There are changes in the spa-
tial scale of social processes. There is an apparent compression of
space and thus of the time needed to overcome it, or space–time
compression (Harvey 1989). Rather than seeing globalization as anni-
hilating space (Scholte 2000) and equating globalization with a
process of de-territorialization, there is a need to consider the irre-
ducible territorial element to human social practices. Most global
processes touch down in particular territorial locations for some func-
tions. These processes need to be located somewhere, to have some
kind of territorial bases, in which certain sorts of functions can be
carried out. Some services, such as key aspects of health, need to be
close to where people actually live. Indeed many transnational cor-
porations still have a national base even if they trade globally (Hirst
and Thompson 1996). Even the most de-territorialized transnational
corporation still needs to have its headquarters somewhere, maybe in
specialized ‘world cities’, and needs to be serviced by both executives
and cleaners who have homes somewhere (Sassen 2001). It is impor-
tant not to equate the phenomenon of transnational corporations
with the wider notion of ending all borders. Space is not made irrel-
evant, but reconfigured by processes of globalization. There are
processes for the re-scaling of polities (Jessop 2002).
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A simple notion of the homogenization of world culture through
globalization is untenable, though the spread of some cultural prac-
tices is increasing. Hollywood and McDonalds may have become
more important for some peoples in some periods (Ritzer 1993), but
not in a consistent way. A variety of conceptualizations attempt to
capture the more subtle effects, including transformation (Held et al.
1999), glocalization (Robertson 1992), hybridization, and regime
influence (Krasner 1983; Keohane 1989; Ruggie 1996, 1998). In glo-
calization, the globalization process is not a process of cultural
homogenization, but rather one in which cultures may see themselves
relative to other cultures in the world, but nonetheless maintaining a
discrete, if somewhat reformed, identity (Robertson 1992). Examples
include the appeal to the doctrine of universal human rights to pro-
tect social practices authorized by religion by some Islamic minorities
in the West (Soysal 1994), and the appeal to the Westphalian, now
global, doctrine of the sovereignty of nation-states in order to resist
external interventions on behalf of oppressed groups. Hybridity cap-
tures the two-way exchange that may be taking place, in which some
entities are transformed as they merge so that something new
emerges rather than merely the subordination of one to another
(Gilroy 1993). This is important especially in discussing the extent to
which certain political practices, such as the discourse of universal
human rights, really are a global hybrid rather than a Western inven-
tion imposed on the rest of the world (Woodiwiss 1998).
Globalization has happened before: it is neither only new nor
only old. It does not fully exist, rather it is still developing. Chase-
Dunn et al. (2000) have identified three waves of globalization,
each related to the development of a particular hegemon within a
capitalist system, which established the conditions under which
trade and travel could flourish. Current globalization is best
regarded as a new phase of world integration, with new dynamics,
but not as a sudden and completely new phenomenon, and the
implications of previous, if less significant, waves of globalization
being taken into account.
Although some polities are losing power as a result of global
processes, other polities are increasing their capacities. While glob-
alizing processes have often been considered to have a tendency to
erode polities (Fukuyama 1992; Cerny 1995, 1996; Ohmae 1995),
there is a more diverse range of relationships between globalization
and political entities. These include: resistance to globalization
(Castells 1997; Huntington 1998), the creation of nation-states by
world society (Meyer and Hannan 1979; Meyer et al. 1997), the cre-
ation of globalization by hegemons as part of the securing of the
conditions for world trade (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1999;
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Chase-Dunn et al. 2000), as well as a broader global restructuring
(Brenner 1999; Held et al. 1999). Some states lose power, with their
capacity to act circumscribed by changes in the global environment,
as the greater mobility of capital than labour enables capital to go
shopping for its preferred regulatory regime, although there are
limits to this process due in part to the nature of the polity.
However, not all polities lose power because of globalization. The
European Union is a hegemon that has increased its powers, using
perceived global threats to the small economies of Europe as a
powerful legitimation of the development of its remit and regula-
tory capacity (Bornschier and Zeitlin 1999).
Globalization involves not only economies and states, but also
non-state political processes. Global waves of social and political
movements are part of the changes that constitute globalization.
Some movements may appear to be opposed to globalization, but
often they are primarily opposed to the form that globalization is
taking. These include environmentalism, anti-neoliberalism, femi-
nism, and human rights. There are also constellations of actors that
are pro-globalization, such as those constituting the current neolib-
eral wave. Social and political movements have arisen to contest
particular aspects of globalization (Castells 1997). Their focus may
involve the excesses of transnational corporations, the institutions
of global financial governance such as meetings of the IMF and G8,
as well as specific further targets (Klein 1999). They include global
civil societal waves centred on equal rights, feminism, environ-
mentalism, religious fundamentalism, and neoliberalism, which
become unevenly embedded in political institutions (Berkovitch
1999; Klein 1999; Johnson 2000; Moghadam 2005).
Neoliberalism is not the same as globalization. Neoliberalism
emerged as a civil society project, which was taken up and embed-
ded in political projects, becoming a global wave and then embed-
ded in institutions and the programmes of governmental and global
bodies (Brenner and Theodore 2002; England and Ward 2007). While
neoliberalism is often rhetorically associated with globalization, it is
but one of the projects that competes for hegemonic position.
Although neoliberalism can be treated as a contemporary wave, it is
continuous with an earlier project and practice of liberalism.
There are competing societalization projects at a global level.
Societalization is a process in which a set of principles, or an identity,
is generalized throughout a social system, so that the whole system
becomes self-reinforcing. This concept, drawn from Weber (1968), is
further developed as a sociological variant of the concept of autopoiesis
developed in complexity theory to capture the self-organizing nature
of systems. In social analysis it is necessary to make it clear that systems
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are produced and not pre-given, that this takes place in a process that
occurs over time and that this is very probably contested by other soci-
etalization projects and thus is rarely fully completed. A societalization
project may be built around a number of starting points, principles, or
identity sources. These have included especially capitalism, various reli-
gions, and nation-building projects. Any given instance of the societal-
ization process is usually interrupted by competing principles before it is
fully completed. Globalization processes do not have unmediated
effects, instead there are complex implications of changes in the over-
all environment or ‘fitness landscape’ as a consequence of changes in one
or more component systems. The extent to which globalization is a
process in which aspects of one societal model come to dominate oth-
ers is an empirical question explored in the rest of this book.
Hegemons often have global societalization projects. Hegemons
shape the global rules, or fitness landscape, so that they suit the
characteristics of the dominant hegemon – while these rules are gen-
eral to all players, the hegemon benefits most. The concept of hege-
mony is useful because it captures simultaneously notions of
asymmetry, power, and yet consent (Gramsci 1971; Anderson 1976/7).
It is helpful in grasping the setting of, and implications of, the reg-
ulations of many economic aspects of the global system, for exam-
ple, the rules of international trade as set by the World Trade
Organization. The power of the concept of the hegemon is further
advanced if it is juxtaposed with the concept of the ‘fitness land-
scape’ derived from Kauffman (1993). The US hegemon, by ensur-
ing that its rules are best represented by the WTO, has changed the
fitness landscape to its own advantage, contesting the EU in the
process. The hegemon not only has power over other countries, but
also changes the landscape in which it competes in its own favour.
Rather than treating globalization as a single causative process
there are several different global processes, including global flows
of capital, trade, and people, the development of global institutions,
networks and hegemons, and global civil societal waves. Rather
than a process that might be more or less successfully resisted,
global processes coevolve with the trajectories of development of
specific countries; there is a mutual adaptation of complex social
systems in a global fitness landscape.
Implications of globalization
for social theory
Global processes make it clear that there are no neatly bounded,
hermetically sealed ‘societies’ (if there ever were), but rather there
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are inter-connections across national boundaries that must be
assumed to be usual rather than exceptional. While globalization is
not as new as is sometimes suggested, it is taking on new forms
and increased significance.
The concept of society, and its conventional equation with the
nation-state in modernity (Giddens 1990), needs to be re-thought in
order to be able to address globalization. This book rejects the notion
of bounded ‘societies’ – based on an idealized nation-state – as inade-
quate to deal with the social linkages in a global era and with the
complexity of social divisions originating in many over-lapping polities.
It considers the ways in which social formations develop forms of
self-organization and how this may be more fruitfully conceptualized in
terms of projects of societalization, rather than as a completed process.
The boundaries of different forms of economy, polity and civil
society rarely map onto each other in the way such a conflation of
society and nation-state demands. In addition, the nature of global
political processes goes far beyond the conventional relations
between states. Globalization challenges the assumption in some
forms of social theory that social processes can usually be analysed
within a specific society and that in the modern era these can be
effectively equated to nation-states.
Global processes do not simply undermine polities, rather there is
coevolution between a variety of entities in a changing global fitness
landscape. Globalization is not only associated with a neo-liberal ver-
sion of capitalism, but is also more complex. Global conflicts cannot
be understood without an understanding of the deep social fractures
related to ethnicity, nation, religion, and gender, as well as class.
Globalization leads variously to new forms of universalism or the
maintenance or invention of new particularisms. There is neither sim-
ple homogenization nor simple maintenance of differences, but rather
the forming and re-forming of social differences and inequalities. The
theorization of complex inequalities is key to these processes.
Complexity Theory
Complexity theory comprises a collection of work that addresses fun-
damental questions on the nature of systems and their changes.
While sociology has had something of a hiatus in the development
of concepts of systems since the rejection of simple forms of Marxism
and functionalism (though with some exceptions such as Luhmann),
other disciplines, influenced by complexity theory, have engaged in
its revision so as to overcome the oft-mentioned problems of early
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formulations of the notion of system. Complexity offers a new set of
conceptual tools for social theory that are capable of resolving some
of the classic dilemmas in social science, in particular the tension
between the search for general theory and the desire for contextual
and specific understandings (Kiser and Hechter 1991; Griffin 1993;
Kiser 1996; Calhoun 1998; Haydu 1998), which lies at the heart of the
tension between realist (Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1997; Byrne 1998;
Somers 1998; Sayer 2000b) and postmodern (Lyotard 1978; Cilliers
1998; DeLanda 2000) approaches. Complexity theory addresses the
postmodern challenge to modernist metanarratives to confront issues
of diversity without giving up the quest for explanation. Rather than
the conventional sociological focus of developing the concept of sys-
tem by engaging with the work of Luhmann, the approach here is to
synthesize complexity theory with social theory more inspired by the
heritage of Marx, Weber, and Simmel, than that of Durkheim and
Parsons.
Complexity theory has developed powerful new ways of thinking
that may be used to develop social theory. As a trans-disciplinary
development (Capra 1997), it is important to carefully specify the
nature of the translation of concepts and theories from different dis-
ciplines, especially between those based on mathematical abstrac-
tions and those complicated by empirical observations. While
systems can share common features, they will differ according to
their context, for example, whether this is biological, social, or phys-
ical, and therefore this needs due consideration. Although there have
been some attempts to develop a unified theory of complexity
(Holland 1995), the significance of the relationship of a system with
its environment, ambiance, or context means that this project is
fraught with difficulties (Chu et al. 2003). Sociology has often rejected
the application of theoretical developments from the sciences on the
grounds that they miss the particularity of what is human (Luhmann
1995). Not only this, but outside of the sub-discipline of social
studies of science (Latour 1987; Law 1991; Pickering 1995; Haraway
1997), which, while well developed, is rather segregated from much
of social theory, the view as to what constitutes scientific method is
often far behind current developments, indeed, even located in a
view of science as positivist (Harding 1986). The argument here is
that recent developments in science, such as those around com-
plexity theory, have produced concepts that are more sophisticated
than most Sociology imagines. There is much to be gained from the
examination of the concepts, methods, and epistemology of com-
plexity theory in order to see what insights they can offer for
Sociology, after a due process of re-specification to ensure an appro-
priate application.
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Complexity theory offers new concepts for developments within
social theory. These include: a renewed rejection of reductionism,
drawing on the notion of emergence; a re-worked concept of sys-
tem, that avoids the problems of stasis, for example using the con-
cept of positive feedback; the system/environment distinction,
which enables greater flexibility in thinking about the relations
between systems; and concepts for addressing major changes,
including the coevolution of complex adaptive systems and path
dependency. The notion of system used in much of Sociology, fol-
lowing the Durkheimian tradition, is seriously flawed. It assumes
that the social system has a tendency to regain equilibrium and that
change is gradual. The traditional concept of system in Sociology
developed by Durkheim (1952, 1966, 1984) and Parsons (1949,
1951) presumes self-equilibration, in which the social system
returns to balance after pressure to change. Despite refinements,
most notably by Merton (1968) and Smelser (1959), to deal with
criticisms that this framework dealt insufficiently with conflict,
power, a lack of consensus and inequality, this functionalist school
is widely regarded as discredited (though see Alexander 1982, 1984,
1998). From the perspective of complexity theory, some of the
severe limitations of Durkheimian-influenced theory are a result of
utilizing an equilibrium conception of system, which Merton and
Smelser did not substantially revise.
A common response to these theoretical pressures on the old con-
cept of system was to abandon the concept of system altogether as
part of the postmodern turn, which looked to discourse, decon-
struction, and identity as ways out of this perceived theoretical
impasse (Lyotard 1978; Barrett and Phillips 1992; Braidotti 1994).
This turn was often associated with a prioritization of agency and a
rejection of the tendency to ignore human action in many forms of
structural or system-led explanations. For example, attempts to meld
the analysis of gender with Marxism were sometimes alleged to
become ‘abstract structuralism’ (Pollert 1996). Yet even though the
concept of system has often been overtly rejected in Sociology,
some nearly equivalent notion is often deployed, though under a
different name. There are many concepts in social theory that are
similar to and parallel with system and which address both the issue
of social inter-connectedness and a social level that is not reducible
to individuals. They include the concepts of ‘social relations’
(Emirbayer 1997; Somers 1998); ‘regime’ (Connell 1987; Esping-
Andersen 1990, 1999); ‘network’ (Latour 1987; Scott 2000) and ‘dis-
course’ (Foucault 1997). Some concept is often found necessary
in order to address the conceptualization of social inter-connections.
However, the negative connotations attached to the notion of
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system have been sufficiently great that many prefer to use a term
other than system, even while seeking to convey a similar meaning.
New forms of system theory have been developed within com-
plexity theory that challenge old concepts of system in a different
way. Within complexity theory the concept of system has been rad-
ically transformed so that while retaining a focus on relationships
and connections it is able to grasp sudden change as well as the
more gradual coevolution of systems. Complexity theory offers a
new vocabulary to grasp issues of change, so that simple notions of
uni-directional impact are replaced by that of mutual effect, the
coevolution of complex adaptive systems in a changing fitness land-
scape, as well as by concepts to capture sudden non-linear
processes of rupture, saltation, and path dependency. This facilitates
a more subtle understanding of the diverse processes of social
change in an era of globalization. The concept of a social system is
necessary in order to be able to theorize complex social inequalities
and global processes, but its traditional definition is subject to many
challenges, in particular that it is too monolithic, rigid, falsely implies
equilibrium, and cannot deal with the plurality of inequalities. It is
necessary to revise rather than abandon the concept of system.
Central to the re-thinking of the concept of ‘system’ is the rejection
of old assumptions about equilibrium in favour of analysing of
dynamic processes of systems far from equilibrium and re-specifying
the relationship of a system to its environment. This enables a more
adequate theorization of diverse sets of social relations and the
analysis of sudden, non-linear, social change. It thus provides a
new framework for enquiries into complex inequalities and social
change in a global era.
Complexity theory facilitates a re-revision of those old forms of
systems theory that have been rightly faulted for false assumptions
of stability, consensus, and rigid nested hierarchies of structures
(Capra 1997; Byrne 1998). These problems have been part of the
reason that many reject systems thinking along with metanarratives
and many large-scale forms of theorizing. However, an under-
standing of globalization requires concepts that grasp notions of
inter-connections on a large scale (Benhabib 1999). There is a new
conceptual vocabulary available within complexity theory that
enables fresh thinking on the conceptualization of the varied ways
in which processes are inter-connected, including that of systems.
This involves, for example, notions of the coevolution of complex
adaptive systems (Kauffman 1993); of non-linear processes
(Prigogine 1997); of emergence (Holland 1995, 2000); of punctuated
equilibria (Eldredge 1986); and the re-specification of the system/
environment distinction (Maturana and Varela 1980). These enable
Walby-3874-Ch-01:Walby-3874-Ch-01.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 50
In
tro
d
u
ctio
n
51
much more fluid, complex and subtle ways of addressing old
theoretical dilemmas.
The use of these new concepts is beginning to develop within
social science including, economics, with work on increasing rather
than diminishing returns (David 1985; Arthur 1989); political science,
on critical turning points (Pierson 2000) and international relations
(Jervis 1997); legal studies, on global law (Teubner 1997); manage-
ment science, on complex adaptive systems (Mitleton-Kelly 2001)
and coevolution (Koza and Lewin 1998); as well as sociology
(Luhmann 1995; Byrne 1998; Cilliers 1998; Medd and Haynes 1998;
Urry 2003). In this book these developments in complexity theory
will be used to develop the analysis, especially in relation to social
science concerns with path dependency and critical turning points
(Mahoney 2000), and the significance of temporality and sequencing
(Abbott 2001).
That systems are self-reproducing is definitional of a system. The
work of Maturana and Varela (1980) has inspired much work on
the conceptualization of systems as self-organizing (Capra 1997).
The process of self-reproduction of a system is self-organizing and
self-defining. The system has internal processes that internally con-
nect and reproduce the system. These features are called autopoi-
etic by Maturana and Varela. Autopoiesis is a network of processes
in which each element participates in the production or transfor-
mation of other elements in the network. In this way the network
or system reproduces itself over and over again. The system is pro-
duced by its components and in turn produces those components.
This includes the creation of a boundary that specifies the limits and
content of the system’s operations and thereby defines the system as
a unit. The system reproduces itself.
The problem of explaining order in the world is shared across
many disciplines from the social (Alexander 1982; Lockwood 1992)
to the physical and biological sciences. As Bertalanffy (1968) notes,
there is a contradiction between, on the one hand, Kelvin’s second
law of thermodynamics and the tendency to disorder, to the dissipa-
tion of energy, and, on the other hand, Darwin’s account of the evo-
lution of ever higher order species, where the living world shows a
transition not towards disorder and homogeneity but towards a
higher order, heterogeneity, and organization. The implication of this
contrast is one of the starting points of complexity theory on the
nature of systems (Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Kauffman 1993,
1995; Capra 1997). There is a tendency for self-organization to take
place where there was previously an absence of such organization.
For Kauffman (1995: 23) the extent of the development of order
rather than disorder is a sign of the existence of underlying laws of
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emergence. We as human beings are ‘at home in the universe’, the
consequence of the emergence of self-organizing systems, rather
than having developed as the chance result of atomic and molecular
interactions. It is this tendency to order that lies at the heart of the
notion of the emergence of order and the notion of systems as self-
organizing and is key to many of the more empirical-based analytic
developments associated with complexity theory from biology
(Kauffman 1993, 1995) to political science (Jervis 1997) to legal
studies (Teubner 1997).
Complexity is not a single coherent body of thought but is con-
stituted by a range of different traditions and approaches (Thrift
1999). For example, complexity theory has inspired at least two
main ways of addressing the issue of change and diversity. The first
involves the concept of the coevolution of complex adaptive sys-
tems, where the concept of coevolution replaces any simple notion
of a single directional impact. The second involves the notion of
saltation, of sudden critical turning points, in which small changes,
in the context of complex systems, give rise to bifurcations and new
paths of development that are self-sustaining. These may be under-
stood either as competing accounts of change reflecting the ten-
sions between the different branches of complexity and chaos
theory, the first associated with the Santa Fe school and the second
with the Prigogine school, or, ultimately, as reconcilable.
The interpretation of complexity theory by social scientists is var-
ied, not least because the concept of a social system is treated quite
differently in different forms of social theory. On the one hand,
Cilliers (1998) and DeLanda (2000) emphasize the unknowability of
the world, with Cilliers taking complexity theory as a defence of the
postmodern as opposed to modern perspective on the social world,
and Delanda, full of suggestive metaphors loosely derived from com-
plexity theory, emphasizing the non-linear and a lack of equilibrium
in history. On the other hand, Byrne (1998) uses complexity theory
as a defence for realism to support the modernist argument about
the deterministic nature of the world, arguing that complexity
accounts are foundationalist. Much of the criticism of the turn
towards complexity theory in social theory has focused on
Prigogine-inspired accounts, with an emphasis on the difficulty of
interpreting key concepts such as non-linearity (McLennan 2006)
and leaving out of focus the more systems-oriented development of
complexity theory in social theory.
Perhaps the most developed and widely cited example of the use
of complexity notions in social theory, especially in relation to the
concept of system, is that of Luhmann (1985, 1990, 1995, 2000).
Luhmann (1995) synthesizes functionalism and phenomenology
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with the insights of early complexity theory (Knodt 1995) and
thereby challenges the simpler versions of the critique of function-
alism. Luhmann (1990, 1995) attempts to integrate the concepts and
insights of complexity theory into Sociology, with modifications to
make them suitable for a social rather than a natural system. He
especially developed those concepts concerned with systems, such
as the system/environment distinction of Bertalanffy, and drew out
their epistemological implications. He applied his systems analysis
to specific social systems, including those of law (Luhmann 1985)
and of art (Luhmann 2000). Key to Luhmann’s approach is the sim-
plifying assumption that each system takes all others as its envi-
ronment. It is this that enables him to move beyond the rigidities of
conceptions of systems in terms of parts and wholes. Luhmann is
thus one of the first sociologists to draw on and demonstrate the
advantages of the new complexity theory for social theory.
However, problems result from Luhmann’s integration of insights
from complexity theory with both Parsonian functionalism, espe-
cially notions of system and of function, and phenomenology,
especially the focus on communications (Knodt 1995). The heritage
of Marx is relatively absent, as is seen in Luhmann’s lack of inter-
est in analysing power, inequality, and the economy. The priority
accorded by Luhmann to communication leaves these forms of
materiality and power out of focus. Further, the work is highly
abstract and, despite attempts at application to specific social sys-
tems such as law and art, remains devoid of much content about
changing forms of social inequality. Thus Luhmann’s work, while a
rare and important development of systems thinking in recent
Sociology, is limited in its direct relevance to analyses of changes
in social inequality. It is unable to adequately integrate, as matters
of central rather than marginal concern, issues of conflict, inequal-
ity, materiality, and agency. As such, Luhmann is perhaps at best an
uninspiring ambassador of complexity theory for much contempo-
rary Sociology, at worst a distraction that slowed the utilization of
the larger toolkit of complexity thinking within social theory.
More promising is the range of attempts to take a Marxist (or
Weberian) inspired Sociological heritage and either synthesize or
inflect with complexity theory (Byrne 1998; Jessop 2002; Urry
2003; Winickoff et al. 2005). In many ways the Marxian heritage is
more open to complexity notions because of its interest in theo-
rizing the sudden ruptures of political upheavals and in dynamic
systems far from equilibrium (Reed and Harvey 1992; Urry 2003).
Although these writers share an interest in social inequality and
injustice, they do not however address the issue of the intersection
of multiple social inequalities. Marx saw capitalism as a system in
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a more complex way than Durkheim, theorizing both institutions
and social relations, as well as processes of change that included
both gradual evolution and processes of sudden transformation
(Reed and Harvey 1992; Urry 2003). Unlike the Durkheimian and
Parsonian tradition, Marx’s (1954) conception of a social system
did not involve the assumption of static equilibrium. Marx’s (1963;
Marx and Engels 1967) theory of change included both long peri-
ods of gradualist development and the modernization of the forces
of production which are interrupted by revolutionary upheavals
led by a self-conscious politically motivated and self-organized
class, during which the system abruptly changes into a new form.
Marx’s conception of a social system is more consistent with com-
plexity theory than that of Durkheim because it does not presume
a self-balancing form of equilibrium, but instead allows that the
social system may be far from equilibrium, generating a sudden
change to the path of development.
Jessop (2002) incorporates some of the insights of complexity
theory developed by Luhmann into Marxist theory, as interpreted
by Gramsci and Poulantzas. He utilizes these developments in sys-
tem theory in his own distinctive version of regulation theory, suc-
cessfully replacing the ideational focus of Luhmann’s work with the
historical materialism of Marxism. Jessop’s theorization of the capi-
talist state thereby locates it within a capitalist system in a non-
reductionist way. He develops the concepts of societalization and
ecological dominance, drawing on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony.
The simple notion of the economic system being determinant in the
last instance is replaced by the notion that the economic system has
ecological dominance in the capitalist system. The concept of soci-
etalization is interpreted as bourgeois societalization, a process in
which the bourgeoisie attempts to spread their power and influence
in the social formation, against resistance.
Urry (2003, 2005) provides a different melding of complexity the-
ory with Marxism, which avoids the influence of Luhmann, by going
directly to the complexity scientists. Here there is a greater focus on
non-linearity, of sudden changes, of the unpredictability of changes
in systems that are on the edge of criticality and far from equilibrium,
though balanced with an analysis of glacial change in systems at
other times. One example is the path dependent development of the
automobility system, in the context of a wider appreciation of the sig-
nificance of mobilities in the contemporary era (Urry 2007), in which
cars cannot be understood outside of a system that includes assem-
blages containing roads and the motor industry.
Although the synthesis of social theory and complexity theory
offered by Luhmann is the one that is most often adopted, this is a
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mistake; the better approach is one that draws on a social theory
that takes as its central interest issues of power and inequality and
finds place for materiality and politics. However, it is also necessary
to go beyond the syntheses offered by Jessop and Urry, which
leave out-of-focus multiple complex inequalities. The utilization of
complexity theory here is not a simple adoption of concepts from
other disciplines, but an active process of selecting insights that can
be synthesized with social theory, rather than imported or trans-
planted in their entirety. This hybridization of complexity theory
with social theory is positioned within the tradition of social theory
inspired by Marx and Weber rather than that of Durkheim and
Parsons, the forerunners of Luhmann.
It is time for a paradigm change in sociological theory, in the
sense intended by Kuhn (1979) and Lakatos and Murgrave (1970).
The old concept of social system has been widely discredited. The
attempt to build social theory without (at least implicitly) using the
concept of the social system has failed. Complexity theory offers a
new toolkit with which a new paradigm in social theory is being
built. A new concept of social system is possible that, when linked
with a range of associated concepts more adequately constitutes an
explanatory framework. The analytic strategy is to break down
some of the overly unified and homogenized elements in traditional
concepts of the social system in order to address multiple and
nuanced forms of inequalities, but to then develop new ways to
theorize their linkages so the end product of the deconstruction is
not mere fragmentation, but rather more subtle and nuanced ways
of addressing their complex inter-linkages.
This involves a fundamental re-thinking of the concept of system,
of the ways in which entities are inter-related and of processes of
change. These complexities can be better understood if our vocab-
ulary of concepts is extended and developed, including ‘coevolu-
tion’ of ‘complex adaptive systems’ rather than simple one-way
impacts; ‘fitness landscapes’ to take account of the changing global
environment; ‘societalization’ to capture the process of moving
towards the synchronization of economy, polity, violence, and civil
society, but rarely reaching a full mapping of these in the same ter-
ritory; ‘path dependency’ to capture the multiple rather than single
trajectories of development; and ‘waves’. The concept of ‘wave’ is
particularly important for grasping some of the new ways in which
social processes developed in one space and time are disembedded
and re-embedded in a new one, capturing the non-linear spatiality
and temporality of such processes. The concept is deployed in
order to get a grip on phenomena that simultaneously display tem-
porality, spatiality, sequencing, and non-linearity while lacking a
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consolidated embedded institutional form. These are often marked
by considerable energy yet have relatively few deeply embedded
institutions. Waves are very important in the movement of civil soci-
etal ideas and practices from one country to another in a global era.
Contents
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 reconfigures social
theory in order to be able to address the central significance of mul-
tiple complex inequalities and globalization. It draws on the
insights of complexity theory to re-work and develop the concepts
of social system, path dependency, coevolution, global fitness land-
scape and wave.
The next set of chapters address in turn each of the main institu-
tional domains of economy, polity, violence, and civil society. In
each case the conceptualization of the institutional domain is devel-
oped so as to enable a full consideration of multiple complex
inequalities and globalization and to identify the main path depen-
dent developments of varieties of modernity. Violence is introduced
as a fourth institutional domain alongside the conventional trilogy of
economy, polity, and civil society. The last chapter in this group
addresses the constitution of the main regimes of inequality, address-
ing their internal cohesion, their varieties, and the implications of
their intersection.
The final set of chapters demonstrates the usefulness of these theo-
retical reformulations for practical and especially comparative analysis.
Chapter 8 searches for and identifies varieties of forms of modernity,
especially in employment, welfare, violence, and the gender regime,
both globally and among the rich countries of the OECD in the global
North. Chapter 9 assesses the ‘progress’ of these countries according to
the different framings of progress identified in this introduction, con-
sidering the implications of different ways of approaching these issues,
and assessing associations between the different forms of progress and
different varieties of modernity. Chapter 10 compares the development
of the path dependent trajectories of varieties of modernity of con-
trasting countries (the USA and three members of the EU: Sweden, the
UK, and Ireland). These are selected in order to facilitate a compari-
son between the routes into neoliberalism and social democracy; the
transition from domestic to public gender regimes; between greater
and lesser inequality; and more and fewer human rights. Chapters 8
and 9 draw on descriptive statistics from global and OECD datasets
in the search for patterns among large numbers of countries, while
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Chapter 10 draws on qualitative and historical material that
enables a consideration of the significance of the temporality and
sequencing of events.
Chapter 11 investigates the potential tipping point of the global sys-
tem away from neoliberalism towards social democracy, following the
financial crisis of 2008. This is centred in the contest between the
hegemons of the US and the EU to set the rules for the future global
order within which all countries have to operate.
The concluding chapter, 12, draws together the implications of the
substantive analysis for the theoretical arguments of the book and
shows the importance of complex inequalities and globalization for
understanding and theorising the varieties of modernity and the con-
tested project of progress.
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Meeting the challenge of theorizing multiple complex social inequali-
ties in a global era requires fundamental revisions to central concepts
in social theory. One response to this challenge to social theory to
address the specificity and situatedness of multiple differences has
been the postmodern critique. However, while this critique has merit
in drawing attention to the myriad of differences and inequalities left out
of focus in traditional modernist theory, it goes too far, to the detriment
of explanation and the significance of the global. The challenge here is
to capture the multiplicity and nuances of social inequalities while
retaining the scale and scope needed to grasp the global, to understand
difference but not at the expense of the explanation of inequality.
The concept of social system needs to be re-thought, but not
abandoned; it is deconstructed and then reconstructed. Systems of
both institutional domains and regimes of inequality need to be dis-
tinguished. Each set of unequal social relations is conceptualized as
a system, as a regime; including (but not only) class, gender, and
ethnicity. Each institutional domain is conceptualized as a system:
the economy, polity, violence, and civil society. The conventional
notion that parts make up a whole system is rejected and replaced
by the distinction between a system and its environment, in which
each system takes all others as its environment. This distinction
between sets of social relations (regimes) and institutional structure
(domains) enables the simultaneous theorization of several different
sets of social relations within each institutional domain. Each regime
of inequality is a system that possesses ontological depth, through
the inclusion in each case of the economy, polity, violence, and civil
society. These systems are not reducible to each other, although
they mutually adapt in a changing global fitness landscape.
2 Theorizing MultipleSocial Systems
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Social systems are over-lapping, not saturating any given territory
and non-nested. The institutional domains of economy, polity, vio-
lence, and civil society may each have a different spatial and tem-
poral reach; likewise, different regimes of inequality may each have
a different spatial and temporal reach. These may not map onto
each other in time and space. This replaces the conventional notion
that typical societies are bounded and that domains of economy,
polity, violence, and civil society overlap and are nested.
There are ongoing processes of societalization rather than fully
formed societies. The assumption that there are ‘societies’ in which
economy, polity, violence, and civil society are congruent in the
same territory is rejected as inconsistent with the globalizing world.
This is replaced by analyses of multiple processes of societalization,
in which the domains of economy, polity, violence, and civil society,
and regimes of inequality have a tendency to move towards align-
ment, a process often begun but rarely completed before another
societalization project intervenes. The concept of emergence is used
to characterize the relationship between different levels, including
that between agency and structure, so as to avoid reductionism.
Bodies and technology are included within social theory by con-
ceptualizing assemblages of humans and non-humans as actants. The
inappropriate marginalization of forms of inequality associated with
bodies, such as those linked to violence, reproduction, and sexuality
(which are especially relevant to gender inequality), is addressed by
re-thinking the conventional distinction between humans and non-
humans. This inclusion of non-humans as well as humans also
enables a more adequate inclusion in social theory of the significance
of new technologies that are associated with globalization.
Rather than a single path of development, as in much moderniza-
tion theory, there can be several trajectories of development. Social
systems do not have to be in equilibrium, but are rather subject to
dynamic non-linear forms of change involving positive feed-back
loops. The concept of path dependency is developed in order to the-
orize variations between systems, while not abandoning the project
of a general social theory. A series of concepts is introduced to grasp
non-linear processes of change, including critical turning points, cat-
alysts and dampeners, and waves. The concept of waves is developed
to conceptualize some of the distinctive types of social energy con-
necting social systems in a global environment, to capture the non-
linear non-institutionalized nature of movements of political and civil
societal practices that swirl around the globe. Social systems are com-
plex adaptive systems that coevolve as a result of their mutual inter-
actions, instead having a one-way impact. They have unequal power
to alter the rules of their global environment or ‘fitness landscape’.
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Multiple Inequalities and
Intersectionality
There are multiple complex inequalities in addition to class.
‘Complex inequalities’ include: gender, class, ethnicity, race, religion,
nation, linguistic community, able-bodiedness, sexual orientation,
and age. In each case there is a complex combination of inequality
and difference, the balance of which varies according to both the set
of social relations under analysis and the interpretation of them. The
concept ‘complex inequalities’ is used to capture the simultaneity of
inequality and valued difference.
Are multiple inequalities best conceptualized using a few big cat-
egories, or by careful attention to detail and nuance? A theoretical
tension exists between the appreciation of detailed differences and
the requirements of more general social theory. While the existence
of multiple types of social inequalities is well established and empir-
ically documented, their inclusion at the heart of social theory rather
than in specialist sub-fields remains a challenge. The task is to the-
orize the multiple sets of social relations associated with complex
inequalities while not losing sight of the macro global horizon. This
challenge to macro social theory has been articulated as a general
critique of metanarratives (Lyotard 1978), as a series of demands that
specific inequalities are taken into account and are not neglected
(Stanworth 1984; Calhoun 1995), and as the need to avoid general-
izing from the experiences of one group to that of others (Mohanty
1991). Various analytic strategies have developed (Crenshaw 1991;
Braidotti 1994; Felski 1997; Young 2000), but there is a tension
between essentializing and dispersing categories and between simple
powerful models with limited dimensions of complex inequalities
and rich thick descriptions of finely differentiated identities (Felski
1997; Sayer 1997, 2000a; Holmwood 2001; Ferree et al. 2002a).
Intersectionality is a term to describe the relationships between mul-
tiple forms of social inequality. One of the complications of theorizing
multiple inequalities is that at their points of intersection it is insuffi-
cient to treat them merely as if they are to be added up because they
can also mutually change each other (Crenshaw 1991; Collins 1998;
Brah and Phoenix 2004; McCall 2005; Phoenix and Pattynama 2006).
This is not a new issue in social theory (Jakobsen 1998) since it lay at
the heart of the debates on the intersection of gender and class
(Crompton and Mann 1986), especially in dual systems theory
(Hartmann 1976; Mies 1986; Walby 1986) as well as other analyses of
gender, ethnicity, and class (Westwood 1984; Phizacklea 1990), but it
has been given a new inflection under the auspices of the concept ofG
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intersectionality, especially as launched by Crenshaw (1991) in rela-
tion to the intersection of gender and ethnicity.
There are at least six approaches to the analysis of intersectionality.
The starting point is a criticism of false over-generalizations. For
example there are divisions within the category of woman by class,
by ethnicity, and by whether they are from the North or South of the
world (Mohanty 1991). Few would disagree with this point. However,
this is sometimes linked to a more general turn in social theory
towards the particular and a critique of the so-called meta-narratives
(Lyotard 1978; Mirza 1997), which is more open to contestation.
The second approach to multiple inequalities is that of reduc-
tionism to a single primary axis of social inequality. One form of
reductionism, found especially but not only in Marxist inspired
social theory, is to class or capitalism. A range of social inequalities
such as gender and ethnicity may be empirically noted, but
explained as an outcome of the dynamics of the capitalist system
(Seccombe 1974; Pollert 1996; Jessop and Sum 2006).
A third approach is that of micro-reductionism. This position
grew from a rejection of the conceptualization of social relations
using the concept of system because of the difficulty of theorizing
multiple forms of difference and inequality (Barrett and Phillips
1992). In pursuit of the analysis of intersectionality, there is an
analytic strategy of identifying and studying neglected intersec-
tions (Crenshaw 1991). This is intended to analyse groups at the
point of intersection, for example, a group that is simultaneously
female and African-American and working class and older. It is
often associated with the use of case study, ethnographic and nar-
rative methods of enquiry (e.g. Prins 2006). McCall (2005) in her
review of intersectionality refers to this as ‘intracategorical inter-
sectionality’. However, there are a number of problems with this
approach. It has tended to become a strategy of seeking out ever
finer units for analysis, in pursuit of a pure intersecting category.
But there are no pure groups, there are always more forms of dif-
ference, there will still always be some differences within the
group being researched (Jakobsen 1998; McCall 2005). There is
also a tendency to cultural reductionism and the use of rather sta-
tic identity categories, even though a critique of the restrictive use
of the concept of ‘identity’ was one of the starting points for
Crenshaw’s analysis. Further, with such a micro approach it is
hard to address larger questions, such as those involving a global
horizon (Benhabib 1999).
The fourth approach rejects the use of categories altogether
(anticategorical complexity in McCall’s analysis). The limitations of
the strategy of identifying groups at specific intersections and in
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particular identity analysis have led to challenges to the strategy of
developing categories at all, as inherently essentializing. A focus on
difference is preferred to one on identity. This draws on postmodern
and poststructuralist analysis in order to avoid the pitfalls of essen-
tialism (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Barrett and Phillips 1992;
Haraway 1997) and in particular on the Derridian concept of dif-
ference and the practice of deconstruction and a Foucaultian
derived concept of discourse (Barrett and Phillips 1992). Analytic
categories have been seen not only as never adequate representa-
tions of the lived world, but also as potentially pernicious in their
potential for a false sedimentation of these categories in practice.
The destabilization of group categories became the aim of some
forms of analysis. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari (1987), Braidotti
(1994) invokes concepts with a metaphorical focus on movement
rather than stability in order to achieve this, including the use of
the metaphor of ‘nomad’ to privilege the crossing of borders.
However, such a radical deconstruction and destabilization of cat-
egories makes substantive analysis, which requires distinctions
between categories, rather hard (Felski 1997; Sayer 1997).
A fifth approach, which is centred on the need to avoid essen-
tializing the human agent, deconstructs the notion of the agent,
replacing it with a focus on performance (Butler 1990). The perfor-
mance, rather than the agent behind the performance, becomes the
focus. This allows for greater fluidity and sense of possibility, reject-
ing notions that a person can have a real essence. While this theo-
retical move is successful in displacing the concept of agency it
does so at the expense of a move towards voluntarism and a thin
ontology of the social, although in later work Butler (2004)
acknowledges the need to avoid flattening the ontology.
Sixth is a segregationary reductionist strategy, in which each set of
social inequalities is connected to a single and separate base. Rather
than rejecting categories, the analytic strategy is to build up a better
analysis of each category. Each set of social relations is considered
to have a different and autonomous ontological base. Yuval-Davis
(2006: 200–201) puts it thus:
the ontological basis of each of these divisions is autonomous, and
each prioritises different spheres of social relations … For example,
class divisions are grounded in relation to the economic processes of
production and consumption; gender should be understood not as a
‘real’ social difference between men and women, but as a mode of
discourse that relates to groups of subjects whose social roles are
defined by their sexual/biological difference … Ethnic and racial
divisions relate to discourses of collectivities constructed around
exclusionary/inclusionary boundaries.G
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This approach segregates the bases of each of the categories: class
is grounded in the economy; gender is a discourse about sexual and
biological differences; ethnicity relates to discourses about exclusion
and inclusion. The implication appears to be a relatively simple
base-superstructure understanding of each set of social relations.
The segregationary reductionist approach is not new. This analytic
strategy was utilized within both Parsonian (Parsons et al. 1955) and
Marxist (Althusser 1971; Habermas 1987, 1991) systems theory. In
this analytic strategy gender is theorized as if it were accounted for
by the institution of the family; the family is treated as the dedicated
site of gender relations for the system as a whole. The family as an
institution is treated as saturated with gender and patterns of gender
relations everywhere are considered to be critically shaped by the
family. This approach reduces gender to the family. Such reduction-
ism means there is no analytic capacity to theorize variations in gen-
der relations that are not associated with changes in the family.
Another example of this approach is that of Esping-Andersen
(1990, 1999), who tries to include gender as well as class in his
analysis of the development of three forms of welfare state regime
(liberal, social democratic, conservative corporatist). While empiri-
cally noting the importance of gender, Esping-Andersen is unable
to theorize its significance adequately. This is not because he thinks
that gender is irrelevant to his analysis. This accusation, though
often made, does not do justice to his analysis. Esping-Andersen
does think women are relevant, indeed in his recent work (1999)
he says that he thinks they are very important, but the theoretical
tools he uses are too unsubtle, too simple, to achieve an adequate
outcome. This is because he does not have an adequate theory of
gender relations. He slides between the concepts of family and
of gender as if it made no difference which one is used. He treats
gender as if it were constituted in the family and that the sole
source of change in the family is the welfare state. The concepts
he uses to capture changes in gender relations are ‘familialism’ and
‘de-familialism’ (Esping-Andersen 1999: 45). He asserts that ‘Given
women’s (or at least mothers’) family responsibilities easily restrict
their ability to gain full economic independence solely via work,
their de-familialization, as many studies have shown, depends
uniquely on the welfare state’ (Esping-Andersen 1999: 45). As a
consequence, he is unable to achieve the analytic payoff that his
empirical recognition of the importance of full employment for
women within a social democratic regime ought to deliver for his
analysis. It does not deliver because he does not theorize the impli-
cations of different patterns of gender relations in employment. He
ought to theoretically link full employment for women to the other
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constitutive elements of the pattern of equality and inequality in the
welfare regime. But he does not do this because gender is theo-
rized as being constituted within the family, with sources of varia-
tion of this restricted to variations in the welfare state. The extent
of women’s employment is treated as purely dependent on this.
Hence, he cannot bring theoretical focus to the significance of dif-
ferent levels of women’s employment. He is thus led to the (false)
conclusion that there is little difference between a welfare regime
in which women have fairly high levels of employment (in particu-
lar that of central Europe, such as Germany) and one in which they
have fairly low levels of employment (in particular that of southern
Europe, such as Italy). Hence, he argues (wrongly) that a focus on
gender makes little significant difference to a typology of welfare
regimes. He does this because he has no theoretical purchase on
the implications of the variation in levels of women’s employment.
The reason for this is that he can theorize only one set of social
relations in each institutional domain: class in the economy and
state and gender in the family.
Regimes and Domains
So what is the solution to these theoretical dilemmas? It is neces-
sary to analytically separate the relations of inequality from the
institutional domains. This separation is essential in order to be able
to theorize multiple inequalities in the same institutional domain
and in order to be able to theorize the ontological depth of each
set of inequalities. The terms ‘regime’ and ‘domain’ are used to dis-
tinguish these two forms of system. Each set of social relations of
inequality is theorized as a system, as a regime of inequality. Each
set of institutions in an area is theorized as a system, as an institu-
tional domain.
This analysis draws on the distinction between institutional and
relational conceptions of social structure clarified by López and Scott
(2000). Much contemporary social structural analysis takes an insti-
tutional approach to social structure, drawing implicitly on or paral-
lel to a Durkheimian tradition. Some, however, use a relational
approach (Emirbayer 1997; Somers 1998), drawing implicitly on or
parallel to Simmel. The concept of relational structure usually
focuses on the struggles and cooperations of distinguishable social
groups which benefit or lose from these engagements by which they
are constituted. In a few instances both institutional and relational
structures are used simultaneously as in some work inspired by
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Marx. In the analysis in this book institutional and relational forms
are conceived as coexisting and not alternatives. The term ‘system’
is preferred to ‘structure’ so as to avoid the connotations of rigidity
and to be consistent with complexity theory.
Each set of social relations of inequality is a type of system which
is not reducible to other sets of social relations. These are regimes
of inequality. They include class, gender, ethnicity, age, and more.
These regimes of inequality have relationships with each other, in
which they mutually impact on each other, but are not reducible to
each other.
Each institutional domain is a different kind of system. The four
domains are the economy, polity, violence, and civil society. The
relationship between them is not one of simple determination, as in
a base-superstructure model. Rather these are complex systems that
mutually adapt. By institutional domains is meant an elaborated
version of the conventional distinctions between the economy,
polity, and civil society. In order to adequately address complex
inequalities, the conceptualization of each domain needs to be
broadened. Thus the economy includes not only free wage labour,
but also domestic labour. The polity includes not only states, but
also the European Union, organized religions that govern specific
areas of life (such as aspects of intimacy), and some nations (those
with developed institutions, such as Scotland) (Walby 2003, 2004a).
The Gramscian concept of ‘civil society’ is used in preference to cul-
ture, since it signals the contestations over the constitution of mean-
ing more effectively. A fourth domain of violence is added since
inter-personal violence is so important in the constitution of gender
and minority ethnic relations and organized military violence is so
important in the formation of nations and states.
It is necessary to theorize the full ontological depth of each
regime of inequality. Rather than there being merely a single base
to each regime of inequality, there is a much deeper ontology,
including all four institutional domains of economy, polity, vio-
lence, and civil society, and all levels of abstraction, including
macro, meso, and micro. The implication of this is that within each
institutional domain (economy, polity, violence, civil society), there
are multiple coexisting sets of social relations (e.g. gender, class,
and ethnicity). All institutionalized domains and all regimes of
inequality are conceptualized as systems and not parts of systems;
domains are one type of system, regimes another.
Only with this analytic separation between regimes of social
relations of inequality and institutional domains is it possible to
theorize the complex articulation of different forms of social rela-
tions, of class, gender, and ethnicity, within any given institutional
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domain. Each set of social relations is present in each of the insti-
tutional domains of economy, polity, violence, and civil society.
The distinction between relational and institutional systems allows
for the theoretical possibility of there being more than one set of
social relations within any particular social institution or domain.
This enables the theorization of social relations of gender, of class,
and of ethnicity operating and interacting simultaneously within
the institutionalized domain of the economy without conflating or
reducing one to another.
Why is this approach not generally seen as an available theoret-
ical solution? This new approach requires the theorization of mul-
tiple sets of social relations in the same institutional domain, but
pre-complexity systems theory makes this unavailable as a theoret-
ical option. It requires a concept of system that does not insist that
it necessarily saturates its territory, but pre-complexity systems the-
ory does not allow that. Instead it requires a concept of system that
allows for more than one set of social relations in the economy
(and other domains) without insisting on a nested hierarchy, in
which all non-class relations were theoretically subordinated to
class – but old systems theory does not allow that either. It requires a
concept of system that does not insist that gender has an institution-
ally different base (e.g. culture, family) from that of class (rooted in
the economic), but allows both class and gender to have ontological
depth, each constituted in all these domains – but the old systems
theory does not allow for that either. The attempt to theorize simul-
taneously multiple inequalities without an necessarily hierarchical
and nested relationship between them puts pressure on the old con-
ceptualization of system. It is stretched to breaking point.
In Sociology over the last three decades only a little work has
been done developing the concept of system. This is at least
partly as a result of the trenchant rejection of both Parsonian
structural-functionalism and of Marxism, each of which had con-
tributed systems-based thinking to Sociology. In the avalanche
of criticism of ‘meta-narratives’ (Lyotard 1978), and the turn to a
postmodernist frame of reference, there was little enthusiasm in
the mainstream of the discipline for development of the concept
of system. So the development and refining of the concept,
which had been taking place within both functionalism (Smelser
1959; Merton 1968; Alexander 1984) and Marxism (Althusser
1971; Poulantzas 1973), slowed significantly, although there are
exceptions (Luhmann 1995; Chase-Dunn 1998; Jessop 2002). In
order to address the development of the concept of system it is
necessary to draw on the development of the concept of system
within complexity theory.
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System and its Environment:
Over-Lapping, Non-Saturating,
Non-Nested Systems
In order to make the analytic separation of regimes and domains
needed to theorize the ontological depth of each regime in each
domain, and to theorize the mutual adaptation of different regimes
within each domain, it is necessary to re-think the concept of social
system. It is necessary to move away from the traditional notion of
a system as being made up of its parts, and to have a more flexible
way of theorizing the relationship between regimes and domains.
The distinction between system and environment is disarmingly
simple, but it is key to a series of revisions that enable greater flex-
ibility in the conceptualization of systems. It enables the notion that
each system takes all other systems as its environment (Bertalanffy
1968). This makes it possible to go beyond the old notion that the
parts of a system make up the whole. It allows for the identifica-
tion of ‘social systems’ not only at the level of ‘society’, but also at
lower levels of abstraction and aggregation (Luhmann 1985, 1995,
2000). Each social system (whether the economy, polity, violence,
or civil society) takes all other systems as its environment. Likewise
each set of social relations (e.g. gender, ethnicity, class) is a system,
taking all others as its environment.
This distinction between a system and its environment does not
entail a presumption of hierarchy between inter-connected phe-
nomena; rather hierarchy is a special case of differentiated systems.
This makes for a more flexible conceptualization, providing the
opportunity to avoid rigidities such as that of ‘part and whole’
(Parsons 1951) and of ‘base-superstructure’ (Marx and Engels 1967),
as well as the ambiguities of ‘relative autonomy’ (Althusser 1971),
which involve some kind of hierarchical relationship between nested
sub-parts of a system. The sub-systems in Parsons’ (1951) formula-
tion are a particularly rigid example of this. Within Marxist systems
theory there were two interpretations of the formulation. The sim-
pler and more popular version was that of a base-superstructure
model, in which the economic base determined the political and
cultural superstructure. A more complex interpretation was that of
Althusser’s relative autonomy, that removed the simple hierarchy of
these elements making it a relative hierarchy. This in turn raised the
question of the degree of autonomy entailed without unduly stretch-
ing the notion of the relative hierarchy of the elements. In this new
approach, social systems are mutually adaptive, influencing how
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each develops, though without the loss of their specific identities.
The nature of the relationship between the domains of the economy,
polity, violence, and civil society is not given a priori in theory, but
is to be ascertained in the analysis of actual situations, leaving open,
at this theoretical level, the relationship between these domains.
These are empirically investigated in later chapters of this book.
Each of the regimes of inequality has a specific temporal and
spatial reach. These social systems overlap in some times and
places, but are not necessarily congruent. For example, the reach
of a specific form of gender regime is not necessarily the same as
that of a specific form of capitalism. Each institutional domain has
a specific temporal and spatial reach. The specificity of the tempo-
ral and spatial reach of each domain and regime is linked to its
independence as a system. The differences between the temporal
and spatial reach of various regimes and domains are contingent.
The different temporal and spatial reach of a range of cultural
‘scapes’ – ethnoscapes (persons), mediascapes, technoscapes (tech-
nology), finanscapes (global capital), ideoscapes – has already been
noted (Lash and Urry 1994; Appadurai 1996). This argument is taken
further here, since it is also applied to polities, violence, and economies.
The different spatial reach is not the same as deterritorialization, in
which space loses its social significance (Brenner 1999; Scholte 2000)
since space remains important (Harvey 1989; Sassen 2001); rather it is
a different way of thinking of the changing relevance of space.
One set of social relations rarely saturates a given institutional
domain or territory. Instead, different regimes of inequality coexist
within institutions and within countries. This lack of saturation is a nec-
essary part of the conceptualization of simultaneously existing multi-
ple forms of inequality. Further, a single institution, even a polity, rarely
saturates the domain or territory in which it operates. Rather several
institutions may coexist, maybe in cooperation, or competition, or both.
They may overlap, not sharing the same spatial or temporal boundaries.
Social systems institutions should be conceived as non-saturating any
given territory; they are porous and web-like (cf. Simmel 1955) rather
than dense solids. The lack of saturation of any field by a single set of
social relations or a single social institution opens the theoretical
agenda that has been prematurely closed by traditional systems think-
ing. It allows the possibility of an analysis of multiple simultaneous
complex inequalities while retaining concepts of social system.
The relationship between these domains is non-nested, since
there is no presumption that there is a specific set of determinant
inter-connections between them. This position is allowed for by the
use of the system/environment distinction. In some circumstances the
domains may be nested but not in others. Sociological conceptions
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of systems have often over-stated the extent to which systems are
nested. For example, the notion of a ‘society’ in the modern era is
widely presumed to be a nation-state that contains nested eco-
nomic, political, and cultural systems (Giddens 1990), but this is
theoretically and empirically erroneous.
Rather than looking for and analyzing the function of a part for
the reproduction of the whole ‘society’, here there is the absence
of the assumption that systems are nested. Rather the extent of the
coherence is a question for empirical research. The institutional
domains of economy, polity, violence, and civil society may have a
different spatial and temporal reach. The different regimes of
inequality may also have a different spatial and temporal reach.
Awareness of globalization has disrupted conventional accounts of
neatly bounded, separated, and endogenously determined societies. The
simple conception of society as constituted by spatially and temporally
congruent structures of the economy, polity, and civil society is rejected
on the grounds that such congruency is rarely if ever achieved. This has
a series of implications, including the over-lapping nature of systems of
social inequality, the non-saturation of a territory by a system, including
by a polity, and the non-nested nature of systems. In turn these imply
a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between social rela-
tions and space: there is neither the complete monopoly of a space by
one set of social relations, nor the elimination of the relevance of space.
Societalization not Societies
Fully formed societies in which there is a congruence of the econ-
omy, polity, violence, and civil society in a specific territory are
very rare. Social systems of gender, class, and ethnicity do not sim-
ply map onto each other, are not congruent, in the same territory.
They will often have different temporal and spatial reach. There are
often competing principles of social organization, and a lack of
congruence of the domains. There are many processes that lead
towards the creation of a society but they rarely fully achieve this
form before they are interrupted.
Societalization is the process of moving towards a ‘society’. The
term refers to a process of change, rather than to an end state. The
concept is fleetingly introduced by Weber to capture the movement
towards a coherent and cohesive set of social and political arrange-
ments. ‘Bureaucracy is themeans of carrying “community action” over
into rationally ordered “societal action”. Therefore, as an instrument
of “societalizing” relations of power, bureaucracy has been and is a
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power instrument of the first order’ (Weber 1948: 228). ‘Concerning
“classes”, “status groups”, and “parties”, it must be said in general that
they necessarily presuppose a comprehensive societalization, and
especially a political framework within which they operate’ (Weber
1948: 195). However, Weber does little to develop the concept fur-
ther. Jessop (2002) uses the concept of societalization to capture the
development of capitalism, based on the principle of accumulation,
which he calls ‘bourgeois societalization’. He draws variously on the
development of the market, imposition of economizing logic in non-
economic areas, the ecological dominance of capitalist economy (as
opposed perhaps to legality or religion), and economic hegemony,
and in each instance faces down opposition and resistance.
Here, the concept of societalization is used to capture the ten-
dency to move towards congruence of the domains of the econ-
omy, polity, violence, and civil society, but with no expectation that
this movement is ever completed at any specific time. The complete
congruence of these domains within a given territory could be
described as a ‘society’. However, such complete congruence is
rarely if ever achieved. There is often a process of ‘societalization’,
that is, a movement, over time, towards the formation of a society,
but this is rarely completed because there are often rival bases for
the achievement of such congruence.
Most countries will contain more than one societalization pro-
ject. These may be of several different kinds, for example, a
nation that would be a nation-state, an emerging hegemon such
as the European Union, ‘Westernization’, neoliberalism, social
democracy, a particular religion. Each project provides a focal
point around which other domains can be brought into align-
ment. For example, a nation may seek to establish a state for
itself that would secure the political conditions for the alignment
of economic and civil societal systems around the values and
practices of that nation. Since there are many more nations than
there are states, it is clear that many nations never complete this
agenda of societalization.
The process of societalization involves the restructuring of these
institutional domains and regimes of complex inequalities, bringing
them towards alignment. If there were to be complete congruence
of these systems, (both institutional domains and regimes of
inequality) in a specific territory this would then be a ‘society’. A
focus on globalization makes it clearer than previously that the
social systems that are institutional domains and regimes of inequal-
ity are rarely in sufficient alignment to be appropriately called a
society, but the phenomenon of the rarity of fully formed societies
is not itself new.
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Emergence and Projects
The concepts of ‘emergence’ and ‘project’ are used to avoid the
pitfalls of reductionism while retaining explanatory power and
they are developed drawing on complexity theory. Complexity
offers a re-framing of the debate about the importance of a non-
reductive analytic strategy, a way of going beyond the unfortunate
choice of macro or micro levels of analysis.
Much traditional science, both natural and social, has had a pref-
erence for a single level of analysis, a tendency to search for con-
nections that reach back to one fundamental level (Rose 1997). The
search for general theory in traditional scientific thought in many
disciplines has often involved a process of reducing complex phe-
nomena to simpler ones. This may involve either a reduction down-
wards to ever smaller units of analysis as in the movement from
organisms to cells to genes in modern biology (Rose 1997) or in the
methodological individualism of rational choice theory (Coleman
1990; Kiser and Hechter 1991; Goldthorpe 2000), or it may involve
a reduction upwards, as in much structuralist thought in the social
sciences (Parsons 1951; Althusser 1971). By contrast, other schools
of sociology reject these ambitions for a general explanation by
means of reduction, sometimes by staying close to the meaning of
human actors (Smith 1987) and sometimes by privileging thick rich
descriptions over the search for causal explanation. This forced
choice between levels of analysis is a significant limitation on
explanations. The challenge is to find a way that allows a more
effective combination in a richer explanatory account.
This problem has often been expressed in social theory in a ten-
dency to focus on either structure or agency. Traditional social
systems theory has been criticized for its inability to theorize agency
(Thomson 1963), a longstanding issue in social theory (Marx 1954;
Durkheim 1966; Alexander 1984; Archer 1995; Sayer 2000b;
Goldthorpe 2000). In classical social theory, both the Durkheimian
and Marxist traditions found ways to theorize this relationship
between the individual and society without reducing one to the
other. In contemporary debates this has come to be seen as more of
a challenge. There is a challenge to a macro level analysis to pay
adequate attention to the significance of individual and collective
agents, as well as a challenge to the analysis of individuals to situate
them sufficiently in a structural context. There is a tendency to let either
structure (Althusser 1971) or agency (Coleman 1990) take analytic
priority. But in the recognition of agency there is a tendency to essen-
tialize the agent. Although Butler’s (1990) response to this, in which
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gender is tenuously constituted through performance and a stylized
repetition of actions, involves such an extreme form of destabilization
that she is unable to account for the extent of the actually existing sta-
bility of gender inequality. Theorists of gender relations have argued
for the importance of avoiding the notion that women were victims of
oppressive structures and for the significance of attributing them with
agency (Hakim 1991; Pollert 1996). There is a tendency to theorize dif-
ferent sets of social relations at different levels of abstraction: a review
of introductory sociology textbooks found a tendency for the theo-
rization of class to take place at a macro level (e.g. national economy),
ethnicity at a meso level (e.g. group behaviour, segregation) and gen-
der only at micro levels (e.g. socialization) (Ferree and Hall 1996).
In a different approach, Mead (1934) analyses the relationship
between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’, which provides the basic elements of
the system of the individual, which is coupled to other social sys-
tems through the accumulation of experience of this in the ‘me’. In
Mead’s account ‘I’ is never reduced to ‘me’, a distinction that
allows for, indeed requires, reflexivity. Reflexivity is constituted by
the dynamic relationship between the ‘I’ and ‘me’, in which the
moment of performance of ‘I’ draws on the accumulated memory
of the experience of the social in ‘me’. It is a mistake to assume
that the concept of system leads to the treatment of the individual
as a mere cipher. Each individual constitutes a reflexive system
constituted by the relation between the I and the me. The interac-
tions between individuals and collectivities involve the active
negotiation and struggle over meaning; social systems emerge
from these actions but they are not reducible to these. The con-
cept of emergence captures this non-reductionist relationship
between individuals and society.
A further disadvantage in the use of the concept of agency is when
it is reserved to individuals. This is a mistake. Not only are there col-
lective actors, such as trade unions and activist organizations in civil
society, but meaning is also not produced by individuals but is the
subject of collective struggle and negotiation. The ability to deter-
mine the dominant interpretation, or to create hegemony, is a matter
of power and not only ideas (Gramsci 1971). Some of these may be
non-cognitive cultural practices, such as music, in the creation of
new individual and collective practices (Eyerman and Jamieson
1998), as well as highly cognitive practices of argumentation.
There is a challenge to social theory to combine or balance
structure and agency rather than to choose just one as the priority
level of analysis (Giddens 1984; Mouzelis 1993). Giddens (1984)
attempts to overcome the potential impasse in social theory over
structure and agency by arguing that they constitute a duality as
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merely the opposite sides of the same coin. Giddens (1984: 377)
considers ‘structures’ to be ‘rule-resource sets, implicated in the
institutional articulation of social systems’, and as ‘rules and
resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social sys-
tems’. He sought to theorize human reflexivity, although there is a
tension in his work as to whether this is an intrinsic characteristic
of all human beings (as in his early work; see 1984) or whether it
is confined to modernity (his later work; see 1991, 1992). He sought
to avoid both upward reductionism to structure and downward
reductionism to individual agents. However, his critics find a ten-
dency towards a central conflation of structure and agency (Archer
1995), as indicated by his notion of the ‘duality’ rather than ‘dual-
ism’ of structure and agency, and of insufficient analytic separation
of the two to enable a grasp of the shorter time scales of agency as
compared with structure (Mouzelis 1993, 1995; Archer 1995).
The concept of emergence can be used to address the challenge
to theorize the relationship between individuals and society. The
concept of emergence links different levels in a system, especially the
levels of individual, structure, and system (Sawyer 2005). It enables
the thinking of the simultaneous ‘existence’ of each level. It does not
necessarily privilege one over the other, rather they can be recognized
as coexisting and linked. Each level has different patterns and can be
subject to different kinds of theorization. Patterns at ‘higher’ levels can
emerge in ways that are hard to predict at the ‘lower’ levels. The chal-
lenge long-addressed in Sociology is how such levels are to be
linked. This question of the nature of ‘emergence’ has been framed
in a variety of ways including those of ‘macro-micro linkage’, ‘indi-
vidual and society’, the ‘problem of order’ (Alexander 1982), and
‘structure, action, and structuration’ (Giddens 1984). There have been
many who have sought to integrate a concern with individual social
action with a concern with macro level social forms, from
Habermas (1987, 1991) and his theory of both communicative
action and steering systems and Bourdieu (1984) and his concern
with habitus, capital and field to Giddens’s (1984) structuration the-
ory. These attempts to deal with the micro-macro relation are
involved with the process of ‘emergence’, of patterning at the macro
level despite enormous complexity at the level of individual actors.
The concept of emergence addresses the relationship between dif-
ferent levels, so as to solve the potential problem of reductionism to
either the individual or higher level of the system. The emergentist
approach constitutes a fundamental rejection of the reductionism
found in many types of natural and social science. The tendency to
reduce – to seek the key explanation, at ever smaller units, whether
individuals constituted as agents in social theory or genes in biological
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science – is rejected. Also rejected is any tendency to reduce in an
upward direction, to a holism that ignores individuals or an ecology
that ignores organisms. Rather than treating a system as reducible to its
parts, a higher level emerges from the activities of lower levels of sys-
tems (Holland 1995), though whether this is better thought of as top
down is the subject of debate (Conte and Gilbert 1995; Gilbert 1995;
Epstein 1999; Holland 2000). The problematic tendency towards either
upward conflation to a high systemic level or conflation or reduction
can be addressed using this formulation.
The concept of emergence offers a way of surpassing this polar-
ization by the development of ontological depth that is not at the
expense of explanatory power. Emergence refers to the way in which
social systems emerge from the multiple actions of individuals, but
are not reducible to them. It connects the different levels of abstrac-
tion in the analysis without reductionism. The concept of emergence
allows for the non-reductive linkage between levels, facilitating the
linking of a focus on human reflexivity to social systems. This facili-
tates the development of some of the concerns of classical social
theory, such as combining an understanding of both individual and
social structure in a way that does not deny the significance of the
self-reflexivity of the human subject while also theorizing changes in
the social totality.
In this respect, complexity theory has many parallels with the
development of realism in sociological thought (Bhaskar 1979, 1997;
Archer 1995; Sayer 2000b; Bunge 2001; Elder-Vaas 2007). Much com-
plexity theory has as a core assumption the importance of ontologi-
cal depth, of levels that are linked within a system, and that the
relationships in one level are not reducible in any simple manner to
those in another. This recognizes that each level contains the objects
that are present in the other levels, but that they can be analysed dif-
ferently. It is not so much that the whole is greater than the parts as
that it is different from the parts. Examples from biology include that
many cells together constitute a living organism; that many individual
beasts together constitute a species; that several different species in
the same habitat constitute an ecological system (Capra 1997; Rose
1997). Within social science examples include: that individuals living
together constitute a household; that individuals working together
constitute an organization; that many citizens constitute a nation. The
concerns of social science theory thus significantly overlap with those
of complexity theory, even as the latter has developed a specialized
vocabulary of concepts. The interweaving of the concerns of classic
Sociological theory with that of complexity theory has the potential to
move both bodies of theory forward. A major strength of most classi-
cal Sociology is its ontological depth in that it engages analytically
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with both individuals and social institutions and often several further
ontological levels within a single explanatory framework. Complexity
theory facilitates the invoking and developing of these strengths of
classical sociology.
The concept of project is an additional concept developed here to
capture the collective rather than the individualistic processes in the
creation of meaning. Projects are processes within civil society that
create new meanings and social goals and are rooted in collective
action, meanwhile drawing on a wide range of rhetorical and material
resources. Projects involve an orientation to change and this may be
achieved in many ways. The concept of project is different from that
of social movement, in that it can be more stably based in civil soci-
ety. A project is not the expression of stable essentialized identities,
rather it involves the social reconstitution of subjects through joint
activities and discussions. Projects can be transformative processes.
Bodies, Technologies and
the Social
While bodies and technologies are important for the analysis of com-
plex inequalities and globalization, they are unevenly incorporated
into social theory. In some kinds of social theory, concepts of agency
and social structure have developed which scrupulously exclude
the body and the machine from the concepts associated with the
causation of social processes (Giddens 1984). This ‘humanism’ has
a long tradition, for example, in the work of Durkheim, in which
social facts were considered to cause other social facts (Durkheim
1966). The development of Sociology as an academic discipline
involved the specification of a field of study of its own. This often
involved the rejection of adjacent areas and modes of analysis. In
particular it involved the rejection of biology (Benton 1993; Turner
1999), and of psychology (Durkheim 1966). Durkheim’s concepts of
social fact and social structure excluded the biological and techno-
logical. He was so focused on demonstrating that there was a spe-
cific terrain of the social on which a system of thought, an intellectual
discipline, could be built that issues of bodies and technology were,
like the psychological, pushed outside his system of thought. For
example, in Suicide he argued for the importance of the social in
explaining something as apparently as individual as suicide rather
than through individual psychologies.
Many forms of social practice involve bodies and technologies.
Inter-personal violence has been an important form of dominance in
Walby-3874-Ch-02:Walby-3874-Ch-02.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 75
G
lo
b
al
iz
at
io
n
an
d
In
eq
u
al
iti
es
76
both gender (Mooney 2000) and ethnic relations (Shapiro 1988),
involving the deployment of bodies in patterns of coercion. Gender
relations involve sexuality, reproduction, and fertility (Stanworth
1987), invoking not only bodies but also the technologies that alter
them. The analysis of disability requires an understanding of bodies
and the extent to which technology affects the capacity to act (Barnes
et al. 1999), as do processes of ageing. The development of new eco-
nomic forms often involves new technologies and machines, not
least in the development of new information and communication
technologies associated with globalization (Castells 1996).
Once bodies and technological phenomena are extruded from
core sociological conceptions of agency and structure, it is hard to
re-integrate them. It has proved difficult to achieve a more adequate
integration of the bodily into the social that does not simply assim-
ilate one to the other, so that it is neither under- nor over-socialized.
Nevertheless, there are several routes by which this integration of
bodies, objects, and technology with the social may proceed.
Not all classic sociologists exclude technology and nature from
their core concepts. Marx (1954) achieved some inclusion via his
concept of the forces of production that, together with the relations
of production, constituted the mode of production. In this way the
methods by which nature was appropriated were located within the
core explanatory mechanism of his theory. However, with some
exceptions (Macnaghten and Urry 1998), this theoretical insight and
practice are rarely recognized in contemporary attempts to put
nature back into sociology (Benton 1993). A limitation of Marx here
is the systematic inclusion of technology only within the economic
domain, and not the polity or civil society. Further, his approach
to reproduction and gender lacks subtlety, falling back on static
naturalistic conceptions of gender relations. While Engels (1940)
provided a more dynamic account of the changing relations of pro-
duction and reproduction and the consequent changes in the bal-
ance of power between the sexes, this tends to essentialize gender
relations through his utilization of an unduly simple base-super-
structure model of causation.
Many radical feminists positioned bodies and technology cen-
trally within their analyses of gender inequality. This included the
analysis of reproduction by Firestone (1974), sexuality by
MacKinnon (1989), and violence by Daly (1978). For example,
Firestone discussed the extent to which new forms of technology
might be created and used as a way of overcoming the disadvan-
tages women faced as a result of biological difference in relation
to reproduction and associated childcare. However, these accounts
were fiercely criticized for reductionism, biologism, essentialism,
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and technological determinism (Segal 1987; Spellman 1988). In
practice, these radical feminist accounts included descriptions of
alternative inter-connections of social and biological practices, in
particular, the social possibilities that would result if women were
to act collectively and politically change the conditions of their
existence, so these texts did not constitute simple forms of bio-
logical reductionism. Nevertheless, the use of an implicit (Daly
1978) or explicit (Firestone 1974) base-superstructure model of
causation did limit the extent to which they were able to theorize
the variations in the forms of gender relations. Feminist writers
continue to grapple in various ways with the relationship of the
body, biology, and gender (Fausto-Sterling 1985; Keller 1985;
Martin 1987; Jacobus et al. 1990; Strathern 1992; Moore 1994;
Witz 2000).
Foucault’s (1979, 1997) writings on the disciplining of sexuality
and the body attempted the re-insertion of bodies into sociology
through the concept of discourse. Foucault’s work inspired many
attempts to develop this line of analysis on the significance and
regulation of the body, some in a social context (Turner 1987,
1992, 1996; Shilling 1993; Rose 1996), others in a more cultural
direction, attempting to read the body as if it were a text (Bordo
1993) and technology as if it were a form of literature or a code
(Haraway 1997). A drawback here is the tendency to underesti-
mate the importance of physicality and emotionality (Turner
1987; Williams 1998).
A focus on the social shaping of technology in the economy has
provided a series of rich accounts about the relationship between
the social and technology (Wajcman 1991; Cockburn and Omrod
1993; Wajcman and MacKenzie 1999). In this approach, technology
is seen as shaped by social relations, rather than technology deter-
mining social relations. The development of technology is signifi-
cantly affected by the social context in which this occurs. In this
perspective, technology and the social are two mutually exclusive
concepts, even though each has an impact on the other. The
strength of this work has been the recognition of the impact of the
social on the technological.
A further approach to the dilemma as to how to include objects
within social theory, developed by Latour (1987, 1988, 1991),
together with Law (1991), Callon (1991), and Callon et al. (1986),
is to re-think the insistence that only humans can act. Rather than
treating objects as necessarily outside the dynamics of social cau-
sation, this approach includes both humans and objects in the
networks and assemblages that are actants, rejecting the exclu-
sion of the physical. Instead of an exclusive focus on humans as
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actors, actants are constituted of networks of people and objects.
A person rarely acts alone, but a person and object together con-
stitute an actant. For example, a man with a gun is a different
actant from a man without a gun. Purity, or the separation of
humans and objects, does not exist; we have never been modern,
that is, pure (Latour 1993). This does not mean symmetry
between humans and objects; there can often be asymmetry in
these networks since machines usually have a smaller, narrower
range than a human (Suchman 2001).
The strength of Latour’s approach is to enable the inclusion of
objects and technologies in social theory. Its weakness is the restric-
tion of the analysis to actants and networks and the absence of
larger concepts that might position actants within structures and
systems. For example, the ‘man with gun’ only makes sense in rela-
tion to a system of violence as in ‘crime’ or in ‘war’. Network can
be a rather thin concept to capture the ontological depth involved
in the interaction of the various systems in which these actants are
embedded.
Haraway’s work also challenges the conventional boundary
between human and non-human, demonstrating the way in which
human bodies have already become cyborgs in the sense that they
function only with technology (Haraway 1990). Her focus is on the
traffic in metaphor between human and non-human contexts,
treating science to the same kind of analysis as a literary text, for
example analysing the two-way movements in metaphor between
the analysis of human society and primate society (Haraway 1989,
1997). A further example of a system that involves assemblages of
both humans and technologies is that of the car system. A car system
cannot be understood outside of drivers, roads, and the motor
industry (Urry 2004, 2007).
While knowledge has often been considered to be quintessen-
tially human, in modern economies knowledge may in fact be
encoded and embedded in organizations and technical systems as
well as in human beings. Knowledge may be not only embodied
(as in practical skills) and embrained (as when learnt in formal set-
tings), but it may also be encoded (within organizational practices)
and embedded (in routines and systems) (Lam 2002). For example,
in the call centre industry knowledge is held not only by individual
workers, but is also encoded and embedded in the software and
technical systems used in order to address the information needs of
callers (Durbin 2004, 2007). It may be relevant to speak of the call
centre as the actant, or of the call centre worker plus their computer
system, since the person answering the phone does not act without
a system of machinery. The processes by which knowledge is
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developed, especially in the move from tacit to explicit forms, are
key to the development of contemporary knowledge economies
(Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Nonaka and Nishiguchi 2001;
Nishikawa and Tanaka 2007).
The restricted humanistic conception of agency is rejected here
and replaced by a concept of an actant as an assemblage that may
include objects, technologies, and bodies. However, actor-network
theory is insufficient to grasp the ontological depth of the various
systems involved. Technologies are part of the forces of produc-
tion that are included within the concept of the economy and
other domains; they are important for the analysis of globaliza-
tion. Bodies are included as constitutive parts of actants, and as
key to childbearing, as part of the forces of production. Violence
is also a form that is not simply reducible to humanist concerns.
Both mechanical weapons and bodies as weapons are significant
in the understanding of power. These are relevant not only in rela-
tion to states, which in modernity seek to monopolize legitimate
coercion in their territory, but also in relation to inter-personal vio-
lence and forms of group violence that the state does not effectively
criminalize. This is important for the analysis of complex inequali-
ties, especially those of gender and ethnicity.
Path Dependency
There is a tension in social theory between a search for explanations
with the greatest power and range, and a concern with accuracy and
detail about particularities (Haraway 1988; Kiser and Hechter 1991;
Sayer 1997, 2000b; Calhoun 1998; Goldthorpe 2000; Walby 2001a,
2001b). This tension is prominent in the debates as to whether there
is a single driving logic behind the development of modernity or
whether there are divergent varieties of modernity. Do critical turn-
ing points into distinct pathways of development contradict the
notion of a universal explanatory framework, or can such differ-
ences be accommodated, even explained, within it? How significant
and resilient are path dependent developments: does globalization
mean that the differences between varieties of modernity are being
eroded, resulting in convergence? The concept of path dependency
is a bridge between a social theory that searches for general expla-
nations and one that seeks to account for particularity.
There are several questions about the nature, theorization, and
application of the concept of path dependency (Somers 1998;
Mahoney 2000). These include: the nature of path dependency and
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the extent to which divergent paths are sustained over significant
periods of time; the nature of critical turning points and tipping
points; the implications of the notion that small causes can have
large effects; the development of the concept of feedback loops to
include positive as well as negative feedback loops, and the con-
cepts of catalysts and dampeners; the nature of the processes that
lock-in a new path; the nature and implications of temporality and
sequencing in path dependency. A discussion of these issues is
followed by three examples of the use and debate on path depen-
dency in social theory. It concludes with the key questions for path
dependency analysis in this book.
There are many potential examples of path dependency, and many
more that are disputed. In this book the main substantive issue
addressed with the concept of path dependency is that of the devel-
opment of varieties of modernity, especially neoliberalism and social
democracy, and their maintenance in the face of global pressures.
Analysis of path dependency has been significantly developed not
only within social science (Nee and Cao 1999; Mahoney 2000; Pierson
2000), but also within transdisciplinary debates on complexity theory
(Waldrop 1992; Capra 1997). Within the natural sciences the example
that is often cited (or imagined) is that of a small disturbance to the
atmosphere in one location, perhaps as small as the flapping of a but-
terfly’s wings, tipping the balance of other systems and leading ulti-
mately to a storm on the other side of the globe (Capra 1997). A key
example in the economic literature on complexity is that of the devel-
opment of the QWERTY keyboard rather than the more efficient
DVORAK alternative as a consequence of a small but key event in the
development of typewriters (David 1985; Arthur 1989). Further exam-
ples include the use of VHS rather than Beta for videotapes, and the
steel and petroleum car rather than electric cars and other modes of
transportation (Waldrop 1992; Urry 2004).
However, there is a debate over the existence, nature, and signifi-
cance of such turning points and alternative paths of development.
On the one hand they may be deviations which are minor, or rare,
or temporary, and in which there is an eventual returning to the main
path (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995). Or they may be very significant,
leading to permanently different trajectories (David 1985; Arthur
1989; Waldrop 1992). For example, whether the changes in post-1989
central and eastern Europe ‘transitions’ might be understood as these
countries returning to the main form of capitalist development or
whether they may be considered as undergoing ‘transformations’ to
a new pathway. There is a question as to whether the concept of
path dependency is too rigid, with insufficient regard for later changes
as a consequence of new circumstances (Crouch 2001). There are
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implications for the possibility of general theory, in particular whether
too many contingent turning points or too complex a set of sequenc-
ing destroys this possibility (Kiser and Hechter 1991).
Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) argue that the case for path
dependency within economics has been much over-stated. They
distinguish between three forms of the argument, which have dif-
ferent implications. First, the path followed may not be sub-optimal
and thus not in contradiction of neoclassical assumptions. Second,
that it was unknowable whether or not the path was sub-optimal
or not at the time that the path was chosen, and thus not in con-
tradiction of neoclassical assumptions. Third, that while the path
was sub-optimal, there was no movement to a more optimal path.
They suggest that only the third constitutes a serious challenge to
neoclassical economics; yet there is often elision between the three
models, with a case based on one of the first two being represented
falsely as if it were an example of the third. This, they argue, is illus-
trated by frequent recourse to a very limited number of examples,
examples which they think are anyway questionable in that there
were reasons by which the preferences could be accounted for
within mainstream economic theory. While there may be excep-
tional circumstances as to why the most effective technology is not
implemented at the outset, the institutions of the market will even-
tually lead to investment in the most effective technology, and an
adjustment will occur. This leaves the issue as one that is open to
empirical investigation. Do the mechanisms of economic markets
eventually, and in the long run, prove dominant over initial
choices, and indeed over political institutions?
This question of the extent to which distinct paths of development
are sustainable in the long run and not just the short run is a key
issue in many debates about the nature of globalization (Held et al.
1999). Complexity theory re-frames these debates about globaliza-
tion in terms of the sustainability of path dependent forms over the
long run. A central question is whether economic pressures that are
increasingly constituted at a global level will transform local politi-
cal formations, or whether locally specific paths of development are
and can be self-sustaining (Castells 1996, 1997, 1998; Crouch and
Streeck 1997; Pierson 2001). On the one hand it is argued that global
economic forms will dominate, that is, universalist processes will
overcome path dependent forms of nation-state economic and polit-
ical regulations (Ohmae 1990, 1995; Crouch and Streeck 1997;
Martin and Schumann 1997). On the other hand, the continued exis-
tence of varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001) and distinct
welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990) depends upon the
resilience of path dependent processes. Pierson (2001) argues that
Walby-3874-Ch-02:Walby-3874-Ch-02.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 81
G
lo
b
al
iz
at
io
n
an
d
In
eq
u
al
iti
es
82
mature welfare states have self-reinforcing processes over extended
periods of time, not least as a result of shifting the framework within
which actors construct and understand their own interests. Swank
(2002) demonstrates that some types of polity are better able to sus-
tain welfare expenditures than others; in particular those of a more
social democratic form sustain state provision to a greater extent
than polities of a more liberal form. The implication here is that
some forms of lock-in of paths of development are more robust than
others and that path dependent forms of development can them-
selves be revised. The extent of path dependency is thus at least
partly a question for empirical investigation, so Chapter 8 is an
empirical identification of the varieties of modernity.
A critical turning point is a key moment when there is a sudden
change in a system, taking it onto a new path of development. This
occurs when the system has become unstable and far from equilib-
rium. A specific sub-type of a critical turning point is a ‘tipping point’,
in which a slow build up leaves the system vulnerable to sudden
change if the next small event were to occur (Gladwell 2000). This
may be because the threshold for a ‘critical mass’ has been reached
(Ball 2004). In each instance small events lead to the formation of
distinct new paths of development.
There is a debate as to whether the critical turning point should be
conceptualized as ‘contingent’ since it is not usually explicable within
the larger theoretical framework. While the contingency of the event
that starts a particular path of development is assumed or asserted by
many writers on path dependency (Arthur 1989; Mahoney 2000;
Pierson 2000), this is both an unnecessary and a problematic feature
of the current dominant conceptualization of this process. Mahoney
(2000: 507), for example, goes as far as to make this contingency a
key part of this definition of path dependence, as ‘those historical
sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional
patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties’. He under-
stands contingency to mean ‘the inability of theory to predict or
explain, either deterministically or probabilistically, the occurrence
of a specific outcome’ (Mahoney 2000: 513). The limitation of this
approach is its deliberate incompleteness. This approach rejects what
might be considered to be one of the strengths of those interpreta-
tions of complexity thinking that locates such critical events as emer-
gent bifurcations of an unstable system far from equilibrium. Mahoney
(2000) leaves the wider system dynamics out of analytic focus and
hence severely under-utilizes the explanatory potential of the con-
cept of path dependency within complexity theory. The sociological
theory on revolutions and political crises (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979;
Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990) does not have such self-limiting
Walby-3874-Ch-02:Walby-3874-Ch-02.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 82
T
h
eo
rizin
g
M
u
ltip
le
So
cial
System
s
83
ordinances. Rather, in the work of these writers, ‘critical junctures’
‘emerge’ from their analysis of social ‘systems’. It is by deploying a
strong sense of ‘system’ that these writers are able to explain why
certain events become ‘critical’.
These events may be apparently small occurrences, but it is by
locating them within an explanatory account of social and political
pressures within a social system that these writers are able to explain
their ‘criticality’. In short, the level of ‘system’ is an essential compo-
nent of a full and satisfactory explanation of ‘path dependency’.
Without a concept of system the critical junctures become merely
‘contingent’, resulting in the ensuing explanation remaining merely
partial. This sociological literature of revolutions and political turning
points encompasses a theorization not only of ‘normal’ development,
but also of the build-up of various pressures into the critical political
juncture, and of the explanation as to which pathway from a series of
possibilities is taken. This typically involves explanations at different
levels of abstraction, including not only individuals but also institu-
tions, structures, process, and the level of the system as a whole.
This concern with the different levels and their interconnections is
re-framed by the concept of emergence.
A further conceptual addition is proposed to the concept of a crit-
ical turning point: ‘catalysts and dampeners’. Two social systems
each on trajectories of transformation may change at different rates.
There may be factors that speed or ‘catalyse’ the rate of change
while others slow or ‘dampen’ the rate. They may not independently
change the nature of the system, other than its rate of change. Certain
forms of polity speed or catalyse economic development, while oth-
ers slow or dampen economic development. The concepts of catalysts
and dampeners draw on the conception of positive feedback within
a system as part of this. This distinction between those institutions that
catalyse and those than dampen development goes beyond the rather
static conception of lock-in and path dependency that has developed.
An example of a catalyst is a wave of new practices from another
place, although this may not always function to catalyse change. An
example of a dampener might be the religious regulation of women’s
domestic role, though again this may not always function in this way.
The different rates of change may have implications for the relation-
ship of systems to other systems, perhaps altering the balance of
power in determining the fitness landscape. This may change the way
that systems coevolve. For example, a higher rate of economic growth
in one country as compared to another may alter the resources they
have available to bargain as to the nature of global regulations.
Crucial to the notion of a ‘critical turning point’ is that the event
that precipitates one path of development rather than another is
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small in relation to the events that unfold as a consequence. Small
changes at critical moments can have large effects on unstable sys-
tems far from equilibrium. These changes may be sudden, akin to
processes of saltation, as a moment of crystallization of a new struc-
ture and form. The smallness of the event that precipitates these
large-scale changes is disproportionate, and hence inconsistent
with some conventional accounts of causality which assume pro-
portionality between cause and effect. It is outside simple forms
of mathematical modelling based on linearity, being instead non-
linear (Kauffman 1993, 1995; Gladwell 2000). Critical turning points
between paths of development thus challenge certain assumptions
about the linearity of causal connections (Capra 1997; Mahoney
2000; Pierson 2000). The lack of a directly proportionate linear rela-
tionship between cause and effect is troublesome for conventional
science and its associated mathematics (Abbot 2001; Byrne 2002).
Complexity theory emphasizes the importance of non-linear
changes, that small events can lead to large-scale changes in sys-
tems thereby precipitating new paths of development.
The notion of the lack of proportionality between the scale of an
event and its consequences is a challenge to old conceptions of
causation. Newtonian notions of general laws, which can be dis-
covered by science, enable the identification of the cause of a spe-
cific event. This Newtonian conception of cause in which one
phenomenon impacts on another in a one-way direction involves the
notion of directly proportionate impact. Complexity theory has chal-
lenged the easy assumption that direct proportionality – linearity – is
normal (Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Prigogine 1997). In statistical
and graphical terms, a critical turning point means that that there is
no simple linear relationship between phenomena, but rather one
that is non-linear (Nicolis and Prigogine 1989; Byrne 2002).
Conventional statistical analysis in particular is problematized by
this challenge to the prevalence of linear relationships. In practice,
many social analyses using modern statistics have utilized rather
simple equations, assuming a direct proportionality, a linear rela-
tionship, between the changes in the size of the phenomena under
investigation (Abbot 2001; Byrne 2002). This lack of direct propor-
tionality is seen by Prigogine as a fundamental epistemological
challenge to conventional conceptions of science (Prigogine and
Stengers 1984; Nicolis and Prigogine 1989). However, while com-
plexity theory challenges Newtonian conceptions of causation, this
does not necessarily mean that analyses of causal pathways cannot
ultimately be developed in many instances (Byrne 1998), but
rather that they are much more difficult than previously thought.
Since relations between phenomena are not simple their statistical
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modelling demands equations of enormous, non-linear, complexity.
This is especially the case in relation to attempts to model positive
rather than negative feedback loops in systems far from equilibrium
(Arthur 1989). In some cases the complexity of the equations means
that they cannot be solved using the traditional analytic method,
and only the power of modern computers can lead to their solu-
tion. In others, the equations are too complicated to be soluble by
existing resources. This means that while the phenomena may still
be considered to be determined, equations modelling them are
unspecifiable using contemporary techniques.
Old types of systems theory involved a presumption of a tendency
to return to a single equilibrium point achieved through negative
feedback loops. Later conceptions of systems based on complexity
thinking include, indeed focus on, positive as well as negative feed-
back, and an interest in systems that are far from equilibrium and
hence much more subject to rapid and radical change. Much socio-
logical conceptualization of systems has been based on the early ver-
sion of system theory that used the notion of negative feedback,
which acted to stabilize a system and return it to equilibrium. For
example, Giddens (1994) has a limited conception of feedback, which
is primarily homeostatic, that is restoring a system to a state of equi-
librium, while Parsons (1951) utilizes only negative, self-balancing,
feedback loops, giving rise to excessive stability in the account of the
system and difficulty in conceptualizing change. However, there have
always been alternative views, including some interpretations of
Marx.
The concept of feedback is central to the idea of a system
(Bertalanffy 1968). A feedback loop is: ‘a circular arrangement of
causally connected elements, so that each element has an effect on
the next, until the last “feeds back” the effect into the first element
of the cycle’ (Capra 1997: 56). A negative feedback loop entails a
mechanism in which a change in one aspect of the system leads to
a change in that mechanism which in turn leads to a change that
restores the system to its original condition. A thermostat is an
example of such a mechanism, responding to small changes in tem-
perature so as to maintain the system at a near constant tempera-
ture. The concept of a negative feedback loop is associated with the
notion of a system as tending towards equilibrium. Any change or
perturbance to the system is met with a response internal to the sys-
tem that restores it to the original state, that is, maintains equilib-
rium. A positive feedback loop, by contrast, is a mechanism that
drives small changes in a system onwards, escalating change. Thus,
rather than restoring a system to equilibrium positive feedback loops
drive a system further away from equilibrium. The account of these
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positive feedback loops in economic systems (David 1985; Arthur
1989) profoundly challenged conventional economic analysis
(Waldrop 1992), which had been predicated upon the assumptions
of tendency to equilibrium and a declining return to investments.
Arthur (1989, 1994) demonstrated the significance of disequilib-
rium in explaining the dynamism of certain economies. He devel-
ops the understanding of the importance of positive, not just
negative, feedback loops, in which increasing rather than decreas-
ing returns to scale drive the system forward rather than returning
it to equilibrium. Rather than the traditional notion that returns to
an investment tail off, Arthur (1989) found that there could be
increasing returns under specific circumstances. This is a radical
challenge to the neoclassical paradigm since it posits the notion
that there can be multiple rather than a singular equilibrium point;
that it is possible for systems to be in equilibrium in more than one
position. This concept of increasing returns to scale implies a pos-
itive rather than a negative feedback loop within the system. He
argues further that the events that precipitate a shift in the system
may occur as if by chance, and that the earlier they occur in a series
of events the more important they may be. These developments in
systems theory challenge not only conventional economic analysis,
but also those sociological conceptions of system that assume a ten-
dency to return to equilibrium. The notion of positive feedback
underpins radically different conceptions of change as compared
with that of negative feedback.
It is necessary to explain why, once a new path of development
has begun, it is continued rather than returning to the previous form
of development. Institutions lock-in the different paths of development
through a series of feedback processes. Within economic theory this is
a significant departure from conventional theory, with the develop-
ment of the analysis of the significance of institutions in economic
life and not just individual rational actors. Institutions are important
because of the significance of transaction costs and imperfect infor-
mation and because institutions prioritize the interests of those with
the power to set the rules on which they run (North 1990).
The process of this ‘lock-in’ to the new path of development is
addressed through the concept of positive feedback and by recog-
nition of the importance of institutions. In Arthur’s (1994) account,
lock-in was due to four main reasons: large set-up or fixed costs;
learning effects; and coordination effects; and adaptive expectations
(Arthur 1994) which could lock-in an initial small advantage. Under
these circumstances profits and growth could escalate rather than
diminish over time; a small economic advantage could turn into a
large one in a non-linear fashion.
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There are varying conceptions of the nature and means by which
institutions lock-in the different paths of development. In the eco-
nomic literature the focus has been on the significance of set-up
costs, learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expecta-
tions (Arthur 1994), reformulated as investments in learning, related
technologies, standard setting and compatibility requirements by
Rycroft and Kash (1999), while North (1990) focuses on issues of
power and interests. Pierson (2000) argues that four features of
political life make path dependency more likely than in economic
life: the central role of collective action; the high density of institu-
tions; political power; and intrinsic opacity and complexity.
Mahoney (2000) distinguishes four approaches to the mechanisms
of institutional reproduction: rational cost-benefit analysis of indi-
vidual actors; functions for the overall system; elite power; and
moral legitimation. These varied analyses point up the significance
and yet the under-developed nature of the social scientific analysis
of the institutions that lock-in paths of development.
The concept of path dependency requires and facilitates the
inclusion of temporality and sequencing within social theory. Path
dependency means that events that occur at one moment in time
have consequences at later times and that the order in which events
and developments occur has consequences. Path dependent
processes can involve embedding the outcome of social events at
one moment in time in an institution that endures over time, thus
carrying the effect of the past into the present and future. A specific
aspect of temporality in path dependency is that the factors present
early on in a trajectory are likely to be more important than those
that are present later. There is a presumption that the sequencing
of events within a trajectory matters (Goldstone 1998; Haydu 1998).
There are many examples of path dependency processes. In
addition to the examples discussed so far, the concept is useful in
the analysis of the post-1989 developments in eastern and central
Europe (Illner 1999; Nee and Cao 1999; Stompka 1999), the rela-
tionship between economic development and democracy, and the
development of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1999).
The question as to whether the post-1989 developments in
eastern and central Europe should be considered a ‘transition’ (i.e.
a return to the normal path of modernization) or a ‘transformation’
(i.e. something new) can be illuminated by framing it within the
debates on path dependency (Illner 1999; Nee and Cao 1999;
Stompka 1999; Szalai 1999; Ferree 2000). The issue is whether, with
the introduction of economic markets and political democracy, these
countries are making a transition to a societal model common in the
West, or whether (and if so, how) the institutions of the communist
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era are leaving a permanent as opposed to a temporary mark on
these social formations (Hauser et al. 1995; Illner 1999; Stompka
1999). Is the power of economic markets such that eventually the
social patterns established by the socialist era will be eroded to the
point of insignificance, or will the political and cultural institutions
leave an enduring legacy (Szalai 1999; Ferree 2000)? In particular,
are the new elites drawn from the same social strata as the elites in
the earlier era, suggesting a continuity with the old, or are they
drawn from new ones, indicating a more substantial rupture? The
conceptualizing of the process as one of ‘transition’ is dependent
upon a more universalist, more general social theory, in which eco-
nomic markets drive towards common social forms. Its conceptual-
ization as one of ‘transformation’ is associated with the notion of
path dependency, in which the rupture in 1945 and the experience
of nearly half a century of communist institutions leave traces on
East European social formations so that they will not converge with
Western capitalist democratic development. The former is more gen-
eralist while the latter more particularistic approach is that of path
dependency.
A similar re-framing of the debates about the relationship
between economic development and political democracy can be
performed. This is the debate as to whether or to what extent
there is a logic to industrialism and capitalism, of economic devel-
opment and modernization, or whether politics and culture make
a significant difference to the outcome (Lipset 1960; Moore 1966),
for instance, to welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). In the
first, the development of democracy is part of the logical process
of modernization (Lipset 1960; Inglehart 1997). In the second, the
clash and historical compromise of class-based political forces
are regarded as capable of producing a critical turning point in
the path of development, which is locked-in via political institu-
tions which constrain the path of development thereafter (Korpi
1983; Pierson 2000). Modernization theorists have argued that
there is a process of development that involves social and polit-
ical development proceeding along with economic growth,
increases in per capita income, an increase of the proportion of
the workforce employed outside of agriculture, and an increase
in education for all. This approach takes a variety of forms since
it was originated by Kerr et al. (1960) and Lipset (1960) and has
been refined and developed since then (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart
and Norris 2003), but they share the search for a powerful general
explanation. By contrast, other sociological schools, especially
those influenced by a Marxist tradition, have theorized politics
and, in particular, the nature and balance of forces during class
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struggle, either democratically (Korpi 1983) or in political crises
and revolutions (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979), as being critical to
the shaping of the ensuing social formation. In this latter per-
spective, the nature of industrial societies is critically shaped by
key moments of political struggle that have consequences after
becoming locked-in via the particular state and welfare institu-
tions (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999).
Again, this is a debate between, on the one hand, those seek-
ing general theory, in this case the institutional logic of indus-
trialization or modernization, and, on the other hand, those
prioritizing particularity due to political struggle. Moore (1966),
Korpi (1983), Skocpol (1979) and Esping-Andersen (1990) may all
be re-interpreted as theorists of path dependency, because of
their focus on the significance of critical turning points that trans-
form the social formation and set it out on one of a number of
different possible paths of further development. The mechanism
that acts to ‘lock-in’ the new pathway in these accounts is that of
the state and its associated institutions. Rather than one unfolding
process of capitalist development, there are several different vari-
eties of modernity, including bifurcations into democracy or dicta-
torship (Moore 1966), or social democracy or liberal democracy
(Korpi 1983), or a three-fold split into social democracy, liberal
democracy, or conservative corporatism (Esping-Andersen 1990).
The re-framing of this sociological debate within the complexity
theory debate on path dependency facilitates the development of
the concept of path dependency.
The nature of path dependency is addressed both substantively
and theoretically in this book. The first implication of path depen-
dency is that there is no single unified world system or world soci-
ety, there are different paths of development and different varieties
of modernity. This book investigates the extent to which different
paths are significant rather than ephemeral, in particular whether
globalization is eroding differences between varieties of modernity.
Second, divergent paths of development start with critical turning
points or tipping points. The nature and origin of these is investigated,
in particular considering the implications of political processes
involving complex inequalities in addition to class. Third, feedback
in social systems can be positive and driving change forward, as
well as negative and returning to balance. The concept of positive
feedback is developed here with the concepts of catalysing and
dampening change. Fourth, temporality and sequencing are impor-
tant for social theory; the order of events does matter. In this
instance this is taken to include not only issues of economies and
politics, but also violence.
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Coevolution of Complex Adaptive
Systems in Changing Fitness
Landscapes
Complexity theory provides new ways of theorizing change. Some
early accounts of change use a simple notion of a force impacting
on another entity. Within complexity theory, the concept of coevo-
lution replaces this notion of one entity having a simple impact on
another entity. Since every system takes all other systems as its envi-
ronment, systems coevolve as they complexly adapt to their environ-
ment (Kauffman 1993, 1995). These are ‘complex adaptive systems’,
sometimes termed ‘complex evolutionary systems’ (McKenzie 2000).
The concept of autopoiesis is important for understanding the way
that systems coevolve and adapt to each other, rather than one
simply impacting on another (Maturana and Varela 1980). Since
each system has an internal system, any initial impact will have
complex effects upon the internal relations of the other system.
Systems interact with each other. They may do so in such a way
(called coupling by Maturana and Varela) that they assist in the repro-
duction of each other. In this case the mutual modifications of the
systems as they interact do not lead to the loss of the identity of each
system. Of course some interactions with other systems may lead to
the loss of identity of one or both systems, but this is not coupling.
Coupling may lead to the generation of a new unity in a different
domain from that in which the coupled entities maintain their iden-
tities. This new unity may itself be autopoietic, in the sense of self-
reproducing. Thus, there may be a network of autopoietic systems
dependent upon each other for the maintenance of their identities.
‘An autopoietic system whose autopoiesis entails the autopoiesis of the
coupled autopoietic unities which realize it, is an autopoietic system of
a higher order’ (Maturana and Varela 1980: 109).
In order to respond to its environment a system changes inter-
nally. Since its environment is composed of other systems, these
other systems also change internally. Systems impact on each
other in ways other than those of a simple hierarchy or of a sim-
ple impact on a stable environment. Rather, systems are coevolv-
ing; they are complex adaptive systems (Kauffman 1993, 1995;
Holland 1995, 2000). This notion that a system changes as well as
the systems with which it is interacting goes beyond the old con-
ception that an entity simply acts on another entity. Rather, there
is mutual impact. They both change as a result of this interaction;
they coevolve.
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Kauffman (1993, 1995) addresses the complex nature of this
coevolution among and between multiple systems via the concept
of ‘fitness landscapes’. This concept is initially derived from analy-
ses of the evolution of species, but is potentially relevant for other
types of systems. As one system evolves, it changes the landscape
for others, changing their opportunities, and thereby their potential
for success or weakness. The landscape can be adapted or deformed
by systems as they coevolve. This alters the opportunities faced by
other systems, with complex consequences for their development.
The process of interaction between a system and its environment
involves selection and temporality (Luhmann 1995). It involves
selection in that the system has to recognize which phenomena, out
of a range, are to be responded to. It involves temporality, since a
process of change takes time. Coevolution is not instantaneous, but
a process that takes place over time. Internal processes have to
adjust to external changes. The temporal lag in the changes within
systems as a result of their interaction is not merely inevitable, but
is key to understanding the nature of social change.
The implications of the concept of the coevolution of complex
adaptive systems for empirical research include the imperative to
look at the interaction between entities and not to presume a one-
way direction of causality. Further, it is likely that both (or several)
of these entities will change during their interaction thus requiring
a complex appreciation of the objects under study.
The relationship between systems may not involve their mutual
benefit even though it involves their mutual interaction. The concept
of coevolution might appear to carry connotations of consensual har-
monious change, but this is far from what is intended. A change in
one system may well be to the disadvantage of the other system.
Changes may entail changes in the environment within which the
other systems operate. Kauffman (1993, 1995) develops the ‘changing
fitness landscapes’ to capture the uneven implications of changes in
the environment for systems. The features of a landscape may be
such as to advantage or privilege one type of system over another.
There may be strife over the nature of this fitness landscape or envi-
ronment, because of its implications for the functioning of different
systems. An example is the contestation over the setting of the global
rules for trade by the WTO: some countries have a disproportionate
influence over the setting of rules that affect most of the world. The
concept of a fitness landscape enables the incorporation of the rela-
tions between systems in a way that takes account not only of their
mutual influence on each other, but also the way that a system can
change the environment in which it and other systems operate to the
advantage or disadvantage of those other systems.
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Eldredge (1985, 1986) developed a concept of ‘punctuated
equilibria’ in order to grasp the way in which some periods are
marked by relative stability and others by sudden change. He
challenged the traditional interpretation of evolution as a process
of steady development based on the gradual selection of geneti-
cally better adapted individual organisms. Instead he demon-
strated that the process of selection could be better understood if
the level of the species became the focus rather than that of the
organism. This is because evolution does not take place gradually,
with individual organisms slowly changing as a result of natural
selection between organisms of the same species, but instead is a
process of ‘punctuated equilibria’ in which there are long periods
of stability followed by periods of change in which many species
become extinct and many new ones are generated. Species, rather
than genes, are the key level of analysis. A reduction to the level
of the organism, or indeed of genes, is less helpful to an expla-
nation than the focus on the emergent level of species. The con-
cept of punctuated equilibria is relevant to conceptualizing
uneven patterns of change.
There are several advantages and wide-ranging implications of
the conceptualization of change using concepts of coevolution of
complex adaptive systems, a changing fitness landscape, and punc-
tuated equilibria when newly applied to social systems.
The first is that they capture the way that social change takes
place not only as a result of the internal development of a social
system, but also as a result of the interaction between social sys-
tems. In the context of globalization it is especially important that
concepts of change are able to capture the dynamic relations
between systems, and to not only focus on internal development.
The second is that the concept of ‘impact’ is replaced by that of
‘coevolution of complex adaptive systems’. The concept of ‘impact’
usually implies a singular direction of impact and of causality. This is
at odds with the nature of the social world, where such a singular
direction is unusual and mutual impact is more common. Many
social forces are affected by the social phenomena with which they
interact and are changed during the process of interaction; the
social force or system complexly adapts during the process of inter-
action and both systems are changed, not just one. Hence, the
‘coevolution of complex adaptive systems’ provides a better con-
ceptualization of many social interactions than does that of impact.
Third, any unduly restrictive notion of a limited number of
paths is eliminated. Since a system takes all other systems as its
environment, there are many potential patterns of development.
As the environment of a system or its fitness landscape changes,
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the system will coevolve. The notion of a limited number of paths
is replaced by a need to analyse any clustering that occurs in the
nature of social forms.
Fourth, the concept of a ‘changing fitness landscape’ is useful in cap-
turing the changing nature of the environment in which any system
operates. These changes in the fitness landscape may enable a system
to function more or less well, to grow and expand or diminish in
range. A system may be able to alter or deform the landscape in such
a way that this is to its advantage, thereby altering the positioning of
other systems. Changes in the fitness landscape cannot be understood
without a concept of power. The ability to alter an environment so as
to advantage one system over another is a vital form of power. In this
way the notion of power is embedded in the analysis.
These concepts are especially useful in developing analyses of
global processes in which there are changing relationships between
polities and other social systems, and the development of the
European Union where there have been changes in both the nature
and composition of the EU and in the character of its Member
States. The competition to change rules and conventions at a global
level has major implications for the capacity of one polity to grow
at the expense of others. Changes in the global environment con-
cerning issues such as the terms of trade and discourses of politi-
cal legitimation have significant implications for the relative
positioning of polities and social groups.
Conventional accounts have often described globalization as a
process that impacts on nation-states, reducing their capacity for
autonomous action especially in relation to the welfare of their citi-
zens (e.g. Crouch and Streeck 1997; Martin and Schumann 1997).
But the notion of ‘impact’ leaves out of focus the process of dynamic
adjustment of polities to each other in the context of globalization.
In the context of the response of European countries to globaliza-
tion, such an approach has particular difficulty in grasping the
changing nature of the European Union during this process. The use
of the concepts of coevolution of complex adaptive systems in a fit-
ness landscape re-frames this process and enables a more adequate
account. Rather than asking about the impact of globalization on
European states, it is more appropriate to ask about the coevolution
of globalization, the European Union (which has grown in powers),
and Member States (who despite giving up their powers to the EU
are better able to complete their domestic agendas having done so)
(Walby 1999a). These Member States have transferred powers to reg-
ulate the economy from the domestic, country specific, arena to the
European Union. But to treat this as a zero-sum game would be
inadequate. Rather the domestic agendas of the governments of
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these relatively small European countries are better achieved by
such a transfer of powers (Milward 1992).
The concept of coevolution captures this process better than that
of impact. Further, globalization does not simply act on the European
Union, but this polity is itself part of a process of creating globaliza-
tion, for instance in its role in re-negotiating international trade reg-
ulations at the World Trade Organization. The process of coevolution
involves the complex adaptation of the systems of European coun-
tries, the European Union, and global institutions. This coevolution
has resulted in a changed fitness landscape within which the Member
States and European Union operate, with different implications for
the powers of these entities. Within a changing global landscape, the
European Union has increased its powers over the regulation of the
economy while the Member States have reduced theirs. ‘Impact’ is far
too blunt a concept to capture these complex processes. Rather the
concepts of ‘coevolution’, ‘complex adaptive systems’ and ‘fitness
landscapes’ facilitate an improved understanding of these processes,
with the proviso that power relations are understood as embedded
in these processes.
If there is close coupling of the economy, polity, violence, and civil
society, then there is a tendency for changes in each domain to be
closely associated. Under these circumstances changes in the econ-
omy are likely to affect the polity, violence, and civil society. Perhaps
more importantly there are mutual effects from the interaction of
these complex adaptive systems. If there is close coupling then eco-
nomic development is more likely to lead to changes in the polity.
However, while traditionally, social theory has suggested that it is
reasonable to assume such close coupling, there are reasons to doubt
that this is actually the case, except in unusual circumstances. This is
because there are often divergent temporal and spatial reaches to
domains of economy, polity, violence, and civil society. A polity may
be spatially smaller or larger than the associated economy. For exam-
ple, the emerging European Union changes the spatial scale at which
political decisions are taken, but the economy and civil society are
not changing the spatial scale at the same rate. Further, the Catholic
Church is a transnational entity, straddling states and economies, but
having significant effects on the regulation of sexuality and marriage.
There is a tendency, over time, for loosely coupled systems to self-
organize into more closely coupled systems. This is societalization, in
which there is a slow process of bringing into alignment the prac-
tices of the different systems that constitute a potential society.
However, this process, while often started, is frequently interrupted
by challenges to societalize around a different set of practices. While
there is a potential infinity of forms of social systems, in practice
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there are clusters of forms, sharing common characteristics. There
thus appear to be limits to the infinite possibility of social forms.
Waves
The existing conceptual vocabulary for social change is insufficient
to grasp some of the non-linear forms of change in a global era. The
concept of wave is used in order to capture some specific aspects of
the simultaneous temporal and spatial dimensions of social change
in a global era associated with the interaction between systems. The
increase in global processes puts a premium on developing concepts
that capture the nature of how an event and patterns of social rela-
tions at one point in time and space have implications for an event
or social relations at another point in time and space. The concept of
wave is developed here to capture the way that an event in one
social system can have repercussions on social systems elsewhere in
time and space. A wave starts in one temporal and spatial location,
builds rapidly through endogenous processes, and then spreads out
though space and time to affect social relations in other locations.
These events are connected, but not in a simple deterministic manner,
passing through networks and social institutions.
The concept of ‘wave’ captures the sudden transfer of social
practices from one social system to another, especially those asso-
ciated with social movements. These are increasingly important
forms of social linkages across national boundaries. They are more
than simply networks (such as transnational advocacy networks: see
Keck and Sikkink 1998; Zippel 2004), and more than new forms of
community (such as epistemic communities: see Haas 1992),
although they do include features of network and community, since
these concepts do not capture the rapid temporal escalation of the
phenomena in question. The concept of wave deployed here draws
on at least five different sources for its intellectual heritage.
First, the concept of wave draws on the concept of rounds of
restructuring, which has been used to capture the effects of a wide-
spread change in the economic environment upon a spatially varied
pre-existing institutional structure (Massey and Meegan 1982; Bagguley
et al. 1990). The concept was used to theorize aspects of spatial
unevenness in social processes. The outcome of any given round of
economic restructuring varied between different localities because of
pre-existing differences in the social, economic, and political institu-
tions of different places. The interaction of the round of restructuring
with these varied institutions produced different outcomes, rather than
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simply producing conformity around a new principle of social and
economic organization. It was intended to embed historical and
spatial dimensions into the analysis of political and economic change
(Bagguley et al. 1990). The concept of wave captures the notion that
a common factor may have different local implications as a result of
variations in the pre-existing institutional structure.
Second, a wave captures a different kind of social process from
those centred on institutions; it is not an institution or a system.
Instead it is a form of social energy, a process. It may pass through
institutions and systems, thereby disturbing them, but is not itself
organized as an institution or system. In this way the concept of
wave draws upon our already existing understanding of the dis-
tinction between wave and particle. Light is energy that is without
mass and takes the form of a wave, while particles have mass and
organization. The concept of wave is likewise concerned with the
transmission of energy – this time social energy – in a form and
process that are not heavy with institutions.
Third, the concept of wave draws on the heritage of social move-
ment theory (Freeman and Johnson 1999). As in social movements,
the focus of an analysis of waves is on the process of a develop-
ment of new (or re-worked, revived) civil societal projects. Social
movement theory has built a sophisticated range of a concepts and
explanatory practices to capture the rise, impact, and fall of social
movements. They typically rise out of civil society and seek to
impact on and change established institutions, being themselves
changed in the process. The concept of wave draws on this, but
goes beyond it with the added dimension of spatiality.
Fourth, the concept of wave draws on that used in the analysis of
the history of feminist movements. Its primary use there has been to
capture the temporal, rather than spatial, dimension of feminist
movements. There was a powerful feminist movement in the latter
part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which succeeded
in winning the vote for women as well as reforming the laws on
marriage and practices in employment and education (Banks 1981;
Spender 1983; Berkovitch 1999). There was also a further powerful
feminist movement starting in the late 1960s in the USA, in the 1970s
in the UK, and then spreading around the world. In between these
two movements there was not a total cessation of feminist activity,
but it was less public, less confrontationist, less visible, and less
powerful. The concept of wave is used in order to capture the notion
that while feminism did not go away completely, neither was it
sustained at the same level of visibility and activity. Like an ocean,
feminism is with us always as long as there is gender inequality, but
there are waves of publicly visible activism only some of the time.
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Fifth, the concept of wave captures a social process marked by an
absence of linearity in the relationship between events and in the tem-
porality of the process itself. An initial event may build suddenly to
large proportions, or it may fade away with little impact. The classic,
metaphorical, example of the former is the flapping of the butterfly’s
wings that disturbs the air in a way that indirectly leads to a storm
elsewhere in the world. This is the terrain of chaos theory (Gleick
1988). It draws on the way that many social and ‘natural’ systems are
not in stable equilibrium so that a small event can create a positive
feedback mechanism which builds into a large event. This is an
account of the world in which the simple abstractions of linear analy-
sis, in which an event has a direct and proportionate response, do not
apply (Capra 1997). The non-linear dimension of time and impact are
elements pertinent to the understanding of some social phenomena.
Biggs (2001) demonstrates that the dynamics of social movements,
such as strikes, especially in their very rapid, non-linear, rate of devel-
opment, have parallels in nature with phenomena such as forest fires.
They share a form of endogenous development with a positive feed-
back loop speeding the process of ‘contagion’. These events are gov-
erned by a power law whatever the scale, that is, they take a power
fractal form (Mandelbrot 1982). This is because any one agent can
affect a set ratio of other agents, provoking them to either action or
combustion. My concept of wave draws on these arguments. A wave
transforming social action can have significant endogeneity. It is the
endogeneity and the positive feedback loops that are crucial to the
explanation of the suddenness of waves of civil societal movements
and of the rapidity of the generation of their intensity and power.
The concept of wave developed here integrates these notions of
the spatial, temporal, non-linearity, and transformative social
energy. A wave of political activity is initiated at one point in time
and space and travels to other places, reaching them at slightly
later times. It has somewhat different impacts, depending on the
prior institutional structure at those locations. Its starting point
depends on the particular contradictions in social relations and
institutions, the resources available to participants, the availability
of a potential network, and the available frames. The rate of
increase in the intensity of the wave depends not only on the
resources available to participants but on the nature of the
endogenous feedback processes within the movement and
between the movement and potential participants. The extent of
the spread of the wave depends on external circumstances, the
connectedness of its networks, resources available to participants,
and the energy generated by endogenous processes. In the con-
temporary world such waves can become global, while a century
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ago the horizon of activity might have been more restricted. The
level of impact depends on the conjuncture of circumstances,
which affects whether it is a mere ripple or a tidal wave of
tremendous proportions. The effect of the wave is significantly
affected by the nature of the local circumstances with which it
interacts. The impact may be one of simple change in the direc-
tion of the flow, or it may be one in which it is absorbed via a
complex process of hybridization with prior local practices, or it
may result in a fierce resistance which can have a backwash effect
towards the point of origin. The notion of wave bears some
resemblances to the concept of network, in that it is an attempt to
conceptualize linkages which are not simple, direct, and linear,
and in which there are loose connections between individuals.
But it is more specific in the nature of these linkages, with its
specification of a beginning, of its stimulation of a concatenation
of events, intensification through endogenous processes, and of
the primary direction of its momentum.
Waves today can be global although, historically, regional waves
were more common. Indeed the phenomena of waves becomes
more important in the context of an unevenly spatialized set of
social relations that are only loosely connected. While many, espe-
cially of the better documented, waves may be constituted as pro-
modernist, seeking to speed the modernization of social relations
with a justice and egalitarian oriented perspective, there have also
been a series of anti-modernist waves.
Waves are forms of connections between social systems. They can
promote relatively small, specific projects, or large projects of soci-
etalization. The former may be more easily absorbed or hybridized,
the latter are more likely to provoke resistance or backlash. The for-
mer may merely speed a process of development already begun by
some social forces, and its ideas championed within that social for-
mation. Alternatively waves may challenge the foundations of the
social order, bearing projects that imply societalization around dif-
ferent principles. The potential implications of the project contained
by the wave for key elite groups in the host country are likely to be
of particular importance in determining the nature of the response.
Global waves cross-cut paths of national development. For exam-
ple, as would-be nation-states try to societalize around selected
principles and practices, they are subject to waves of influence of
different kinds from other lands. In the interaction of the wave and
the nation-state project there are several options. The wave may be
absorbed readily, perhaps by a key group that uses it as a support
for its own agenda, perhaps by pushing forward a modernist or
anti-modernist agenda. Or it may be rejected, involving hostility
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against the source of the wave and those who propound its values.
Or it may be hybridized into something new. Waves are considered
further in Chapter 6 on civil societies and in Chapter 10 comparing
country trajectories.
Conclusions
Theorizing multiple complex inequalities is a challenge. The analysis
must include the ontological depth of multiple regimes of inequality
in the institutional domains of the economy, polity, violence, and
civil society rather than flatten this to a single dimension of culture
or economics. But the old concept of social system did not allow
for more than one major axis of inequality in each institutional
domain. This led many who prioritized the significance of multiple
inequalities in social theory to reject the concept of social system.
However, in so doing they lost the capacity to simultaneously the-
orize their ontological depth. In order to theorize the ontological
depth of each of these multiple inequalities it is necessary to revisit
and revise the concept of social system.
The selective integration of complexity notions enables the revi-
sion of the concept of social system. The complexity notion of the
system/environment distinction enables a more nimble conceptual-
ization of systems and their interactions. This allows the rejection
of the notion that a system must saturate its territory, enabling mul-
tiple systems of inequalities in the same space or institutional
domain. It enables the rejection of the notion that parts must be
nested within a whole, and thus a rejection of the reduction of one
set of social relations of inequality to another. Complexity theory
provides the theoretical flexibility to allow a systematic analysis of
social interconnections without the reductionism that so marred the
old. The re-working of these core concepts of social theory is nec-
essary in order to adequately theorize the ontological depth of
intersecting multiple systems of social inequality. This includes re-
thinking the excessive humanism that excludes bodies and tech-
nology from explanations, and the inclusion of individuals as
systems in themselves.
Drawing on complexity theory as well as classic and contemporary
social theory enables new ways of theorizing non-linear social
change. It is important to develop new concepts to address the ten-
sion between the goal of general social theory and understandings of
particular development. These include: path dependency, varieties of
development, critical turning points, tipping points, the coevolution
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of complex adaptive systems in changing fitness landscapes, the
catalysing and dampening of the rate of change, and waves.
The concept of wave is developed to capture for a global era
processes that link social systems speedily yet without solid institu-
tions. A wave is a distinct set of social processes with a particular
kind of temporal and spatial characteristics that can suddenly trans-
fer social practices from one location to another; it can build sud-
denly, interact with a social system, and either produce change or
decay, or hybridize. It is especially important in relation to under-
standing the implications of emergent civil societal projects on
established social formations.
These developments build on and develop the re-thinking of
time and space in social theory prompted by the increasing devel-
opment of global processes. The significance of space is not
reduced, rather it has changed. Social processes still take time. But
social relations in one part of the world can be brought more
rapidly into other social environments than before. This is not just
a process of ‘speeding up’ or ‘acceleration’, but can also take a
more complex ‘wave’ form which combines a non-linear escalation
of a phenomenon and an incorporation or backlash.
The concept of system is revitalized by the insights of complexity
theory, especially: the simplifying distinction between a system and
its environment; the non-nested coupling of systems; the coevolu-
tion of complex adaptive systems; that systems do not necessarily
tend to equilibrium; non-linear patterns of change; path depen-
dency and critical turning points. The distinction between social
relations and social institutions allows for the possibility of more
than one set of unequal social relations within any institutional
complex, and thus the theorization of complex inequalities that are
not reduced to a single dimension. The analysis of the complex
interconnections between social systems during globalization is
facilitated by the notion that social systems are open and not
closed, and by the development of the concept of wave.
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Introduction
This chapter reconceptualizes the economy so as to more adequately
address complex inequalities and global processes; reconsiders what
is meant by economic inequality in this new context; and differenti-
ates between alternative forms of the economy in a way that takes
into account gender and other complex inequalities. This chapter
also establishes the revised economic concepts needed for the com-
parative analysis in chapters 8, 9 and 10.
The conventional understanding of the economy as limited to
marketized and monetized activities is challenged by the significance
of domestic labour and state welfare. Economic inequalities look dif-
ferent when complex inequalities such as gender are included.
Inequalities are complex: entwined with positively valued differ-
ences as well as inequalities.
Taking gender relations in the economy seriously means recog-
nizing that not all social relations in the economy are yet modern;
domestic labour is outside the market and performed under pre-
modern social relations. The transition to modernity in the econ-
omy takes place at different times for class, gender, and ethnic
relations. There is a second ‘great transformation’ still ongoing in
the shift from household to market production. This transformation
of the gender regime has implications for changes in class and
other relations, through its implications for labour and for political
constituencies.
Globalization is not a unified phenomenon, but is constituted
by several different kinds of processes: global flows of capital
trade and people; global institutions, networks, and hegemons;
and global waves of civil societal projects. These global processes
have complex interactions with national ones. Rather than eroding
3 Economies
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difference between economies, these are restructured. Inequalities
are constituted not only within a country, but also between coun-
tries. Global economic inequality requires taking both kinds of
inequality into account.
There are alternative ways in which modern economies can be
organized. Neoliberalism is not an inevitability; in the global North
there are also social democratic forms, as well as a variety of fur-
ther forms in the global South. The conventional typologies of vari-
eties of economies are challenged to include complex inequalities
in addition to class relations.
Redefining the Economy
The conventional definition of the economy is developed in this sec-
tion so as to include complex inequalities in addition to class. This
enables a rethinking of what is meant by economic inequalities.
The economy is the system of relations, institutions, and processes
concerned with the production, consumption, distribution, and cir-
culation of goods and services to support human life. It is an insti-
tutional domain containing multiple regimes of inequality. In order
to take account of complex inequalities and global processes, a
series of conceptual developments are needed to redefine the con-
cept of the economy. The concept of the economy needs to be
widened so as to include not only marketized activities, but also
domestic labour and state welfare.
It is important to distinguish between tasks, social relations, and
the site of production. The criteria used to distinguish the economy
from the non-economy is that of its tasks – not the social relations,
which can vary between market, state, and domestic forms, nor the
site of production, which can be anywhere including in the home.
The redefinition of the economy has implications for the concep-
tualization of its inequalities. The inclusion of domestic labour
raises the question as to how to address the concentration of
women in domestic labour: is it intrinsically an inequality that leads
to inequalities in other aspects of gender relations, or is it a valued
difference? Perhaps it is best understood as both an inequality and
a valued difference simultaneously.
Taking global processes into account challenges the traditional
analysis of inequality within countries: whether or not economic
inequality is seen to be increasing or decreasing depends upon
whether the whole world rather than individual countries is the
unit within which inequality is measured. Global processes affect
processes within countries, as well as the world as a whole.G
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Domestic labour as labour
Is the economy just the market economy, the economy where money
is used in transactions? This is the convention in mainstream econom-
ics, where the size of an economy is measured in terms of its mone-
tary value. But this leaves labour that is not involved in money out of
account and out of focus: housework and care-work in the home
would be left out; and likewise forced labour, such as slavery, and
those who are trafficked (forms of labour that are key to gender and
ethnic relations). Care-work in the home is often not considered as
work at all; housewives are considered ‘economically inactive’. While
these forms of labour are not performed as free wage labour, nonethe-
less they are labour and should be included within the concept of the
economy. The economy is more than just the market economy.
Domestic labour or domestic care-work has variously been defined
in relation to the nature of the tasks and outcomes of the work, the
gendered social relations usually involved, and the domestic site of
the labour. The definition here is centred on the tasks and the out-
comes of the work. The implications for the partially overlapping
concerns of social relations and site of the work are addressed later.
Domestic labour, or household production, is a set of activities that
produces accommodation, meals, clean clothes, and the care of chil-
dren and adults, via a series of intermediary inputs including clean-
ing and shopping (Ironmonger 2001). It is the care-work of looking
after children and other household members, such as the sick, frail
elderly, and disabled (Gardiner 1997) as well as cooking and food
preparation, cleaning both the home and clothes, and the mainte-
nance of that home and its equipment (Bose 1979). Oakley (1974)
argued that housework was indeed work by demonstrating that the
activities involved were similar to other forms of work by means of a
painstaking empirical examination. It is work like other work; there
are empirical similarities between the tasks and outcomes of domes-
tic labour and paid work (Reid 1934; Oakley 1974; Delphy 1984).
The tasks accomplished by domestic care-work could be accom-
plished as either welfare provided by the state, or as goods and ser-
vices purchased on the market (inside or outside the home). These
activities are part of the economy and should be considered to be
production (Reid 1934; Delphy 1984). It is the conceptualization of
domestic care-work as a set of tasks that is most challenging to eco-
nomic and social theory.
The conceptualization of unpaid domestic care-work as part of
the economy is a challenge to the narrow definition of the economy
as activities that have monetary value. This is a challenge to the
measurement of the size of the economy in monetary terms of the
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Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and to the standard of living as the
GDP per person (per capita) (HM Treasury 2006). It is a challenge
to the conceptualization of unpaid domestic workers as ‘economi-
cally inactive’. It challenges the ‘strategic silence’ on gender in the
economy (Bakker 1998).
This revised conceptualization of domestic care-work as part of
the economy is a challenge to those forms of social theory that con-
ceptualize these activities as primarily cultural. Women’s activities in
the home have been seen as ideological, where the family is an ide-
ological state apparatus (Althusser 1971), or the lifeworld where
meaning is created outside of the steering system of the economy
(Habermas 1989, 1991), and as socialization (Parsons 1955). This is
not to say that there are not civil societal aspects to these activities;
there are. But they are economic.
The conceptualization of domestic care-work as part of the econ-
omy draws on feminist traditions in social theory that cross-cut con-
ventional divisions. Engels (1940) conceptualized domestic labour
as reproduction, and as part of the economy alongside production
and thereby as part of the material basis of social relations. A cen-
tury ago, feminists such as Schreiner (1911) and Gilman (1966) con-
ceptualized women’s household work as labour and as part of the
economy, and addressed its relations with class and imperialism.
The relationship of domestic labour with capitalism was the subject
of the ‘domestic labour debate’ (Seccombe 1974; Malos 1980). The
forms it takes have been documented and analysed (Oakley 1974),
including its use of technology (Silva 2000), its implications for the
use of time (Gershuny 2000), and the tension between time spent
on care-work and paid work (Hochschild 1997; Gatrell 2004).
Domestic production can be conceptualized as a scarce resource in
marginalist economics through a focus on time as the resource that
might be put to alternative uses (Becker 1965, 1981); there is a
choice between the use of time in production in the household and
its use in the market (Mincer 1962; Mincer and Polachek 1974),
which requires the understanding of the implications of choices at
one point in time for options at a later time drawing on game the-
ory and theories of bargaining to enable the understanding of house-
hold inequalities (Humphries 1998). Not all those making such
decisions experience them as economically rational, being situated
within complex moral economies where the priority is understood
to be to do the right thing in relation to care (Duncan and Edwards
1999), but that does not make them any less decisions about the
economy.
What are the implications of treating care-work as part of the
economy for the analysis of economic inequalities? Is the divisionG
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between domestic care-work and paid employment best thought of
as a positively valued difference or as inequality? In some locations
a positive value is attached to care-work because of the long-term
and important emotional work that is involved (Hochschild 2000;
Himmelweit 2002). Indeed, some consider that this is the case for
care-work whether it is paid or unpaid (Himmelweit 1999); although
the uniqueness of the emotional involvement in care-work is over-
stated since many paid workers become committed to their work
and to the quality of its output. However, even when there is a pos-
itive valuation of domestic care-work, it simultaneously contributes
to gender inequality since domestic care-work is not paid and
employment is paid. In addition, the gendered division of labour
contributes towards other forms of gender inequality: it has a ten-
dency to reduce women’s access to formal political power (see
Chapter 4), and to increase their vulnerability to domestic violence
(see Chapter 5).
When care-work is the basis of a person’s livelihood it is associ-
ated with economic inequality, even though it may be highly val-
ued. This paradox of the simultaneity of inequality and valued
difference lies at the heart of the ‘complex inequality’ that is gender.
Most analyses of economic inequality treat care-work as if it is of no
value, because the dominant frame of reference considers only
monetary value. This is problematic, but so also is the treatment of
care-work and free wage labour as if they had equal consequences
for gender inequality. A livelihood based on care-work is much less
likely than one based on free wage labour to deliver access to eco-
nomic resources, political influence, freedom from violence, and
personal independence. The resolution to this dilemma is to treat
gender as a complex inequality, in which difference and inequality
are entwined. Care-work can be simultaneously highly valued and
also a source of inequality across the breadth of the gender regime.
State welfare as part of the economy
The economy is constituted not only by the private market and the
domestic sphere, but also by some of the activities of the state. Some
of the welfare aspects of the polity are also part of the economy,
while other aspects of the polity are part of the governance of the
economy. The welfare state, which involves the provision of public
services such as education, health, and care and the redistribution
of income through taxation and social benefits, is considered here.
The governance of the economy through the regulation of labour
and macroeconomic policy is considered later.
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The concept of welfare is complicated because it straddles activities
carried out in different sites and organized through different social
relations. The concept and practice of welfare are wider than the sub-
set of activities that constitute the welfare state. These activities, espe-
cially education, health, and care, can be performed not only by the
welfare state but also by the market and by unpaid domestic care-
work, and, in some instances, institutions associated with organized
religions. In different varieties of modernity the balance between
these three sites and sets of social relations under which this welfare
is carried out varies considerably.
While it is possible to analytically separate the redistributive
aspects of the welfare state from the provision of public services,
the dominant historical account of the welfare state is that redistri-
bution and the provision of public services are inextricably bound
up with each other (Beveridge 1942; Marshall 1950). Redistribution
takes place not only in the tax-benefit and pensions systems, but
also through the provision of services of education, health, care,
and sometimes housing to all or most of the population, but paid
for disproportionately by the better off. Redistribution can be
understood in two ways. The first concerns a distribution from the
rich to the poor, as a contribution to the reduction in economic
inequality generated by capitalism. The second focuses on the risks
of modern life, such as illness, old age, and unemployment, where
there is a need to provide assistance through services and income
support (Beck 1992). Redistribution is not always from rich to poor,
it can also be used to support complex inequalities such as gender
(Lister 1997) and ethnicity (Quadagno 1994; Williams 1995).
The interpretation of the activities of the welfare state as primarily
redistributive can sometimes obscure the understanding of the simul-
taneously economically productive aspects of public services. The pro-
duction of human capital through education is a major contribution to
the development of the economy, especially the knowledge-based
forms of the economy. While access to education is significant in shap-
ing life chances and thus not irrelevant to issues of inequality and
redistribution, nevertheless education is also a major investment in the
productive capacity of the economy. Similarly, while the provision of
quality childcare by the state is an act of gender redistribution since this
work would otherwise usually be mostly performed by women and is
paid for by taxes typically contributed more by men than women, it is
also a major investment in the productive capacity of women as work-
ers, who are thereby enabled to have more continuous employment his-
tories. Welfare state activities are not only redistributive, they are also
investments in the productive capacity of the economy (Reich 1993;
Quadagno 1999; Pierson 2001; Esping-Andersen 2002; Walby 2007b).
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The welfare parts of the economy provided by (some) states thus
include health, education, and care. In addition there are forms of
regulation of the economy that have important welfare effects, espe-
cially for full employment, including macroeconomic policy, active
labour market programmes, and the structure of the tax-benefit
system. The state provision of welfare has implications not only for
class, but also for gender, ethnic and other minoritized groups. It
can be important in enabling access to employment, especially
since the state provision of care facilitates higher levels of employ-
ment by women.
What are economic inequalities?
What is progress in the economy?
What are economic inequalities? The conceptualization and opera-
tionalization of economic inequality has major implications for
whether particular inequalities are made visible or invisible.
The inequalities can be considered by individuals or households;
within countries and between countries; between generations; and in
the world as a whole. They can be differentiated using an implied
class analysis, or differentiated by gender, ethnicity, and other
minoritized status. The choice of unit has implications; for example,
if the household is chosen as the unit, as is common in cross-national
studies of income inequality, then gender inequalities within the
household are made invisible. The inequalities can be restricted to
monetized forms, or include non-monetized exchanges; be limited to
income, or extended to wealth. Inequalities include: inequalities in
the income paid to workers (the wage distribution, the gender pay
gap); gaps in employment and unemployment rates between differ-
ent groups; occupational segregation and lower proportions of
women and minoritized groups in top jobs; income inequalities
between households (as well as individuals); and inequalities in
wealth (housing, savings, and other capital) between individuals or
between households. They include inequalities between individuals
and families within countries, inequalities between countries, and
inequalities at a global level.
Not all labour is performed under market conditions as free wage
labour. Sometimes it may be under voluntary non-market social
relations, as in many households. It may also be coerced or forced,
under menace and involuntary, as a result of indentured labour, as
in slavery, or as a result of trafficking or threats (ILO 2005). The
performance of labour under coercion should be considered a form
of inequality in itself.
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Equality is a key framing of progress in the domain of economics,
but not the only one. Alongside it is economic growth and devel-
opment, where the goal is increased income. These are often posi-
tioned as contesting priorities in debates on economic development
(Rankin 2001), but need not be (Lorgelly and Owen 1999; Forsythe
et al. 2000; Kenworthy 2004). A further frame is that of capabilities,
where the focus on human development, such as longevity, health,
and education, is often used to contest or modify the focus on eco-
nomic growth. An additional frame is that of human rights, less
often deployed, but used especially in contesting forced labour
(ILO 2005). A comparison of these is provided in Chapter 1 and
Chapter 9.
Environmental sustainability is an issue of inequality with impli-
cations for inequality between generations (present and future) and
between the rich and poor of the world (for example, the poor are
more likely to die in floods than are the rich) (Roberts and Parks
2007) and complex inequalities such as gender (Cudworth 2005).
The form of energy used in the current phase of economic devel-
opment is creating global warming, which is leading to extreme
weather events and major changes in the world’s climate that will
cause flooding in areas of high population density, create drought
in other regions that will make agriculture impossible, and generally
lead to a severe diminution in the quality of life for those who sur-
vive (IPCC 2007; Stern 2007). This is an issue of inequality and
potential solidarity between generations; actions today have impli-
cations for future generations associated with a significant global
project to achieve the changes in social activities needed to avoid
global catastrophe. There is a further range of environmental issues,
including pollution, contestation over the use of land and resources
(Macnaghten and Urry 1998) and risky new technologies such as
genetically modified foodstuffs and nuclear energy (Beck 1992;
Wynne 1996). There are major differences between countries in their
prioritization of action on this issue: the USA is reluctant to change
its form of economic development despite the risks, the EU is more
concerned to exercise caution, with contests fought out in emerging
global institutions such as the World Trade Organization (Winnicott
et al. 2005). The UN is a major site of contestation over these issues
in the search for global protocols to move countries to action (Kyoto
Protocol 1997; UN 2007b). The environmental system includes
humans as one of its constituent parts. The inclusion of non-human
objects within the concept of the social system is important in the
analysis of the implications of human-environmental changes for
economic sustainability. The rapid burning of fossil fuels and the
consequent changes to the planet’s climate are undermining the
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possibilities for life in potentially unstoppable ways (Mol and
Sonnefield 2000; Mol 2001; UN 2007b).
From Premodern to Modern:
The Second Great Transformation
Not all of the relations under which labour is performed by women
are yet modern, even in the most developed countries. Only free
wage labour is ‘modern’ labour. This classic insight from Marx res-
onates widely in many different theorizations of modernity, from
Weber to Simmel. Economic relations are not yet modern while there
is not universal free wage labour. Domestic labour is performed out-
side of the market. The continued existence of domestic labour, even
in advanced economies, means that not all labour takes a free and
waged form. No country’s economy is yet completely modernized.
The transition to free wage labour for most women takes place
later than for men, as the shift away from domestic labour takes
place after the initial development of commercial manufacturing
and services. This constitutes a second ‘great transformation’, with
radical implications not only for the household sector but also for
the rest of the economy. In some cases the transition to free wage
labour for minority ethnic groups takes place later than the majority
ethnic group, for example in the USA, with slavery.
There is not just one economic transition to modernity but sev-
eral, each linked to the modernization of the economy in different
regimes of inequality. Industrialization and the development of cap-
italism represent merely the first of the transitions in the movement
of the economy towards modernity. There is a second ‘great trans-
formation’ in the transition away from household production to
market production, associated, albeit unevenly, with the wider
modernization of the gender regime. The transition to modernity
did not happen in one stage, rather there was a series of partial
transitions, affecting gender as well as other sets of social relations.
There are different key moments during the modernization of the
economy affecting different sets of social relations within the econ-
omy at different times.
The hallmark of the first great economic transformation that was
the development of capitalism and industrialization was free wage
labour (Marx 1954). Labour was simultaneously freed and con-
strained in new ways, which were implicated in the transformation
of all other social relations. Free wage labour made possible new
forms of political combination and practice, generating both new
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forms of independence and new forms of collectively experienced
subordination. But, with a few contested exceptions, these were the
experiences of men only. Most women remained outside these new
economic relations, experiencing them only indirectly, and vicari-
ously, through their husbands and fathers. Bringing into focus sets
of social relations in addition to those of class, such as gender and
ethnicity, makes it easier to see that the transition to modernity may
take place in steps rather than all at once, each step being associ-
ated with a particular form of social relations. The modernization of
gender relations in the economy is constituted by the transition
from domestic to market labour for women and a decline in the
domestic sector as the basis of women’s livelihood.
The increase in women’s employment and the decline in domes-
tic labour is not a simple uni-linear development associated with
industrialization. Instead, the early stages of industrialization are often
marked by a decline in women’s employment. Rather than a linear
relationship between industrialization and women’s paid employ-
ment, there is a non-linear U-shaped relationship in which women’s
employment initially declines with industrialization, rising again only
later (Boserup 1970). This has been found in both quantitative
(Pampel and Tanaka 1986; Çagatay and Özler 1995) and qualitative
(Boserup 1970; Walby 1986; Bourke 1993) studies. There are a num-
ber of reasons for this complexity. During the initial stages of indus-
trialization women’s traditional industries decline and are not
immediately replaced; women do not have access to the indepen-
dent legal persona necessary for independent credit; women face
competition and discrimination in the new industrial sector of the
economy; and women are not organized to protect their interests in
same way as men (Boserup 1970; Walby 1986). The changed political
structure leaves women disadvantaged since their primary location
within the domestic sphere creates difficulties for women’s effective
political organization and the representation of their interests in the
state, especially if they do not have the vote. This lack of political
power has serious consequences. Further, the shift in the balance of
productivity in the two sectors of the economy is very complex. In
the very early stages of economic development there is an advantage
in terms of the overall standard of living of households if women
work at home, which is only later followed by a reversal to the more
usual situation of an advantage to women’s working in the market
sector (Bourke 1991). In the early stages of industrialization, men
often possess and utilize organizational resources to exclude women
from some of the better areas of developing employment
(Hartmann 1976; Walby 1986). As women gain political citizenship
they are able to more effectively contest this exclusion from the
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public. This gendered struggle, in combination with a developing
capitalist economy, is leading towards the transformation of the gen-
der regime from a domestic to a public form (Walby 1990).
Once women’s employment has started to grow and the domes-
tic sector to decline a new era begins. The productivity in the mar-
ket sector of the economy usually grows as a result of economic
development. This is associated with increased capital, the devel-
opment and use of new and improved technology in machines, as
well as the increase in human capital and skills. These developing
forces of production are entwined with emerging forms of relations
of production which enable the greater inclusion of women. This
tilts the balance of productivity between labour in the household
and market sectors in favour of the latter. The output in goods and
services per hour worked increases in the market sector relative to
the household sector. The shifting balance of productivity is demon-
strated in the changing rewards to the use of women’s time and the
rise in women’s wages in the market sector compared with
the value of the goods and services that they can produce with the
same amount of labour in the home. Women’s wages go up as they
increase their human capital through more education and spend
more time in employment (Joshi and Paci 1998; Budig and England
2001; Walby and Olsen 2002; Olsen and Walby 2004). This process
is described within a variety of theoretical frameworks from
Marxism (Braverman 1974) to neoclassical economics (Mincer 1962;
Becker 1965, 1981; Mincer and Polachek 1974), to feminist eco-
nomics (Bergmann 1986; Gardiner 1997; Humphries 1998).
Changes in the economy lead to the substitution of publicly pro-
duced goods and services for household production. These goods
and services are sometimes obtained from the market and some-
times provided by the state or polity. The purchase of these com-
modities is often associated with an increase in women’s earnings
as there is more money in the household to buy these goods and
services from outside the household for use within it. There has
been a reduction in household production as a result of the purchase
of substitute goods and services from the national and global mar-
ketplace. This takes several forms. There is an increase in domestic
production goods, such as heating systems, fridges, washer-dryers
and dishwashers, which reduces the amount of labour time
(Gershuny 2000; Silva 2000), although some of this potentially
‘freed up’ time is used to increase the quality of provision rather
than reduce labour time (Bose 1979). There is an increase in the
purchase of services and goods from outside the home, such as
ready-made clothes, pre-processed food, meals from restaurants
and take-ways, and care services for children and elderly relatives,
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such as nannies and cleaners. There is a decline in time spent in
household production (Gershuny 2000). There is a global compo-
nent here: goods and labourers from the South enter households
in the North. Domestic appliances may be wholly or partially
manufactured in countries where labour is cheaper than in those
where the appliances are used. Global care-chains involving
migrant labour from the South provide care-work in households
in the North enabling Northern women to be employed, though
this is more common in the USA than in Europe (Hochschild 2000;
Yeates 2005). In this way homes in the North derive benefit ulti-
mately from the labour in the South. Second, the carers in the
North may be migrants from the South, seeking wages that may
then be remitted to the South (Parreñas 2001).
These changes coevolve with changes in the household form and
structure, and in the number of children that a household raises.
Within two-parent households, there has been a very slight change
in the distribution of domestic labour within the household, with
women doing slightly less and men very slightly more than before,
especially concerning the care of children (Gershuny 2000), with
significant differences between countries (Aliaga 2006). There has
been an increase in the number of one-parent households, largely
lone mother households, in which mothers do almost all of the
domestic labour including care-work (Hobson 1994). There is a
reduction in the amount of household labour associated with the
decline in fertility (Hobcraft 1987), since there are fewer children to
look after. The decline in fertility associated with the transition in
the form of the gender regime is significant, although it varies espe-
cially with the level of state support (Castles 2003).
There are two major ways in which the state or polity can promote
the transition to the free wage labour for women: the provision of
services, especially care-work, which would otherwise have to be
purchased on the market, and the regulation of employment and edu-
cation so as to remove discriminatory barriers to women’s employ-
ment and to facilitate the combination of care-work and employment
for both women and men. These are not uniform changes, but vary
significantly between countries. Further, the direction of change is
not simply uni-directional and linear. These issues are addressed
through an examination of childcare provision, the gendered regula-
tion of employment, and early industrialization. Increases in both
childcare provision and in the gender equality regulation of employ-
ment are common across many countries, but the extent of their pro-
vision is highly varied.
The care of children is a central focus of policies to increase the
provision of care outside the home, though elder care policies are
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increasingly important. This may take place either through the direct
establishment of places for childcare, or through the provision of
funds to facilitate this occurring. There are further forms of care for
the elderly and disabled that are similarly organized and have simi-
lar implications. The provision of this care plays a significant role in
facilitating the employment of mothers who may otherwise have
chosen to look after children in a domestic setting. The greater the
extent of state childcare, the higher and more rapidly the rate of
female employment rises. However, high levels of female employ-
ment do also occur without state support, when households can
afford to purchase services on the market, as is the case in the USA.
There are a variety of forms of state intervention and a complexity of
effects. State supported childcare is most developed in social demo-
cratic Nordic countries. However, the increase in state support for
childcare is occurring not only in the Nordic countries, but in others
as well, including those that have been labelled neoliberal and con-
servative corporatist, as well as in countries undergoing recession
(OECD 2007). It is increasing in countries conventionally considered
neoliberal, including the UK, which has seen substantial increases in
state support for childcare since 1997 (Sainsbury 1994, 1996; Fraser
1997; Mahon 1997, 2002; O’Connor et al. 1999; Hobson 2000; Wincott
2006; Nishikawa and Tanaka 2007). It is also increasing in countries
considered by some to be ‘conservative corporatist’, since even the
German government is increasing funding for childcare from 2005
(Pearse 2005). In Sweden, despite a severe recession in the early
1990s during which the state curtailed the level and access to many
social benefits, there was an increase in the proportion of children
utilizing state childcare (Palme et al. 2002).
The second major form of polity intervention that promotes
women’s employment is the removal of patriarchal barriers in the
labour market and their replacement by legislation to regulate the
workplace so as to limit discrimination and also make it easier to
combine care-work and employment (Zabalza and Tzannatos 1985;
Pyle 1990; Pillinger 1992; Hoskyns 1996; Joshi and Paci 1998; Walby
1999b, 2004a; European Commission 2007a). The promotion of
education for girls and women is associated with economic growth
(Klasen 2002).
The form of the polity affects both the speed and the nature of
the transition. In some countries polities speed or catalyse the tran-
sition, in others they slow or dampen the transition. In some coun-
tries there are competing polities that push in opposite directions,
for example, a religious polity committed to a domestic gender
regime, a democratic state committed to a public gender regime,
and the EU that promotes a public gender regime.
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The political processes involved in these changes are not always
centred in the country where the changes are taking place. Global
feminist waves, with new civil societal and political projects, at
repeated intervals have been associated with these changes. These
waves have included conceptions of human rights and equal rights
(Berkovitch 1999) as well as specifically feminist ideas. Sometimes
the outcome is a change in the direction of the wave, sometimes it
is a reaction against it. Sometimes there are opportunities for
alliances with socialist class forces, leading to a renewed social
democratic project; sometimes there are not.
During the transition from domestic labour to free wage labour,
women are changing their political preferences along with their mate-
rial position. This parallels the earlier process during industrialization
when working men emerged not only as an economic class but also
as a political force, though with varying impact depending on
alliances with other social forces. These changes in the gender com-
position of employment are generating a new political constituency
that favours the development of public services of education, health,
and care. Employed women are becoming the new champions of
social democracy (see Chapters 4 and 10). The increased representa-
tion of women in civil society organizations including trade unions as
well as in parliaments has contributed to the development of a polit-
ical project to regulate employment for gender equality and to
develop childcare and other public services. The implications of this
project depend on alliances between supporting groups and the his-
torical legacy of political and industrial institutions. This has effects on
the governance of the economy, which are only just beginning to be
seen. Employed women are the force behind the defence of public
services and the expansion of childcare services; they are also the force
behind the regulation of employment to promote gender equality and
the combination of care-work with employment. There is a positive
feedback loop connecting the increased employment of women with
the changes in the regulation of employment and the provision of
welfare, which in turn increase the employment of women. This
change also has implications for the defence of the project of social
democracy. The new constituency of employed women is likely to
ally themselves with projects seeking public services.
The emergent public gender regime can take either a neoliberal
or a social democratic form. The outcome depends at least partly
on the institutional legacy and on the political resources of poten-
tial allies during the period of transition. This moment is a critical
turning point for the form of the gender regime.
This gender transition has implications for the rate of economic
growth of the overall economy. The income of households rises
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due to women’s increased employment, thereby increasing their
purchases and further driving the economy forward. The timing
and rate of the transition to free wage labour and the rate of eco-
nomic growth are sometimes connected with positive feedback
loops, with economic growth spurts appearing at such moments. In
these cases the rate of economic growth cannot be explained with-
out reference to the transformation of these complex inequalities.
The rapid growth of the Swedish economy in the 1970s and the
Irish economy during the 1990s has been associated with a sub-
stantial increase in women’s employment (see Chapter 10).
The economy is not yet modern anywhere. Until the second
great transformation is complete and women and minorities are
free wage labourers, then we are not yet modern. There is more
than one moment during the transition to economic modernity and
these differ for different regimes of inequality. The transition for
women is later than that for men – it is not yet complete, its con-
sequences are still happening.
Gender relations in the economy are not reducible to class rela-
tions. In some aspects of economic inequality, employment regula-
tion, and welfare provision, gender inequalities are moving in a
different direction from class inequalities. One of the major reasons
for this is that the transformation of women’s labour from domes-
tic to free wage labour is still ongoing; gender labour relations are
not yet fully modern.
The transformation of the gender regime from the domestic to pub-
lic form is an important driver of changes in the contemporary global
economy. Not only does it in itself constitute a major restructuring of
economic and other inequalities between women and men, but it also
changes aspects of the rest of the economy partly through its restruc-
turing of employment and welfare relations and partly because it
gives rise to a new political constituency with a tendency to support
social democracy.
Global Processes and Economic
Inequalities
Are global processes increasing economic inequality, or not? Is eco-
nomic inequality increasing (or decreasing) for reasons within
countries rather than the global level? Are changes due to some
interaction between these global and local processes? When looking
at inequality, it has been usual to consider it within a country, so
the comparisons are with other people living in the same country.
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In a global era, might it be more appropriate to compare everyone
in the world and not merely in the same country? What are the
implications for conclusions about the shape and level of inequality
of taking the country, regional, or the global level as the focus?
Inequalities between countries do not necessarily change in the
same direction and speed as inequalities within countries. What are
the implications of taking account of complex inequalities other
than class, such as gender, in this analysis?
Globalization is not new. Rather, it is a general feature of capital-
ist expansion (Marx 1954). There have been waves of globalization
before this current one, associated with the expansion of different
European empires, including those of the Dutch and British (Arrighi
1994; Chase-Dunn et al. 2000). Global economic inequality concerns
not only money and class, but also inequalities associated with gen-
der, ethnicity, and nation. The British Empire created a distinctive
form of slavery, using force supported by the military to remove
people from Africa and transport them to colonies in the Caribbean
and the USA where they would grow the raw materials, such as cot-
ton and sugar, that were needed to support British industry. British
cotton manufacturers depended on the production of cotton, and
their industrial working class ate sugar that for them was cheap, all
at the expense of the African slaves (Walvin 1992). The inclusion of
an account of these coercive transnational trades is necessary to
understand the rapid development of the British and US economies.
While that form of slavery no longer exists, it still leaves its mark in
the racialization and economic and social position of minority ethnic
groups within the USA, the UK, and elsewhere (Rex 1973), and is an
important contributor to the weak development of the welfare state
in the USA (Quadagno 1994; Manza 2000).
Economies have never been fully nationally bounded, but the
current wave of globalization further reduces the significance of
national states in regulating economies. The conventional view that
an economy maps neatly onto a polity and a civil society in a given
territory thereby constituting a society and a nation-state (e.g.
Giddens 1990) is rejected here. Rather the economy, polity, vio-
lence, and civil society are each seen to have a different spatial and
temporal reach. They overlap, but not completely so; nor are they
nested in a simple hierarchical manner.
Capital takes several forms, some of which have a wider spatial
reach than others. The conventional focus was once on fixed or
industrial capital in machinery and buildings but finance capital is of
increasing importance, with implications for globalization since it can
speed further and faster around the world than the relatively fixed
industrial capital (Strange 1986; Young 2000). The development of
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new financial instruments using synthetic securities increase rather
than reduce the level of risk in economies world-wide (Tavakoli
2003), producing ‘bubbles’ and crises in financial markets in the USA
that began to spread around the world in 2007–2008 (Soros 2008).
During early industrialization there is often an increase in eco-
nomic inequality within countries which is followed by a plateau and
then a decline: this is known as the ‘Kuznets curve’ (Kuznets 1955).
Have recent global processes ended the slow decline in inequality
associated with the demise of low wage agriculture? Are global
processes eroding differences between countries, levelling down to
the lowest level (Crouch and Streeck 1997; Standing 1999)? Or do dif-
ferences between countries remain? In 1950, Latin America was the
most unequal region in the world, followed by continental Europe,
East Asia, South Asia, the Nordic countries, and the Anglo countries
(based on measurements of the mean Gini index by macro-region:
see Mann and Riley 2006). Have these regional differences been
maintained or restructured in the recent period of globalization?
In the period from industrialization to the mid-1970s the evidence
is unequivocal: the rich countries got richer more rapidly than the
poor, increasing the economic inequalities between countries.
While in the early nineteenth century the average incomes in the
richest countries were around four times greater than those in the
poorest, by the end of the twentieth century their incomes were 30
times greater (Firebaugh 1999). Inequalities between countries are
composed of two elements: the extent of the exploitation of one
country by another, and the differences in the rate of economic
growth. In a global system the terms of trade tend to favour the
stronger richer countries, which are then able to influence global
regulations in order to suit their own interests; they are able to
change the ‘fitness landscape’ in which all countries operate so as
to advantage themselves. Between-country inequalities are also
affected by the rate of economic growth. If rich countries grow
more quickly than poor ones, then the inequalities between coun-
tries increase: if rich countries grow more slowly than poor ones,
then the inequalities between countries decrease.
What global processes?
Globalization involves several different types of processes including:
global flows of capital, trade and people; global financial institu-
tions; global hegemons; and global waves. It is important to differ-
entiate between the forms of these global processes and the content
that they carry rather than conflate these into a single process of
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globalization. Neoliberalism is not an inevitable consequence of
globalization, but instead a key project carried by and implicated in
some global processes; and always contested.
Global capital flows
Increased flows of financial and industrial capital are a key feature
of the current wave of globalization. The movement of capital out
of the North in search of cheaper labour in the South is implicated
in the increase in inequalities in countries in the North; of course,
such flows of capital may also be associated with economic growth
in the South. The strongest case for globalization increasing eco-
nomic inequality focuses on the increased amount and speed of
flows of capital associated with new information and communica-
tion technologies, transport, and political restructuring. Increased
global flows of capital are seen to lead to a shift in the balance of
power between capital and labour and a reduction in the capacity
of states to support good conditions of work and the welfare of
workers and citizens. Global capital flows have been linked to
processes of deregulation and the degradation of the conditions of
working life as a result of the increased global interconnections
consequent on new ICTs, which tilts the balance of power between
capital and labour towards capital partly because it is more mobile
than labour (Castells 1996, 1997, 1998; Crouch and Streeck 1997;
Standing 1999; Sassen 2001), although there are debates as to the
extent to which capital goes ‘regime shopping’ (Traxler and
Woitech 2000). The reduction in (or the threat of a reduction in)
employment reduces the bargaining capacity of labour as com-
pared with capital (Alderson and Nielson 2002). This engages a
process through which states reduce social protection and increase
the flexibility of their workforces in order to follow prevailing views
about the best way to compete in a global marketplace (Cerny
1996). Martin and Schumann (1997) see global capital undermining
the conditions of working life; Crouch and Streeck (1997) see cap-
ital undermining national welfare states; Sennett (1998) argues that
these changes are leading to a corrosion of character since people
need the stability of the old ways of working. These divisions are
re-configured spatially, reducing the extent to which these are pri-
marily intra-national inequalities and increasing the extent to which
they are inequalities between countries as a result of the position
of different countries within a global market, though some signifi-
cant development of local elites continues. The positioning of
countries depends on whether they are a core or peripheral coun-
try within a global system, their relationship with global hegemons
and regional networks, as well as on local developments such as in
Walby-3874-Ch-03:Walby-3874-Ch-03.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 118
E
co
n
o
m
ies
119
education (Reich 1993), form of governance structures (Evans
1995), and telecommunications (Huws et al. 1999).
During the 1990s and the start of the twenty-first century, there
was an increase in ‘private equity’ as compared with equity invested
in companies that are quoted on the stock market and subject to
public scrutiny and reporting requirements. Similarly avoiding such
controls is the development of ‘off-shore’ tax havens to avoid
scrutiny and taxation. These developments of even more mobility by
capital reduce democratic control over capital and its taxation.
Finance capital has different global dynamics from that of indus-
trial or fixed capital. With globalization there is a stock market open
somewhere around the world almost all the time; exchanges can take
place electronically and near-instantaneously. The increased size and
speed of the flows of finance around the world contribute to the sig-
nificance of the speculatory gambles that can lead to financial crises.
Financial bubbles are a routine feature of global financial markets, in
which financial speculation or gambling inflates values before a
crash. Usually, the richer speculators will be able to make profits dur-
ing the up-swing while the crash will disproportionately affect
smaller investors (Strange 1986; Perez 2002). Such bubbles are com-
mon in financial markets because of the lack of direct information
that can be used to stabilize a valuation; instead, a reflexive process
among traders will tend to exaggerate both the up-swings and down-
swings. Financial markets are often far from equilibrium rather than
being self-equilibrating (Soros 2008).
The volatility of global financial markets has increased since 1999
with the invention of credit derivatives – including synthetic securiti-
zations or collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps –
to manipulate financial risk. Since the 1990s until the crash of 2008
there had been a rapid increase in the scale of this market. The orig-
inal intent was to use securitization to move mortgage-backed secu-
rities and other loans off the bank’s balance sheet risk, reducing its
exposure to risk. However, the practice has developed in such a way
that banks have increased their exposure to risk. This was com-
pounded by poor assessment of the risk by the ostensibly specialized
risk rating agencies. More important, however, was that the general
dismantling of the regulation of the financial markets that had been
introduced after the Great Depression of the 1930s (Krugman 2008;
Soros 2008) as part of the neoliberal project. Although there were sig-
nificant variations in the extent to which national states deregulated
their financial markets, the USA and the UK being among the most
extreme, the consequences have been global (even though uneven)
such is the extent of the global interconnectivity and flows of finance.
During 2007 and 2008 a series of escalating financial crises started in
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the USA and spread around most of the rest of the world (see
Chapter 11). Global capital flowed towards the core countries from
the semi-periphery as part of the process of this recapitalization of
banks in the core but to the detriment of the economies outside the
core. In this way the global financial crisis, though started in the USA,
has had disproportionate effects upon poorer countries.
Global trade flows
Global trade concerns movements in goods and services rather than
capital and some definitions of globalization focus on these elements.
Does the current increase in global trade increase or decrease eco-
nomic inequality? This question can be answered with either a focus
on the economic inequalities within countries or the economic
inequalities between countries.
First, there are implications for inequalities within countries
where the argument is parallel to the arguments about the flow of
capital. The increased flow of goods and services brings workers in
the North into closer competition with less well paid workers in the
South, particularly the less skilled workers in the North. There are
fewer workers in the South who can match highly skilled workers
with high levels of education and human capital. This reduces the
demand for less skilled workers more than would be so with skilled
and highly educated workers, thus driving up wage inequalities in
the North (Wood 1994).
Second, there are implications for economic inequalities between
countries which depend on the relative rate of growth of different
economies. There are two radically divergent arguments here. On the
one hand the world systems, especially dependency, theorists argue
that the terms of trade are so organized by global hegemons in their
own interests that trade is an instrument in which the rich North
exploits the poor South, or rather, the core countries exploit those in
the periphery of the world system (Wallerstein 1974; Frank 1975). The
rules of world trade are set not by a democratically elected world
council but by the world’s richest countries in their own interests, with
tariffs in place to protect their goods (for example, US steel and EU
agricultural production) that are combined with demands to remove
tariffs for the rest of the world. On the other hand, the World Trade
Organization and others (Dollar and Kray 2001) have argued that
globalization, understood as increased world trade, encourages eco-
nomic growth and thereby reduces poverty and inequality. It encour-
ages economic growth because free trade allows countries to better
specialize in their comparative advantages and adds pressure for the
removal of the protection of special interests. Here the data as well as
the arguments are fiercely contested (Wade 2004). For example, the
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concepts of ‘poverty’ and ‘inequality’ need to be distinguished.
Economic growth does have a tendency to lift people above a
given threshold of poverty – for example, defined as living on less
than $1 dollar or $2 dollars a day (UN Millennium Development
Goals 2007a) – but this is not the same as reducing inequality, under-
stood either as the gap between the top and the bottom of a coun-
try’s population or as the gap between rich or poor countries.
Global flows of people
The restructuring of patterns of inequality is associated with flows of
people and the consequent reconstitution of national and ethnic rela-
tions within countries (Urry 2007). Migration is not new (Therborn
1995), but takes new forms in a global era (Cohen 1997). Migrants
may not have access to full citizenship entitlements, leaving them
especially vulnerable to economic exploitation since they might be
reluctant to seek help from the authorities. In ‘global care chains’
(Hochschild 2000), caring labour is mobile from the South to the
North (Yeates 2005); unequal social relations are embedded in these
global chains, constituted by class, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and
position in the North or South. While some movements of people
are voluntary, and indeed eagerly embarked upon, others are
coerced, with a consequent extreme vulnerability to continuing
inequalities and violence. Human trafficking is one of the more per-
nicious forms of inequality associated with increased global mobil-
ity (Raymond et al. 2002; Huda 2006).
Global institutions
Global institutions that affect economies include those that are focused
on finance as well as those more concerned with security and with jus-
tice. Global financial institutions are implicated in increasing economic
inequalities not only because they are becoming more important in the
regulation of economies around the world but also insofar as they
carry a neoliberal project. They include formal multi-lateral institutions,
especially the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the
World Trade Organization; international regimes with agreed rules of
conduct, such as the Bretton Woods 1944–1971 monetary agreement;
and more informal gatherings of leaders of the world’s largest
economies such as the G8 and G20 (Keohane 1989; Ruggie 1996, 1998;
Held et al. 1999). The International Monetary Fund lends money to
governments in financial crisis but attaches stringent conditions to the
loans, sometimes demanding the significant restructuring of the gov-
ernment’s budget and the way a country’s economy is governed. It
also monitors economic and financial developments and provides
expertise (International Monetary Fund 2007). The World Bank lends
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money to developing countries in a way that is supposed to be
intended to assist their economic development (World Bank 2007a).
The World Trade Organization oversees the rules and import tariffs
used in world trade; it has a long-standing ambition to reduce tariffs
and to promote free trade, engaging in negotiations over many years
to take forward this project (World Trade Organization 2007). While
such international institutions are more important than ever before,
they are not entirely new; the nineteenth century also had an inter-
national monetary system (Hirst and Thompson 1996). The neolib-
eral ‘Washington Consensus’ promoted by such institutions is
contested in various formal and informal ways. For example, within
the UN the ‘Group of 77’ – established in 1964 and with 130 mem-
bers and a permanent institutional structure by 2007 – represents
developing states in global trade negotiations, although it is not as
powerful as the US-led institutions (Group of 77 2007). Further, the
International Labour Organization (ILO), founded in 1919, has long
promoted worker rights (Thomas 1996; ILO 2005).
It is not only the existence and powers of global financial institu-
tions that are important, but also the kinds of projects, policies, and
programmes that they run. Since the 1970s these institutions have
largely operated within a neoliberal understanding of economics and
their actions have had a tendency to increase economic inequality. A
wave of financial deregulation, with the demise of the Bretton Woods
agreement in 1971, entailed the removal of controls on the movement
of capital, thereby enabling the development of rapid movements of
capital around the world. The conditions attached to loans by the IMF
and World Bank often require the structural adjustment of economies
away from public services and towards greater privatization (Sparr
1994; Stiglitz 2002). At moments of financial crisis governments and
governing elites are often divided and in a weak position to resist the
neoliberal policies of the global financial institutions, despite their
uneven record in assisting economic recovery (Stiglitz 2002; Klein
2007). This neoliberal content is linked to increased gender inequal-
ity (Elson 1991, 1995; Sparr 1994; Peterson and Runyan 1999; Grown
et al. 2000; Rankin 2001; Dennis and Zuckerman 2006), although
there have long been attempts at taking gender more seriously in
global financial institutions (Murphy 1995; Haxton and Olsson 1999).
However, the neoliberal content of the programmes of these gov-
ernmental institutions is contested. Countries from the South refused to
sign up to the Doha round of trade negotiations that had been organized
by the WTO and were aimed at removing trade protections. Protesters
at meetings of these entities, most famously of the WTO in Seattle in
1999, have ensured that an alternative view is seen and heard.
Intellectuals and activists have challenged the indicators that are used
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to measure progress (Bardhan and Klasen 1999; UNDP 2006), fighting
both outside and inside the global financial institutions (Wade 2002).
For example, the rate of economic growth is no longer the sole indi-
cator of progress for the IMF and World Bank, which have adopted
the broader UN Millennium Development Goals that include human
capabilities such as education and health in addition to economic
growth (UN 2007a).
The global financial crisis of 2008 led to calls for a new ‘Bretton
Woods’ to restructure the global financial architecture to ensure that
such a crisis could not be repeated. Such restructuring would
involve a greater regulation of finance – a further challenge to the
neoliberal project.
Financial institutions are not the only international institutions to be
relevant to the shape of economic development. Decisions over the
legitimacy and conduct of war and economic sanctions, made by the
UN Security Council, are also important for economic inequalities.
Global hegemons
Global hegemons are important in setting the rules of the global
financial system and the global security system, even when these
decisions are ostensibly taken by international bodies. Since the
middle of the twentieth century this has been the USA. Previously,
the global hegemon was the UK.
The USA is not uncontested as a global hegemon as the EU is an
increasingly powerful entity on the global stage. The EU regularly
disagrees with the USA in global financial institutions such as the
World Trade Organization, over matters such as the regulation of
world trade and the use of the precautionary principle in the assess-
ment of risk in environmental matters (Winickoff et al. 2005). With
the rapid economic development of China, at some point in the
future there is likely to be a further re-balancing of global power
over economic policy (Hutton 2003).
Global waves
Global political and civil societal waves are a further form of global
process. Neoliberalism is a powerful global wave. Neoliberalism
started as a project in civil society that became a governmental pro-
gramme in the world’s most powerful hegemon during the Reagan
presidency of 1981–1989 and is now rooted in the USA’s social for-
mation and in many global financial institutions. It has become the
preferred political project of US capital. It is important not to con-
flate the form of global processes with the content that they carry.
The neoliberal project gained support in the context of fears about
global economic pressures, which were used to support arguments
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about the inevitability of welfare retrenchment in order to maintain
economic competitiveness (Schwartz 2001). Crisis situations may be
used as opportunities to restructure (Klein 2007). Indeed the reversal
of the prioritization of low inflation and low unemployment towards
low inflation often involves an apparent crisis, which provides an
opportunity for neoliberal restructuring (Korpi 2003). The political
project of neoliberalism centrally involves a deregulation of the mar-
ket and a reduction in the provision of welfare by the state; it also
includes de-unionization and pressure to keep the minimum wage
low. The political pressure to deregulate the workplace has led in
some countries to the removal of protections for workers, as well as
a downward pressure on the extent and quality of welfare provision
(Cerny 1995, 1996; Held 1995; Martin and Schumann 1997; Standing
1999).
There are other global waves of political and civil societal practices
that carry quite different projects. Among those that concern the
economy are: the anti-neoliberal/global justice project; rights (includ-
ing both equal rights and human rights), and feminism. These global
waves spread suddenly around the world in non-linear ways and
interact with quite different sets of social relations in diverse coun-
tries. Global waves carry not only neoliberalism but also other con-
testing civil societal projects. For example, the protest against the
neoliberal globalization project at the meeting of the WTO in Seattle in
1999 was a key moment in the generation of a global anti-neoliberal-
capitalism wave. In 2008, the aftermath of the global financial crisis
is providing a new context for social democratic challenges to the
‘market fundamentalism’ (Soros 2008) of neoliberalism.
Country processes
Global processes are not the only forces restructuring economies
and their inequalities. Processes at the country level not only inter-
act with global processes and neoliberal projects, but can also gen-
erate pressures towards the increase or decrease of economic
inequality. Some of these processes apply to all countries though at
different times; some of them apply unevenly to countries.
Changing balance of economic sectors within a country
The changing balance of economic sectors has implications for the
shape and extent of inequality in a country because some sectors,
usually the newly developing ones, will pay higher wages than oth-
ers. When only a few people work in a new sector these higher
wages have only a marginal effect on the overall wage distribution,
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but as these numbers grow they stretch the overall wage gap
thereby increasing the overall economic inequality which reaches its
maximum when the two sectors are equal in size. As the high wage
sector continues to expand and the low wage sector reduces, the
numbers on low wages decline thereby reducing the overall eco-
nomic inequality.
The Kuznets (1955) curve, concerning the increase and then
decrease in economic inequality in countries undergoing indus-
trialization, is accounted for by the changing balance between
the low wage agricultural and higher wage industrial sectors. As
the latter grows relative to the former inequality rises until the
sectors are of equal size thereafter declining. When all of the
workforce are in the industrial sector, there is no ‘Kuznets’ effect
based on the decline of the low wage agricultural to continue to
decrease inequality.
While Kuznets looked only at the relationship between the
agricultural and industrial/service sectors, a parallel analysis could
be applied to the changing relationship of other economic sectors,
in particular the knowledge economy and the domestic economy.
The knowledge economy is a new type of economic sector with
average higher wages than the older non-knowledge sector. As the
higher paying knowledge grows relative to the older sectors, then
inequality increases until they are of equal size thereafter declining.
The domestic sector is an old economic sector that creates no mon-
etary income for those who work in it; its coexistence with the mon-
etized economy contributes to overall economic inequality. As the
domestic sector declines in size, so its contribution to economic
inequality in the economy as a whole declines. This is in addition to
its effects on gender inequality, between men (disproportionately in
the new monetized sector) and women (disproportionately in the
domestic sector), which should decline as the domestic sector
declines. This could be described as ‘gendering the Kuznets curve’.
The knowledge economy
In the latest phase of economic development knowledge itself has
become a factor of production, in human skills and in the develop-
ment of new information and communication technologies, and in
their many interconnected assemblages (Castells 1996, 1997, 1998).
There is a new form of capital in addition to financial and industrial
capital – human capital, made up of skills and experience. The scale
and significance of the knowledge economy have been much dis-
puted: sceptics suggest that much is merely over-blown hype (Thrift
1999) while others consider that it is transforming the totality of employ-
ment (Handy 1994). The knowledge economy has been associated
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with ostensibly divergent accounts of its implications for social
inequalities. For some, the development of a knowledge-based econ-
omy provides higher skilled jobs with greater autonomy, flatter hier-
archies, more flexible working time schedules, and an improved
quality of working life (Flores and Gray 2000). The belief that a
knowledge-based economy can provide high quality as well as more
jobs underlies EU economy policy as expressed in the 2000 Lisbon
European Council’s adoption of the goal that the European Union
should become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (Rodrigues 2003;
European Commission 2007f). For others, the development of a
knowledge economy stretches the gap between wages, thereby
increasing inequality by producing larger numbers of workers in the
higher skilled occupations (Glyn 2001; Smeeding 2002).
One of the reasons for the different accounts is that different defin-
itions are being used that produce quite different profiles and scales of
the knowledge economy. Is it high technology and science, embed-
ded or encoded in machines? Or is it knowledge, embrained in highly
educated and trained people? Or is it the jobs associated with new
ways of processing information by using computers? Three different
kinds of knowledge economy can be distinguished. First is high tech-
nology manufacturing, including aerospace, computers, electronics-
communications, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and scientific
instruments. Second are the knowledge intensive services, including
water and air transport, post and telecommunications, financial inter-
mediation, real estate, computer services, research and development
services, education, health and social work, recreational, cultural, and
sporting activities. A third kind lies in between and is associated with
information, including publishing, printing and the reproduction of
recorded media, post and telecommunications, computing-related
activities including software, and recreational, cultural, and sporting
activities (European Commission 2001; Eurostat 2005a, 2005b; OECD
2005; UN Statistics Division 2005a, 2005b; Shire 2007; Walby 2007).
The first sector – the high technology manufacturing – fits the
image of the new economy as based on science and technology. It
is a machine-based conception of innovation. The second – knowl-
edge intensive services – is quite different, being based on people
possessing knowledge not machines. This knowledge or human cap-
ital is developed in education (Becker 1993; Reich 1993) as well as
within workplaces in the dynamic relationship between the tacit and
explicit knowledge of workers and managers (Nonaka and Takeuchi
1995; Nonaka and Nishiguchi 2001; Nishikawa and Tanaka 2007). A
considerable proportion of workers in knowledge intensive services
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work in health and education (Walby 2007b). The third type of sec-
tor, focused on information, best fits the image of the workers that are
more autonomous, more flexible, in better quality jobs, coordinated
through flatter hierarchies and networks because the nature of the
work requires cooperation and communication rather than coordina-
tion through simple hierarchies. They have greater flexibility in the
use of labour time and a reduction in certain types of spatial con-
straints on where work is carried out, facilitating the development of
new forms of careers and attachments to the providers of work (Reich
1991; Drucker 1993; Handy 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Castells
1996, 1997, 1998; Seltzer and Bentley 1999; Flores and Gray 2000;
Nonaka and Nishiguchi 2001; Lam 2002; Rodrigues 2003).
The high technology sector is a very small proportion of the
workforce as is the information sector; by contrast the knowledge
intensive sector is substantial. In the UK, high technology manu-
facturing is 2 per cent, information 4 per cent, and knowledge
intensive services 42 per cent of the workforce (Walby 2006). While
the information sector is most frequently taken as emblematic of
the knowledge economy, it is tiny; knowledge intensive services
are more representative. The most distinctive feature of the knowl-
edge economy is not the development of more sophisticated
machines, but the development of new types of knowledge held by
human beings. It is the ownership of this knowledge, this human
capital, by workers themselves that has the potential to change the
nature of social and economic hierarchies.
Has there been a larger increase in higher or lower level jobs?
Even when technology is cutting edge there is no necessary reason
why the associated occupations should be disproportionately high
skill (Fleming et al. 2004). However, the evidence here is of a dis-
proportionate increase in the higher level jobs associated with the
knowledge economy: within the European Union between 1995
and 2000 over 60 per cent of new jobs were created in the high-
skilled non-manual occupations (European Commission 2001).
While most of the early concerns over the implications of glob-
alization concerned the pay and conditions of those at the bottom
of the job market in advanced economies, part of the growth in
inequality is associated with an increase in incomes and wealth at
the top as well as the bottom end of the economy. These processes
concern not only class, but also gender relations (Walby et al.
2007). Are women winners in a new economy that places a high
value on human capital derived from the high levels of education
increasingly obtained by women, or are they the losers in a segre-
gated workforce confined to the non-technological parts of the
economy (Brine 2006; Mósesdóttir et al. 2006)? Serrano-Pascual
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and Mósesdóttir (2003) doubt that women benefit as much as men
from the high skill components of these developments for two
main reasons: first because of the role of occupational segregation
by sex, which remains in all labour markets (Anker 1998), and sec-
ond because women’s formal educational qualifications may trans-
late less well into employment assets than those of men.
If the knowledge economy is understood as the high end tech-
nology present in manufacturing and bioscience, then it is a small
proportion of the economy and overwhelmingly male. If the knowl-
edge economy is understood as highly expert people, then it is pre-
sent in services such as health and education and slightly more
populated by women than men (Shire 2007; Walby 2007b; Walby et
al. 2007). The shift in the economy towards a knowledge-based
economy places a higher premium on human capital. This advan-
tages those people who have acquired the relevant type and level of
education. Increasingly this is women, or rather women are increas-
ingly among those who are educated at the levels that facilitate their
participation in the knowledge economy. However, there is a need
for caution since the sex segregation of both education and employ-
ment means that there is no easy translation between education and
employment position (Mósesdóttir, Pascual and Remery 2006).
The development of the knowledge economy does tend to increase
the proportion of more highly skilled and better paid jobs.
Simultaneously, this tends to increase economic inequalities because it
stretches the wage spread (Glyn 2001; Smeeding 2002). The extent to
which this is a major rather than a minor contribution to economic
inequality needs to be treated with caution however, given the scale of
the other processes occurring at the same time (Card and DiNardo 2002).
The decline of the domestic economy
The decline of the domestic sector of the economy and the con-
comitant shift from domestic labour to free wage labour by women,
typically decreases the overall economic inequality as well as
specifically gendered economic inequality. This shrinking of an
economic sector that provides no monetary income while simulta-
neously increasing the proportion of adults who have some, rather
than no, monetary income is the reason for this. Thus, the upward
trend in the proportion of women in employment and the propor-
tion of the workforce that is female are both indicative of a decline
in overall economic inequality. The size of the gender pay gap is
another indicator of gendered economic inequality.
However, if economic inequality is measured by the inequality
between household units rather than individuals then any decline
in the domestic economy is rendered irrelevant, since this effect is
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hidden inside the household that is treated as the unit. This means
that measurements of inequality that use the household as the unit
are inadvisable.
Decline in economically-based constituencies for social democracy or not?
The level of priority given to economic equality by a polity depends
at least in part on the strength of the social forces that support such
a project. Traditionally, economic equality has been part of the social
democratic project that has been disproportionately supported by
male manual workers in manufacturing industries. With a decrease in
the size of this economic sector and the growth of the service sector,
there has been a decline in the size of the traditional class support for
social democracy (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). The decline of the
traditional base in electoral support in the male manual manufactur-
ing industry has been seen to at least partially explain this retreat
(Callaghan 2000) and transformation (Kitschelt 1994) of social democ-
racy, and thus the opening of the political space for neoliberalism. In
addition there has been a tendency for the dealignment of class and
voting practices (Crewe et al. 1977).
However, when gender and other complex inequalities are brought
into focus these arguments about the declining socio-economic base
for a social democratic project are brought into question. Employed
women tend to support the public provision of services and hence to
support those political parties and projects that are socially and demo-
cratically inclined. This has occurred most obviously in those coun-
tries where there is a near-full employment of women – Sweden and
the USA (Manza and Brooks 1998) – but is also emerging in many
advanced economies (Huber and Stephens 2001).
When gender as well as class forces are taken into account the
thesis that there is a decline in the socio-economic base for social
democratic projects is challenged.
Fiscal crisis of the welfare state?
One of the challenges to the thesis that global pressures are forcing
a retrenchment of the welfare state and hence its amelioration of eco-
nomic inequality is that there are long term domestic reasons for this.
The shift from an industrial to a post-industrial economy in the con-
text of the maturing of the welfare state produces fiscal pressures on
the welfare state that might account for its austerity (Pierson 2001).
The recent tendency towards austerity can be linked to the rise of the
service sector, which has little potential for increases in productivity,
the ageing of the population with consequent increases in expendi-
ture on pension and care needs (Pierson 2001), and changes in the
size and position of groups fighting over distribution (Iversen 2001).
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However, bringing gender into focus challenges some of these
arguments. The increase in women’s employment increases the pro-
portion of the population paying income tax while not in itself
increasing the numbers of those claiming benefits. The transforma-
tion of the gender regime thus potentially reduces the fiscal pressure
on the state. Therefore structural changes within a country could
have implications for the fiscal viability of welfare provision in either
direction and not only towards austerity.
Despite the global pressures, there has been little change in pub-
lic spending on social expenditure in OECD countries in the period
1990 to 2003 (OECD 2007b: 193). Public social expenditure very
slightly increased over this period, with many countries growing
during the period towards the peak in 1993 with a slight decline
since then. There are variations within this, such as a slight rise for
the UK since 1999 (associated with the change in government to
the Labour Party). However, since these figures include unemploy-
ment benefits they are affected by an increased expenditure asso-
ciated with high levels of unemployment (e.g. Sweden in 1993)
(Korpi 2003).
Political institutions and coalitions
Political actors and institutions at a country and regional level have
significant effects on the balance between neoliberalism and social
democracy, with implications for the regulation of finance and of
employment and the state provision of welfare. Insofar as they
experience global economic pressures, they interpret and mediate
them so that global processes may lead to new sources of differ-
ence rather than homogeneity. These national processes have been
thought of as a form of resilience or resistance to these global
processes (Swank 2002), but this may be better thought of as inter-
action or coevolution of these processes since the country and
regional practices can have implications for the global level. The
political institutions of advanced capitalist countries have different
kinds of capacities to respond to the challenges of global processes
as a consequence of forms of electoral system, the nature of inter-
est group representation, the relative centralization or decentraliza-
tion of policy-making authority and the structuring of welfare
programme provision, and only in those countries that have a more
liberal political structure do global pressures lead to reductions in the
welfare state while in the large welfare states of northern Europe
there has been little impact (Swank 2002). To the extent that such
institutions mediate the response to global pressures, there can be no
simple assertion that globalization leads to a general undermining of
the conditions of employment.
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An important set of such institutions is the trade unions, with their
density, influence, and resilience varying considerably between coun-
tries (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999). The neoliberal attack on trade
unions, the minimum wage, and other institutions that promote eco-
nomic equality has been stronger in some countries (such as the US
and UK) than in others. The significance of declines in unionization
and the minimum wage has featured strongly in several accounts of
increasing economic inequality in the USA (DiNardo et al. 1996; Lee
1999; Card and DiNardo 2002). Card and DiNardo (2002) assess the
thesis that rising income inequality is due to the skills-biased techni-
cal change associated with the development of the knowledge econ-
omy. They show that while in the USA wage inequality rose in the
1980s and stabilized in the 1990s there were continuing advances in
new computer technologies in the later as well as the earlier period.
They conclude by suggesting that a decline in the minimum wage is
the likely cause of the increase in wage inequality. DiNardo et al.
(1996) found that deunionization and the drop in real value of the
minimum wage were important factors in the rise of wage inequality
from 1979 to 1988. Lee (1999) finds that a decline in the real value
of the federal minimum wage was also important in explaining the
rise in wage inequality in the USA during the 1980s.
A different aspect of resilience and resistance is that of the build-
ing of new political coalitions and projects in which political actors
forge new projects, alliances, and institutions; new forms of part-
nership, social pacts, and corporatism (Hanké and Rhodes 2001);
and move from ‘social’ to ‘competitive corporatism’ (Rhodes 1998,
2001). The European Union itself is one example of the develop-
ment of a new political project and coalition that proactively
engages with global processes (Walby 1999b). These new political
projects and coalitions involve not only class forces but also forces
that are gendered and engage with religion and nation.
Summary
Globalization is made up of many different processes. These
include global flows of capital, trade and people; global institutions;
hegemons; networks; and waves. These global processes need to
be separately identified and not merged into a single process of
globalization. Economies are shaped by the mutual adaptation of
systems at a country level and these global processes, which
involve not only economies but also polities, violence, and civil
societies. These restructure inequalities in complex ways, as is
investigated empirically in Chapter 9 on ‘measuring progress’.
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Varieties of Political Economy
One important division is that between modern and premodern forms
of economy, while other distinctions can be made between modern
forms. Within the modern economy path dependent processes can
be identified in employment relations, welfare provision, and the
nature and regulation of finance. A key distinction is between
neoliberal and social democratic forms. In the neoliberal variety
there is little democratic intervention or regulation of employment
and finance as compared with the social democratic form; there is
much less state welfare provision than in the social democratic
form; and there is more economic inequality than in the social
democratic form.
Complex inequalities challenge the traditional categories and
analyses of varieties of employment relations and welfare provi-
sion. Rather than treating all social relations within the economy as
if they were the consequence of class relations there are significant
differences between regimes of inequality, in particular, between
those of class, gender, and ethnicity. Whether or not regimes of
inequality map onto each other should be treated as an empirical
question rather than as a presumption. There is a further question
as to whether all aspects of political economy are tightly coupled
or whether there is divergence between the varieties of employ-
ment regulation and welfare provision.
As well as identifying the different varieties of political economy it
is important to ask about their causes. This involves a consideration
of critical turning points and the different pathways and the institu-
tions that lock them in. These can occur at different times for differ-
ent regimes of inequality and involve different polities and social
forces. One question here is whether global processes are eroding
and ending the distinct pathways and varieties of economies.
The focus in this chapter and in the subsequent empirical analy-
sis is on employment regulation and welfare provision. However,
it is important to note that other aspects of the economy could be
subject to parallel analyses. In particular, there is considerable
variation between countries in the regulation of finance capital.
This is despite the extent of the globalization of finance capital,
often regarded as more globalized than other forms of capital. In
the USA and the UK there are few regulations of finance; new
financial instruments have been invented that lie outside of those
banking regulations introduced after previous crises in the bank-
ing and finance sector. However, in some EU Member States such
new forms of financial capital have not been encouraged – and
speculation and financial bubbles are less common and less
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severe as a consequence. This may be seen as a further aspect of
the differentiation of more neoliberal and more social democratic
forms of economies.
Varieties of employment relations
Early distinctions in forms of capitalism focused on changes over time.
These are indeed significant, but are not the main concern of this sec-
tion. One example of a temporal approach to differences in the form
of capitalism is that from Fordism to post-Fordism, where Fordism is
the social organization that was associated with mass production and
mass consumption, while post-Fordism or flexible specialization is the
social organization associated with craft specialization and niche con-
sumerism (Piore and Sabel 1984; Boyer and Durand 1997). Another
approach addresses the shift from a Keynesian welfare state to a
Schumpeterian workfare state (Jessop 2002).
Here interest lies in the varieties of employment relations across dif-
ferent countries at the same point in time. The existing analysis tends
to focus on those institutions associated with market-based produc-
tion, especially the nature of the relations between employers, labour,
and governmental institutions, sometimes in wider social contexts
(Olson 1982; Piore and Sabel 1984; Lash and Urry 1987, 1994; Streeck
1992; Crouch 1993; Hirst and Zeitlin 1997; Hollingsworth 1997;
Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Whitley 2000; Hall
and Soskice 2001; Streeck and Yamamura 2002; Swenson 2002;
Yamamura and Streeck 2003). These distinctions have often been typ-
ified as a dichotomy into which different groups of countries can be
clustered, though with varying conceptualization and with an empha-
sis on different institutions. These include the distinction between cor-
poratism and liberalism (Crouch 1993), liberal market or coordinated
market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001), institutionally thin and
thick societies (Streeck 1992), and liberal and non-liberal (Streeck and
Yamamura 2002); social democracy is often conflated with coordi-
nated or corporatist forms. These writers differ on a series of dimen-
sions. The main forces are differently conceptualized: capital, firms
(Hall and Soskice 2001), employers, employers’ organizations
(Swenson 2002), or service class (Lash and Urry 1987); workers, trade
unions, trade union density or coverage, collective bargaining, cen-
tralization or coordination (Gallie 1998; Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999),
worker representation in parties and government (Huber and
Stephens 2001); the welfare state. They vary in the extent to which
social institutions, arenas and forces beyond capital and labour are
included: welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990; Pierson 2001), educa-
tion and skills regime (Estevez et al. 2001), macroeconomic policy
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(Young 2000; Iversen 2001; Korpi 2003), civil society, culture and
organized religion (Lash and Urry 1994), political representation and
access to governance (Huber and Stephens 2001). There are differ-
ences in the extent to which the analysis is realist or constructionist,
focused on actors or structures (Herrigel 2005), and the extent to
which there is full integration of actors and institutions into a single
system or not, with implications for the extent of path dependency
(Morgan and Kubo 2005).
A slightly different approach from employment relations and capi-
talist production regimes is that of ‘corporatism’. The key distinction
is between liberal and corporatist, where the liberal form was pri-
marily coordinated through the market and the corporatist is coordi-
nated through institutions including employers, workers, and the state
(Schmitter 1974). The focus is on the extent to which the inherently
conflictual relationship between capital and labour is institutionalized
and mediated by the state. Corporatism is a form of economic gover-
nance that involves organizations of employers, trade unions, and
government making bargains and compromises in order to secure
their common interests in economic development. It is usually cen-
tralized at a national level, with meetings at periodic intervals to make
binding agreements (Olson 1982; Crouch 1993). Corporatism involves
compromises over the round of pay rises with usually the government
giving something to enhance worker incomes in some other way,
normally though not always in the form of a social wage or social
benefits. It is sometimes assumed that the leading form of corporatism
is its social democratic form, in the Nordic countries of Sweden,
Norway, Denmark, and Finland. However, this is far from always the
case. It has taken a more regressive form in relation to complex
inequalities other than class, as in the conservative corporatist forms
found in some parts of central Europe, such as Germany and Austria.
More recently, new forms of corporatism and corporatist analysis
have developed with a more nuanced analysis than that of a
dichotomy between liberal and corporatist, with different kinds of
corporatist arrangements or social pacts (Rhodes 1998, 2001;
Boucher and Collins 2003; Baccaro and Simoni 2007), social part-
nerships (Roche 2007), or ‘concertation’ (Ebbinghaus and Hassel
2000) being analysed. This includes ‘competitive corporatism’ in
countries such as the Netherlands and Ireland, which involves new
forms of distributional and productivity coalitions consolidated in
social pacts that prioritize economic growth and lowering unem-
ployment, with agreements on incomes policies, a reduction in the
social protection of elite groups, and a prioritization of education
and training (Rhodes 1998, 2001). In such types of corporatism, it
is necessary to distinguish between the form – in the sense of the
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partners to the agreement – and the content – which can include
not only social democratic but also neoliberal policies.
Amid this myriad of slightly differing distinctions, the distinction
between liberal and coordinated market economies has emerged as the
leading typology (Hall and Soskice 2001). Hall and Soskice (2001: 8)
distinguish between ‘liberal market economies’ (LMEs) in which
‘firms coordinate their activities primarily via hierarchies and com-
petitive market relations’ and ‘coordinated market economies’
(CMEs) in which ‘firms depend more heavily on non-market rela-
tionships to coordinate endeavours with other actors and to construct
their core competencies’. In LMEs the demand and supply of a mar-
ket are important, in CMEs the strategic interactions between firms
and other actors are important. The firm is placed as the central actor
in this analysis, rather than the relations between organizations of
capital and labour and the differential organizational strength of
labour. Nevertheless, the range of institutions considered relevant still
includes the traditional range of employer associations, trade unions,
share-holding networks, and legal systems. In addition, the institu-
tional structures for the acquisition of skill and other forms of human
capital are included. In liberal economies the individual acquisition
of skills and education in schools and colleges are more important
than employer-based systems, while in coordinated economies skill
acquisition is centred in employer-based systems that are supported
by the long-tenure of jobs so that both worker and employer can
benefit from such an investment.
The operationalization of the forms of employment regulation that
lie at the heart of the distinction between liberal and coordinated
varieties of capitalism is centred on the strictness of employment
protection (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). This is based on OECD (1994,
1997a) measures of the difficulty of employers dismissing workers,
calculated through the nature of the rules governing the hiring and fir-
ing of individuals and collective dismissals (redundancy). Estevez-Abe
and colleagues have added to this their own measure of company-
based protection, although (with the exception of Japan) this corre-
lates so highly with the state legislation-based measure that this
makes little difference to the relative position of the countries.
The approach by Hall and Soskice and others to the varieties of
capitalism entails a dichotomy in which social democracy is made
invisible, being subsumed within the category of ‘coordinated’
market economies. The empirical analysis tends to use Germany
as the emblematic example of coordination, rather than the social
democratic form of Sweden, in comparison with the USA as the
example of liberal economies. This obscuring of the socialist and
social democratic tradition of organizing advanced economies
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does not bring clarity to an analysis of the origin of this path-
dependent form. Few have attempted to build the project of coor-
dination, yet many have and still do attempt a social democratic
project. Germany is not the leading example of social democracy:
rather somewhere to its right, positioned in between a liberal and
social democratic form. A dichotomy based on liberal versus coor-
dinated capitalism is less helpful than one based on liberal versus
social democratic.
Employment protection legislation has developed over many
years. In countries with the greatest strictness of protection, this
was developed and consolidated in the post-war years, from the
1950s to the 1970s, during a period of social democratic ascen-
dancy and trade union growth in several Western and Northern
European countries. However, the development of neoliberalism
has led to a reduction in these protections in some countries,
though not all. This was often associated with a drive to reduce the
power and significance of trade unions. For example, during the
1980s the UK saw a reduction in these traditional forms of legal
employment protection (Crouch 1993; Dex and McCulloch 1997;
Korpi 2002, 2003).
Employment protection was usually only provided for ‘standard’
forms of employment. In practice this meant for those people who
worked for a single employer, with regular hours (such as 9 to 5,
Monday to Friday) and expectations of continuous employment.
The erosion of the significance of employment protection took
place not only through a direct challenge to this legislation, but also
by the growth of employment that was outside of the ‘standard’
forms that had this protection. These forms of non-standard
employment concern the ‘new temporalities, new contractualities
and new spatialities’ of employment today (Walby 2007b). They
include the growth of part-time and temporary employment in
those countries where full-time working provided access to protec-
tions, thereby undermining the proportion of the workforce cov-
ered by such regulations. Such newly expanding non-standard
forms of employment are often disproportionately filled by women
and minoritized ethnic groups, thereby exacerbating divisions and
inequalities in the workforce (Gottfried 2003; Durbin 2007;
Gottschall and Kroos 2007; Perrons 2007; Shire 2007; Walby et al.
2007). In such a context, workers in standard forms of employment
(disproportionately male) enjoy protections, while workers in non-
standard forms of employment (disproportionately female and
minority) are more exposed to the market. However, in some coun-
tries the development of equality legislation has eroded this differ-
ential exposure of women and minorities.
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Employment relations and complex inequalities
These distinctions between varieties of capitalism and employment
regulations tend to neglect social divisions other than class.
References to gender, ethnicity, and other complex inequalities are
rarely more than brief empirical notes with few perceived theoretical
implications; the substantial literature on gender and employment and
ethnicity and employment is rarely integrated into these analyses.
What would it mean to include complex inequalities in addition to
class within an analysis of the varieties of employment relations?
There are additional types of regulation and institutional practices
that need to be included in order that complex inequalities are included
in the conceptualization of varieties of employment relations – those
that support inequality as well as those that are intended to erode
inequality. Some legal regulations overtly restrict women’s employ-
ment, such as the marriage bar under which women were obliged
to give up their jobs when they marry, from pre-EU Ireland
(Curtin 1989) to Japan (Horton 1996). Other legal regulations indi-
rectly support inequality by providing benefits for dominant gender
and ethnic groups, leaving women and minoritized groups exposed
outside these protections, such as the use of criteria for access to
benefits that women and minorities are less likely to meet.
Examples include the number of hours worked (excluding part-
timers who are disproportionately women), or contractual status,
excluding temporary and agency workers (who are more likely to
be minorities). These exclusions may appear to be of minor impor-
tance when introduced, but become more significant as employers
disproportionately expand employment in the unprotected niches.
Workers in non-standard conditions are least likely to have employ-
ment protections, and are also least likely to be from the dominant
gender and ethnic groups (Shire 2007; Walby et al. 2007).
Employment ‘protection’ legislation, such as that which protects
workers against redundancy, may reduce inequalities when
analysed using a class lens (comparing the interests of employers
and workers), but increase inequality when analysed using a gen-
der and ethnic lens (comparing workers from the dominant and
subordinate gender and ethnicities).
In addition to these legal regulations there are institutional prac-
tices that support or entrench complex inequalities, the most impor-
tant of which is segregation. Segregation is of women and
minorities into specific occupations, industries, and non-standard
forms of employment defined by their temporality (e.g. part-time
hours, shift working, night work) and contractual status (e.g. tem-
porary or agency worker). Segregation is associated with lower
pay and worse employment conditions for women and minorities.
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The reproduction of segregation draws on direct and indirect forms
of discrimination, and differences in the acquisition of general and
specific skills that are rooted in institutions of education and train-
ing (Walby 1986; England et al. 1988; Kilbourne et al. 1994; Jacobs
1995; Cotter et al. 1997; Tam 1997; Anker 1998; Blackwell 2001;
Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 2002).
In contrast to the regulations that entrench inequalities are regula-
tions that erode inequalities (Pillinger 1992; Hoskyns 1996; Wahl
2005). Regulations eroding inequalities have increased over time,
especially since 1970, and they also have a path dependent element.
These most frequently concern gender and ethnic inequality, but they
have been extended, in some countries, to sexual orientation, reli-
gion, age, and disability. These regulations are stronger or weaker in
three ways. First, at the lowest level they engage with direct discrim-
ination; at higher levels they engage with indirect discrimination in the
workplace; at the highest levels they engage with the wider structural
origins of the inequality. Second, the form of implementation ranges
from individual legal complaint through collective legal engagement
to making promotion of equality a duty on employers and public
bodies. Third, a wide range of inequalities beyond gender and eth-
nicity are named as legally unacceptable.
The most basic level is seen in regulations that address equal treat-
ment in employment, such as laws covering equal pay for equal work.
This type of equality law can have a limited impact because the better
paid work is often segregated from the worse paid work, making it
hard to compare the value of the work: inequality is often hidden
behind the ‘difference’ produced by segregation. One way forward has
been the development of job evaluation schemes that compare the
value of jobs by using points for each component of the work (Acker
1989), thereby addressing the issue that men and women rarely work
in the same occupation. A second development was to apply equal
treatment laws not only to groups of visible men and women or visi-
ble ethnicities, but also to the employment categories in which women
and minorities were more often to be found. In particular, the EU has
a law that requires the equal treatment of part-time employment,
which is disproportionately performed by women in segregated
employment niches, with full-time work. A similar principle under-
lies the extension of the right to equal treatment to temporary work,
so that the pay and conditions are the same even if the length of
the contract is different. This is relevant to women and also to
minority ethnic groups, especially recent migrants, who may be dis-
proportionately found in such employment niches.
The most developed types of regulations are those that address the
underlying structural generation of the inequalities. These differ
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significantly for different forms of inequality, since each regime
of inequality is constituted differently. In relation to gender, there are
employment regulations that address the relationship between care and
employment, in the context where women disproportionately provide
care in a way that is to their detriment in employment. The regulation
of working time is designed to structurally rebalance these gendered
domains in order to generate equality; including work/life balance poli-
cies such as maternal, paternal and parental leaves, and those restrict-
ing the ability of employers to demand excessively long working hours.
In relation to disability, some countries place a duty on employers to
make a reasonable accommodation of the working environment in order
to facilitate the employment of disabled people. The EU has a full set
of such employment legislation (European Commission 2007a, 2007d).
There are variations in the mode of implementation of these reg-
ulations, from individual complaints to more collective forms, includ-
ing affirmative action, class actions, support from equality bodies or
trade unions, and collective bargaining; placing duties on employers
to establish a workplace free from harassment and to monitor
equality; placing duties on public bodies to promote equality; and
the mainstreaming of equality, especially gender equality, policies.
The more collective forms tend to produce more change than the
individual forms. The USA once had the most developed forms with
the early development of affirmative action and class actions in the
courts (Willborn 1989), but since the implementation of the 1999
Treaty of Amsterdam the EU is now more advanced, with policies on
gender mainstreaming and duties on public bodies to promote gen-
der and ethnic equality (European Commission 2007a, 2007b).
The early development of these legal regulations tended to focus
on one inequality, only later spreading into other axes of inequality.
In the USA early developments were on ‘race’ and were then followed
by gender, and to a lesser extent age and disability. In the EU, early
developments were on gender, but between 1999 and 2006 were
extended to cover ethnicity, disability, religion/belief, age, and sex-
ual orientation (European Commission 2007d), thus becoming
more inclusive than the USA.
The strength of equality laws in employment can be summarized
and operationalized for empirical research using these three sets of
differences: beyond direct to indirect discrimination; collective
rather than individual routes to the implementation of laws; and the
range of inequalities covered by such laws. There is both a devel-
opmental component and beyond this path dependent varieties.
These fit along a neoliberal to social democratic continuum – less
state intervention the more neoliberal, more state intervention the
more social democratic.
Walby-3874-Ch-03:Walby-3874-Ch-03.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 139
G
lo
b
al
iz
at
io
n
an
d
In
eq
u
al
iti
es
140
This is a distinction between different kinds of employment
regulations. Not only are there employment protections (which
form the almost exclusive empirical focus in the operationaliza-
tion of these), there are also regulations that promote equality.
The nature of the employment regulations matters because if pro-
tections are applied not to all groups but only to elite groups
(often demarcated either directly or indirectly by gender and eth-
nicity) then they can be regressive in effect.
How should these be integrated with the distinction between
employment relations that are not regulated and those that are? If
there is to be a single category for regulations, then it is inappro-
priate for this to be driven solely by protections that can feed
inequalities. One solution is to make an explicit distinction between
protection and equality regulations and to produce both opera-
tionalizations for analysis. This option produces clarity, but at the
expense of a loss of simplicity. An alternative solution is to include
equality regulations when operationalizing the concept of regulated
labour markets. This latter option is consistent with a single con-
tinuum from neoliberal to social democratic.
Why should the non-liberal category be social democracy rather than
coordinated, including complex inequalities beyond class?
If there is to be a single dichotomy between unregulated and reg-
ulated labour markets, the best way of distinguishing varieties of
employment regulations is that between neoliberal and social
democratic forms. The comparison of the liberal with coordinated
instead of social democratic is less helpful as it obscures the more
significant differences.
It is important to be able to name forms of coordination that
include a universalistic approach to equality as part of the project,
that is, social democracy. It misdescribes the world if the project
concerned with social inclusion, equality, and justice is left out of
focus. If complex inequalities are to be included, and the distinctions
between employment practices relevant to them are also to be
included, then the distinction between neoliberal and social demo-
cratic better captures contemporary divisions than does that between
neoliberal and coordinated.
The type of labour markets previously called ‘conservative coor-
dinated’ are declining in number and also an unstable category.
They are declining because the proportion of women in the work-
force in those countries once considered conservative coordinated
is rapidly increasing towards social democratic levels. They are also
declining because the practices that enabled a section of the work-
force, in particular white men, to be privileged are being eroded by
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new legislation that makes discrimination in employment illegal.
They are unstable since the articulation of conservative class inter-
ests is increasingly taking place via neoliberal discourse and practice
rather than conservative corporatism. For example Germany, often
the leading example of non-social democratic coordination, has ris-
ing rates of female employment that have nearly reached social
democratic levels and is subject to EU equality laws. The privileged
positions of class fractions and dominant gender and ethnicities in
employment are being eroded. The distinctive form of conservatism
that Germany once had is in decline. The clustering of varieties of
employment regulation into either neoliberal or social democratic
forms is increasing as the category of non-social democratic coordi-
nation is in decline. There is both a reduction in the traditional forms
of employment protection as a result of the neoliberal wave and an
increase in equality regulations as a result of the emergence of fem-
inist social democracy. The directions of change of class and gender
are different, indeed opposite, as gender and the class dynamics of
employment regulation are not to be conflated.
The theoretically most important form of labour market regula-
tions in advanced economies concerns equalities. These regulations
are relatively new and are growing in importance. Old forms of
protective legislation that are not fully inclusive are in decline. The
most important theoretical, political, and policy contrast with
neoliberalism is social democracy, not coordination.
A measure of the strictness of employment protection legislation
may work well for the comparison of liberal versus coordinated vari-
eties of employment regulation, with a lens on class as employer
versus worker. However, it obscures the treatment of groups within
the workers. For this it is necessary to use an additional indicator –
the strength of equality regulation.
Whether the strength of equality regulation maps onto the
strength of employment protection regulation is contingent. The
development of these forms of regulation drew on different
social forces and different forms of polities. Employment protec-
tion legislation developed first, and drew on the organization of
workers in trade unions and their political parties at a time when
women and minorities were poorly represented in both trade
unions and parliaments. The development of equality legislation
is more recent, drawing on the increasing representation of
women in trade unions and parliaments. In addition, much
employment protection was developed by countries before the
EU came to have the effective powers necessary to regulate the
employment relations of its member states, so the legislation
originates in different types of polities.
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Conclusions
The most important division in varieties of employment regulation
is that between little regulated neoliberal employment relations and
social democratic employment relations in which there are both
employment protections and equality regulations. In order to take
complex inequalities other than class into account it is necessary to
include equality regulations, since employment protections can
lead to the protection of the workforce elite alone. The ‘other’ to
neoliberal practices is best conceptualized as social democratic
rather than coordinated, since the concept of coordinated hides the
important distinction of whether or not regulations are intended to
erode complex inequalities beyond class.
Rather than treating the economy as a unity, the distinction
between employment regulations and welfare provision is made
here. Whether or not they map onto each other is a question for
analysis and not given a priori.
Varieties of welfare provision
Welfare is a set of tasks that are part of the economy. Welfare is
performed in three ways: state welfare, both as free wage labour in
the provision of public services of education, health, and care, and
in a redistribution of income through the tax-benefit system; as free
wage labour in the market; and in the home as unpaid domestic
care-work performed largely by women. The balance of activities
between state, market, and domestic is key to the varieties of forms
of advanced welfare systems. Class has often been seen as central
to the development of different forms of welfare but this is insuffi-
cient as gender and ethnic relations are also important.
State welfare includes the provision of goods, services, and income
to provide for the welfare of the population. The distributional
aspects of state welfare mean that a greater provision of services is
likely to entail some redistribution to poorer social classes. These ser-
vices include health, education, and care. Some aspects of state wel-
fare, such as childcare, are especially important for gender relations,
for the transition from a domestic to a public gender regime.
The extent of state welfare provision is partly linked to economic
development, especially in less developed economies. Among more
developed economies, a further increase in the level of economic
development is often thought to make little difference to the amount of
state expenditure. After this, a major part of the variation in the extent
of state welfare is often considered to be a result of divergent paths
of development (Flora and Alber 1981; Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen
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1990, 1999; Wilensky 2002). Do global pressures erode these differ-
ences or are they maintained (Montanari 2001; Pierson 2001; Swank
2002)?
In advanced welfare economies, is there little further development
of state welfare? Or when gender, and not only class, is brought into
focus, is there a continuing development of state welfare provision?
The implications of the modernization of the gender regime are a
challenge to both class-led and gender-led theories of welfare.
Neoliberal and social democratic varieties of welfare provision
There are various ways to distinguish between welfare state
regimes. The most important distinction is that between neoliberal
and social democratic welfare states. This follows the same princi-
ples as that used in the analysis of varieties of employment rela-
tions, though it takes on different forms and practices in this
different area. In this typology the state tends to provide welfare
(social democratic) or does not (neoliberal).
There have been many attempts to develop further categories.
In the work of Esping-Andersen (1990) there is a third category
that is additional to liberal and social democratic: conservative
corporatism. In this variety of welfare regime, collective entities
other than the state are involved in welfare structures, leading to
unequally stratified welfare outcomes which reflect market
inequalities. Countries are clustered into three forms: Anglos tend
to be liberal, Nordics are social democratic, while continental West
Europeans tend to be conservative corporatist. The theoretical
principle behind the distinctions made by Esping-Andersen con-
cerns whether there is a tendency to ‘de-commodification’ in the
provision of welfare, or whether individuals are exposed to the
workings of the capitalist market.
Esping-Andersen’s three-fold typology generated many responses
suggesting further nuances and additional categories (Arts and
Gelissen 2002). Further suggested forms include a residual form,
found especially in the Mediterranean countries where state welfare
was little developed especially for women (Leibfried 1993; Ferreira
1996); and a wage earner form, found especially in Australia, where
wage earner funds rather than the state provided relatively gener-
ous welfare benefits (Castles and Mitchell 1993). Esping-Andersen
(1997) himself later suggested that Japan should be considered a
hybrid form of conservative corporatist and liberal, but rejected the
suggestion that there was a distinctive Asian form of welfare
regime. There were many suggestions as to how gender might be
better included (Lewis 1992, 1993, 2002; Orloff 1993; Jenson 1997;
O’Connor et al. 1999; Daly and Rake 2003).
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Most of those in dialogue with Esping-Andersen have suggested
additional categories; by contrast, Hicks and Kenworthy (2003) argue
that on the basis of statistical analysis of 18 rich countries over the
1980s and 1990s there is only one principle dimension from liberal
to social democratic, reducing the conservative component to a
secondary dimension. In their analysis the difference between lib-
eral and social democratic is one of degree, forming a continuum or
gradient, and is best thought of as a dimension in the analysis, rather
than thinking of discrete clusters of countries. This finding is accepted
by Esping-Andersen (2003). However, Hicks and Kenworthy’s sug-
gestion that the main dimension be re-described as one concerning
‘progressive liberalism’ rather than social democracy or socialism is
robustly rejected by Esping-Andersen (2003) as an inappropriate
erasure of the socialist tradition that brought about most of the poli-
cies under discussion.
However, the secondary dimension of conservatism is yet again
misspecified, with insufficient analytic attention given to the cen-
trality of the different forms of gender inequality involved. This is
an a-theoretic eclectic category, which is declining in empirical,
political and analytic significance and compounded by an insuffi-
cient conceptualization of its gender components. The most impor-
tant issue here is that of domestic welfare – when this is addressed
(see below), a major reason for the existence of the category of
‘conservative corporatist’ falls away.
A key distinction in types of welfare state in advanced economies
is between neoliberal and social democratic forms, where provision
is predominantly from the market or the state. The distinction
between liberal and social democratic welfare systems is sometimes
associated with a similar division in a range of other institutions
including employment regulation. However, the extent to which
these map onto each other is a question to be empirically investi-
gated rather than presumed.
Including gender: premodern forms of welfare as domestic labour
Welfare is provided not only by the state and the market, but also
by (largely) women’s unpaid domestic care-work. This does not fit
into either of the categories of market or state welfare and hence
potentially disrupts the distinction between neoliberal (market) and
social democratic (state) welfare. The market and state forms of
welfare provision, and the typology associated with them, refer
only to those forms of welfare that are performed in the monetized
economy, that is, in the modern economy. The welfare provided
under non-monetized domestic relations is an additional issue that
must also be addressed. The need to include this gendered form of
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welfare has been a major challenge to class-led accounts which has
produced various responses.
In Esping-Andersen’s work the significance of women’s work is
addressed in two ways. In his early writing (Esping-Andersen 1990),
those countries where there was significant provision of welfare by
women’s domestic labour were located within the category of ‘con-
servative corporatist’ alongside the special treatment of class fractions
such as civil servants, as if it were a path-dependent variety of wel-
fare capitalism. The three-fold typology generated critical responses
from those who sought to add additional nuanced categories and
from feminists who argued for a greater focus on the theorization of
this gendered form of welfare provision (Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1994,
1996; O’Connor et al. 1999; Hobson 2000; Daly and Rake 2004).
The significance of gender relations challenges the theorization of
welfare states led by Esping-Andersen, in which de-commodification
was seen as progressive because it reduced the hold of capital over
people’s lives. This is a challenge because gender relations have a
different relationship to de-commodification than do class rela-
tions; not only is domestic labour not yet commodified, so that de-
commodification is not an option, but commodification might also
be progressive rather than regressive for women in these cir-
cumstances. The implications of the commodification of women’s
labour (from domestic to wage labour) for their welfare are
underestimated within a theoretical framework that asserts that
de-commodification (from dependence on the wage to support
from the state) is the most effective basis of equity (Orloff 1993).
Rather the commodification of women’s labour in its move from the
domestic to the public sphere is progressive. This is acknowledged
by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) in his account of women’s full
employment in the social democratic model and the process of defa-
milialization as progressive, but is not fully integrated into his theo-
retical model, which reduces gender to the family thereby excluding
gendered employment from the theoretical model (see Chapter 2 for
a more detailed account of this theoretical problem).
In contrast to Esping-Andersen’s class-first analysis of welfare state
regimes, with a focus on the balance of state and market provision of
welfare, is a gender-first analysis that focuses on the balance of domes-
tic and state provision of welfare. Lewis (1992) with Ostner (Ostner and
Lewis, 1995) developed a typology that centres on the extent to which
there is a ‘male breadwinner–female housewife’ model. This ranges from
‘strong male breadwinner’, ‘modified male breadwinner’ to ‘weak male
breadwinner’ (sometimes referred to as ‘dual earner’). Ireland is taken as
most typical of the strong male breadwinner model (Lewis 1992), with
Britain sometimes being included (Lewis 1992) while at others being
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seen, like Germany, as modified male breadwinner (Lewis 1993). France
is seen to follow a ‘modified’ (Lewis 1992) male breadwinner model,
while Sweden is seen to follow a ‘weak’ male breadwinner model
(Lewis 1992), sometimes, dual-earner.
While important in addressing gender, this model and its analysis
suffer from a series of problems. First, the typology does not address
the situation of households where there is no man at all. Hence the
rather odd situation of Ireland being described as a strong bread-
winner model, while a rather large proportion of Irish households
have no male breadwinner at all; Ireland is thus not well described
as having a strong breadwinner model when so many households
do not have a male breadwinner. Second, there is a series of
nuances in the way that the welfare state addresses care-work which
are underestimated in the model. Women may be treated within the
welfare system as wives or mothers or workers (Sainsbury 1996).
The mode of resourcing care may be as a service, money to pur-
chase services, or as money for time at home. With a focus on care
(Jenson 1997), rather than unpaid work, distinctions can be made
between who cares, who pays, and how is care provided. A further
distinction is in the outcome of the system for women’s income and
wellbeing (Hobson 1994), for instance, whether the gender welfare
regime provides ‘the capacity for a woman to form and maintain an
autonomous household’ (Orloff 1993: 319). Others have usefully
broadened the range of issues considered (Haintrais 1995; O’Connor
et al. 1999) and have distinguished different forms of defamilializa-
tion (Leitner 2003). There is in addition a third option: the perfor-
mance of care tasks on the market. The possibility of the purchase
of a wide range of goods and services, from meals to childcare,
means that it is not sufficient to only differentiate between domes-
tic and state relations: it is important to include a further category of
the market, rather than domestic or state, provision of care-work.
The way forward is first to separate the concepts of gender and
family, but not reducing one to the other. The family is merely
one part of the construction of gender relations: gender is also
constituted by social relations in employment, the polity, violence,
and civil society. Second, the movement of work outside the
household (‘defamilialization’ for Esping-Andersen) is not only the
consequence of the development of state welfare, but can also be
the consequence of the increase in women’s paid employment.
There are two forms of public gender regime: one is associated
with state welfare and the second with the expansion of the mar-
ket, providing both welfare; also employment for women.
The transition from a domestic to a public gender regime is a
developmental change. The domestic provision of welfare is not a
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stable, path dependent form, but one that is reducing in scale and
significance. Insofar as domestic welfare is considered to be a key
part of conservative corporatism, then conservative corporatism is
in decline and not a stable path dependent form of welfare regime.
Insofar as domestic welfare is considered to be central to the notion
of a strong male breadwinner regime, then strong male breadwin-
ner regimes are in decline and are not a stable path dependent
form. The analysis by both Esping-Andersen and his feminist critics
assumes too much stability in domestic labour. It is in decline and
thus so are the associated social forms. This is a more generic
developmental, rather than path dependent, phenomenon.
The change from a domestic to a public gender regime can lead
to different forms of public gender regime. These may involve either
state or market welfare. There are major ongoing reductions in the
provision of domestic welfare; these coevolve with the transforma-
tion of the gender regime from a domestic to a public form. These
reductions in domestic welfare are associated with an increase in
either market welfare or state welfare. The extent to which the mar-
ket or the state takes over these activities is path dependent.
At the centre of the investigation of different forms of welfare, in
particular the relationship between domestic welfare and public wel-
fare (both state and market forms), lies the provision of childcare, and
to a lesser but increasing extent other forms of care such as that of
frail elderly and disabled people. The extent to which (and the way
in which) childcare is performed is central to these debates. However,
many of the leading accounts of welfare provision select substantive
examples that at best marginalize childcare services and at worst omit
childcare altogether. See, for example, Esping-Andersen’s classic (1990)
work which focuses on pensions.
Welfare is social democratic welfare when the state takes a leading
role in the provision of welfare. Neoliberal is when it is performed on
the market. Premodern is when it is performed in the home.
Do varieties of employment regulation and welfare map onto each other?
Do varieties of class regime map onto gender and other complex inequalities?
Do neoliberal and social democratic varieties of economies map
onto each other? Are they aligned across domains? Are they aligned
across regimes of inequality, such as class and gender? The analy-
sis of varieties of political economy has engaged two main institu-
tional foci – employment relations and welfare provision – and two
main sets of social relations – class and gender. Do varieties of insti-
tutions and social relations map onto each other, or do they
diverge? Here this is explored on the basis of theory and existing
research, while in chapters 8 and 10 it is addressed empirically.
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The distinctions between forms of employment regulation might
appear to have similarities with the distinctions between forms of
welfare provision. Both the employment-focused (Hall and Soskice
2001) and the welfare-focused (Esping-Andersen 1990) varieties of
capitalism have argued that there is just one typology that applies
across both the employment and welfare aspects of the economy,
although in practice they each lead the analysis from one substan-
tive area or the other. This assumption of a single typology rele-
vant to both employment and welfare is found in a range of writers
(Lash and Urry 1994; Hollingsworth 1997; Huber and Stephens
2000, 2001; Jessop 2002).
Yet the practical integration of the typologies developed for each
field has proven challenging (Ebbinghaus and Manow 2001). Why
might this be? The allocation of cases to typologies would diverge if
the political forces and/or the institutions centrally involved in the
construction of employment regulation were to differ from those
involved in the construction of state welfare. There are two main rea-
sons for thinking that this might be the case. One is that the social
forces are different, or differently positioned, in relation to these
fields, in particular gender and ethnic forces and various relations with
class forces. A second is that there are different polities involved, in
particular that in the European Union while employment is predom-
inantly regulated by the European Union level, welfare is almost
entirely provided by the Member State level of governance.
First, the main social forces are not only a variety of class forces;
there are also different gender forces; some seeking to privilege
men while others seek gender equality; and also diverse ethnic
forces, some seeking to privilege white people while others seek
equality. While both employment regulation and state welfare
involve the state, class forces and gender forces, there have been var-
ied prioritizations and mobilizations in the different areas (Walby
1986; Huber and Stephens 2001; Mósesdóttir 2001). In particular, the
later transition of women than men into free wage labour typically
means that the political mobilization of women and their engage-
ment in formal political institutions occur later than for men (Inter-
Parliamentary Union 1997). Employed women typically support
projects for public services associated with social democracy
(Manza and Brooks 1998). However, whether this has had signifi-
cant effects may depend on the availability of effective allies in
organized working men (Huber and Stephens 2001).
Second, the different policy fields of employment and welfare may
or may not be directly connected even at a national level (Ebbinghaus
and Hassel 2000). In the context of the European Union, there is even
greater separation of decision-making processes in the fields of
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employment and welfare. In the EU, the regulation of employment is
primarily decided on at a European level, while state welfare is pri-
marily decided on at Member State level. Different historical legacies
are embedded in these institutions of governance at state and EU
level; it should be anticipated that these might give rise to discrepant
forms of intervention. The gender project of the EU is more oriented
to a public gender regime than many of its Member States, with impli-
cations for its gendered regulation of employment (Pillinger 1992;
Hoskyns 1996, Walby 1999b, 2004a).
Do variations in the class and gender aspects of the political econ-
omy of welfare and employment map onto each other; or can there
be polity intervention to reduce gender economic inequality but not
class-led inequality? It is often argued that varieties of class inequalities
and varieties of gender inequalities map onto each other. In work on
welfare states, Esping-Andersen argued this case not only in his early
work (1990) but also in his response to his feminist critics (1999), while
Estevez-Abe (2005) similarly put forward that patterns of gender rela-
tions in employment are led by the distinction between varieties of
capitalism. Korpi (2000: 142), however, cautions that state institutions
might promote different levels of class inequality from levels of gen-
der inequality. The evidence is that there can be contrary directions of
change in gender-led and class-led inequalities in both employment
regulation and in state welfare provision (Walby 2007b). Class and gen-
der do not necessarily map onto each other. Further evidence on this
disjuncture is shown in Chapter 8 on varieties of modernity.
Critical turning points into varieties
of political economy
The identification of the varieties of path dependency is not the
same as an explanation of them (Rothstein 1992). This requires in
addition an account of the critical turning points into new paths and
the mechanisms that lock-in the path. The neoliberal and social
democratic varieties of political economy (employment relations and
welfare provision) are path-dependent trajectories of development,
differentiated at critical turning points and locked-in by specific
institutions.
At the critical turning points the combination of power resources
and institutional capacity can produce new paths of development.
While there has been important analysis of the role of class struggle
in these turning points (Moore 1966; Korpi 1983; Lash and Urry
1987; Esping-Andersen 1990; Nee and Cao 1999), there has been
little that considers the significant role of other complex inequalities
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such as gender and ethnicity as contributing to the power resources
involved. Similarly, in the approach that focuses on institutional
legacies, there is little that considers the sedimentation of gender
and ethnic forces in addition to class. The approach to path depen-
dency that focuses on the mobilization of political forces has usu-
ally focused on class forces, varying in the extent to which capital
and labour are articulated in a few or several class fractions and
whether agricultural workers and owners are included (Moore
1966; Korpi 1983; Lash and Urry 1987; Esping-Andersen 1990).
Rarely have gendered political forces been included, yet these are
clearly relevant to the development of employment regulations that
promote either gender inequality or equality (Hartmann 1976;
Walby 1986; Mósesdóttir 2001). In parallel, ethnic forces both pro-
moting exclusion and inclusion are relevant to the forms of regula-
tion that develop (Miles 1989). Not only is the presence of these
forces important to the outcome, but also the extent to which there
are solidaristic forms of cooperation or the building of joint projects
drawing on progressive class, gender, and ethnic interests.
An approach that considers the historical legacy of institutions
overlaps with that on the mobilization of political forces, differing in
the focus on the sedimentation of the outcomes of these political
contests in institutions, especially state institutions. Again, however,
the gender and ethnic components of these legacies are less fre-
quently considered (exceptions include Skocpol 1992; Walvin 1992;
Quadagno 1994; Manza 2000), even though they are important to
the outcome. Further, the development of democracy (Moore 1966)
and its deeper forms (Fung and Wright 2001) has implications not
only for class but also for women and minoritized groups, provid-
ing institutionalized routes to the effective expression of their polit-
ical projects. The winning of democracy is a critical turning point in
the development of employment regulations and welfare provision
not only for men and class relations but also for women (Walby
1990) and minority ethnic groups. Sequencing matters: for example,
the institutionalization of medical occupations as professions at a
time before women had the vote had negative implications for the
position of women’s occupations (Witz 1992). The temporality of
paths of development is considered in Chapter 10.
Crises are often important contexts for critical turning points. The
phenomenon of financial crises is often an opportunity for capital
to restructure to its advantage. Military defeat and victory can lead
to the reconstruction of states, as in the creation of the European
Union and the demilitarization of Germany and Japan. The surge in
unemployment following the 1974 shock of significantly increased
oil prices, further sustained by neoliberal projects, brought to an
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end the era of social democratic advance in Western Europe (Korpi
2002, 2003). The financial crises in Southeast Asia and Latin
America provided the opportunity for a restructuring of value: at
times of financial crisis the IMF makes loans conditional on a move
towards neoliberal policies (Stiglitz 2002; Harvey 2003, 2005).
Military coups in Chile and ‘natural’ disasters such as Hurricane
Katrina also provide new opportunities for a neoliberal turn (Klein
2007). The financial crisis of 2008 that started in the USA and
extended to most of the rest of the world is a further potential crit-
ical turning point, a new context for the contestation of neoliberal
and social democratic projects in the economy (see Chapter 11).
The locking-in of social democratic pathways in political econ-
omy depends upon a series of institutional developments, including
trade union membership and organizational form, social democratic
parties in government, industrial relations systems, and welfare state
development (Western 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001). A series of
associated institutions lock-in early differences in trade union mem-
bership and organizational effectivity, including the Ghent system in
which trade unions (in the Nordic countries and Belgium) act as the
agents for unemployment insurance, legislation to facilitate trade
union membership, and action such as the legality of the closed
shop, strikes, and picketing (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999). A further
set of associated institutional lock-ins occurs with the development
of political parties aligned with trade unions, promoting social
democracy and the establishment of the welfare state (Bartolini
2000; Huber and Stephens 2001). The establishment of state welfare
can further lock-in these developments, due to the formation of
interest groups of recipients and workers (Pierson 2001) and the
entrenched policy preferences of citizens (Brooks and Manza 2006).
The most important varieties of political economy in modern
advanced economies are neoliberal and social democratic, which
can be separately identified in employment relations and in welfare
provision. In addition most countries with advanced economies do
not yet have fully modern economies, in that there is still some work
performed for a livelihood as domestic labour that is outside the
monetized economy. A domestic livelihood sector may be compati-
ble with the concept of a neoliberal modern sector of an economy
but not with a social democratic economy, since full employment is
a defining characteristic of a social democratic economy.
The use of a category of coordinated market economy in employ-
ment relations or conservative corporatist in welfare provision is over-
taken by this typology. These categories often contained a hidden
gender component; in this proposed formulation gender is made vis-
ible and explicit and allows for its adequate integration into theories
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of gender relations and the integration of gender into mainstream
socio-economic theory.
In contrast to the attempt to squeeze the analysis of employment
relations and welfare provision into the same conceptual category,
this analysis explicitly allows for potential divergence as well as
potential alignment. Divergence might be expected where different
polities are involved in employment regulation and welfare provi-
sion, as is the case in the Member States of the EU where employ-
ment is regulated at the European level and welfare is provided at
Member State level, and where different coalitions of class, gender,
and ethnic political forces are involved in the various aspects of
political economy. Alignment might be expected where there is a
strong political coalition leading to pacts that can address both insti-
tutional arenas and all social groups.
In contrast to the attempts to reduce the analysis of the economy to
a class-led account of capital and labour, this analysis explicitly allows
for a potential divergence as well as a potential alignment. Divergence
might be expected as a consequence of the different moments at
which democratic access was gained by men, women, and minoritized
ethnic groups, with consequent effects on an ability to argue for pro-
tective or an equality legislation and welfare provision. Alignment
might be expected where there is a strong political coalition that forges
a project that addresses all such social groups.
Conclusions
The concept of the economy has been broadened here in order to
address complex inequalities: domestic labour and state welfare
need to be included. This extends the definition of the economy
beyond the conventional restriction to monetized and marketized
activities. Only when the concept is extended in this way is it pos-
sible to make sense of the changes associated with the transforma-
tion of the gender regime and the implications of the shift of
women from unwaged to waged work.
Globalization is often linked to increasing economic inequali-
ties within countries. The increased flows of capital, trade, and
people increase the tendency towards economic inequalities by
both reducing the bargaining position of less skilled workers who
are exposed to global competition while the development of the
knowledge sectors of the economy is associated with increases in
the wages paid to increasingly skilled workers in these sectors.
At least as important as these economically-led global processes
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is a neoliberal global political wave that exacerbates economic
inequalities with its practices of de-regulation and de-unionization.
The capture of global financial institutions and the US hegemon by
this neoliberal discourse extends its effectivity from civil societal
institutions to the level of global governance. However, these ten-
dencies are far from universal in their practice and effects. At a
country level, the uneven historical legacy of particular forms of
political institutions and the emergence of new coalitions of political
forces ensure uneven effects. These may be either the continuation
of path dependent practices of particular forms and levels of eco-
nomic inequality, or their restructuring or coevolution into new
trajectories of development. Global processes have not produced
convergence.
While class-led forms of economic inequalities have increased
during this recent period of globalization, those associated with gen-
der have decreased. The dynamics of gender relations do not sim-
ply map onto the dynamics of class relations. The decrease in
gendered economic inequalities is linked to the transformation of
the gender regime and the movement of women from unpaid
domestic labour to waged labour, thereby narrowing the gap in mon-
etized economic rewards between women and men. This increasingly
large constituency of employed women tends to support the provision
of state welfare and the political projects associated with this policy,
especially social democracy. Through this emergence of new cham-
pions for democratic projects, the transformation of the gender
regime has implications for the overall level of economic inequality.
There is no single trajectory of economic development, instead
there are different path-dependent forms. The most important cur-
rent distinction in the modern sector of the economy is that
between neoliberal and social democratic trajectories of develop-
ment. This distinction can be separately identified in the different
forms of regulation of employment, of finance and in the provision
of welfare: they do not necessarily align because different polities
and social forces are involved in their production. This distinction
can be separately identified in different regimes of inequality as
class has a different dynamic from gender, even though there is a
tendency to coevolution of these regimes. In addition to these dif-
ferences in the modern sector of the economy, there are differences
between countries in the extent to which the premodern domestic
sector of the economy still exists as a form of livelihood for women.
Globalization of the economy has implications for the conventional
presumed units of analysis of nation-state and society. The boundaries
of different economic forms do not map onto a single polity or civil
society or violence nexus in a global era. The emergent institutions of
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global financial governance do not fully regulate the economy, nor do
states fully regulate the economy in their own territory. The EU is
more important in regulating the economy in its territory than are its
Member States, even though matters of taxation and welfare are still
determined by the latter. The economy, polity, violence, and civil
society neither map onto each other nor are they nested.
Global processes make a difference to economic development.
The movement of capital as well as goods, services, and labour
around the world has tended to increase competition thereby lead-
ing to pressure to reduce pay and conditions of employment.
However, whether this pressure leads to significant changes varies
according to the nature of country specific political institutions and
coalitions. There are global political and civil society processes as
well as economic ones. Global political waves of human rights,
equal rights and feminism have resulted in greater gender equality
in access to education and employment rights at earlier stages of
economic development in the contemporary world than in the
older industrialized economies. The development of institutions of
global governance such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank has implications for the economic policy of those
countries that need to call on them. The regulation of world trade
in the World Trade Organization is the result of contestation at a
global level between the USA, the EU, and groups of developing
countries in the South. The competition between the EU and the
USA is currently critical in the determination of trade rules for the
world and for the economic processes that underlie them.
Neoliberalism is often conflated with globalization. This is a mis-
take. Neoliberalism and global processes are analytically separate.
Neoliberalism is one global project carried initially as a civil soci-
etal wave that is then embedded in governmental programmes and
in social formations. There are other projects carried by global
waves including projects centred on rights, social democracy, and
environmentalism. Neoliberalism attempts a global hegemonic sta-
tus but it remains contested. It interacts with ongoing changes in
the social relations in specific countries, creating a diversity of
effects on economic inequality. Some processes that have sometimes
been attributed to globalization, as if there were inevitable outcomes
to global economic processes, are better attributed to a specific polit-
ical project of neoliberalism.
Transitions to modern forms of the economy are affected not only
by the forms of the economy but also by polities and civil societies.
While there are linkages between these systems that may drive for-
ward the process of transition to modern forms of the economy, the
conception of a singular universal form of transition omits many
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important aspects of these transitions. The different forms of polity
and civil society can entail different pathways of transition and
thereby path-dependent forms of economic development. The mutual
interaction between different sets of social relations associated with
these economic developments may produce yet further differentia-
tions in the processes of transformation and their outcomes.
Polities may speed or catalyse these economic changes, or may
slow or dampen them. They can catalyse by promoting the transi-
tion to the free wage labour for women – the provision of services,
especially care-work, which would otherwise have to be purchased
on the market and the regulation of employment and education so
as to remove discriminatory barriers to women’s employment.
Polities may dampen the transition by legislating or allowing dis-
criminatory barriers to women’s employment and by promoting a
domestic gender regime.
Bringing those complex inequalities that are additional to class
into focus has a series of implications for an analysis of the econ-
omy. The intersection of these multiple sets of complex inequalities
has mutual effects on each other and on economic development.
Most importantly, there is more than one critical moment in the
transition to a modern economy. In particular, the transformation of
gender relations associated with the shift from household to free
wage labour often takes place at a later time than the transition
associated with class relations.
So does globalization mean the erosion of a divergent path-
dependent development and convergence? Not in any simple way.
While there is an increased importance of the global level in
economic governance, globalization is not a simple process of
Westernization or Americanization: it involves contesting forces, not
least those between the hegemons of the USA and the EU.
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Introduction
Polities constitute an institutionalized domain, a sedimentation of
political forces in a system of centralized institutions that govern
the economy, violence, and civil society. The nature of political
institutions is the outcome of past political struggles that continue
to have implications into the future as a consequence of their
embeddedness in institutions. States and polities need to be recon-
ceptualized in order to fully take into account complex inequalities
and global processes. Four themes are addressed in this chapter:
the reconceptualization of types of polities; the non-saturation of a
territory by any one polity, and the implications of their overlaps;
rethinking the conceptualization of democracy; the development of
democracy.
First, the concept of state is too narrow to capture the range of polit-
ical institutions that are made visible when complex inequalities are
brought into focus. The broader concept of polity is needed so as to
encompass not only states but also nations, organized religions, hege-
mons, and emerging global institutions. Further, the assumption that
nation-states were ever common is challenged, not only in a global era.
Understanding a globalizing era requires new concepts for polities.
Second, polities overlap and rarely politically saturate any given
territory, especially in a global era. This is a challenge to conven-
tional analyses of the state, which assume that a single polity has
a monopoly over political authority. In particular it is a challenge
to the concept of the nation-state: nations and states rarely com-
pletely map onto each other. There is often more than one signif-
icant polity in a country, and they compete as well as cooperate.
Third, a modern polity is a democratic polity. The conventional
definition of democracy, however, insufficiently captures the varying
4 Polities
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depth of democracy that is so important for women and minoritized
groups. It is important to identify separately the depth of democracy
separately for different regimes of inequality, since these often do
not coincide. A ten-point scale is introduced, and distinctions
between suffrage-democracy, presence-democracy, and the breadth
of democracy.
Fourth, while economic development has traditionally been seen
as the most important force behind men’s suffrage-democracy, a
wider range of forces appear relevant for the suffrage-democracy
associated with complex inequalities. In a global era a wider range
of forces is potentially relevant, from global waves of democratiza-
tion to the interventions of global hegemons.
Reconceptualizing Types of
Polities
Introduction
The concept of state needs to be rethought to address complex
inequalities and global processes. As indicated in Chapter 1,
while globalizing processes have often been considered to have
a tendency to reduce the powers of states (Fukuyama 1992;
Cerny 1995, 1996; Ohmae 1995; Castells 1997; Habermas 2001),
there is a more diverse range of relationships between globaliza-
tion and political entities including: resistance to globalization
(Castells 1997; Swank 2002); the creation of nation-states by a
world society (Meyer and Hannan 1979; Meyer et al. 1997); the
constitution of states within a world-system of capitalism
(Wallerstein 1974, 1980; Robinson 2001); the development of
hegemons (Chase-Dunn et al. 2000); as well as broader global
restructuring (Brenner 1999; Held et al. 1999); and the develop-
ment of multi-level (Ruggie 1998), transnational (Haas 1958,
1964; Habermas 2001), and global (Held 1995; Robinson 2001)
forms of governance of the system as a whole. Understanding
globalization also necessitates understanding the changing nature
of the global landscape in which polities are embedded, as to
whether this is becoming de-territorialized (Scholte 2000) or not
(Sassen 2001, 2008), more or less regionalized (Hettne et al.
1999), or increasingly regulated by global bodies (Held 1995).
Much analysis of the state, democracy, and globalization has
focused on social processes primarily connected with changes in
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capitalism and associated class relations. However, this is unduly
restrictive, as it excludes other complex inequalities stemming from
ethnicity, ‘race’ (Wilson 1987), nation (Smith 1986; Calhoun 1995;
Brubaker 1996), religion (Beyer 1994), and gender (Kenworthy and
Malami 1999). When these complex inequalities in addition to class
are made visible, then a wider set of polities comes into focus.
In particular, religions are prime carriers of ethnic, national, and
gender projects into global and regional conflicts. Such conflicts (for
instance, that between fundamentalism and ‘the West’) are hard to
understand without the inclusion of interests of gender and ethnic-
ity alongside those of class and economics. It is important to con-
sider the full range of polities and not only the sub-set constituted
by states if the politics associated with complex inequalities are to
be included in the analysis.
A minimal definition of a polity is an entity which has authority over
a specific social group or territory or set of institutions, which in turn
has some degree of internal coherence, some degree of centralized
control, some rules, the ability to typically enforce sanctions against
those members who break its rules, the ability to command deference
from other polities in specific arenas over which it claims jurisdiction,
and which in turn has authority over a broad and significant range of
social institutions and domains. The forms of authority and power, and
the means to enforce sanctions, are varied. There are different kinds
of power of polities, including coercion, economic, legal, and sym-
bolic power. These can be coordinated in different ways and have var-
ied spatial and temporal reach. The notion of membership is needed
to ascertain who is within and who is without a polity, and most have
complex rules regarding entry and exit (for example, membership if
the parent was a member or if birth was within its territory), with com-
plex processes or rituals mediated by bureaucrats or priests. This def-
inition of polity is wider than that traditionally used, however, it is not
intended to capture all forms of governance structures within this def-
inition. There are some forms of governance that do not have the tem-
poral and spatial scale or the institutional range necessary to constitute
a polity. Small-scale specialized institutions of governance, such as
business firms, labour unions, hospitals and universities, are not within
the concept. Not all sets of political institutions constitute polities.
There are a number of borderline cases, for instance, national projects
that have strong institutions within civil society. If a political collectiv-
ity is not able to enforce deference to its rules from its members and
from established polities then it falls outside the definition of polity.
Only very well developed national projects will meet these criteria,
and many embryonic projects will not. Similarly, communities based
on criteria of ethnicity or racialization or linguistic commonality mayG
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or may not establish sufficiently developed institutions for them to
constitute a polity.
Polities include, in addition to states, nations (if they have
well-developed sets of civil society institutions), regional polities
(such as the European Union), some organized religions (such as
Catholicism and Islam), empires and hegemons. ‘Nation’ should not
be conflated with ‘state’ (as in ‘nation-state’) if the greater number of
states than nations and conflicts between nations and states are to be
explained. Empires should not be conflated with nation-states,
because of the political significance of multiple nations subject to a
common state. Organized religions should not be excluded from the
category of polity, if the ethnic, national, and gender political projects
that they carry onto a global stage are to be understood. The
European Union is a significant polity, with consequences for gender,
ethnicity, and nation, as well as class, but defeats categorization as
either a state or a committee of states. Both the USA and the EU are
hegemons. In addition there are emergent global political institutions.
States
States today are usually polities. This is a pared-down concept of state,
from which the notion of nation has been stripped out, which does
not make the presumption of a congruent civil society and economy.
Most contemporary states have sufficient power and authority to com-
mand internal governance and external deference, to warrant being
conceptualized as polities. However, there are occasional exceptions,
such as when a state’s institutions of internal governance have
suffered serious collapse due to a civil or foreign war, for example, as
was the case in Somalia at the turn of the twenty-first century. States
are distinguished from most other forms of polities by their use of
force to obtain and maintain consent, among other forms of gover-
nance. States have relations with other states in an inter-state system.
Nations
Nations can be a type of polity under certain circumstances. A nation
is a social and political group which is perceived to have a common
history and destiny (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983),
sometimes a common ethnic origin (Smith 1986), although this may
not necessarily be so (Gellner 1983), and a set of governing institu-
tions that root such beliefs in the social and political practices. It can
be a polity when its institutions are well developed and it is able to
demand some external deference. It can be distinguished from a state
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(Guibernau 2004) because it does not have a full range of centralized
political institutions, such as those that control the majority of the use
of force. One example is the Irish nation in the period just before the
establishment of the Irish state (Miller 1973; Larkin 1975) while
another is contemporary Scotland (McCrone 1992). Nations can be
important in carrying ethnic, religious, and gendered projects.
Nation-states?
Nation-states exist more in myth, as aspirations, than as empirical
entities. It is inappropriate to treat nation-states as the main type of
contemporary polity for several reasons: there are many more
nations than states; several key examples of supposed nation-states
were actually empires; and there are diverse and significant poli-
ties in addition to states, including the European Union and some
organized religions.
There are far more nations than states (Guibernau 1999; Keating
2002; Minahan 2002). It is rare for a territory to have one nation and
the whole of that nation, and one state, and the whole of that state.
Most nations and national projects do not have a state of their own,
instead they often share a state with other nations and national pro-
jects. This pattern of cross-cutting nations and states can be a result of
migration (forced or voluntary), or of war or conquest. This is not
to argue that there are not states, but rather that there are not often
stable nation-states. For instance, within Britain or the United
Kingdom in the post-empire period there are nations of English,
Scottish, and Welsh, as well as part of the Irish nation (Nairn 1977;
McCrone 1992; Bryant 2006). The struggle over the location of the bor-
der between the UK and Ireland is an example of the militarized con-
flict and terrorism that can be generated when there is a contestation
rather than the neat mapping of state and nation. Within Spain and
France there is the Basque nation that seeks separation and a state of
its own. The break up of the Soviet empire has precipitated many
nations and would-be nations into seeking states of their own, with
several of these having not achieved their objective despite the multi-
plicity of new states that have been created. The state of Canada con-
tains not only Canadians but also the French speaking, state-seeking
nation of Quebecois. The nation of Germany had two states for half
the twentieth century. The boundaries of states can change rapidly, as,
for instance, in the case of Germany, established as a state only in the
nineteenth century, which has seen the repeated movement of pieces
of territory between itself and France, enlargement and contraction
during the middle of the twentieth century, partition into two quiteG
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different states in the second half of the twentieth century, followed by
a short recent period of reunification of East and West. Europe is rid-
dled with cross-cutting nations, aspiring nations, and states (Therborn
1995; Brubaker 1996; Boje et al. 1999). Minahan (2002) finds 300 devel-
oped or emerging national groups. Cohen (1997) estimates that there
are around 2000 ‘nation-peoples’, that is, around ten times as many as
the states recognized by the United Nations. Nation-states with the
whole of one nation and no other and one state and no other polity,
which are stable in time and space, are hard to find in Europe and
indeed anywhere elsewhere in the world. At most, nation-states exist
for short moments in history before being reconstructed yet again.
Many key examples of nation-states were actually empires.
Nation-states are often considered to become a common political
and social form after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The hey-day,
the height, of this form is usually considered to be from the
eighteenth or nineteenth centuries until the mid-twentieth century,
and its most frequently found location is usually assumed to be
Europe (Tilly 1990; Mann 1993a). For instance, Mann, despite his
interest in early, pre-1760 empires (Mann 1986), leaves this con-
ceptualization behind in his analysis of the post-1760 period, where
he treats Britain and France as if they were nation-states (Mann
1993a). Yet several of the key examples of nation-states (for exam-
ple, Britain, France, Spain and Portugal) were actually empires dur-
ing the nineteenth century and not nation-states. It does not make
sense to consider people who were subject to such empires to be
either members of European nation-states or members of their own
local nation-states. At the time of these empires most people were
not within an entity that could reasonably be called a nation-state,
since those colonized would hardly recognize themselves as part of
the colonizing ‘nation’. To consider the British and other empires to
be nation-states rather than empires is to erase from history the
experiences of those many people who were subject to these states.
It is also to neglect the use of political and military domination to
restructure economies in the interest of the imperial power. It is not
appropriate to ignore these empires in accounts of the rise of
nation-states, as if those under the rule of empires were of little
significance, as if Europe and North America constituted the whole
of the world. Empires have states, not nation-states. The nineteenth
century was the hey-day of empires, not nation-states.
Nation-states are largely mythical entities, frequently aspired to,
but rarely realized in practice. Disaggregating nation and state can
be more helpful than conflating them in a spurious unity of nation-
state. The tensions that can exist as a result of the usually incom-
plete and partial mapping of nation onto state are a major cause of
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contemporary militarized conflicts and terrorism. The conflation of
important distinctions between nation, state, and nation-state thus
leaves out-of-focus points of disjuncture between these entities that
are important in generating social and political struggle and change.
Such disjunctures have important consequences for social and
political strife. Different polities often carry different gender and
ethnic projects, so the outcome of these conflicts has implications
for the form and degree of complex inequalities.
To argue that nation-states are largely mythical does not mean
that beliefs about them are unimportant (contra Bruce and Voas
2004). Myths are powerful. Ideas move people to action. Invented
traditions have effects (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983). A myth is a
narrative story that is considered to represent a tradition and to pro-
vide information about core values and the conduct necessary to
achieve them. The myth of the nation-state is that a nation will find
full and true expression of its values and will secure its economic
well-being only if it has a state of its own in a territory of its own;
and that it is possible to achieve this, with the evidence being that
there are believed to be many examples of successful nation-states.
It is predicated on the assumption that it is possible and desirable to
bring into alignment in one place culture, economy, and political
representation through a state.
The myth of the nation-state is a very powerful force. It does not
depend upon there being any actually existing nation-states, only a
belief that there are. Many national movements believe that it is pos-
sible as well as desirable to achieve a nation-state. The myth of the
nation-state has launched many political movements and militarized
conflicts. The nation-state is a powerful myth about purity. It is about
a nation having a state of its own so that it can self-regulate its envi-
ronment in conformity with its values. The nation-state myth is about
the close fit of a nation and its own state, with its own politics, econ-
omy, and culture mapping onto one another in the same territory.
The desire of a nation, or would-be nation, for a state of its own
has been a tremendous force in human history. On the one hand it
can be understood in terms of a discourse of self-determination, of
community, of democracy, of the realization of a society in confor-
mity with the values of the nation, free from the impositions of inva-
sive, colonialist, exploitative, foreign powers. On the other hand it
can also be a terrible force. It can unleash militarism and armed
struggle, by regular armies, guerrillas, and terrorists, as nations seek
to establish a state of their own in a territory of their own. It can
be a force that seeks purity where there is none, driving genocide,
ethnic cleansing, communal murders, and pogroms. The nation-state
is a powerful and resilient myth. The aspiration of nations for states
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of their own is a powerful driving force in contemporary politics.
However, nationalists seldom achieve a state just for themselves and
usually have to settle for some sort of messy compromise with other
nations and polities.
Organized religions
Organized religions constitute polities in those instances where they
have significant powers of governance over significant aspects of
people’s lives. Religions frequently have authority over the regulation
of intimacy, and sometimes economic matters, such as whether it is
acceptable to pay interest on loans (usury), though there may be con-
testation or negotiation with a state for authority over these matters
(Inglis 1987; Farrell 1988; Kandiyoti 1991). This can include the regu-
lation of marriage, divorce, non-marital sexuality, clothing, and diet.
Organized religions have three main routes to authority: moral author-
ity articulated through religious belief; political pressure on states and
other polities; and the power to sanction members of the religious
community if they break the rules of a religion. It might be thought
that, in the modern world, the powers of organized religion have been
reduced to the first two and that only the state has the right to sanc-
tion citizens for breaking community rules. However, this is mistaken.
This power is still potent in some locations, especially in the regula-
tion of intimacy (that is, in areas of sexuality and family relations such
as marriage, divorce, contraception, abortion, and homosexuality).
Sanctions can include a religion’s refusal to carry out rituals which are
considered essential (e.g. communion for those ex-communicated;
divorce; church re-marriage for those divorced by the state); exclusion
from a religious community with implications for a way of life, con-
demnation to some kind of hell in a believed-in afterlife, that is, the
threat of eternal damnation (e.g. for abortion); a refusal to recognize
unions and legitimate offspring with implications for property entitle-
ments as well as moral standing, and various forms of penitence
(Smyth 1992; Hardacre 1993; Moghadam 1993; Helie-Lucas 1994).
Religion is sometimes considered as no longer relevant to analy-
ses of modernity (Thompson 1995), largely because of a presump-
tion that modernization produced secularization. While the process
of secularization is an important process (Bruce 2002) its extent can
be exaggerated, while the significance of its restructuring in relation
to secular polities can be under-estimated (Gorski 2000). There are
important variations in the secularization process in different coun-
tries, with the process much more advanced in Europe than in the
USA (Inglehart 1997; Norris and Inglehart 2004).
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Organized religions typically have a different range of power
resources from those of states. Nevertheless, in certain contexts they
may effectively govern important social institutions such as intimacy
(sexuality, reproduction, marriage, and divorce). Not all religions
take the form of a polity. The concept is restricted to those religions
that have regularized structures of governance and a hierarchy of
organizational practices. Only salvational religions are likely to
develop such governance structures.
Organized religions are important on the global political stage. For
example, in international politics Islam constitutes a significant polity
that has various effects on the policies of other bodies. Islam can be
an actor on the global stage, despite very important internal differ-
ences and multiple centres of power. It can constitute a frame of ref-
erence within which Islamic individuals perceive themselves to be
acting. Jihadists are prepared to die in the pursuit of goals that they
perceive as part of Islam. A further example of the presence of both
Catholicism and Islam as polities on the global stage was that of the
alliance between Islam and Catholicism in opposition to the EU at the
fourth UN world conference on women in 1995, on the nature of
women’s human rights in relation to fertility and sexuality. Catholicism
was represented by the Pope’s representatives since the Vatican is
treated by the UN as if it were a state. The religious coalition sought
to restrict the extension of rights to individual women to make their
own choices on matters of intimacy, especially abortion, contracep-
tion, and sexuality. The EU, by contrast, was a significant advocate of
a woman’s individual right to choose (Moghadam 1996). The argu-
ment here is that the major salvational religions of Catholicism and
Islam constitute polities. They govern significant aspects of life, espe-
cially intimacy, among significant numbers of people.
Empires
Empires are an important form of polity in history (Mann 1986),
with lasting effects. There have also been various attempts to
broaden the usage of the concept to some modern polities (Van
Alstyne 1974; Hardt and Negri 2000, 2006).
An empire is a specific form of polity in which a single main state
rules over many other countries using formal political hierarchies
supported by military force. Military force is usually necessary to
establish the political hierarchies through which routine rule is main-
tained. Routine rule may be further supported by religious and other
ideological forms for cultural domination. The British state ruled
many countries around the world, from Ireland to Africa, from
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Canada to Australia, as part of the British Empire. Most of Africa was
subject to colonial rule from Britain, France, and Portugal. Most of
South America was subject to colonial rule from Spain and Portugal
until almost the end of the nineteenth century. De-colonization of
Africa from the British Empire was not complete until the 1970s
(Banks and Muller 1998). Several countries in central Europe did not
achieve independence from empires, such as the Hapsburg and
Ottoman, until 1918 (Therborn 1995). During the nineteenth and
most of the twentieth centuries the Russian empire grew to stretch
from East Asia to the middle of Europe, including by the middle of
the twentieth century countries in Eastern and Central Europe.
Russian de-colonization did not take place until after 1989. A ruling
group of people, while clearly distinct from the subordinated
people, may deny their separateness (Kumar 2000).
The expansion in military power of the USA, for example in its
invasions of Vietnam and Iraq, has led some to consider that it
takes the form of an empire (Van Alstyne 1960; Johnson 2000; Mann
2003). However, while significant military power was used, the for-
mal political hierarchies that are a defining feature of empires were
never successfully established by the USA. This was partly because
public adherence to the notion of respect for national sovereignty
meant that such political hierarchies had to be covert rather than
overt in order for this public rhetoric to be sustainable, and partly
because of a practical assumption that dominance could be main-
tained without such political mechanisms, resting on military force
and economic pressure alone. As Mann (2003) noted, this stance
led to incoherence and a lack of sustainability for this US project.
Hardt and Negri (2000) have addressed the new forms of power that
are consequent on globalization. They consider that there is now one
empire, one sovereign power, which governs the whole world as a
consequence of the globalization of economic and cultural exchanges.
It does not have a geographical centre, nor territorialized instruments
of rule; its nationalities are merged and blended. Hardt and Negri
(2006) assert that we are now in a state of global war. This is not an
argument that capitalist power is absolute, but one in which there are
also a wide-ranging set of oppositions. The multitude is better placed
than before to effect a transformation. Hardt and Negri are right to
argue that there are new forms of political interconnections in this
global era; power is more fluid (cf. Bauman) and interconnected; polit-
ical configurations take new spatialized forms; boundaries between
countries are treated more lightly in some respects. However, their pic-
ture of a globalized polity over-states the extent to which deterritorial-
ization of political forms has occurred. Corporate capital still needs
concentrated territorial locations for some of its functions (Sassen
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2001), while geographical distance is implicated in many forms of
capitalist appropriation (Harvey 2003). Powers are still concentrated in
specific states and other polities which are in opposition to each other
rather than merged into a unity. While they are right to integrate an
analysis of the importance of violence into political economy they
over-generalize – the USA may be leading a war but not all countries
have joined in. The concentrations of power and its alternative con-
figurations are important for understanding the potential for alternative
futures. Hardt and Negri (2000) have invented a novel use for the term
empire, which traditionally has been used to denote a geographically
located dominant state that has power over many peoples outside its
home territory through the use of formal political structures supported
by military power. While new concepts are needed to grasp the par-
ticularities of global organization, it is not useful to use a term that has
a clearly established meaning. We need new terms to denote new con-
cepts to capture new forms of global hierarchy.
Hegemon
Hegemon is a term that more usefully captures the concept of a
dominating state that is able to deploy a range of forms of power
over many other countries in the contemporary era (Chase-Dunn
1998; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1999; Chase-Dunn et al. 2000).
Dominance is created through a range of technologies of power,
including military, political, economic, and civil societal means.
Each of these forms of power is a contingent rather than an essen-
tial part of the powers of the hegemon. Following Gramsci, hege-
mony is achieved through a mix of coercion and manufactured
consent; the mix varies over time and place so that at some times
coercion is dominant while at others consent is achieved without
visible coercion. The concept of hegemony is useful in invoking
notions of asymmetry, power, and coercion simultaneously with
consent (Gramsci 1971; Anderson 1976/7).
The concept of hegemon captures the new modalities of power
in a global era better than the more traditional concepts of empire
and militarism. The concept of hegemon, drawing on Gramsci’s con-
cept of hegemony, better captures the dynamic mix of coercion and
consent. It allows for the various combinations of these forms of
power, signalled in Gramsci’s notions of wars of position as well as
wars of manoeuvre. The concept avoids the notion of overt formal
political hierarchy, which is a time-specific form of global power
from a previous era. It enables a consideration of the nature of
power that avoids some of the simplicities of a ‘zero-sum’ approach.
Walby-3874-Ch-04:Walby-3874-Ch-04.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 166
P
o
lities
167
This includes a range of issues, including that countries may perceive
benefits from acquiescence rather than contestation, that there can be
mutual benefits in the avoidance of hostile contestations, and also that
in some instances there can be meaningful co-development. Polities
are complex adaptive systems that coevolve. The concept of hege-
mon signals the range of forms of power, as well as their shaping by
the economic, political, military, and civil societal environments.
Hegemons have societalization projects, which are directed externally
as well as internally. These are never complete but always in process,
as rival hegemons and other entities compete to set the rules by
which all must live. Within the territory of a hegemon there may well
be competing projects, for example of organized religions.
Hegemons set the global rules in order that they suit the charac-
teristics of the dominant hegemon, so that while these rules are gen-
eral to all players nonetheless the hegemon benefits most. The
concept is helpful in grasping the setting and implications of the regu-
lations of many economic aspects of the global system, for example,
the rules of international trade as set by the World Trade Organization.
The power of the concept of hegemon is further advanced if it is
juxtaposed to the concept of ‘fitness landscape’ derived from
Kauffman (1993). The US hegemon, by ensuring that its rules are
best represented by the WTO, has changed the fitness landscape to
its own advantage. It is not just that the hegemon has power over
other countries, but also that it has changed the landscape in which
they all compete in its own favour. The environment, or fitness land-
scape (Kaufmann 1995), within which these polities operate is
changing as a result of increased global linkages. These increased
links are partly the result of new technologies that speed communi-
cations both physically and electronically and partly consequent on
new political institutions and practices developing at regional and
global levels. Changes in the fitness landscape have implications for
the construction of political preferences and for an ability to carry
these through. Some political actors thrive under one set of condi-
tions but wilt in others. Their capacities for action are the result of
their interaction with their environment and not only their intrinsic
capacities.
Both the European Union and the United States of America are
currently hegemons. Both have economic, cultural, and political
powers, though these are differently constituted and deployed. But
they do differ critically in relation to military force. The EU does not
have significant armed forces of its own (though its Member States
do), while the USA hegemon depends on its armed forces.
While the EU meets the definition of a polity, there have been exten-
sive arguments over whether or not the EU meets the conventional
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definition of a state. These focus in particular on its lack of armed
forces and the question of its degree of autonomy from Member States.
Conventional definitions of states (following Weber) include a mono-
poly of legitimate force in a territory. The EU does not have its own
standing army, militia, or police. Early attempts to create a military arm –
the European Defence Community in the 1950s – failed (Kapteyn
1996). However, since 2004 there has been the capacity for the EU to
engage in a temporary military deployment through the European
Union Force (EUFOR) by drawing temporarily on the armed forces of
Member States, as it did in Bosnia in 2004, Congo in 2006, and Chad
in 2007 (Council of the European Union 2007b). This lack of a stand-
ing army either means that the EU is not a state or that the conven-
tional definition of a state needs to be revised so as to encompass such
bodies as the EU.
The second reason offered as to why the European Union might
not be a state is that it is merely an inter-governmental body, used
as a tool by Member States to complete their own domestic agendas
(Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1993). This position is based on giving pri-
macy to the consent of Member States through their signature on
treaties rather than to the actions of the EU machinery of governance,
and considering the Council of Ministers as more important in the
internal governance of the EU than the European Commission, the
European Parliament, or the European Court of Justice. However,
these arguments that the EU is merely an inter-governmental body
are not convincing. This is because the EU, through the European
Court of Justice and European Commission, has powers not only to
coerce recalcitrant Member States to obey its rulings, but also allows
EU citizens direct access to EU legal rulings on those matters within
its remit (Wallace 1994; Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Kurzer 1997).
The EU has sufficient internal coherence, rules of actions, ability to
enforce its rules through sanctions, and institutional depth and
breadth to constitute a polity even though it is not a conventional
state. Its prominence as an actor at a global level means that it is a
hegemon and not only a polity. In particular, the EU conducts a dis-
tinctive foreign and security policy with global implications despite
differences between Member States. It also conducts trade and eco-
nomic policy for all Member States, including negotiations with the
WTO (Smith 2003; Smith 2004).
The USA is a state, polity, and hegemon: it is also close to being
a nation and a nation-state. The USA is a hegemon in a different way
from the EU. It does not have a queue of countries wanting to join
voluntarily. While it is joined by Mexico and Canada in a free trade
area (NAFTA), these countries did not change their regulations in
order to do so. The USA is more assertive in setting the parameters
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of global economic policy than the EU and enforcing its policy pref-
erences. The USA is much more assertive in foreign affairs as a result
of its use and threat of use of military force. The USA is currently a
more powerful hegemon than the EU.
There are further potential or would-be hegemons. Japan has
sometimes been considered a third hegemon alongside the USA
and the EU, because of its influence over economic development,
especially in South East Asia (Hettne et al. 1999). However, a lack
of economic growth since the 1990s as well as political and finan-
cial difficulties have reduced its capacity for action and influence.
Islamic radicals have their own project to counter Western military
aggression and secure universal respect for their religious ideals.
However, this project does not involve the whole of Islam even if
it is done in its name. Despite Huntington’s (1998) assertions of the
clash of civilizations, Islam is not best currently understood as a
singularity, but instead enjoys considerable variations (Kandiyoti
1991) and internal contestations over changes. However, some
within the radical Islamic movement do conceive of their project
as potentially hegemonic, indeed they proclaim a jihad or holy
war in order to achieve this. China is likely to become a future
hegemon. This is due to its current rapid economic growth which
means that in the foreseeable future it will become the world’s
largest single economy, its relative internal cohesion and an
increasing tendency towards involvement in global bodies such as
the WTO, influencing diplomacy in international crises, and host-
ing global events such as the UN conference on women and the
2008 Olympics. However, the speed of this trajectory is not clear
and neither is the extent to which China will seek influence out-
side its borders (Hutton 2003).
The contemporary contestation between two hegemons, the EU
and the USA, is key to the emergence of the new economic world
order. For example, their battles within the World Trade Organization
determine the level of risk allowed in food production through the
use of new technologies such as the genetic modification of organ-
isms and the use of antibiotics on farm animals; deciding the tariffs on
goods and services that encourage or discourage trade and particular
types of economic development. The WTO’s rules establish the fitness
landscape under which some economies thrive and others suffer.
More frequently the USA wins these contests with the EU, as in the
case of the WTO adjudication of the riskiness of genetically modified
foods (Winickoff et al. 2005), though there are exceptions, such as in
the case of data privacy standards where EU regulations do have an
effect on the USA, with the WTO protecting the EU from threats of
retaliation from the USA (Shaffer 2000). This contestation between the
Walby-3874-Ch-04:Walby-3874-Ch-04.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 169
G
lo
b
al
iz
at
io
n
an
d
In
eq
u
al
iti
es
170
EU and US hegemons and their varieties of modernity is discussed
further in Chapter 11.
Global political institutions
A series of political institutions have been established at a global
level that assist in the governance of global finance, militarism, and
human rights. These are best regarded as emergent polities rather
than as fully formed.
They include the global financial institutions discussed in Chapter 3
on Economies, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) that lend
money to governments in times of financial crisis and act as regula-
tors of the global economic environment through a series of con-
ventions, groups, and meetings (for example the G20). They are not
entirely new – even the nineteenth century had a global financial
system, while the Bretton Woods monetary agreement lasted from
1944 to 1971 – but they are increasingly important (Keohane 1989;
Hirst and Thompson 1996; Ruggie 1996, 1998; Held et al. 1999).
There has also been the development of international ‘security’
structures, such as the UN Security Council and regional military pacts
such as NATO (Held 1995; Ruggie 1996, 1998); and the emergence of
global institutions with the ability to compromise the power of states
especially over issues of human rights. There are near-global legal
institutions, especially in relation to human rights and crimes against
humanity, including the United Nations (with its power to declare
wars legal and legitimate), and the International War Crimes Tribunal.
There have been developments in international law covering legal
rights for individuals that are over and above the legitimate powers of
states, concerning the implementation of the UN Declaration of
Universal Human Rights (Haas 1964; Held 1995; Ruggie 1996, 1998).
The state is only one of several types of polity. Rather than focus-
ing only on the concept of the state, it is important to consider a wider
range of polities, including not only the state but also the nation, orga-
nized religion, empire, and hegemon. This increase in the range of
polities beyond states is needed in order to include the significance
of complex inequalities in addition to class for centralized political
institutions. Nations and organized religions often carry gender and
ethnic projects, as well as class ones. Including these entities within
the analysis of polities is important in order to analyse and theorize
the significance of complex inequalities in addition to class.
The nation-state is a very powerful myth; its institutional existence
is very rare. The recognition of the normal lack of congruency of
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nations and states (and also ethnicity and religion) and the strenuous
efforts to achieve this elusive alignment are crucial to explaining the
extent and nature of group and state violence, which so often takes
place along these fractures. Attempts to bring nations and states into
alignment are part of the process of societalization, and their frequent
failure to complete the process to produce a society that has a full
alignment of economy, polity, violence, and civil society is usual.
The concept of hegemon is needed to theorize global processes,
since their emergence and relative significance are central to under-
standing the emerging form of globalization and societalization.
The globalizing world is not made up of similar types of polities,
of nation-states, but rather a much richer variety of entities.
Globalization has not resulted in a single polity or empire, but
rather of a contestation between hegemons and the emergence of
would-be hegemons.
Polities Overlap and do not
Politically Saturate a Territory
In a global era, it becomes especially clear that it is rare for one polity
to politically saturate any given territory. In any given territory it is rare
that any one polity controls all possible political niches and domains.
The concept ‘saturate’ is introduced in order to address this issue.
Polities variously cooperate, compete, fight, and accommodate each
other – and they can overlap in the same territory. Different kinds of
polities often govern different areas of social life. While some polities
that coexist in a given territory may reach an accommodation as to
their respective remits, others may continually contest this. Sometimes
polities will agree overtly, or accommodate de facto, to their division
of jurisdiction over different institutions. Such a division means that
two different polities can coexist in a given territory, since they will
govern different institutions. The notion of a monopoly of political
control must give way. The exceptions to the conventional notion of
political monopoly constitute the norm, not the exception. It is in the
tension between different overlapping polities within the same terri-
tory that many important issues are shaped.
For instance, a church and a state that coexist in the same territory
may divide between themselves those institutions over which they
can claim authority and jurisdiction. The variable boundary between
religion and state is an example of these processes. There are signif-
icant variations in the institutions over which church and state can
claim jurisdiction. Many institutions have been effectively claimed to
be within the remit of the church in some times and places and in
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others by the state. In most of Europe, various churches have, over
recent centuries, been slowly if unevenly ceding to the state (often
after a struggle) the authority to regulate many aspects of intimacy or
‘personal’ life, such as contraception, abortion, marriage, divorce,
homosexuality, and sexual practices (Smyth 1992; Snyder 1992;
Nelson and Chowdhury 1994). These have often been constructed as
‘moral’ issues when they have been under religious jurisdiction, but
have become more ‘political’ the more they come under the jurisdic-
tion of a state. This change is related to processes of modernization
and to a change in the nature of the gender regime (Walby 1990,
1997). This transfer of remit of this arena is not complete in Europe,
but is openly contested in Ireland (Smyth 1992) while it is more set-
tled in the Nordic countries. The location of the boundary between
religion and the state in the regulation of intimacy is an important
focus in many fundamentalist movements, both Christian and Islamic,
from Asia to the USA, which seek to reverse this transfer of authority
(Marty and Appleby 1993).
Islam has complex relations with the states with which it coexists.
In many though not all Moslem countries, Islamic religious or Sharia
law directly governs intimacy while in other matters Islamic principles
merely guide the state. In practice, there is a vast variety of relations
between Islam and various states, ranging from the formal separation
of religion and the state in Turkey and the application of ‘personal’
religious laws to Muslims only as in Malaysia, to the integration of reli-
gion and state in a theocratic state under the Ayatollah in post-1979
Iran (Ibrahim 1980; Kandiyoti 1991; Moghadam 1993; Shamsul 1996;
Afshar 1998). The contestation of the remit of the state and Islam has
been particularly acute in the area of ‘personal laws’ regulating
marriage, divorce, women’s clothing, and whether wife beating is
within the remit of secular or religious law. There have been quite dif-
ferent outcomes to this contestation among such Muslim countries as
Malaysia, Iran, and Turkey (Sisters in Islam 1991; Hardacre 1993;
Moghadam 1993, 1994; Helie-Lucas 1994). There are significant varia-
tions in its form, at least partly due to the interactions between Islam
and the state, and with the economy of the country as well as the
ethnic identity of its location (Moghadam 1993; Shamsul 1996; Afshar
1998). The detailed implications of the Koran for conduct are inter-
preted by local as well as regional and global Islamic leaders and can
vary according to the social and economic environment. For instance,
interpretations of the rules surrounding interest on savings and related
banking transactions are more conducive to modernization in
Malaysia than in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. In Malaysia there has been
a process, albeit contested and uneven, of a reformation of Islam so
that it has become more conducive to economic development than is
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the case in contemporary Pakistan (Said 1996; The Economist 2000).
The ethnic composition of the population is a further source of vari-
ance, since the form of Islam more typically practised by Arabs can
differ from that of other ethnic groups, such as the Malays in Malaysia
(Said 1996; Shamsul 1996). Further, the political economy of Islamic
countries varies according to whether they possess oil or not.
Polities cut across each other. Nations rarely coincide with states,
and still less with ethos and religion, as any analysis of Europe
demonstrates (Brubaker 1996; Boje et al. 1999). Many states contain
more than one nation, while nations may straddle more than one
state. Diaspora may or may not have national aspirations, and
always straddle state boundaries (Cohen 1997). Some religions have
a global reach (Beyer 1994) and follow rules that are in contest with
those of the host state.
The EU is not in a monopoly position in the area that it covers, nor
does it not saturate all the political arenas within its territory. Rather
there are other polities with which it overlaps on the same territory.
Not only are there Member States, there are also other polities
including the Catholic Church and nations without states. Most of the
time there is a clear division as to which institutions are governed by
the EU, which are by Member States, and which are by other polities,
though this is occasionally contested. Initially the remit of the EU was
restricted to a specific range of economic matters that focused on the
creation of a single, fair, and competitive market for products, services,
and labour. However, its remit has grown in recent years especially fol-
lowing the Treaty of Amsterdam, although many policy matters are
currently still outside its remit and belong to Member States.
Power relations are not always zero-sum. While the relations
between polities may be one of contestation, there may also be
relations of cooperation where each helps the other to fulfil their
goals. For example, while the EU is legally superior to Member States
on those areas within its remit, this superiority is not best conceptu-
alized as always being a zero-sum game between these polities.
Instead, sometimes, the EU enables Member States to carry out
domestic agendas more successfully than if they were not part of the
EU (Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1993). In particular, the development
of the Single European Market has made it more possible for some
Member States to have successful domestic economies in a global
era. For some Member States the EU has increased their discretion in
policy making, though this may not be the case for all. In another
example, the Church in Ireland had complex relations with the devel-
oping national project and establishing state. Sometimes they were in
conflict over their spheres of action, as over the development of state
welfare provision (Whyte 1971), and at other times they provided
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mutual support (Larkin 1975; Inglis 1987). Polities coexisting in the
same space may sometimes be rivals and sometimes not.
Polities do not usually exist in nested hierarchies, although these do
exist within a federal polity. For example, there are nested hierarchies
within federal polities of the USA and Germany, where clearly demar-
cated powers are devolved to more local levels. However, most of the
relations between the polities under discussion here are not nested.
Political relations within the USA are not an appropriate template for
understanding the relations between polities elsewhere. Rather, there
is a range of types of relations between polities, including coopera-
tion, symbiosis, conflict, and accommodation.
Instead of a nested hierarchy, the relations between polities are
conceptualized, as noted in Chapters 1 and 2, as the mutual adap-
tation of complex systems operating in a changing fitness land-
scape. The mutual adaptation involves changes to interacting
polities rather than simple impacts. These mutual adaptations
change the environment for other political systems. The changing
political environment in which these interactions between polities
take place affects the nature of the polities and their interactions.
For example, the increase in global linkages changes the environ-
ment for polities, while the development of the European Union
changes the environment for states in Europe.
Polities do not have exclusive authority over a given territory,
nor are their powers limited to a specific territory. This is not a
new phenomenon, as is sometimes suggested in accounts of the
ostensibly restricted power of the nation-state in the era of global-
ization (Brenner 1999). Several religions, including Islam and
Catholicism, have always straddled state boundaries and have
often been accommodated by a state, dividing authority over dif-
ferent areas of social life (Kandiyoti 1991). Polities such as the EU
share legitimate authority with their Member States within negoti-
ated and agreed arenas (Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Walby 1999a,
1999b). Even states have rarely exercised the monopoly of legiti-
mate violence in a given territory, given the extent to which they
have condoned, and thus accepted as legitimate, the use of vio-
lence by husbands against wives within the home (Dobash and
Dobash 1980; Walby 1990). Further, the power of some states
extends way beyond their borders as a result of their exercise of
military or economic power. There are overlapping polities with
differing remits over differing areas of social life; the boundaries
between these different remits themselves variously contested and
accommodated.
The extent to which polities are constituted in and through
space is variable. Mid-twentieth century states were more intensely
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territorialized than many other entities. Early empires did not have
the technologies of power necessary to have such an intense hold on
their territories, such as bureaucracies with sophisticated means of
surveillance (Mann 1986). Religions are less intensely territorialized,
in the sense that members of religious groups often retain their affil-
iations whether or not they are in the heartland of their religion,
although they are stronger when they have at least the amount of
proximity needed for groups to meet in churches and temples. Ethnic
groups likewise usually retain their sense of belonging whether they
like it or not, even when they are a minority. The retention of such
ethnic and religious identities constitutes the basis of the phenome-
non of diaspora (Cohen 1997); religions and ethnic groups may
strongly maintain group boundaries without a dependence on terri-
torial boundaries.
By contrast, the dominant conception of the contemporary state
usually includes a territorial element, locating this entity in a spa-
tialized location. This lies behind the conception of a ‘Westphalian’
state that has sovereignty over its territory within its physical bor-
ders. This concept is used widely in social science and not only in
international relations (Waltz 1979). Weber (1948) defined the mod-
ern state as that body that had a monopoly of legitimate coercion
in a given territory. However, this spatialized conception of a state
serves us badly when we come to try to understand globalization.
This is because there are many exceptions to a state having that
monopoly of legitimate coercion in a given territory, and indeed to
many other forms of monopoly authority (Krasner 1995). The temp-
tation is then to declare these exceptions to the idealized notion of
the Westphalian state as new and indeed as a consequence of glob-
alization. However, deterritorialization is not entirely new. The extent
to which polities and other social entities have been constituted in
and through space has always been variable and constantly subject
to change. This is despite accounts of globalization in which
enhanced mobility and communications are seen newly to under-
mine societies. There have rarely if ever been states that politically or
otherwise saturated their territories. There have always been over-
lapping powers, other entities that claimed authority over specific
domains, even the authority to use coercion. The conventional
notion of space and authority is one in which space has traditionally
been conceptualized as a solid that could be under one authority or
another. This needs to be replaced with a notion of space that is
more of a porous sponge than a solid, as a location where many fluid
entities can overlap and coexist as well as sometimes competing.
Polities can be fluid and polities are created: over 100 new states
have emerged since the formation of the United Nations in 1945
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(Inter-Parliamentary Union 1995). Polities can also disappear, sub-
sumed involuntarily within other states or empires (McNeill 1963;
Mann 1986); and polities can change, voluntarily forming alliances
such as that of the European Union which entail the loss of sover-
eignty (Leibfried and Pierson 1995); their borders can change, los-
ing and gaining territory, such as Russia/Soviet Union and Germany
(West, East, and now united). Stability is unusual, even though more
social theory is written about polities that have a long history than
those which do not (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979).
In any one country there is likely to be more than one polity often,
but not always, governing different aspects of social relations accord-
ing to different practices with a different spatial and temporal reach.
Each is likely to constitute a focus for a project of societalization in
which other domains are brought into alignment with its priorities
and principles of social organization. As the relations between the
polities change with the changing fitness landscape, then their impli-
cations for different sets of complex inequalities will also change.
It is necessary here to have an understanding of the global politi-
cal system. This wider framework has been variously understood to
be a determining system (Wallerstein 1974), an influential regime
(Krasner 1983), or merely a background global arena. There are epis-
temological and ontological issues here as to whether individuals,
polities, or the system in which they are embedded are seen as the
prime mover in the analysis (Cerny 1990; Ruggie 1998). There are
ontological debates as to whether the focus should be on the polity
or system, as well as substantive debates as to whether time-space
compression alters the relationship between the polity and the
global. This analysis has ranged from realist international relations
theory in which states are understood to be the prime movers (Waltz
1979) to Marxist accounts which see the world system as the prime
mover and in which states are merely nodes (Wallerstein 1974).
The conventional understanding of the relations between states
suggests that they follow their own interests in international
settings. However, states can adjust to, shape, or otherwise co-
evolve with the global fitness landscape. However, there is a ques-
tion as to how these perceptions of their own interests are formed
and indeed the content of these interests (Ruggie 1998). Rather than
treating the interests of states as self-evident, as in the realist inter-
national relations tradition, it is important to see these as socially
constructed (Ruggie 1998). This is not a denial of the notion of state
self-interest, but rather that the pursuit of this self-interest may take
several different routes, and that these cannot be simply read off
from the balance of power (Ruggie 1996). Such strategizing will
involve both the particular and the contingent in the interaction
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of regime and polity. Ruggie (1996, 1998) develops the notion of
multi-lateralism, which sits in between the notion of a polity-led
or a system-led analysis. Rather, it is states that jointly construct new
sets of expectations and understandings and build these into new
institutions. This implies a notion of an international regime that
significantly conditions the actions of other states (Krasner 1983).
The argument here is that at least both the levels of polities and
global system are needed for the analysis and that it is inappropri-
ate to consider only one to be inherently primary. Some levels of
the system are emergent from others, and it is important to develop
a multi-level analysis of interacting complex systems in a changing
fitness landscape. The changing global fitness landscape facilitates
the emergence of new polities as well as the restructuring of their
powers and capacities.
While military and economic power are pre-eminent in the global
fitness landscape, there is also some power in argumentation. Risse
(1999), inspired by Habermas, locks onto the space between knowl-
edge and power where knowledge and power do not quite equate to
the other, arguing that argumentation is an important part of the polit-
ical process in relation to the application of international norms, espe-
cially those concerning human rights which are diffusing, via a
process of the socialization of states. ‘Human rights are embedded in
a whole variety of international regimes and organizations and thus
form part of the normative setting of international society. They
increasingly define what constitutes a “civilized state” as a member of
the international community in “good standing”’ (Risse 1999: 529–30).
Risse suggests there are three types of process: the forced imposition
of norms, strategic bargaining, and instrumental adaptation; processes
of institutionalization and habitualization; and processes of moral con-
sciousness raising, argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion.
There are coalitions of countries in global fora which can be sig-
nificant for outcomes of global negotiations although they do not
constitute a polity. The ‘Group of 77’ at the United Nations, estab-
lished in 1964 and with 130 members in 2007, is the largest inter-
governmental organization of developing states at the UN (Group
of 77 2007). This group is important in global trade negotiations,
and has sometimes thwarted the ambitions of countries of the North
in negotiations over trade liberalization in the WTO.
There is usually more than one polity in any geographical area as
any one polity does not saturate any given territory. Polities coevolve,
unevenly, in a changing global fitness landscape. They overlap. They
contest and cooperate in the same territory, sometimes in different
spheres of governance. Some are more dominant than others:
the most powerful are global hegemons, with a disproportionate
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influence on the rules through which the globe is governed on
matters from trade to human rights. A key difference between
polities is the extent to which they are governed democratically.
Democracy
Democracy is treated here as a key indicator of both modernity and
‘progress’, despite dissenting voices. Democratic governance is a key
component of good governance, which also involves the rule of law,
the protection of minorities, human rights, and those institutions suffi-
ciently developed to deliver democratic intent. The conventional defi-
nition of democracy is too narrow: in order to address complex
inequalities it needs to be broadened to include, in addition to suffrage
and elections, the presence of women and minorities within the insti-
tutions of governance. Here a ten-point scale is proposed to capture
three levels of the depth of democracy: suffrage-democracy, presence
democracy, and broad democracy. Conceptualizing democracy in a
global era is also a challenge. The depth of democracy is linked to the
development of neoliberalism or social democracy. The analysis of the
development of democracy is challenged when complex inequalities are
included since it arrives in stages and not all at once. Further global as
well as country-specific processes are involved.
Democracy and modernity
Democracy today is a major hallmark of modernity while polities
that are not democratic are premodern. Democracy is often framed
as progress, as a universal value. It is valued in North and South,
USA and EU, and enshrined in many UN statements. However, there
are exceptions to this framing of democracy as progress and moder-
nity, in particular from the perspective of multiple modernities.
In the discourse of ‘Asian values’ democracy is not seen as part
of modernity or progress because of the priority given to the col-
lectivity over the individual, of a combination of consensus and
hierarchy (Thompson 2000; Barr 2002), but this view is widely con-
tested as being merely self-serving for elites in some Asian coun-
tries (Sen 1997). Another challenge to the valuation of democracy
is the communist prioritization of socialist economic development
over individual rights, as in the former Soviet Union and in China
today (Woodiwiss 1998). Similar issues concerning individuation
are discussed in Chapter 6 on civil societies.
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The absence of democracy is here understood as a lack of com-
pletion of the project of modernity. The comprehensiveness of
access to political power through democratic procedures and the
depth of that democratic power are here taken as indicators of
modernity and progress.
Redefining democracy
The conventional definition of democracy is too narrow. In order to
include procedures that are necessary for effective access to politi-
cal power for women and minoritized ethnic groups, it is necessary
to reconsider this definition of democracy. Polities that allow access
to political power for some groups but not others are not fully
democratic. Democracy can vary in its depth (Fung and Wright 2001;
Beetham et al. 2002). While the oft-stated goal of democracy is to
provide equal access to political decision making for all citizens and
to ensure the accountability of government, in practice the conven-
tional definition is primarily procedural, involving universal suffrage
and free, fair, and competitive elections that elect representatives of
the population to parliament in the context of freedom of speech
and association (Dahl 1971; Held 1995; Potter et al. 1997; Freedom
House 2008). These are indeed important, but not sufficient to
capture the depth of democracy.
The focus here is on the full range of procedures that are needed
to achieve democracy. The timing of democracy is often different
for different social groups, with implications for the depth of the
democracy of the polity as a whole. Ten indicators of the depth of
democracy in a country are:
1. no hereditary or unelected positions, including a monarch and
members in either chamber of parliament;
2. no colonies (i.e. no governance of territories that do not also
meet these criteria);
3. no powers of governance held by an additional non-democratic
polity (e.g. organized religion);
4. universal suffrage, de facto as well as de jure;
5. elections, especially those that are free, fair, and competitive,
in a context of free speech and free association and developed
civil society associations;
6. a low cost for electioneering, either by law or by custom;
7. an electoral system with proportional representation;
8. an electoral system with quotas for under-represented groups
such as women;
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9. a proportionate presence in parliament of women and minorities;
10. a range of institutions (e.g. welfare services) that are governed
by the democratic polity.
These ten points are grouped into three forms of democracy each
of a different depth. The shallowest is that of ‘suffrage-democracy’
(involving points 1–5) which concerns the absence of hereditary,
military, and religious governance together with universal suffrage
and free, fair, and competitive elections in the context of a free civil
society. A deeper form of democracy is that of ‘presence democ-
racy’ (additionally including points 6–9) and the presence of all
groups in the governing institutions. The deepest form is ‘broad
democracy’ (which includes point 10), concerning the application
of democratic principles of governance across a broad rather than
a narrow range of institutions.
First, the absence of a hereditary principle is a basic precondition for
democracy. Surprisingly it is often passed over as if it is of no account
that hereditary monarchs still exist (e.g. in the UK and Sweden), and
that in some (e.g. the UK) they still have constitutional duties, even if
these are severely circumscribed – indeed the UK in 2009 still had 92
hereditary peers in the upper chamber of its parliament. Democracy
entails elections to all governing institutions. Once again there are
some curious exceptions here, such as appointments to the upper
house (the majority method of selection in 15 out of the 58 countries
with a second chamber), including those by the government in both
Ireland (11 out of 60 members) (Russell 1999) and the UK (in the sec-
ond chamber most are appointed for life; short-term appointments
include top judges and religious leaders; no one is elected).
Second, there is an absence of colonies. Colonies in an Empire are
not democratically governed. Hence any country that is an empire is
directly responsible for the absence of democracy in those territories
that it colonizes. Several European empires, such as the British,
French, and Portuguese empires, did not break up until the last half
of the twentieth century. Former colonies typically had universal suf-
frage on their day of independence but not before. There are perhaps
a surprising number of ‘territories’ that continue to be ruled by some
countries which are not geographically contiguous and have attained
only partial integration into the full set of democratic processes of the
main state. The USA has several of these, including Guantanamo Bay.
Third, is an absence of governance by non-elected religious bodies.
A key set of polities that are not democratic are organized religions.
While these do not govern all aspects of social life, in some cases
they are important in the governance of intimacy, including marriage,
divorce, contraception, abortion, and sexual practices. Organized
Walby-3874-Ch-04:Walby-3874-Ch-04.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 180
P
o
lities
181
religions have significantly different modes of governance than
states, confining access to decision making to small groups of
anointed rather than democratically elected leaders which usually
excludes women. The more important organized religion is in the
governance of personal life, the less democratically governed that
area of life will be. Countries in which an organized religion governs
intimacy compromise democracy.
Fourth, is universal suffrage. Universal suffrage might seem an
obvious essential for democracy but some analysts have settled for
male suffrage or even majority male suffrage as the indicator of democ-
racy, for example, Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) take suffrage for 60 per
cent of men as their indicator of democracy. This is a mistake, as the
omission of women and minority ethnic groups from the franchise
precludes the designation of a country as democratic. Women and
ethnic minorities have often gained the right to vote later than men in
the dominant ethnic group. When fully universal suffrage without
exceptions for women and ethnic minorities is taken as an essential
benchmark for democracy, the timing of the democratic transition tra-
ditionally used by scholars is put back by several decades for most
countries in the North (Therborn 1977; Paxton 2000; Paxton et al. 2003),
though less frequently for those in the South where universal suffrage
will often have been won at independence. Suffrage requires the
de facto right to vote, not only its de jure existence. In the USA, the
disenfranchisement of African-American slaves in the southern states
by ‘Jim Crow’ laws until the civil rights movement appeared, means
that the claim that the USA became democratic before the late 1960s is
compromised.
Fifth, free, fair, and competitive elections in the context of free
speech and free association are an important part of democratic
procedure. This is well recognized and captured, for example, in
the Freedom House (2008) indicators of political rights and civil lib-
erties, which rank all countries of the world on a 1–7 scale for each
of these: most Western countries were awarded full marks.
Sixth, is access to the democratic process through the low cost of
electioneering. Several detailed procedural matters have a signifi-
cant impact on the differential access of less and more advantaged
citizens to political power. Levels of expenditure can have a signif-
icant effect on the outcome of an election, especially for chal-
lengers (rather than incumbents) (Jacobson 1978). Some countries,
such as the UK and Ireland, have implemented a cap that limits the
amount of money that can be spent on elections in an attempt to
ensure that those without rich supporters can still effectively stand
for election (Walecki 2007). In the USA candidates can spend very
large sums of money contesting elections: for example, the cost of
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running for election for the President of the USA in 2004 was $367m
for the winner (Bush), and $328m for the loser (Kerry) (Rooney
2007), while the amount for the 2008 election contest between
Obama and McCain rose to around $1 billion.
Seventh, there are electoral systems with proportional represen-
tation; eighth, there are electoral systems with quotas for under-
represented groups such as women; and ninth, the proportionate
presence in parliament and governing institutions of women and
minoritized groups. Suffrage, free elections, and free association are
not sufficient to deliver democracy if the concept is interpreted as the
procedures necessary to facilitate the equal involvement of all social
groups in political decision making – a presence in parliament is also
required. The presence or absence of women in parliament makes a
difference to political priorities and policy outcomes; there is evi-
dence of this from a range of countries including the UK (Norris
1996a), the USA (Thomas 1991), and Sweden (Wängnerud 2000).
On average, elected women are more likely to support policies
that directly or indirectly support gender equality. In Sweden,
Wängnerud (2000) finds that the presence of women in the Swedish
parliament (Riksdag) makes a difference in that women in the Riksdag
are more likely than men to hold to the notion that gender equality
is a good thing. In the UK, Norris (1996a) finds that the increase in
women politicians in Westminster makes a difference to support for
gender equality issues and other social democratic matters. Women
MPs and candidates to be MPs are more likely than men to support
women’s rights on abortion, criminalizing rape in marriage and
domestic violence, and promoting equal opportunities, as well as on
some other important issues including, nationalization/privatization,
trade union power, equal opportunities for ethnic minorities, use of
the death penalty, nuclear weapons, and defence spending. In a
comparison of states within the USA, Thomas (1991) finds that
women do make a difference. Women in states with the highest
percentages of female representatives introduce and pass more pri-
ority bills dealing with issues about women, children, and families
than men in the same states and more than female representatives
in legislatures where they are low in number. She also suggests that
women can diffuse their policy priorities in two ways: through high
percentages of women in office, or through the presence of a for-
mal women’s legislative caucus.
Drawing on Kanter (1977), she argues that relative numbers are
critical in shaping interaction dynamics: a critical mass of women
makes a difference as well as women’s caucuses in the legislature.
In a ‘skewed’ group that has 15 per cent or less of the total its mem-
bers are seen as token, continuously responding to their status. In
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‘tilted’ groupings minority members form 15–40 per cent. Where
there is ‘balance’ – a 60/40 split – members of the minority are less
often perceived as aberrant. This is highly relevant in a context
where few countries can match Sweden’s 47 per cent of women in
parliament in 2007. Indeed the USA has only 16 per cent of women
in its legislature and Ireland 13 per cent (Inter-Parliamentary Union
2007), the proportion where they may only be seen as not much
more than token. However, even in the USA, the increase in women
in parliament is associated with significant changes in gender policy
since 1945, with a movement away from separate spheres gender
policies towards equal opportunities in areas of violence, employ-
ment, maternity leave, and childcare (Burstein et al. 1995).
The significance of women in parliament for policies requires
a rethinking of the conventional operationalization of the notion
of ‘representation’ and the relationship between ‘descriptive
representation’, where representation reflects the identified
groups, and ‘substantive representation’ where the presump-
tion is the representation of the interests of the group (Pitkin 1967,
2004; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Phillips 1995; Squires 1999). The
relative lack of presence of women and minority ethnic groups in
parliament has been shown to reduce their prospect of influ-
encing governmental decision making; while they are formally
represented via the electoral system, the representation of their
views is less established. Presence matters. A proportionate
presence in parliament should be included in the operational-
ization of the concept of democracy. However, while the pres-
ence of women is necessary for the representation of women’s
interests it is still not sufficient (Jones and Jónasdóttir 1988;
Jónasdóttir 1991).
A series of procedures exist that are more likely to lead to the
less unequal presence of women. These include: voting systems
that involve proportional representation rather than ‘first past the
post’; multi- rather than single-member constituencies (Norris 1985;
Kenworthy and Malami 1999); and the use of quotas (Dahlerup
1998). Proportional representation makes a difference in the repre-
sentation of minoritized ethnic groups as well as of women. In the
UK in 2007 using ‘first past the post’, 2 per cent of elected MPs were
from minority ethnic groups as compared with 6 per cent of UK
representatives to the European Parliament who were elected using
proportional representation (Economist 2007).
Tenth, there is the application of the democratic principle to a
broad range of institutions. This is revealed in ‘democratic audits’
that consider a wider range of institutions (Beetham et al. 2002) and
a concern for the depth of democratic practice, particularly the
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deliberative or empowered participatory governance involving citi-
zens more directly in decision making (Fung and Wright 2001).
Three types of institutions in particular vary in the extent to which
they are governed by democratic practices: welfare institutions,
employment, and the military. First, education, care, and health ser-
vices, and the criminal justice system are under democratic control
and directly provided by the state in some countries, while in others
(to varying degrees) they are organized through the market. This
tends to align with the difference between social democratic and
neoliberal forms of governance. The move towards neoliberalism
is often accompanied by the privatization of previously public ser-
vices (Hedlund 1998; Harvey 2005). This shift is facilitated by the
(much disputed) WTO directive on the liberalization of public ser-
vices. Privatization of public services is an example of the shrinking
of the remit of the democratic polity. This is often represented as if it
were a reduction in the state and bureaucratic control of services, but
if the state is democratic then it is also a reduction in democratic con-
trol. Second, the governance of the workplace and employment may
be at the discretion of employers or can be subject to regulation by
the polity and sometimes by the participation of worker representa-
tives, usually unions. Third, is the extent to which military institutions
are controlled by a democratic polity or have significant autonomy
(Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2008).
This varies as a result of different forms of state reconstruction
through war – the extent to which organized economic interests are
entwined with the military in a military-industrial complex, including
the privatization of security operations (Mills 1956; Harris 2005). All
three types of institutions (welfare, employment, and military) are sub-
ject to greater democratic control in social democratic as compared
with neoliberal forms of development.
Bringing into focus gender and other complex inequalities thus
requires revisions to the conventional definition of democracy. The
depth of democracy does matter: it is necessary to distinguish between
suffrage-democracy that is limited to suffrage and free elections, pres-
ence-democracy that includes the procedures to ensure the presence of
women and minorities in governing institutions, and broad democracy
in which democratic practices are extended to a wide rather than nar-
row range of institutions. When these distinctions are drawn, inequali-
ties in access to democratic power between social groups are made
more visible. This increased visibility enables the differentiation of the
time at which different levels of democracy are accessed by different
groups, typically later for women and minority ethnic groups than for
men of the dominant ethnicity. The depth of democracy is linked to
the extent to which a country is neoliberal or social democratic.
Walby-3874-Ch-04:Walby-3874-Ch-04.qxp  23/06/2009  4:04 PM  Page 184
P
o
lities
185
The development of democracy
Does economic development drive the creation of democracy, as is
conventionally argued, or are processes in civil society and vio-
lence also important? Are processes within countries the most
important, or are global processes also significant? Democracy does
not arrive all at once for all people, instead it occurs at varying lev-
els and times for different regimes of inequality. Do the same
processes in the development of democracy apply to gender and
ethnic regimes of inequality as that of class, or do they differ? To
what extent do political processes create negative or positive feed-
back loops in the development of democracy and modernity?
There is a robust correlation between democracy and economic
development when it is limited to male suffrage-democracy (Lipset
1959; Diamond 1992; Muller 1995a). There are several ways in
which economic development facilitates the development of suffrage-
democracy. One is through the growth of a larger middle class and
the development of education, which reduces the grounds for
extremist politics and promotes tolerance and the legitimacy of
democratic values (Lipset 1959). However, higher levels of inequal-
ity tend to reduce the prospects for, and stability of, democracy
such as in Latin America during the 1980s (Muller 1995a), probably
because it increases the resistance of the powerful to sharing power
(Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Muller 1995b). The second way in
which economic development feeds the development of democ-
racy is by increasing the resources available for the struggles of the
disadvantaged. Economic development is associated with an
increased independence of free wage labour and the resources to
build organizations for a robust civil society and political struggle.
This increases the efficacy of the struggle of the working class by
facilitating growth in the economic and organizational resources
that the under-represented groups need in order to struggle effec-
tively for access to political power, thereby translating economic
power into political power (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). But it is not
reducible to economic development, opening up the possibility of
divergent paths of development to democracy (Moore 1966).
Presence-democracy for working-class men and parties representing
their interests in parliament was not simultaneous with male suffrage
but came later. It depended on the development of civil society orga-
nizations, especially trade unions, to form the organizational strength to
have both a presence in parliament and to introduce a labour agenda
within parliament. This occurred most readily in those countries where
there developed strong trade unions with high rates of membership and
a centralization of activities as well as the development of a labourist or
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socialist party. This trade union and party pattern became common in
Nordic countries such as Sweden, moderately so in the UK, but was
much less developed in the USA and Ireland. The development of
social democracy was strongest in those countries with the strongest
development of trade unions (Kitschelt 1994; Callaghan 2000).
The development of democracy is not only the outcome of
processes at the country-level, but is also affected by global and
regional processes of various forms. Military intervention in the
aftermath of the Second World War led to the reconstruction of
authoritarian states as democratic ones in Germany and Japan. The
1920s and 30s in Europe saw divergent waves of fascism in the
south and social democracy in the north, with the former attacking
embryonic forms of democracy and the latter enhancing them.
During the mid- and late-twentieth century a wave of decolonization
was associated with democratization as nationalist movements
world wide adopted a democratic agenda.
What difference does taking complex inequalities in addition to
class into consideration make to this analysis? Does the correlation
between economic development and democracy apply to complex
inequalities other than class? And does it apply equally to suffrage,
parliamentary presence, and a range of potentially democratically
governed institutions?
Access to democracy often occurs at different times for different
social groups. Women have often achieved suffrage later than men in
the North, though more often at the same time during decolonization
in the South. Minoritized ethnic groups are sometimes excluded from
access to suffrage and other democratic procedures. There may be de
facto exclusions, such as those of the ‘Jim Crow’ practices in the
southern states of the USA, which excluded African-Americans, the
former slaves, from voting (Potter et al. 1997), including acts of vio-
lence (Shapiro 1988). African-Americans in the south of the USA only
obtained the vote after the efforts of a strong civil rights movement
(Tilly 1978; McAdam 1999). There may also be formal legal barriers to
political citizenship, as in the case of in-migrants who may work and
live in a country without political entitlements. In some countries a
second generation acquires political citizenship at birth (e.g. the UK);
in others citizenship can only be inherited from parents. In cases
where the in-migration was not legally approved, political citizenship
cannot be acquired. Increased global migration for economic reasons
can thus sometimes entail political disenfranchisement.
Unlike the case for men, the winning of female suffrage does not cor-
relate with either economic development (Therborn 1977) or women’s
employment. In North-West Europe and North America, most countries
granted women the vote around 1918–1920, with a second wave in
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southern and eastern Europe around 1945. This challenges a simple
link of economic development and democracy for women. Rather there
was a global, or perhaps better, a regional wave of female suffrage.
While Ramirez et al. (1997) link women’s suffrage to the development
of world society, in which each country adopts similar practices con-
cerning citizenship as a result of a global diffusion of cultural and polit-
ical practices rather than economic development, this misses the
specificity of female suffrage and the intense and highly contested fem-
inist struggles for the vote in the period up to 1918, which is not best
captured by the rather gentle notion of a process of diffusion. In the
UK the process involved women from all classes, from those organized
in unions in the cotton textile mills of northern England to middle-class
ladies, with their actions ranging from mass property damage (e.g.
smashing windows in fashionable shopping streets, setting fire to post
boxes, and burning ‘votes for women’ into golf courses) with conse-
quent imprisonment, hunger strikes, and force feeding, to petitions, lob-
bying, and mass demonstrations (Evans 1977; Liddington and Norris
1978; Purvis and Joannou 1998). Suffrage-democracy for women is not
as driven by economic development as for men, but instead is more
associated with global and regional civil societal waves.
Presence-democracy for women, in which women are elected as
representatives in parliament and are present in executives and other
governing bodies, does however correlate with economic development
(Matland 1998), more especially women’s free wage labour (Rule 1981,
1987; Matland 1998; Paxton and Kunovitch 2003), the presence of
women in higher level jobs (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Knutsen
2001), and women’s education (Rule 1981, 1987). Thus, while economic
development is not clearly linked to suffrage-democracy for women,
it is linked to presence-democracy. This is in addition to its association
with the use of proportional representation rather than majoritarian
voting systems, multi-member rather than single-member constituencies
(Rule 1981, 1987, 1994; Norris 1985; Darcy et al. 1994; Kenworthy and
Malami 1999). Thus, a combination of economic development, which
includes women’s free wage labour and education, and specific elec-
toral forms drives the development of presence-democracy for women.
A further global aspect of presence-democracy for women has
been the development of quotas to address the shortage of women
in parliament (Dahlerup 1998; Karam 1998). In 1995 only three
countries (Bangladesh, Eritrea, and Tanzania) had statutory quotas,
but by 2003 there were 40 countries which had a constitutional or
statutory quota and 62 had a political party quota, so that overall
83 countries had some form of quota system (some had more than
one kind) (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1995; IDEA 2005). While in
some cases the process of the introduction of quotas may have a
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predominantly national focus, in others development is as a result
of local activists drawing on a near global feminist movement and
learning from ideas and practices in other countries to push for
change in their own (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).
Presence-democracy also deepens as a result of the increasing
organization of women in civil society organizations. While the
highly visible aspects of women’s movements have declined some-
what (Taylor 1989; Bagguley 2002), there has been substantial growth
in the organization of women in civil society, including trade unions,
professional associations, and many NGOs. Contrary to Fraser (1997),
much of this is associated not with cultural issues but rather with eco-
nomic and political issues. In many countries the proportion of women
who are members of trade unions has been growing strongly and in
several (including Sweden and the UK) it is now around 50 per cent of
trade union membership (Hicks and Palmer 2004). Alongside this
change, the proportion of women in leadership positions in trade
unions has grown (Ledwith and Colgan 2000), there is a developing
equalities agenda within trade union bargaining strategies (Ellis and
Ferns 2000), and there is a new representation of women’s interests in
workplace bargaining as a result of these changes in trade unions
together with women’s increased presence in the labour market
(Gagnon and Ledwith 2000).
Most Western countries now have established national feminist
organizations that coordinate activity across a variety of fronts. The
European Union actively encourages this development through its
funding of the European Women’s Lobby, with representatives
coming from each Member State’s ‘peak’ feminist organization
(European Women’s Lobby). At a global level feminist coalitions
seek and find international spaces, especially in the interstices of
the United Nations, to develop shared platforms for action, as for
example in Beijing in 1995 (UN 1995). These have implications for
the development of positions put forward at a national level, from
suggestions for the reform of democratic procedures, such as quotas
(Dahlerup 1998), and the development of state institutional
machinery to take forward gender equality issues at a national
level (Mazur 2002), to shared feminist programmes.
The development of democracy, the modernization of the polity,
is not simply driven by economic development, but a consequence
of the complex interaction of economy, polity, violence, and civil
society. Democracy for women and minoritized ethnic groups is
often but not always later than for men of the dominant ethnicity.
It is important to note the varying depth of democracy and to go
beyond the traditionally narrow focus on suffrage-democracy, to
include presence-democracy and broad democracy.
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Conclusions
Making visible complex inequalities and global processes requires
the deconstruction and rebuilding of the conceptualization and
theorization of polities and democracy. It also requires the use of
the broader concept of polity rather than the narrower one of state,
the rejection of the misleading concept of nation-state, and the
understanding that polities overlap and do not saturate their terri-
tory. It demands differentiation of the depth of democracy so as to
capture variations in the access to political power of different
groups at different times.
The concept of state is too narrow and should be replaced by the
broader concept of polity, which encompasses a variety of forms
including states, nations, organized religions, empires, and hegemons
in order to facilitate the visualization of conflicts between political
projects involving complex inequalities such as ethnicity and gender
more fully. Any one polity rarely saturates its territory. Instead
nations, states, religions, and hegemons overlap, contesting and
accommodating in the same geographical space. Different polities
carry differently gendered, classed, and ethnicized projects, so the
contestation between these polities has implications for the nature of
gender and ethnic relations as well as that of class. The concept of
the nation-state with its purported settlement of one nation and one
state misleads since this is rarely fully achieved. It is preferable to dis-
aggregate the different polities to be able to examine the implications
of their lack of mapping onto each other, such as the militarized con-
flict associated with nation-state projects when a nation, state, and
religion do not map onto each other. The myth of purity associated
with the nation-state project is a terrible driving force in history
when combined with the low likelihood of its achievement. Global
processes will create new fitness landscapes within which competing
polities variously thrive or decline. Emerging and contesting global
hegemons are key to setting up the rules of such global landscapes.
The concept and operationalization of democracy are revised so
as to include issues related to complex inequalities. Ten indicators
of the depth of democracy are identified: no hereditary or unelected
positions, including a monarch and members in either chamber of
parliament; no colonies, that is, no governance of territories that do
not also meet these criteria; no powers of governance held by addi-
tional non-democratic polity, for example organized religion; uni-
versal suffrage, de facto as well as de jure; elections, especially those
that are free, fair, and competitive; a context of free speech and free
association and developed civil society associations; a low cost for
electioneering, either by law or by custom; an electoral system with
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proportional representation; an electoral system with quotas for
under-represented groups such as women; a proportionate presence
in parliament for women and minorities; a range of institutions (e.g.
welfare services) governed by the democratic polity. Democracy
may be shallow or deep: suffrage-democracy though conventionally
equated with democracy is its most shallow variant; presence-
democracy in which women and minorities are present in governing
institutions is a deeper form; the deepest of all is broad-democracy,
where a broad range of institutions (welfare, employment, military)
is governed by democratic practices. Neoliberalism typically has no
more than suffrage-democracy, while social democracy has both
presence-democracy and broad-democracy.
The development of democracy rarely happens all at one point in
time for all social groups, despite the convention of dating democ-
racy from the year of men’s suffrage. Even suffrage-democracy was
usually at different times for men and women in the North, though
more often simultaneous during the decolonization of the South.
Presence-democracy is still rather uncommon, found in few coun-
tries other than the Nordic ones. Broad-democracy is confined to
social democratic countries. While suffrage-democracy for men is
often linked to economic development, suffrage-democracy for
women is not, although presence-democracy is.
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Introduction
The importance of violence for people’s well-being, for regimes of
inequality, and for other institutional domains, is much underesti-
mated in social theory; indeed it is frequently rendered invisible.
Yet the regulation and deployment of violence is part of the con-
stitution of the social order, complex inequalities, and globaliza-
tion. The conceptualization of violence should be neither simply
naturalistic, nor solely discursive. Violence is not a significant part
of the classical sociological tradition of Marx, Durkheim, and
Simmel, nor of contemporary social theory; rather it is examined
within rather specialized social science traditions associated with
international relations and criminology and not integrated into
mainstream social theory. Four challenges are made to social the-
ory in order to theorize violence.
First, the development of an ontology of violence. Violence is a
social phenomenon, not reducible to psychological traits, hor-
mones, emotions, or individualized pathology. Violence constitutes
a social system, an institutional domain, that is parallel to those of
economy, polity, and civil society. When complex inequalities are
brought into focus, the range of phenomena visible as violence is
extended beyond the traditional focus on war and criminal vio-
lence to include non-criminalized forms of inter-personal and
group violence. The inclusion of group violence and war between
states alongside interpersonal violence in the same theoretical
frame of reference challenges the academic division between inter-
national relations and criminology. The institutions of violence are
concerned with its deployment and regulation; they are inter-
connected. Violence is a distinct institutional domain; it is not
reducible to the polity nor dispersed in civil society.
5 Violence
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Second, the traditional view of the relationships between violence
and modernity, and between violence and inequality (drawn from
Weber, Merton, and Foucault) is transformed when complex inequal-
ities are brought into focus. The Weberian conceptualization of the con-
temporary state as modern, on the assumption that it has the monopoly
of legitimate violence in its territory, is challenged by making visible
the existence of widespread uncriminalized violence against women
and minoritized ethnic and national groups that is de facto condoned
by the state. In a challenge to conventional criminological theory, from
Merton to neo-Marxist, since making gender- and ethnic-based vio-
lence visible reverses the assumption of who are the disadvantaged and
who are the victims. Until violence against women and minorities is
subject to criminalized regulation the state is not yet modern.
Democracy increases the regulation of violence and decreases its
deployment: the deepening of democracy to include women and
minorities is associated with the criminalization of violence against
them; mature democratic states are less likely to launch wars against
each other. The Foucauldian conceptualization of changes in the mod-
ern form of governance from punishment to discipline is challenged by
making visible gender- and ethnic-based violence. Rather than a shift
from punishment to discipline, this violence is newly subjected to pun-
ishment as crime. While the Foucauldian distinction between forms of
social order based on the deployment of overt brutal violence by the
state and on the disciplining of the self is useful in pointing up the impor-
tance of processes in civil society as well as the state for building social
order, the direction and universality of such a temporal shift are chal-
lenged by the inclusion of complex inequalities other than class.
Third, there are path dependent trajectories of the regulation and
deployment of violence in modernity; not a single path of develop-
ment. There are higher levels of violence in neoliberal countries than
in social democratic ones. Higher levels of violence are associated
with both inequality and lower levels of democracy. A neoliberal
state is not a small state: instead it has expanded institutions of vio-
lence, criminal justice, and the military. In social democracy there is
less violence and smaller state institutions to deploy or regulate it.
Militarized institutions once established are hard to diminish, unless
there are exceptional circumstances restructuring polities.
Fourth, the increasing significance of global processes restructures
the deployment and regulation of violence. The different understand-
ings of globality and violence affect the scale and nature of the deploy-
ment of military violence in different polities. The increased political
salience of terrorism at a global level changes the prioritization of civil
liberties in some locations. Global waves of human rights and feminism
change political priorities in regulating and criminalizing different formsG
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of violence, thereby affecting its deployment. The development of
universal human rights and embedding these in national and interna-
tional institutions changes the regulation of violence.
Developing the Ontology of
Violence
The ontology of violence is not obvious. Violence is neither simply
naturalistic, nor solely discursive. The deployment and regulation of
violence are socially constituted. Too often violence has been individ-
ualized as if it were the product of personal psychology and isolated
failures of socialization; but it is not reducible to these. That many vio-
lent practices have been rendered socially, politically, and theoretically
invisible does not mean that they are not significant. The calling of
violence into view and its naming are key parts of the process of
analysis. The construction of the object of enquiry is riddled with the-
oretical implications. The claim here is that these violences are inter-
related social practices – they involve its deployment and regulation,
they are embedded in and constituted by social institutions, and they
are significant for the making and reproduction of regimes of inequal-
ity. Violence is not merely an instrument or tool of already constituted
power; it is itself constitutive of power. The varied forms it takes in its
deployment and regulation contribute to the constitution of power
and inequality; they are not merely a reflection of them. Violence is
an institutional domain, a social system in its own right and not
reducible to any other. The possibility of the use of violence and its
potential implications varies according to its environment or fitness
landscape, including the form of the state and its criminal justice sys-
tem and military, the depth of democracy, the extent of economic
autonomy, and the nature of the global environment.
Violence is deployed and regulated by states, individuals, and
groups. Violence has been most visible in social theory when it
involves the state as war-maker against other states: it is most fre-
quently studied as part of inter-national relations, but it also
depends on domestic social relations and institutions. Inter-personal
violence has been most visible when it has been criminalized by
the state. It is most frequently studied as part of criminology yet
there are also important non-criminalized forms. Group violence
is rarely studied (with some exceptions for terrorists and ethnic
cleansers) but has a long history.
The development and use of military force is a significant aspect
of the deployment of violence. The military are a very significant
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form of power and not reducible to the state, having their own set
of institutions (Mann 1986). Military force is a significant element in
the conduct of state, national, ethnic, religious, and hegemonic pro-
jects. It varies significantly in the form that it takes and the effects
that it has (McNeil 1963; Tilly 1990, 2003; Rummel 1997; Bornschier
and Chase-Dunn 1999; Shaw 2005; Kaldor 2006).
States have a set of coercive institutions in addition to the mili-
tary. This includes in particular the criminal justice system. Criminal
justice systems vary in the extent to which brutal violence or other
forms of disciplining are used. At one extreme is the use of the
death penalty and there are also prisons, the police, and other coer-
cive institutions. The extent to which states spend their resources on
the military and criminal justice systems varies significantly.
There is also ‘irregular’ state violence. Not all the violence used by
the state against its citizens and foreigners is within its own laws of
conduct. States and religions have used violence in subduing resis-
tance and opposition at home and abroad. There is documented use
of torture and other coercive methods to extract information and to
subdue prisoners. People are held in custody and camps outside of
the rule of law (Gregory 2004). Periods of heightened militarization
are conducive to the erosion of civil liberties and to the use of coer-
cive methods against perceived opponents and enemies.
Some of the more severe interpersonal violence is criminalized –
murder, assault, and robbery (theft with violence). This is well stud-
ied in its own sub-discipline of criminology (McLaughlin et al.
2003). This violence varies widely over time and between countries.
But not all interpersonal violence is criminalized. When forms of
inequality beyond class are brought into focus, important further
forms of violence become visible. Gender-based violence is only
partly or recently criminalized: domestic violence, rape, sexual
assault, stalking and harassment. Interpersonal violence oriented
towards other minoritized groups (for example, the harassment of
gays and lesbians, and ethnic and religious minorities) is also only
slowly becoming criminalized. Group violence oriented towards
ethnicity, religion, and nation is unevenly criminalized: lynching,
pogroms, ethnic cleansing, genocide, terrorism, and harassment.
The wider range of regimes of inequality involved in violence
challenges traditional approaches to interpersonal violence that have
often viewed it through a class lens. The dominant criminological
approach to interpersonal violence attributes it to the frustrations
of the economically disadvantaged, a position found within a
broad range of theoretical perspectives from functionalism (Merton
1968) to neo-Marxism (Lea and Young 1984; Garland 2001).
The socio-economically disadvantaged are seen to commit mostG
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crime, from theft to violence, because while they endorse the dominant
values, they are unable to attain these goals as a result of economic
disadvantage. In response they break the rules in order to achieve
these goals. The underlying cause is the tension between the dom-
inant social value of achievement and the social institutional frame-
work that precludes the disadvantaged from obtaining this. Only if
the rules are broken, can the socio-economically disadvantaged
reach these goals. Criminals are seen as being drawn predominantly
from disadvantaged groups whose aspirations for the established
markers of success are thwarted as a result of their restricted
resources due to their social backgrounds: they break the rules in
order to reach these goals.
This approach has been developed through an analysis of sub-
cultures which help to sustain the deviant minority (Wolfgang and
Ferracuti 1967). The account receives evidential support if the focus
is on a single dimension of inequality associated with class; those
who commit crimes then appear disproportionately to be poor
men. However, this account is only sustainable if gender and other
forms of inequality beyond class are ignored. It is not poor people
who commit most crimes against property and persons, but poor
men and not poor women. If gender is brought into focus (Lenton
1995), then it is not the most disadvantaged who commit crimes
since men are not disadvantaged as compared with women.
Violence is often deployed as a form of instrumental power by
dominant groups, though its implications depend on its regulation
and the resources and resilience of the potential victims. There are
significant amounts of inter-personal violence that are not effectively
criminalized. When complex inequalities beyond class are brought
into focus, these additional forms of violence come into view as sig-
nificant. The predominant theorization of inter-personal violence
as a consequence of a disadvantaged class position is challenged
by its use by dominant groups to maintain gender and ethnic/
racialized/national/sexual hierarchies.
The proportion of women who have experienced gender-based
violence at some point during their lives ranges from one quarter to
one half, according to the World Health Organization and many
national surveys (Krug et al. 2002). A national US survey found that
22 per cent of women had suffered domestic violence at some point in
their lifetime, 18 per cent had been subject to completed or attempted
rape, and 8 per cent had been stalked (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000a,
2000b). A UK national survey found that over their adult life-times,
21 per cent of women had been subject to domestic violence, 5
per cent had been raped, and 19 per cent had been stalked, with 45
per cent being subject to one or more of these forms (Walby and Allen
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2004). Victims of domestic violence may have been subject to a series
of incidents constituting a coercive pattern of conduct; though these
patterns vary, ranging from ‘patriarchal terrorism’ to ‘situational cou-
ple violence’ (Johnson 1995; Johnson and Leone 2005). In the UK,
female victims of domestic violence experienced an average of 20
incidents per year (Walby and Allen 2004).
Inter-personal violence significantly affects the quality of life.
Many women suffer severe harms to their physical and mental
health (Krug et al. 2002). In addition to physical injuries many
women who are subject to domestic violence will suffer depression
and post-traumatic stress disorder, especially if they are raped, from
which they can take years to recover (Breslau et al. 1998; Golding
1999). The repercussions of domestic violence can reverberate
widely, limiting women’s productive employment as a result of
injuries, anxieties, threats from partners, and the need to move house
(Lloyd 1997; Raphael and Toman 1997), as well as restricting their
mobility through fears about certain types of public locations (Stanko
1990; Johnson 1996). These effects then reverberate through a wide
range of social practices, including the welfare state, the economy,
and family break-up, as well as on children (Walby 2004b).
Racialized, or ethnically, nationally, or religiously inspired violence,
takes both individual and group forms, including actions by individ-
uals, by ephemeral groups (such as lynch mobs) and by organized
groups. They may involve networks and loose organizations, as well
as more individualized actions involving a shared value system that
legitimates this conduct. Non-state violence is a key and not a mar-
ginal feature of periods of contestation between ethnic, national,
and religious groups. Harassment is repeated abusive or intrusive
conduct towards another person. It may be verbal, but it can include
assault. This can occur across racialized differences and inequalities.
Harassment of racialized minorities overtly seeking equal rights is
common. This was widely noted during the civil rights campaign in
the American South during the 1960s (Shapiro 1988; Griffin 1993). It
continues today, now sometimes known as ‘hate crime’ (Perry
2003). Inter-ethnic violence can take a gendered form, when the vio-
lence of men from one ethnic group is directed towards women
from an opposing ethnic group, as in acts of mass rape in wartime
(Brownmiller 1976; Jacobs et al. 2000).
Ethnic cleansing and pogroms represent the practice of attacks by
a dominant group on a minority social group, involving variously the
destruction of property, being driven from their homes, physical
threats, the coerced denial of an economic livelihood, and physical
assault and killing. Pogroms in European history especially took
place against Jews. There are also instances of pogroms in Asia, for
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instance, against the Chinese minority in the post-war period in
South-East Asia. Ethnic cleansing is a similar process; this term was
especially used in the complex Balkan conflict between ethno-national
groups in the 1990s to refer to systematic attempts to drive out minori-
ties in order to create a more ethnically homogeneous ‘homeland’
(Bertilsson 1999; Mann 2005). Europe before the First World War was
composed largely of multi-ethnic empires, but following the violent
pursuit of the chimera of a pure nation-state it had by 1950 reached an
unprecedented level of ethnic homogeneity (Therborn 1995; Stamatov
2000). Genocide is the deliberate destruction of an entire people, iden-
tified by their ethnicity, racialization, religion, or nation.
Lynching performed by members of a dominant group on mem-
bers of weaker social groups accused of a crime by-passes the crim-
inal justice system, with its procedures for trial and due process.
Lynching was prevalent in US history in the period after the end of
slavery, when whites lynched African Americans in the formerly
slave owning South (Shapiro 1988; Griffin 1993). Harassment and
physical and sexual assaults against slaves were routine and widely
carried out during the era when slavery was legal in the USA (Davis
1981), further suggesting that extremes of dominance are conducive
to high rates of violence.
While many of these examples of group violence concern com-
plex inequalities other than class, there are also instances of this
form in class conflicts. In particular, at times of heightened indus-
trial conflict and strikes violence has been used. In late nineteenth-
century America, there were violent attempts at breaking strikes
and unions by employers using their own forces which were then
ignored by the criminal justice system (Smith 2003).
Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence against a civilian popu-
lation in order to create terror that will in turn achieve political
change. Terror has been especially used by some nations and would-
be nations that are seeking to establish a state of their own and to
remove all those they regard as outsiders. There are several exam-
ples in Europe’s present and recent history, including those seeking
the unification of Ireland and the Basques seeking a separate state
(Anderson 1995). The nationalist contestation of the boundary
between Britain and Ireland has involved waves of irregular military
and terrorist interventions since Eire’s independence from the United
Kingdom left the six northern counties in Ireland under British sov-
ereignty in 1922. There are also terrorist attacks such as 9/11 which
claim their inspiration from radical or fundamentalist interpretations
of Islam, thus condemning the perceived imperialism and corrup-
tion of the West especially as exemplified by the USA and the
thwarting of efforts to build a Palestinian state. However, far from
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all contemporary terrorism – even suicide bomber terrorism – should
be regarded as part of a fundamentalist Islamic jihad (Pape 2003).
Violence straddles the traditional distinction between human
action and objects. Violent action involves differently abled bodies
and technologies as well as human subjects and institutions. Its
conceptualization and theorization thus demand rethinking tradi-
tional humanist conceptions of agency. The ability to exercise vio-
lence against another person usually depends upon the
possession of a capable body that has been informally or formally
trained which can then be deployed as a weapon. It is necessary
to go beyond the tendency to push anything biological, such as
bodies, outside the frame within which analysis can be conducted
(Benton 1993). The recognition of the differential ability to use
the body as an instrument of power need not be a return to bio-
logical essentialism. However, it requires the rejection of the
humanist-inspired narrowing of the conception of agency to activ-
ities of the mind only, and the development of a concept of
agency that can include the body. The inclusion of bodies within
the analysis of violence is not merely the inclusion of a biologi-
cally-based power, since it depends upon their positioning within
a mesh of institutions that may variously sanction the violence or
protect potential victims. In order to fully locate the significance
of bodies as weapons it is necessary to consider the wider sets of
social systems that constitute the environment within which it may
or may not be possible to deploy a body as an instrument of
power effectively. The theorization of violence requires a rejec-
tion of the traditional humanist narrowing of concepts of agency
and structure in order to include violence, which is partly consti-
tutive of complex inequalities, within social theory.
Violence is a form of power that is used to dominate others, to
create fear and to shape their course of conduct. It is deployed
and regulated by individuals, groups, and states. It is used by
members of dominant groups against members of weaker social
groups, as well as in response. This contradicts the conven-
tional account that most interpersonal violence in civil society
is predominantly used by the disadvantaged against the power-
ful. When the notion of inequality is confined to class, these
inequalities associated with the use of interpersonal violence as
power remain out of focus. When the conception of social
inequality is broadened beyond a single dimension associated
with class, so as to include gender and other complex inequal-
ities, then this new picture emerges. It is deployed and regu-
lated by groups (especially ethnically, religiously, and
nationally defined groups) against others. It is deployed and
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regulated by states through their military and criminal justice
systems against and for other states, groups, and individuals.
These forms of violence are interconnected, constituting a social
system, an institutional domain of violence.
Modernity and Violence
Modernity is linked to variations in the deployment and regulation of
violence in several ways. Weber linked modernity with the concen-
tration of legitimate violence in the state. Foucault linked modernity
to a shift from the use of overt violence by the state to technologies
of discipline. While these have been important contributions, they
miss some of the key links between modernity and violence that
exist because of the development and deepening of democracy.
Violence tends to decline with the development of the economy and
democracy (Rummel 1995, 1997; Eisner 2001, Tilly 2003), though
there are dissenting voices (Bauman 1989). The development of
democracy is important in reducing violence for at least two reasons.
First, the development and deepening of democracy tends to lead to
greater regulation through the criminalization of violence against
women and ethnic, racialized, and national minorities. Second,
mature democracies tend not to initiate the deployment of military
power through going to war, especially against each other.
Following Weber (1947), it has been conventionally assumed that
the modern state has a monopoly on the use of legitimate violence in
a given territory (Giddens 1985; Elias 1994). The state is considered to
accumulate power and particularly the monopoly of legitimate vio-
lence during a long process of development associated with the mod-
ernization of the social system. There is a shift from feuding barons,
roving militias, and armed tribes towards the centralization and con-
centration of coercive power in the state. This centralization and
concentration of coercive power includes the development of the rule
of law and its associated institutions. This covers the criminal justice
system and the civil legal system – police, courts, lawyers, judges,
prisons, reform programmes, and the death penalty (Tilly 1990).
However, while there is indeed a tendency for the use and reg-
ulation of legitimate violence to be concentrated during the
processes of state formation and modernization this process is not
yet complete, especially for that violence which occurs along gen-
der or ethnic, religious or national divisions. There is a significant
amount of inter-personal violence that is not criminalized by
the state, hence the state does not have a monopoly on legitimate
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violence. If gender-based violence were effectively criminalized
and its perpetrators were hunted down and punished, then the
state would have a monopoly over legitimate violence in a given
territory even if it did not catch all of the offenders. In the absence
of such actions the state effectively condones this violence. The
existence of significant amounts of non-state violence which is in
practice condoned by the state requires a re-theorization of both
violence and the modern state. The state is not yet modern while
there is extensive violence against women and minorities that effec-
tively goes uncriminalized and unregulated by the state.
The existence of inter-personal violence does not by itself consti-
tute a contradiction to the notion that the modern state has a monop-
oly on legitimate coercion in a given territory. It is when such violence
is not de-legitimated by a process of effective criminalization that the
state loses its monopoly on legitimate coercion. There is much inter-
personal violence that is so criminalized. In particular, violence inflicted
by lower-class men on strangers in public places is routinely regarded
as criminal. It is the absence of criminalization of inter-personal vio-
lence between particular categories of people that is the issue here.
An important aspect of lynching, harassment, ethnic cleansing,
and genocide – and of domestic violence and sexual assault – is that
the state does not effectively intervene to either prevent this vio-
lence or to criminally punish the perpetrators (Shapiro 1988; Griffin
1993; Harris and Grace 1999; Hoyle and Sanders 2000). These acts
of violence are against statute law but this is not sufficient to accord
the state a monopoly on legitimate violence. The law, and still less
the state, is not merely a set of statutes but is also a social institu-
tion which includes the police, sheriffs, lawyers, judges, legal pro-
cedures, juries, prisons, and a hierarchy of courts. While statute law
is subject to modification by state institutions such as parliaments
and legislatures, its implementation depends on the local practices
of sheriffs and juries and, in some jurisdictions, case law. If the local
police will not arrest, or juries will not convict, or if a higher court
finds someone not guilty, then the perpetrator of an act of violence
is treated as if they were innocent. By non-enforcement of statute
law the state condones the acts of violence and treats these as if they
were either legitimate actions or outside its remit. Thus it can be said
that the state does not have a monopoly over legitimate violence in
a given territory. The state, of course, is not a monolithic body, and
different agencies and institutions of the state may follow slightly
different courses of action. Nevertheless, there are forms of coher-
ence, hierarchies of command, and a presumption of political
responsibility in modern states that would describe themselves as
democratic. In the context of conflicting priorities, an outcome of
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non-action constitutes a course of action. Only when inter-personal
violence against women and minorities is effectively criminalized
can it be said that the state does not condone it.
In the case of gender relations, power through violence can be
possessed by the male head of a household, a husband, partner, or
father. Historically, the state did not challenge the ‘monopoly of
legitimate violence’ as exercised in ‘his’ home by the male ‘head’ of
a household. Rather, it considered the ‘private’ sphere of the home
as outside of its remit of action. Although in the same geographical
territory, there was a division of legitimate authority to use violence
between male heads of households and the state. The state did not
have a monopoly of legitimate violence in its own territory, instead
this was shared with the patriarchal heads of households. And in
some cases the regulation of a ‘family’ and intimacy is shared, fur-
ther, with organized religion.
One example is that of rape in marriage. This was rarely illegal in
any country until a few countries started to criminalize the practice
of sex without consent from the 1990s. Until then, husbands were
entirely within the law if they raped ‘their’ wives (Russell 1990). In
practice, convictions of a man for rape are extremely rare if the
woman has ever consented to sex with him; husbands did (and are
usually still able to) rape ‘their’ wives with legal impunity (Kelly
et al. 2005). It is also still the case that rape, even outside of mar-
riage, is rarely effectively criminalized (Lees 1996; Martin 2005).
Over 90 per cent of cases in which a woman reports rape to the
police do not lead to a criminal conviction. In the UK, only 5.6
per cent of reported rapes led to a criminal conviction in 2002 (Kelly
et al. 2005). Domestic violence until recently was a further obvious
example. In nineteenth-century England a man could beat ‘his’ wife
so long as the stick was no thicker than a man’s thumb with legal
impunity (Dobash and Dobash 1980). Only since the 1970s has the
legal impunity for a man to beat ‘his’ wife or partner begun to be
challenged (Hague and Malos 1993; Hearn 1998). While there have
been important recent developments (Hanmer et al. 1989; Hanmer
and Griffiths 1998; Home Office 2005; UNDP 2005), the effective crim-
inalization of this practice is still not complete (Kelly et al. 1999, 2005;
Lewis 2004). Indeed, the relative invisibility of domestic violence in
the criminal justice system is illustrated by the absence of such a cat-
egory in most official or criminal statistics.
In the USA, in the post-slavery era, an absence of police inter-
vention was a contributory cause in the lynching of African-
American men. However, in some instances the police did intervene
and a potential lynching was averted (Raper 1933). It is this histori-
cal counterfactual which provides such strong support to the argument
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that the criminal justice system should be treated as a variable in the
explanation of lynching (Griffin 1993). African-Americans were
especially vulnerable to white violence while they were politically
disenfranchized and economically weak (Shapiro 1988). During the
slave era, up until the late nineteenth century, white owners could
routinely use violence on black slaves with no sanctions from the
criminal justice system, except very occasionally in the case of
killing (Davis 1981). In the post-slave era, African-Americans were
subjected to extensive and varied forms of white violence which
were condoned by the state to which they were denied democratic
access by Jim Crow laws and other racist practices. The economic
weakness produced by the post-slavery agricultural system of share-
cropping compounded this vulnerability.
This vulnerability to white violence was reduced by the effects
of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s which won
effective political citizenship, such as the practical right to vote
from the Voting Rights Act 1965 and its enforcement, by migration
to the northern cities of the USA where economic freedom and the
absence of Jim Crow laws facilitated the growth of a black elec-
torate which could impact on federal politics, and by the new avail-
ability of television and other media to communicate the evils of
the system facilitated by the new tactics and strategies of emerging
political leaders such as Dr Martin Luther King (Maidment 1997).
The complex inter-connection of political citizenship and eco-
nomic independence led to the de-legitimation of white violence
against African-Americans in the late twentieth century. After the
political enfranchisement of African-Americans with the removal of
the Jim Crow laws which had prevented them voting and the end-
ing of legal segregation, as a consequence of the civil rights move-
ment of the 1950s and 1960s, the USA saw the beginning of some
enforcement of laws against violence against African-Americans
(Shapiro 1988).
The criminalization of violence to ethnic and racialized minorities
is not complete in the contemporary UK either, as the failed investi-
gation into the murder of the black teenager Steven Lawrence in
Britain in the 1990s (Macpherson 1999) demonstrated. Indeed the
police have also been seen as part of the problem in their dispropor-
tionate use of ‘stop and search’ methods on black people in the UK
(Bland et al. 2000). There are other minorities who also have a height-
ened vulnerability to violence as a consequence of their limited abil-
ity to gain the protection of state institutions. These include groups
defined by their sexuality, such as lesbian and gay people, who can
be subject to homophobic violence and again with minimal police
intervention (Mason and Tomsen 1997). The conceptualization of the
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contemporary Western state as modern, as in the Weberian tradition,
is mistaken. While there is so much violence against women and eth-
nic and other minorities that is de facto condoned by the state, the
state is not yet modern.
The inclusion of women and minorities within democratic
processes has been necessary before there is a use of state power
to regulate and reduce violence by dominant groups. The devel-
opment of the effective criminalization of inter-personal violence
against women and minorities is part of the process of the mod-
ernization of the state. Key to this process is the deepening of
democracy, the effective political representation of the interests of
women and minorities. Political pressure from these non-dominant
groups and their allies is key to the criminalization of inter-personal
and group violence from dominant men. Only when this violence
is effectively criminalized does the state have the monopoly over
legitimate coercion in its territory. The completion of the project of
modernity requires deep democratization.
The analysis of governmentality and violence engages with long-
standing questions in social theory about the nature of social order,
social control, and social cohesion (Alexander 1984; Giddens 1984;
Lockwood 1992; Archer 1995). It addresses the issue of social inte-
gration and the relationship of the individual to the social, at both
micro and macro levels.
Elias (1994) sees the civilizing process as one in which self-control
over emotions and violence develops with the advent of modernity,
thus reducing the extent of violence over time. In Elias’s theory of
‘the civilizing process’, state formation is associated with processes of
increased self-control, the inhibition of spontaneous emotions, and
the ability to refrain from open displays of aggression. In this way
changes in the social structure have implications for the form of per-
sonalities and their likelihood of violent behaviour. Insofar as vio-
lence is seen as a result of little development in social control and
uninhibited emotions, then it is likely to diminish with the develop-
ment of the civilizing process; macro-level changes in societal devel-
opment have implications for the level of violence.
These questions are posed in different ways by Foucault’s (1991,
1997) approach to modernity which involves a shift from governance
based on punishment through brutal state power to one based on
discipline and the development of self-regulation. Foucault’s choice
of image for a traditional sovereign power is that of public execution.
This is highly visible and brutal, a form of power that is tightly
focused on the state or sovereign. The threat of the use of this terri-
ble power is considered crucial to the maintenance of social order
and it is a notion of justice based on retribution. It is public and overt,
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indeed it is constituted as spectacle. With modernity and democracy
there is a change in the form of governance to one that is achieved
through the development of institutions that can secure the internal-
ization of the norms needed for social life. Foucault’s (1997) choice
of image for discipline includes that of a prison that seeks to reform
its prisoners within a regime of surveillance so that they will choose
to make different choices when they are released. More broadly, he
identifies a multiplicity of technologies of power throughout social
life by which a person comes to choose courses of action that are
consistent with the maintenance of social order. This is captured by
the notion of ‘governing the soul’ (Rose 2000).
The shift from a regime of punishment to one of discipline was
linked to the development of democracy – which undercut old
forms of authority – requiring new forms of practice to ensure social
cohesion (Foucault 1997). These practices that ensure the nor-
malization of the population are widely diffused. Modernity requires
these new forms of governance in response to democratization.
Normalization is the process that ensures the maintenance of a
social order under democracy. Overt power is replaced by a dis-
guised disciplinary grid. Thus Foucault’s thesis concerning moder-
nity is the displacement of the brutal power of the sovereign or state
by a multiplicity of technologies of power in civil society that will
ensure the alignment of the individual with the social order.
While this dichotomous distinction between sovereign power
and discipline remains the dominant reading of Foucault’s work, a
distinction within the category of discipline can be identified in
some of his later writings. Here, Foucault distinguished a third cat-
egory, that of governmentality (1991), which concerns the securiti-
zation of the whole population and uses a range of technologies of
power including the economic. The focus in this case is not on a
few potential deviants, but on the level of risk among the popula-
tion as a whole. In this regulatory regime such focus is no longer
on the disposition of the individual, but rather on decreasing the
risk to the population as a whole of experiencing crime. It is the
population that are subject to this form of governance, in order to
improve their security. In securitization, the entire population is
cajoled into developing their own protection from risk.
First of all, the state of justice, born in the feudal type of territorial
regime which corresponds to a society of laws – either customs or
written laws – involving reciprocal play of obligation and litigation;
second, the administrative state, born in the territoriality of national
boundaries in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and corresponding
to a society of regulation and discipline; and finally a governmental
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state, essentially defined no longer in terms of its territoriality, of its
surface area, but in terms of the mass of its population with its vol-
ume and density, and indeed also with the territory over which it is
distributed, although this figures here only as one among its compo-
nent elements. This state of government which bears essentially on
population and both refers itself to and makes use of the instrumen-
tation of economic savoir could be seen as corresponding to a type of
society controlled by apparatuses of security. (Foucault 1991: 104)
Foucault thus positions individuals as targets of governance in the
first two forms only, while in the third this becomes the population
as a whole. Foucault’s work straddles and re-works the conceptual
division between civil society and state (Cohen and Arato 1992). In
developing a new vocabulary of concepts to address these tech-
nologies of power, Foucault’s work acts as an inspiration for a wide
range of domains.
However, there is an ambiguity in Foucault’s (1991) writing as to
whether the three forms are temporally sequential or coexisting
(Merry 2001), though some would remain convinced that they can
coexist (Rose 1999). The above quotation – which refers to the
period covering the feudal regime followed by the administrative
territorial state of the fifteenth and sixteenth century and then fol-
lowed by a non-territorially defined governmental state – appears
to support the interpretation that these are sequential stages of
development. However, the quotation below from the same article
suggests simultaneity.
Accordingly, we need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a
society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society by a society of govern-
ment; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government,
which has as its primary target the population and as its essential
mechanism the apparatuses of security. (Foucault 1991: 102)
Foucault’s initial dichotomous distinction is clearly a temporal shift
in the form of governance associated with the onset of modernity.
However, it is less clear whether his three-fold classification is
intended as a shift from one form of governance to another or
whether the new form is that of coexistence (Merry 2001).
There is a challenge to Foucault’s analysis in that the develop-
ment of state and societal responses to gender- and ethnic-based
violence does not follow the temporality he proposed. The state is
not the first stage in the regulation of this violence. Rather, women
and minorities had to look to their own resources first, to secure
their own protection, and only after democratization were they
able to access state support in addition. That is, democracy is not
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associated with a move from a state to a civil society regulation of
this violence, but rather with the development of an effective state
response. Bringing complex inequalities into focus challenges the
temporality of Foucault’s account.
While the discussion of the regulation and deployment of violence
so far has centred on the changing relationship of the state and civil
society during the development of modernity, it is also important to
consider the significance of economic development. The question here
concerns the nature of the relationship between the different forms of
regulation and the deployment of violence associated with the level of
economic development. Economic development in the long term has
been linked to changes in the level of violence in a variety of ways.
An increase in economic development and in the income per person
has been associated over the long term with a reduction in homicide.
Economic development specifically associated with women and
minorities can increase resilience through the increased resources
needed for autonomy and for flight. The level of homicide is the best
indicator for comparing violent crime between countries: it is almost
always reported to the authorities and so is a robust measure, and in
addition the extent of other crimes such as non-lethal violence strongly
correlates with the level of homicide (Barclay and Tavares 2002).
There is some historical evidence to support the thesis that during
the last centuries of economic development in Europe there has been
a decline in the rate of homicide in Europe (Gurr 1981; Eisner 2001).
Further, the rate of homicide is lower in richer as compared with
poorer countries in the contemporary world, being inversely corre-
lated with GDP per capita (Van Wilsem 2004). The modernization of
economic relations associated with the transition to free wage labour
provides greater economic autonomy that can facilitate a resilience to
violence. The acquisition of independent economic resources sup-
ports the practices needed to escape risks and threats of violence. The
ability to escape, to flee, to not be dependent on the person or group
who constitutes the threat often depends on the possession of eco-
nomic resources. For example, women who are employed and thus
have independent access to economic resources are less vulnerable
to domestic violence than those who are not (Walby and Allen 2004).
Does modernity reduce the likelihood of war? There is a well-
supported thesis that mature democracies do not initiate wars with
each other, nonetheless among democracies some countries spend
considerably more of their income on their military than others and
have different propensities to go to war.
Democracy provides important limits to war. Democracy is linked
to the extent of use of military force; military power is used less in a
mature democracy than in other regimes; mature democracies rarely
Walby-3874-Ch-05:Walby-3874-Ch-05.qxp  23/06/2009  4:05 PM  Page 206
V
io
len
ce
207
if ever initiate wars against each other (Rummel 1995). This may be
because of the nature of political culture in a democracy (Weart 1998).
Further, democracies can provide routes by which those whose lives
are put at risk by military engagement can find a political voice and
effective resistance. These processes can link domestic and external
politics. An increase in the proportion of regimes that are democratic
should thus be associated with a decrease in violent warfare.
Militarization and war are associated with the absence of an effec-
tive democracy. The death of young men in war is, in a democracy,
subject to the popular will. Usually this sacrifice is considered
appropriate only if there is a real and present external threat. If this
threat is weak, then young men and their associates are likely to be
able to resist by using democratic means. If there is no effective
democracy, then these objections do not have a route for effective
expression and action. So democracy is likely to limit the capacity
of a state to initiate war.
While there are general processes that can link democracy to the
containment of militarism, this does not mean that democratization
always reduces militarism. The relationship is mediated by both
levels of inequality and also by path-dependent processes for the
development of military institutions. For example, while it has
suffrage-democracy the USA not only spends a higher proportion of
its budget on the military (World Bank 2006c) but also engages
more readily in wars than many other democratic countries. Here it
is necessary to add some qualifications (Walt 1999), especially to the
concept of democracy. First, is the qualification ‘mature’ to democ-
racy, since newly emerging democracies are as likely to go to war
as non-democratic regimes, possibly because of the allure of nation-
alism in the process of forging statehood in the context of as yet
unstable political institutions (Mansfield and Snyder 1995).
A second qualification is to consider the depth of the democracy
and the extent to which social inequality reduces the capacity for
resistance to war. Some countries that are formally democratic may
still lack the processes for an effective representation of all political
views. Further, processes of democracy depend upon a free civil
society and the adequate circulation of accurate information. The
effective use of the myth of the weapons of mass destruction by the
US and UK governments in the decision-making process of going
to war in Iraq may be considered as one example of where the
potential of democratic processes was less than fully realized
(Gregory 2004). The effectiveness of democratic limits on war mon-
gering depends at least partly on whether the voices of poor men –
drawn especially from minority ethnic groups who make up most
of the armed forces – and their associates (e.g. family who care
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about them) are significant in the democratic process. High levels
of social inequality make it less likely that the voices of poor eth-
nic minorities are significant in the political process. There is also
the gendering of democracy. Women are more likely than men to
oppose war (Woolf 1938), although not exclusively so and they are
not altogether absent from military support systems (Enloe 1983).
This includes women’s views as expressed in opinion polls and
elections and in their presence in anti-war social movements
(Wiltshire 1985; Oldfield 1989). So where women have more access
to democratic political power there may be a lower probability of
the development of militarization and war.
The development and deepening of democracy in modernity is
associated with reduced violence in at least two ways. Democratization
is linked to a reduction in the likelihood of war, since mature democ-
racies rarely initiate war on each other and women are less likely to
promote militarism. Deep forms of democratization entailing the polit-
ical presence of women and minorities facilitate the criminal regulation
of and reduction in violence against them.
Path Dependency in Trajectories
of Violence
Changes in the regulation and deployment of violence are not only
linked to the development of modernity, but also with its path-depen-
dent forms that are associated with the depth of democracy, the extent
of economic inequality, and the history of militarism. The depth of
democracy and the extent of economic inequality are linked to the
path dependent development of neoliberalism and social democracy:
there is more violence in countries that are neoliberal than in those that
are social democratic. Militarism has a specific set of legacies and once
entrenched it takes very unusual circumstances to reduce it.
The depth of democracy is not only linked to the development of
modernity, but also to path dependent forms of modernity – democracy
tends to be deeper in social democratic countries. With such deeper
democracy in more social democratic countries, there is a tendency
towards a fuller criminalization of violence against women and minori-
ties and the lesser deployment of harsh penalties in the criminal justice
system such as the death penalty. There is also the more effective artic-
ulation of the voices of women’s political projects in deeper forms of
democracy, which tends to mean more opposition to militarism.
There is an association between inequality and the deployment and
regulation of violence. Countries with higher degrees of economic
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inequality have higher crime rates (Halpern 2001). The association
between economic inequality and higher rates of violence can be
found in at least three areas: higher rates of homicide in countries
with higher rates of economic inequality; higher rates of domestic vio-
lence in homes where there is greater inequality between partners;
and more punitive criminal justice procedures in countries and times
where there is greater economic inequality. The rate of homicide is
higher where there is greater economic inequality (Van Wilsem 2004).
Several studies have found that countries with higher degrees of eco-
nomic inequality have higher crime rates (Fajnzylber et al. 1998;
Halpern 2001).
There is a link between greater gendered economic inequality
and higher rates of domestic violence. Women with fewer economic
resources are more vulnerable to domestic violence. Studies from
the USA (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000a, 2000b, 2000c), the UK (Walby
and Allen 2004), and Sweden (Lundgren et al. 2001) found higher
rates of domestic violence in poor households and in particular
where women have lower wages (Farmer and Tiefenthaler 1997)
and where women find it impossible to raise small sums of money
at short notice (Walby and Allen 2004). When conflict occurs, egal-
itarian households are the most resilient to the possibility of violence
and asymmetrical households are more likely to succumb to violence
when conflicted than symmetrical ones (Coleman and Strauss 1986).
Women’s dependency in marriage is correlated with violence: among
women with high marital dependency – operationalized as to
whether the woman was employed, whether she had children aged
5 or younger at home, and whether her husband earned 75 per cent
or more of the couple’s income – the rate of severe violence was
much higher (Kalmuss and Straus 1982). Greater gendered eco-
nomic inequality is thus linked to greater gender-based violence.
The turn in some countries towards neoliberalism is linked to an
increase in the harshness of the criminal justice system. There has
been a ‘punitive turn’ in the criminal justice systems of some coun-
tries, in particular in the USA and UK, with the development of
harsher and more brutal punishment and a move away from ‘penal
welfare’ (Garland 2001). This involves an increased use of impris-
onment in both the UK and the USA and a reintroduction of the
death penalty in the latter. Rather than a continuing shift away from
overt force and towards discipline, as is suggested by Foucault,
there has been a reversal of this process in the field of criminal jus-
tice in these countries since the 1980s. However, this is not a uni-
form trend. There have been varied increases in the rate of
imprisonment since 1990: between 1991 and 2001, imprisonment
rates rose by 61 per cent in the USA as compared with 26 per cent
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in the EU. There is one particular exception here, the social demo-
cratic Nordic region: in Denmark and Finland the rate of imprison-
ment declined by 9 per cent, while in Norway there was little change
with an increase of 3 per cent, although in Sweden there was an
increase of 17 per cent (Barclay and Tavares 2002, 2003). The excep-
tionalism of this social democratic region suggests that there is no
inevitability about the process of an increasingly punitive criminal
justice system, but rather that the variety of modernity makes a sig-
nificant difference to this process. Where there is a turn towards
neoliberalism there is a punitive turn in the criminal justice system,
but not in those countries that continue to be social democratic.
Violent crime is more common in neoliberal forms of governance
than social democratic and is more likely to be met with a punitive
(high rates of imprisonment and use of the death penalty) rather
than a penal welfare approach than in social democratic countries.
This is at least partly due to the association of the more frequent
deployment of violence with inequality, which is greater in neolib-
eral than social democratic countries. High rates of inter-personal
violence and punitive criminal justice systems are associated with
greater militarization of the state. Neoliberal governments often
extol the virtues of low taxation, but the violence nexus that is asso-
ciated with neoliberalism is associated with high state expenditure
on law and order and the military, thereby requiring taxation.
Neoliberal states are not quite such low expenditure states when the
level of violence that is associated with this type of governance is
brought into focus. The regulation and deployment of violence is
part of the difference between neoliberal and social democratic pro-
jects, programmes, and social formations. Neoliberalism and social
democracy are not only concerned with political economy. Despite
the ostensible conflict with the discourse on the desirability of a
small state that is rhetorically associated with neoliberalism, in prac-
tice neoliberalism requires a big state in order to create the social
order that would otherwise be provided by a range of institutions in
the civil society and welfare state in a social democracy.
Militarism and warfare are important forms of violence in the
contemporary world (Shaw 2005; Kaldor 2006). There are three
ways in which variations in militarism and warfare can be under-
stood as path dependent developments: there are links between
militarism and neoliberalism; militarisms have their own set of insti-
tutions with an historical legacy of their own; there are differences
in the entrenchment of the myth of the nation-state.
There are several links between militarism and neoliberalism:
there is a coevolution of militarization, the depth of democracy, and
economic inequality. Not only does democracy reduce militarism,
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militarism can also reduce the civil liberties that are an essential com-
ponent of democracy. Although ostensibly a separate institution that
is externally oriented, in practice, military activities have implications
for the internal securitization of a homeland. This involves increased
surveillance that entails a loss of privacy, an increased entitlement to
survey, to question, and to hold persons for interrogation. This tips
the balance between the state and civil society, leading to an
increased penetration of civil society by the state. The external threat
makes this change more likely to be internally acceptable. The ero-
sion of civil liberties may make the political resistance to war more
difficult to articulate and organize. An erosion of civil liberties is more
likely where there is more social inequality. Militarization is thus
associated with a reduction in civil liberties, which in turn is associ-
ated with a decreased political opposition to war.
Militarized institutions can become embedded in the economic insti-
tutions of a country in a path dependent way. The development of a
military-industrial complex, a mutually supporting growth and devel-
opment of both the military and the arms industry, embeds the mili-
tary into economic welfare for workers as well as capital. Companies
that make their profits from wars have interests in continuing mili-
tarization. A close linkage between military institutions and those
industries making armaments may lead to increased political sup-
port for militarization (Mills 1956; Harris 2005).
A history of military engagement can create a military legacy that
is hard to put aside. A colonial or imperial heritage is associated
with the development of military institutions which are hard to lay
down: the rise and maintenance of an empire leads to the
entrenchment of militarized institutions. Even though decoloniza-
tion entails the end of a requirement for a high level of militariza-
tion, military institutions can be difficult to reduce or end because
of entrenched interests.
Conflicts over borders between those nations in pursuit of a state
of their own can similarly entrench militarized institutions. The his-
tory of Europe in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies was continually marked by such disputes. The development
of the European Union was a deliberate and highly successful
attempt to erode the nationalist basis of militarism (Haas 1958;
Hallstein 1973), with no wars between the Member States of the
European Union for half a century. While this has not precluded
terrorism around nationalist issues in the north of Ireland and in the
Basque country, there have been no wars between Member States
of the European Union. Peace in the EU is not kept via the threat
of superior military power, since the EU does not have an armed
force of its own for use in the EU (Kapteyn 1996).
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Kaldor (2006) argues that in the current global era there are new
forms of warfare. By comparison with the ‘old’ wars, ‘new’ wars are
more decentralized, more likely to use tactics of terror to destabilize,
to more often attack civilian rather than military targets, and to be
based on identity politics. In some of the examples that Kaldor exam-
ines, especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, these are indeed features that
contrast with both World Wars. However, she overstates the prevalence
of the new and underestimates some continuities with the old as a
consequence, in particular of a tendency to neglect the activities of the
USA. ‘Identity’ politics is not so much new as a re-combination of three
forms of organized violence that have been traditional in Europe
which have not infrequently taken a decentralized form: the practice
of nations using military means to seek states of their own (much
nationalism has taken this form) (Smith 1986); the driving out of reli-
gious or national minorities (for example, European pogroms against
Jews occurred regularly in European history) (Therborn 1995); and
Medieval Europe had decentralized warring lords and princes before
the concentration of military might in states (Tilly 1990). There is a con-
trast to be made with WW1 and WW2, but perhaps the degree of cen-
tralization and the regulation of the forms of combat in these wars
might be regarded as exceptional rather than the rule from which new
wars deviate. In particular, Kaldor has curiously little to say about
America as a centralized military hegemon with an intentionally global
reach, which has engaged in a series of ‘old-style’ wars, even though
referring to the US military intervention in Iraq. Do the wars in which
the USA is involved really fit the notion of new wars as involving ‘the
fragmentation and decentralization of the state’ (Kaldor 2006: 95)? In
her enthusiasm for detailing some specific forms of contemporary war
(correctly) she mistakenly over-generalizes to include all current wars.
The USA has a centralized state with coherent military powers.
So these forms of decentralized warfare with a special focus on
nations seeking to ‘purify’ a territory and create a state of their own
are premodern, taking place where often there is not yet modern
economic development. Once economies are developed there are
two major forms of security strategy – unilateralist and militarist,
most often found in neoliberalism (for example, the USA) and mul-
tilateral broad-based less militarist, most often found in social
democracy (for example, the EU).
Global
Global processes have variously been implicated in increases and
decreases in the deployment and regulation of violence. The global
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is invoked by the development of nuclear weapons with the poten-
tial to destroy life on the planet as a whole, generating global
attempts to restrict their proliferation. At a global level, a core remit
of the UN is to attempt to reduce violent conflict. The development
of the USA into a global hegemon has increased the scale of its war-
ring; in contrast the development of the EU has led to the cessation
of its history of internal European wars in pursuit of the impossible
goal of the pure nation-state. Increased global flows of capital, trade,
and people can intensify the competition for scarce resources.
Increased global communications have speeded up the opportunities
for knowledge about conflicts and wars, the development of global
terrorism, increased vulnerabilities, and the development of an oppo-
sition to war and violence (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000; Harvey
2003; Harris 2005; Shaw 2005; Kirby 2006).
There is a globalization of the effects of war with the development
of weapons of mass destruction and global mass communications.
Nuclear weapons, first deployed by the USA against Japan in 1945,
have the potential to annihilate all human life on the planet.
Possessed by the hegemons and a limited number of other powers,
they create a state of potential global catastrophe. The response has
been directed through the UN, especially through its Security Council
and related agencies, with efforts to defuse crises and to establish
and monitor non-proliferation treaties. The globalization of the media
has the implication of internationalizing knowledge about conflicts
and wars, albeit unevenly. Wars can no longer be so easily hidden
from view. Publics back home can become aware of the implications
of military actions done in their name, with consequences for the
mobilization of opposition as well as support for wars, although gov-
ernmental control over the media may limit this process.
Global hegemons have divergent strategies in relation to vio-
lence, as a consequence of domestic as well as international con-
testations. These strategies rest in part on theories about the
relationship of violence to power: does violence by itself provide
access to power or is it more effective if meshed with softer forms
of influence? They also rest on theories about the global order:
whether military power can be effectively exercised unilaterally or
if it is more effective when exercised with stakeholders and allies
around the world. Does unilateral narrow military violence deliver
power, or does the embedding of military force in a nest of multi-
lateral alliances and softer forms of pressure and diplomacy deliver
more effective power?
The US under the Bush administration, 2002–2008, adopted the for-
mer strategy, while the EU took the latter. The USA’s aim is to win
wars, by unilateral action if necessary and without expending
Walby-3874-Ch-05:Walby-3874-Ch-05.qxp  23/06/2009  4:05 PM  Page 213
G
lo
b
al
iz
at
io
n
an
d
In
eq
u
al
iti
es
214
additional resources on nation building. Its strategists assume that vio-
lence is sufficient to overcome the enemy if there was enough of it to
‘shock and awe’ the opposition. Raw violence is seen as power with
a wider policy engagement viewed as unnecessary (Harris 2002).
By contrast, the European Security Strategy seeks to address
global challenges by creating an ‘international order based on effec-
tive multilateralism’ and developing good policies on trade and
development, as well as the development of the European Union’s
armed forces (Council of the European Union 2003). As the
European Union has emerged as a global actor it has developed a
distinctive security strategy in which violence is deliberately
embedded in softer forms of power in order to be effective (Smith
2003; Smith 2004; Bretherton and Vogler 2006).
There are further divisions between the USA and the EU in their
approach to the global divisions that underpin these security strate-
gies. The world may be understood to be divided in different ways:
first, into distinct hegemons or regions, each with their own interests
and priorities; second, into one of three categories of stable market
economies with democracies, stable peripheral market economies
with near-democracy, and a terrorist-generating set of countries that
are economically developed without democracy and sometimes col-
lapsed states; or third, into inter-dependent states and regions.
Within the United States military academies there is lively debate
between the first two positions (Harris 2002; National Defense
University 2008). The first position appears supported by a state cen-
tric or clash of civilizations (Huntington 1998) view, translating into
an approach in which the US is treated as a hegemon. The second
position is more aligned with the neoliberal view that economic
development delivers democracy and all good things. In practical
terms the alternatives are whether the US sees the main threat as
coming from a regional power (once Russia, now potentially China),
or whether this is terrorism from non-state as well as state actors in
the economically poor, politically unstable and undemocratic parts of
the world (Harris 2002; Institute for National Strategic Studies 2008).
By contrast the EU adopts the third position, seeing the world as
inter-dependent and understanding its own interests as best realized
by cooperation alongside a view that it is ‘inevitably a global player’
because of the size of its population and economy and possesses a
concept of ‘European interest’ (European Council 2003). A failure by
the USA to acknowledge the multipolarity of world power is a source
of its current weakness (Zakaria 2008).
The use of different theories regarding the relationship of violence to
power and the nature of globality by the USA and EU is associated with
quite different strategic approaches to the use of violence by polities.
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Processes of globalization affect the regulation of violence
through the development of the discourse of universal human
rights. The development of the discourse of universal human rights
and its institutionalization in law, tribunals, and courts has reframed
and increased the regulation of several forms of violence. It has
been key to the development of tools of intervention using new
forms of international law, regulation, and argumentation. The
longstanding, initially Western, tradition of equal rights has been
articulated and institutionalized in various stages and forms (Meyer
et al. 1997; Berkovitch 1999), the most important of which was the
Declaration of Universal Human Rights by the newly formed United
Nations in 1948 (UN 1948).
In practice, there have been two main substantive foci in these
developments to hold governments to account for their breaches of
human rights’ codes. One concerns their use of torture and other
inhuman practices on those who are imprisoned or those who have
been captured in war, as well as concern for war crimes such as geno-
cide. This includes global mobilization to abolish the death penalty in
state criminal justice systems. A second concerns the use of human
rights’ rhetoric and institutions to change policies on violence against
women and minorities. Both involve using the UN as a resource.
Campaigns on human rights focused on examples of their viola-
tion through the use of extreme violence by states against which it
was appropriate for international agencies to intervene. The institu-
tional power available to implement human rights has been
increased by the establishment of the international war crimes tri-
bunal in the Hague, which has been especially active in the use of
violence against minority ethnic and religious groups, and the incor-
poration of the European Convention of Human Rights into
European Union law and hence the EU and the domestic legal sys-
tems of EU member states (Held 1995; Peters and Wolper 1995;
Therborn 1995, 1999; Kelly 1997). These developments give legiti-
macy to a set of practices protecting individuals from the arbitrary,
cruel, inhumane, and excessive exercise of force by states. The UN-
sponsored International Criminal Court, established by UN Treaty in
1998, was established in the Hague in 2002 after 60 countries signed
up in order to try individuals for war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity (UN 2002; McMorran 2003). The death penalty is
now considered by the Council of Europe, the European Convention
on Human Rights adopted by the EU, and the UN General Assembly,
to be contrary to human rights. The Council of Europe called on
states to reject the death penalty on human rights grounds in 1983;
the UN Commission on Human Rights did likewise in 1997. The UN
General Assembly adopted resolutions stating that it was desirable
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for states to abolish the death penalty in 1971 and 1977. In December
2007 the UN General Assembly called for a global moratorium on
executions (UN General Assembly 2007).
A second use of human rights interventions in violence has been that
to underpin justice for women and minorities. In the context of gender,
this has particularly meant the framing of violence against women as a
human rights violation. Despite its ostensible universality, the opera-
tionalization of the concept of human rights is varied in time and place.
The concept was broadened when, in 1993, a UN conference accepted
that women’s rights were human rights and that violence against women
constituted a violation of their human rights (Bunch 1995; UNIFEM
2000b). The conference stated that violence against women was a vio-
lation of human rights and therefore national governments must
strengthen the response of their criminal justice systems in support of
women. This was done as if it was an already existing universal human
right, even as it was known that it had been recently constructed
through struggle (Davies 1993; Peters and Wolper 1995; Heise 1996).
The increased regulation of inter-personal violence is facilitated
by the development of the discourse of universal human rights and
its embedding in transnational institutions. It provides a significant
form of legitimacy and rhetorical power to those seeking to per-
suade states to effectively criminalize and thus regulate non-state
violence against women and minority ethnic and religious groups.
Activists can draw down on this resource in many countries, what-
ever the level of economic development.
These developments have produced a re-framing of gender-
based violence as a human rights violation, although this is not
universally the case. There has been a shift in the political under-
standing of violence against women away from the view that this
was a brutal oppression of women by men (Brownmiller 1976;
Daly 1978; Mackinnon 1989), towards a view that it is a violation
of women’s human rights (Peters and Wolper 1995; Keck and
Sikkink 1998; Kelly et al. 2005), while not losing sight of its role in
constituting gender equality.
Conclusions
The deployment and regulation of violence are social processes.
Violence is a distinctive institutional domain. It should not be reduced
or collapsed into the state, conceptualized merely as its instrument,
nor should it be dispersed into individuals behaving in non-social and
emotional ways. It involves bodies and weapons as the means of
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violence, not only humanistic agency. Violence is socially patterned,
embedded in institutions and regimes of inequalities. The different
institutions involved in the deployment and regulation of violence are
interconnected. The more unequal a country is, the higher the rate
of violence. There is a link between the amount of violent crime and
the harshness of the state’s responses: the higher the rate of homicide
the higher the rate of imprisonment and use of the death penalty. The
greater the militarization of a country and its propensity to go to war,
the more group and inter-personal violence is found.
Making complex inequalities in addition to class visible changes the
understanding of the relationship between inter-personal violence
and inequality. Violence is more usually from the dominant to less
powerful groups than the other way around when gender, ethnicity,
and sexual orientation are brought into focus, challenging the
assumptions of much contemporary criminology. Most states are not
yet fully modern in that they do not fully criminalize and delegitimize
violence against women and minorities. Since democracy is being
deepened by the increasing access of women and minorities to demo-
cratic political power, the criminal regulation of inter-personal vio-
lence is increasing. States are slowly moving towards modernity.
While there is some reduction of violence in modernity, linked to
the deepening of democracy, there is no simple one-way trajectory of
change. There are path-dependent developments, there are reversals,
and there are changes at different times for different social groups.
Those countries that are more unequal and less democratic, the more
neoliberal countries, have higher rates of violence of all forms – from
interpersonal to the criminal justice system to the military – than do
those countries that are less unequal, more fully democratic, and more
likely to be social democratic. The US hegemon is more violent than
the EU. The myth of the nation-state, the myth of the purity of an eth-
nic group, of a religion, of a nation, and its ‘right’ to solely inhabit and
run a particular territory, is a terrible force underlying many tempta-
tions to the use of violence at individual, group, and state levels.
The global environment and global processes shape the deploy-
ment and regulation of violence by polities, groups, and individu-
als. Strategies of military violence used by hegemons and other
states diverge according to their interpretation of globality and the
relationship between violence and power. The perceived increase
in the threat of global terrorism changes the deployment of state
violence against other states and their own citizens. Global waves
of feminism and human rights bring civil societal pressure to bear
on the regulation and deployment of violence. The embedding of
conceptions of universal human rights in international institutions
changes the regulation and deployment of violence.
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Introduction
Civil society is a key institutional domain for the transformation of
meanings, the creation and hybridization of projects, the practice of
individual and collective agency, and the contested production of frames
and discourses. Approaches vary considerably in the extent to which
meaning is seen as a source of contestation or consensus, and the nature
of the link between civil society and other institutional domains.
The notion of what constitutes modernity in forms of civil society
is particularly contested: are there multiple modernities; a distinc-
tion between premodern and modern, postmodernity; or varieties
of modernity? When complex inequalities, especially gender, are
brought into focus these issues are particularly acute.
The inclusion of global processes challenges the tendency to
understand civil society as constituted primarily and more authenti-
cally at a local or national level. Global civil societal waves have
important effects on social relations around the world, whether as
conformity or backlash.
Theorizing Civil Society
Quite different approaches to the theorization of civil society are
offered by Habermas, Foucault, Bourdieu, and Gramsci. While all
avoid both the reduction of civil society to the economy and its rep-
resentation as a free-floating domain, they each offer different
accounts as to its links with other institutional domains, the extent of
contestation or consensus, heterogeneity or homogeneity, and its rela-
tionship to power (Cohen and Arato 1992; Thompson 1995; Alexander
6 Civil Societies
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2006). While providing a rich set of theoretical and conceptual tools,
however, these writers are limited in their engagement with complex
inequalities and global processes, though others have sought to make
appropriate revisions (Fraser 1989; Ramazanoglu 1993; Adkins and
Skeggs 2004).
Habermas offers two concepts of civil society and its relationship
to capital and the state: ‘the public sphere’ (1989) and the ‘lifeworld’
(1987). The public sphere of free and rational debate depends on
both the publicness and equality of social relations in this space. For
a short moment in eighteenth-century London these conditions were
met for a few men, but evaporated with the interventionism of the
state and the commercialization of the press. Habermas’s concept of
the public sphere is used in contemporary discussions of the condi-
tions under which rational debate and authentic values can be
developed (Emirbayer and Sheller 1998; Crossley and Roberts 2004),
including the international community of states (Risse 1999), and
epistemic communities that blend shared values and scientific
knowledge (Haas 1992). However, Habermas’s own analysis is
largely insensitive to inequalities beyond class in access to these
conditions, in particular the gendered nature of the division of pub-
lic and private that so often restricts the public to men (Landes
1998). In later work, Habermas (1987, 1991) locates the realm of
authentic communication within the ‘lifeworld’, a private haven pro-
tected from the steering systems of capital and state power.
However, this tends to romanticize the personal and domestic as a
source of authentic meaning, neglecting the gendered power rela-
tions in family household relations (Hernes 1987; Fraser 1989).
In Foucault’s (1979, 1991, 1997) analyses of civil society, power
is everywhere, operating in ‘capillary’ types of action rather than
centred within the state or capital. Technologies of power are used
to discipline the population, using diverse instruments, procedures,
modalities, and levels of application. However, while power is seen
always to meet with resistance, this is not connected to identifiable
groups of people. Subjectivity is merely an effect. Foucault’s analy-
sis tends to treat capital and democracy as the presumed back-
ground rather than the foreground for analysis. While the concept
of discourse has been used fruitfully in research (du Gay 1996; Rose
1996), the lack of connectedness to structural inequalities remains
a weakness (Ramazanoglu 1993; Adkins and Lury 1999).
Bourdieu (1984) conceptualizes culture as a form of capital
within a field, where the habitus or taken-for-granted practices of
individuals reproduce social hierarchies. Cultural capital enables indi-
viduals to make distinctions that can provide them with further priv-
ileges. Class privilege is reproduced in the field of culture through
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non-cognitive, or not consciously reflexive, action of habitus. This
extends the concept of capital from the economic to culture, but
retains that part of its meaning that connotes the resources that can
be used to deploy power. The relationship between the different
fields in which various kinds of capital operate is not clearly speci-
fied. However, the concepts, especially that of habitus, are not nim-
ble enough to be useful in the analysis of political struggle and social
change, being too rooted in learning from prior events and insuffi-
ciently focused on the processes of change in meanings and practice.
Gramsci (1971) develops the concept of a civil society level in his
explanation of the shape of the social formation, rejecting economic
reductionism and with a focus on struggles over politics and ideas.
He avoids the trap of economic reductionism while still providing a
theorized account of the relationship between civil society, the state,
and the economy, and has been widely influential in building non-
economically reductionist analyses of class relations (Laclau and
Mouffe 1985). Civil society is a site of struggle between social classes
involving the contestation of meaning, in which the ability to achieve
hegemony over ideas is an important part of power. Civil society is
seen as a key domain in which the existing social order is already
grounded and in which a new one could be founded. While brute
force is an important form of power it is potentially destabilizing, so
the achievement of ideological supremacy, the ability to define a sit-
uation through a set of concepts that can interpret the world
favourably to the dominant class grouping, is a significant form of
power. There are different levels of consciousness, one closer to
everyday life in which bourgeois ideas are treated as common sense,
with another the subjective constitution of the class as an actor in its
own interests, while the highest form of consciousness is seen as that
which would transcend immediate class interests to take account of
all social groups and be truly transformatory. The struggle for hege-
mony over culture so that socialist ideas might replace the values of
the bourgeoisie is key to the modern form of class struggle for
Gramsci. The working-class counter-struggle for hegemony draws not
only on worker organization but the ideas developed by organic
intellectuals to provide leadership of a movement so that it could
become more than merely economistic. Gramsci distinguished
between a war of position – in which there is a solid process of refor-
mation of ideas backed by organizational strength – and a war of
manoeuvre in which state power might be seized for a moment but
would remain fragile and fail (Gramsci 1971; Cox 1999; Danieli 2006).
The strengths of Gramsci’s concept of civil society include its inclu-
sion of practices as well as ideas, the foregrounding of the processes
of contestation over ideas rather than implied consensus, the conceptG
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of hegemony which invokes contested power in the terrain of ideas,
the overt linking of macro and micro levels in the relationship of civil
society to economy, polity, and violence, and the differentiation of
different types of strategies of struggle (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Cox
1999). There are some weaknesses and some inconsistencies in the
conceptualization – sometimes the concept is based on a simple
dichotomy of state versus a civil society that included the economy,
sometimes making a distinction between a civil society and the econ-
omy. It does not adequately recognize the significance of the multi-
plicity of complex inequalities, instead focusing only on class.
Key aspects of the concept of civil society used in this book are
derived from Gramsci’s concept: the presumption of contestation as
well as accommodation over a plurality of ideas and practices, and
the significance of these struggles for the institutions and system of
power. However, there is a need to extend the conceptualization of
social forces and systems of power to include those that are relevant
to complex inequalities such as gender and ethnicity as well as class.
Modernity and Civil Society
The meaning of modernity is much contested. In classical social the-
ory, modernity in civil society was associated with rationalization,
secularization (Weber 1947), individuation (Simmel 1955), and the
development of political consciousness and action (Marx 1963). In
contemporary debates these themes have been expanded to include
democracy, human rights, and the emancipation of women. Bringing
into focus complex inequalities has challenged the simplicities of the
conventional analysis of modernity (Taylor et al. 1994; Felski 1995).
The re-interpretation of the contemporary era as postmodern has
been a major response to this challenge (Lyotard 1978; Barrett and
Phillips 1992; Kumar 2005), but this approach has a tendency to
over-state the fragmentation of the social world (Walby 1992).
Differences between forms of civil society have alternatively been
interpreted as distinctions between premodern and modern (Inglehart
and Norris 2003), between multiple modernities (Eisenstadt 2002), and
between different stages (Giddens 1991; Beck et al. 1994; Bauman
2000) or varieties (Schmidt 2006) of modernity (see the discussion in
Chapter 1). A key issue in the discussion of multiple modernities is
where to draw the boundary between modernity and premodernity.
Does the absence of individuation, especially in intimacy, indicate a
different form of modernity or rather premodernity? The resolution of
these questions requires a specification of the definition of modernity
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in civil society. Key topics concern individuation and intimacy,
sexuality and reproduction – issues where gender relations are
central. The challenge is to define modernity in civil society in a
way that is sensitive to complex inequalities, such as gender, and
to different social formations, especially in the area of intimacy.
Is modernity in civil society universal or does it take particular
forms? Are some cultural forms instances of different modernities,
demonstrating the existence of multiple modernities (Huntington
1998; Eisenstadt 2002), or are they better understood as premodern? Is
individuation merely a Western form of modernity, rather than com-
mon to all modernities (Eisenstadt 2002)? In some non-Western cul-
tures, such as those involving Asian or Confucian values, the priority
between individualism and social solidarity appears to be tilted
towards the latter. The individualism associated with human rights,
democracy, and free speech is considered less important than family,
community, and consensus. This can be considered a distinctively
non-Western form of modernity, as has been argued by Asian leaders
in Singapore and Malaysia especially during the 1990s. However, this
position is highly contested. Alternatively, these practices may be
understood as projects by authoritarian political leaders to instrumen-
talize culture in order to maintain their political supremacy, which
would be eroded with the development of democracy (Sen 1997;
Thompson 2000; Barr 2002). The lack of individuation is then better
understood as premodern rather than as a different form of modernity.
The extent of individuation in civil society varies not only between
countries but also with regimes of inequality. This is especially clear
in the areas of human rights and of intimacy. The concept and prac-
tice of human rights is a form of individuation that varies not only
between countries but between genders, despite the claims that have
been made for their universality (UN 1948; Gastil 1982; Therborn
1995; Woodiwiss 1998; Rawls 1999). Bringing complex inequalities
into focus makes visible the varied nature and practice of human
rights, for example some ‘human’ rights have gender implications
(Bunch 1995; Berkovitch 1999). Whether sexual and reproductive
autonomy are considered to be human rights or not is contested, not
least by the USA, the Catholic Church, and Islam (Moghadam 1996;
Ferree et al. 2002b; Human Rights Watch 2006). Further, the desig-
nation of violence against women as a violation of women’s human
rights was added to the UN list of human rights only in 1993 (Bunch
1995; Peters and Wolper 1995).
Increased individuation has been linked to progress via the posi-
tive values of freedom and independence, civil liberties, and human
rights (Gastil 1982; Donelly 2003), and by contrast is lamented if it is
seen as leading to social isolation and a loss of social capitalG
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(Coleman 1990; Putnam 2000), with implications for domestic social
relations (Beck 1992; Irwin 2005), the development of the neoliberal
entrepreneurial self (Rose 1996), and the erosion of the life-world
(Habermas 1987). Underlying the debates about intimacy are vary-
ing views as to whether individuation delivers social justice and
progress to women and others. On one side individuation is seen as
leading to the loss of social engagement (Putnam 2000): there is
concern here that the erosion of traditional domestic forms of inti-
macy undermines social bonds that are important for human well-
being (Habermas 1987; Beck 2002). Habermas laments the erosion
of the ‘life-world’, which he considers the main site of authenticity,
by capital and the media. Beck (1992: 94) fears the ‘contradiction’
between women’s entry into the labour market and ‘social bonds’
which lead to divorce and insecurity. On the other side, this trans-
formation can lead to an increase in the range and form of social
bonds and also their range; individuation may involve an increase
in an individual’s choice and self-determination (Giddens 1992). It
can be celebrated as freedom, independence, and equality for
women as well as promoting well-being for all.
The same gendered changes lamented by Habermas as eroding
the life-world and by Beck as eroding social bonds are hailed by
Bergmann (1986) as the erosion of the confinement of women to
the home thereby facilitating the development of wider social
bonds – the economic emergence of women with its associated
freedoms. Giddens (1992) sees the transformation of intimacy as a
process of democratization and decreasing gender inequality, while
Berkovitch (1999) and Moghadam (2005) point out increases in
women’s rights worldwide. This latter interpretation of modernity is
consistent with that of Simmel (1955), for whom individuation in
modernity led to a ‘web’ of ‘social affiliations’, a myriad of choices
as to social connections. Individuation for women often takes place
later than for men. It is associated with the transition from a domes-
tic to a public gender regime – from domestic work to free wage
labour, access to education, and the formal political sphere, as well
as independence in decision making in relation to sexuality and fer-
tility and bodily integrity. Changes in gendered forms of intimacy
are linked to changes in the form of the gender regime.
One reason for the divergent interpretations of individuation
within modern civil society as progressive or not lies in the differ-
ences between the forms of individuation. The more neoliberal
forms are associated with isolation and lesser social engagement, the
more social democratic forms with an increased range and diversity
of social engagement. The neoliberal form is indicated in the com-
mercialization and objectification of sexuality in prostitution and
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pornography, as compared with the proliferation and acceptance of
diverse forms of sexuality as mutual exchange. This analysis rests on
approaching sexuality and intimacy as socially constituted.
Sexual practices have been and still are socially constituted. While
they involve bodies and emotions, they are not reducible to biolog-
ical or even psychological processes (Foucault 1979; Richardson
2000). The inclusion of sexuality within the realm of the social
requires social theory to incorporate bodies and technologies. While
early attempts by radical feminists to address the social construction
of sexuality as a form of gendered power (Mackinnon 1989) have
been dismissed as biologically essentialist (Segal 1987; Butler 1990),
they have nevertheless put analysis of the social aspects of sexual
relationships on the agenda. The discursive construction of sexual-
ity in the work of Foucault (1979) consolidated the inclusion of sex-
uality within the realm of the social even while it softened the focus
on inequality as a consequence of its conceptualization of power as
dispersed (Ramazanoglu 1993). Addressing sexual and gendered
practices as performance rather than as identities further shifts the
focus of the analysis away from macro-level social structures (Butler
1990). Rethinking sexuality through the lens of citizenship refocuses
analysis on the social institutions that construct the different forms
of sexuality (Jackson 1999; Richardson 2000).
Sexuality can constitute a complex inequality in its own right,
especially as a result of the negative sanctions often applied to same
sex relationships (Weeks 1995, 2007). It is also partially constitutive
of complex gender inequalities. This is partly through the institution
of heterosexuality, the more negative sanctioning of women’s non-
marital sexuality than that of men, the existence of sexual violence
and practices such as female genital mutilation, and because of the
gendered regulation of related practices such as reproduction, mar-
riage, and divorce (MacKinnon 1989; Jackson 1999; Richardson
2000). Indeed most contemporary gender identities are partially con-
stituted on the presumption of heterosexuality, so any erosion of the
polarization between heterosexuality and gay/lesbian identities
would constitute a change in the nature of gender itself (Butler 1990;
Seidman 1996). However, sexuality is only one among several of the
constituents of gender relations and not definitive of its totality.
There are considerable variations in the regulation and practice of
intimacy, some associated with the distinction between premodern
and modern forms, but other variations within modernity according
to the path dependent forms of neoliberalism and social democracy.
There is a pluralization of forms of intimacy in modernity: while some
traditional forms remain (Jamieson 1998), there are new forms of sex-
ual relationship, cohabitation, and friendship (Weeks 1995, 2007).
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There are very considerable differences in the practices of sexuality
(Haavio-Manilla 1985) and attitudes towards sexual conduct (Scott
1998). A comparative survey of many countries finds that there are
significant variations in attitudes towards pre-marital and same sex
sexuality between countries, degrees of religiosity, ages, and over
time. While over time there is a tendency towards greater liberal-
ism, religiosity was the variable most consistently associated with
disapproval of non-marital forms of sexuality (Scott 1998). The
extent of religiosity is in turn associated both with secularization
and with the balance between religion and state in the governance
of intimacy. Variations in the forms of polity are associated with the
path-dependent development of the regulation and practice of inti-
macy and other forms of individuation.
Not all forms of non-domestic sexuality are associated with equal-
ity and independence, however. An example of this can be found
in the newspaper reporting of sex crimes. Before the 1970s this was
quite rare and such articles were short and cryptic. From the 1970s
onwards there was increasing coverage, moving the issue into the
public sphere. Potentially this was a positive move, increasing the
possibility of a serious public debate on issues that had previously
been kept hidden. However, the newspaper reporting was not only
sensationalist but highly sexualized so the presentation was some-
times almost another form of pornography (Soothill and Walby
1991). Protesting feminist voices were excluded from this forum. It
was not an example of an ideal speech situation or public sphere of
the kind to which Habermas aspires, rather it is a new terrain for
struggle over the representation of sexuality, gender, and power.
The public gender regime is associated with high rates of repart-
nering (often associated with low rates of marriage), as well as
divorce, cohabitation, and children born outside of marriage. This
contrasts with the domestic gender regime where partnering was
usually for life. Within the public gender regime there are neoliberal
and social democratic forms of the organization of intimacy. In social
democratic forms the cost and care of children are much more often
borne collectively by state services and payments than in the neolib-
eral forms. The privatization of childcare costs in the neoliberal forms
creates a greater disincentive for men to repartner women with chil-
dren from a previous relationship than in the social democratic forms
where these costs are shared with the state. The implication of this
is that often in social democratic forms there are lower rates of lone
parenthood than in neoliberal forms (see Chapter 9).
There are significant variations in the regulation of practices that
affect the experience of sexual autonomy, including legal and prac-
tical access to contraception, abortion, divorce, and separation
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(Richardson 2000; Human Rights Watch 2006). The presence or
absence of polity regulation confining sexuality to marriage is not the
only consideration. A removal of the pressures that confine sexuality
to the married domestic arena may merely change the form of sex-
ual exploitation rather than reduce it, as in, for example, the
increased circulation of pornography and a rise in prostitution. An
increase in the practice of non-marital sexuality may be associated
with gender equality and an increase in sexual autonomy for women,
but this depends on a range of other circumstances. In their absence,
a reduction in regulation may merely lead to greater commercialized
instead of domestic sexual exploitation of women. As individuation
is increasingly the experience and practice of women, intimacy and
the domestic are transformed. While this is not a simple liberation for
women, neither is it best understood as the erosion of social bonds.
Individuation involves the transformation of these activities; moder-
nity is both freeing and disciplining for women as well as for men.
There is a struggle among global hegemons and world religions
over the standards set for civil society at the global level of the United
Nations which has important outcomes in some locations around the
world. There is serious contestation between the EU – which supports
a more social democratic public gender regime – and the USA,
Catholicism, and Islam – which support more domestic forms of gen-
der regimes – in matters concerning intimacy and sexual and repro-
ductive rights (Peters and Wolper 1995; Moghadam 1996). In 1995 the
UN Beijing conference on women set the standards for a more pub-
lic and more equal gender regime than existed in many of the world’s
countries in its Platform for Action (UN 1995). The reluctance of the
USA post-Reagan to endorse reproductive freedoms for women, such
as rights of access to abortion, has slowed but not stopped the
endorsement of gender equality by the UN in other areas.
Secularization and the decline of religion have traditionally been
regarded as key components of modernity. Modernity was expected
by classical social theory to lead away from religion towards secu-
larism and science. Contemporary support for this thesis is found at
a near global level in the association of economic development with
secularization in the World Values Survey (Norris and Inglehart
2004). In much of Europe, from the UK to Ireland, there has been a
significant decline in Christian religious practices such as attending
church and believing in God (Bruce 1996, 2002; Norris and Inglehart
2004), although there is some growth in ‘New Age’ spiritual prac-
tices (Heelas and Woodhead et al. 2004). Secularization is gendered,
with women giving up organized Christianity to a greater extent
than men (Woodhead 2007), and linked to the declining salience of
Christian beliefs which endorse a domestic form of gender regime
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that has been in long-term decline, at least in Europe. The decline
of organized religion is also a decline in a non-democratic polity and
hence an increase in the depth of democracy. The religiosity of the
USA and the rise of various religious fundamentalisms have been
used to challenge the thesis that modernity is associated with secu-
larization (Finke 1992). In the USA there are strong mainstream reli-
gious groups with political salience (Manza and Brooks 1999), as
well as fundamentalist Protestant sects which are opposed to
Darwinian theories of evolution and the practice of abortion (Ferree
et al. 2002b). Numerous fundamentalisms have developed as minor-
ity approaches within many world religions (Marty and Scott 1993)
with ethnic and national dimensions as well as gendered ones
(Hardacre 1993). However, the religiosity of the USA is more the
exception than the rule among developed economies. One source of
the differences between the United States and Europe may be levels
of inequality, since more unequal countries with perhaps less expe-
rience of personal security have lower rates of secularization (Norris
and Inglehart 2004). This greater religiosity of the USA as compared
with the EU has consequences for the divergence in the forms of
gender regime promoted by these hegemons at a global level.
The development of scientific forms of knowledge is conven-
tionally linked with modernity and the development of certain
forms of science is linked with economic development and good
health through medicine. However, any overly simplistic associa-
tion of science with progress can be contested, since professions
may be as controlling as enabling (Foucault 1979) while modern
techniques may be used to kill people more easily (Bauman 1989).
The implications of scientific development often depend on the
nature of the project with which it is associated. There are diver-
gent patterns of scientific development in neoliberal and social
democratic contexts. In a neoliberal context where capital is dom-
inant, knowledge may be expropriated from its original producers
and sold on for profit. ‘Accumulation by dispossession’ is part of
the neoliberal expansion of global capital (Harvey 2003, 2005),
sometimes involving in particular the appropriation of knowledge
produced in the South and by women (Mies and Shiva 1993).
The regulation of the risk associated with new forms of science
and technology varies according to the positioning of capital and
democratic forces in neoliberalism and social democracy. The EU
holds to a precautionary principle – namely, that it is more cautious
until it is more certain that something is safe – rather than stopping
only when harm has become clear. The US position supports greater
risk-taking in the development and exploitation of scientific
advances. The EU position might be understood as more social
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democratic in that it prioritizes the potential victims of mistakes; the
USA as more neoliberal in prioritizing capital. This contrast in
approaches underpins global contestations as to the acceptable level
of risk in relation to environmental issues, such as climate change
and genetically modified foods. The EU and the USA contest these
issues in the global forum of the World Trade Organization
(Winickoff et al. 2005) and the UN. The development of science is
not simply associated with modernity and progress, but also depends
on the extent of democratic input into its regulation at increasingly
global levels and its intersection with changing complex inequalities.
Bringing complex inequalities such as gender into focus has
implications for the debates on modernity and civil society. The
development of individuation, especially in intimacy, is seen more
clearly as a change from the premodern to modern; its absence is
premodern, not another form of modernity. The form of civil soci-
ety, from intimacy to science, varies as to the neoliberal or social
democratic environment. Commercialized forms of sexuality and
science are found with neoliberalism, greater regulation by demo-
cratic forces in social democracy.
Civil Society Projects
The concept of ‘project’ is developed in this book in order to take
forward the analysis of civil society. Civil society contains many pro-
jects. A project contains a set of goals and ideas about how the
world works and how it could be improved, and is taken forward
by its constituencies using particular methods and technologies of
change and particular forms of organization and resources. A pro-
ject is not reducible to the socio-economic location of its participants
nor an unfolding of pre-given interests, but neither is it simply free-
floating outside of structured economic inequalities. A project is not
only ideational, not only a framing, but also has ontological depth
in its methods, resources, and constituencies. Projects contest and
change using a range of ideational, political, and other resources.
New forms of governance and social formations can start within
governments or be led by economic change. But changes in forms
of governance are very likely to be influenced by innovations in civil
society projects, where innovative new social forms are both argued
and struggled over. Civil society is the space where new ideas, prac-
tices, programmes, and visions of alternative social formations are
developed. They respond to changes in resources, power, and mate-
rial positioning, reworking the frames and discourses that provide
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meaning. States and their programmes are a prize, key fulcrums of
power but rarely the starting point. This is not to argue that power is
principally bottom-up, for it is not. Civil societal projects are situated
in the interstices of multiple forms of power; power that can take the
form of capital, systematic violence, and political domination.
Projects can be from the right as well as the left; authoritarian as well
as libertarian; anti-modernist as well as modernist. But, especially in
countries with even minimal levels of democracy, civil society is a
critical terrain of struggle over new social forms. It may sometimes
appear that a civil society project that once took the form of a social
movement has gone into abeyance when it has lost its visibility to the
media (Taylor 1989; Bagguley 2002). However, it may be that it has
become institutionalized and that its repertoire of actions has
changed towards those that are less visible and more internal to gov-
ernance systems, such as lobbying rather than street protest, or the
establishment of specialized branches of government such as
women’s units (McBride and Mazur 1995; Mazur 2002).
Often, class-based projects are analysed very differently from
projects that invoke gender or ethnicity. The analysis of class-
oriented projects tends to focus on the economic and organizational
resources available and on the implications of changes in structured
economic inequalities, with relatively little attention paid to the
more ideational processes of the framing of demands. An example
is in the development and deployment of the concept of ‘power
resources’ (Korpi 1983). The analysis of gender and ethnic politics
and projects tends to focus on the more ideational processes and
less on the economic and organizational resources that might be
mobilized. One example here is the discussion of the balance
between the concepts of difference and equality in feminist projects
(Holli 1997). There is often a split between the types of analysis of
class politics and of social movements, as if they were very differ-
ent. This specialization of explanatory approaches is unnecessary
and mistaken. Both ideational and resource issues are important in
the explanation of projects and there is a need for synthesis.
The theorization of civil societal projects requires analysis of the
economic, organizational, and other resources available (McCarthy
and Zald 1977; Chafetz and Dworkin 1986); the framing of its ideas
(Snow et al. 1986; Diani 1996; Ferree et al. 2002; Verloo 2005); and its
relationship with allies and enemies in adjacent or competing projects
(Jakobsen 1998; Vargas and Wieringa 1998; Della Porta and Diani
1999; Woodward 2004). It is important not only to identify the issues,
but also to understand the sources of variations in these projects over
time and between countries (Nelson and Chowdhury 1994; Keck and
Sikkink 1998). This analysis starts with the traditional issues of class
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analysis and then genders them before turning to the issues of ethnic
and gender analysis and including class.
Socio-economic structural changes can affect the size of the con-
stituency promoting a particular project. Male manual workers in the
manufacturing industry have traditionally been the workers most
likely to support labourist and social democratic projects through their
trade unions and political parties. Hence the decline in manufacturing
in most countries in the North, associated with both globalization and
with technical change, has been linked to a decline in trade union
membership and support for social democratic parties (Przeworski
and Sprague 1986). However, this analysis depends upon a gendered
gaze. When gender is brought into focus the size of the working class
must be reconsidered. There has been a major transformation in the
relations of production for many women – changing from domestic
relations to free wage labour – during recent decades. This entails the
restructuring rather than decline of the working class.
One of the most important organizational resources of labourism
and social democracy is trade unionism. While a key part of this is
the extent or density of membership, the nature of the organization
is also important: coverage, centralization, and coordination. The
coverage of the workforce by trade union agreements is, in some
countries such as Germany, considerably higher than the extent of
trade union membership. The degree of centralization of trade union
organization, in particular the extent to which a national level body
is given the authority to coordinate action, is a further dimension of
strength. A final dimension is that of coordination; the centralization
of trade union governance is not the only way of securing national
coordination (OECD 1997a; Visser 2006).
The density, coverage, centralization, and coordination of trade
unionism vary very significantly between countries, in particular
higher in countries that are more social democratic than those that
are neoliberal. The strength of trade unionism depends partly on a
number of institutional features that can embed it more or less
deeply in the economic, legal, and social fabric. In those countries
where social insurance for unemployment is organized by trade
unions (the Ghent system as used in Belgium and the Nordic coun-
tries), the density of trade union membership is higher. There is a
relationship between the strength of trade unionism and the extent
to which trade unions are protected by law and embedded into
industrial relations systems (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999).
There has been a general decline in membership of trade unions
in the global North. This has sometimes been associated with the
restructuring of the working class, in particular with the decline in
the manufacturing industry where trade unionism was traditionally
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strongest (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). However, it has occurred
very unevenly between countries. One explanation for this varia-
tion is that it has occurred most in those countries where trade
unions are least embedded – namely, not using the Ghent system
of social insurance, having least protection in law, and implement-
ing fewest corporatist arrangements (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999).
However, when gender is brought into focus a different picture
emerges. Women’s membership of trade unions has in general not
been falling but rising. In many countries women now make up
nearly half the membership of trade unions and in some they are
in the majority (EIRO 2004). Accounts of trade union strength that
do not recognize the contrary direction of change between women
and men miss a very important dimension of the changes in trade
unionism. The changing gender composition of trade unions is
associated with a change in the trade union bargaining agenda
towards equalities issues that concern women (Briskin and Eliasson
1999; Gagnon and Ledwith 2000). Trade unions are becoming the
largest mass organizations of women supporting social democratic
projects (see Chapter 10).
Traditional analysis of feminist organizations has investigated small
organizations within the context of a feminist movement, with the
focus on the movement rather than the organizations. Through the
lens of social movement analysis, there has been a tendency to see a
decline in women’s political activity associated with a decline in visi-
ble protests and street demonstrations (Taylor 1989; Bagguley 2002).
When the focus is shifted to the extent, nature, and power of feminist
organizations a different picture emerges. There has been a steady
growth and development of feminist organizations. These are increas-
ingly coordinated through coalitions at national and international
levels. There has been a shift in the form of feminist activity away
from separatist autonomous groups towards groups and coalitions ori-
ented to lobbying states for changes in legislation and resources. The
European Union funds its own Women’s Lobby. There are network-
type organizations active in the international spaces created by the
UN. The coalition and network form of much feminist organization is
often a response to the need to address the intersection of gender
with other complex inequalities, especially ethnicity. The content of
these politics includes the entire range of feminist issues, but with
greatest emphasis placed on gender-based violence and economic
issues. Contra Fraser (1997), contemporary feminism is not primarily
culturalist (Briskin and Eliasson 1999; Gagnon and Ledwith 2000).
Violence is an oft-neglected dimension in analyses of civil soci-
etal projects which more usually focus on economic and organiza-
tional issues (Tilly 2003). It is perhaps most brought into view in
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the context of contestations that involve ethno-national-religious
projects seeking ‘purity’ and a state of their own (Mann 2005). Since
‘purity’ can never be realized and not all such projects can have a
state of their own, these are projects often faced with failure. Such
projects may use group violence, perhaps developing militias, in
order to pursue their goals. Once violence has been used it is hard
to go back; its use throws into relief categories of ethnic/national/
religious or other identifications that might have lain dormant, pro-
voking them into a more active existence. This insight underpins
the strategy used by terrorists. Suicide bombing is a current form of
such political violence. Violence is of course used in class and gen-
der conflicts too, often at moments of crisis and potential turning
points in the history of these projects. Violence is also used to
break strikes and to quell demonstrations.
Political opportunities and state capacity structure the environ-
ment in which projects operate (Kitschelt 1986). The extent of
access to state power powerfully shapes what is possible for many
civil societal projects. Projects that develop their own political par-
ties have potential access to considerable power to embed their pro-
ject in governmental programmes and then into social formations.
The depth of democracy differentially affects projects of the disad-
vantaged and the strong. Projects that have become governmental
programmes may change the nature of the state and its capacities,
including deepening democracy, protecting or discouraging trade
unions, building welfare capacity, and creating specialized units of
the state such as women’s units.
Ideas are a key aspect of projects; but not the only one. In democ-
racies contestation between ideas is a necessary and significant part
of the contest between projects, even though resources are often key
to whether different positions are heard clearly or misrepresented.
Projects may be framed in terms that are oppositional to the main-
stream or close to it, anti-system or reformist, building a new politi-
cal vocabulary or revising the old one (Della Porta and Diani 1999).
While frame analysis has most often been applied to social move-
ments concerned with gender (Ferree et al. 2002; Mazur 2002; Verloo
2005), regionalism and nationalism (Diani 1996), and ethnicity, it can
be applied to class-oriented projects as well, as in the analysis of the
rapid rise of neoliberalism in Eastern Europe after 1989 (Bockman
and Eyal 2002). Argumentation and not only framing is important:
epistemic communities draw not only on shared values but also on
scientific work (Haas 1992) and they are especially important in envi-
ronmental projects, and increasingly so in feminist projects. Holding
states to account in matters of human rights has been facilitated by
the requirement of consistency in their arguments (Risse 1999).
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Projects are affected by their allies and enemies. Feminist projects
do best where there are three types of gender allies: grassroots or
NGO feminists; women parliamentarians; and gender equality units
of civil servants, (though analyses vary as to exactly which allies:
see Vargas and Wieringa 1998; Woodward 2004). Feminism and
labourism may be allies in co-building social democracy or antag-
onists, promoting different sections of the workforce. The point of
intersection of complex inequalities may be the site of coalitions or
competitor projects.
The concept of the project develops the theorization of civil soci-
ety. It is focused, yet can also encompass a wide repertoire of col-
lective actions; it indicates a level of cohesion, but is not confined
to a specific organization; it contains ideas, but is not confined to
the ideational level.
Global Civil Societies and Waves
While some have claimed that a global civil society has already
been achieved (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2006; Keane 2003; Lechner
and Boli 2005), the evidence does not support this. But neither is
civil society confined to a national or country specific level; there
are transnational forms. In addition there are global waves, increas-
ingly global forms of civil society, and several specific global civil
societies, but all this does not currently form a single global civil
society. The concept of a global wave is an important addition in
order to grasp the global processes present in civil society.
While there have been some near global aspects of civil society
since the rise of capitalism and the British Empire, including the
spread of both Christian and socialist projects, the current round of
globalization pushes further and faster the reach of civil societal pro-
jects. Some projects that started as local resistance to particular global
projects have become global themselves, for example ‘anti-globaliza-
tion’ projects that became global anti-neoliberal projects (Klein 1999).
Projects can be global in respect of either or both of their active
members and their framing. Some involve both activists around the
world and the use of global frames, as in the case of opposition to
violence against women as a violation of women’s human rights and
environmentalism. Some use a global framing of their projects but
only aspire to, rather than achieve, a global network of practitioners,
with elites colonizing key nodes in global networks and institutions.
Others may share a global project of ideas and goals, but neverthe-
less focus any implementation at the level of the national state,
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where the key levers of power are understood to be located (Peters
and Wolper 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Benhabib 1999; Tarrow
2005; Chesters and Welsh 2006).
There is not just one global civil society but several, competing
and contesting. Most started as global waves of social energy before
becoming institutionalized in civil society. The state level is still
important and not all social movements do become global: some
will stay local, national, or regional. But increasingly they are
becoming global. New concepts are needed to grasp the specifi-
cally global dynamics of civil society and to go beyond concepts
developed to capture phenomena that were predominantly local or
national. Wave is one of these concepts.
The concept of wave captures the simultaneous temporal and spa-
tial dimensions of social change in a global era in which there are
new possibilities of forms of contact between social systems. The
concept of wave catches the way that a critical event in one social
system can have repercussions on social systems elsewhere in time
and space. A wave starts in one temporal and spatial location, builds
rapidly through endogenous processes, and then spreads out
through time and space to affect social relations in other locations.
The concept of wave captures the sudden transfer of social practices
from one social system to another, passing as a form of social energy
through networks rather than more institutionalized forms of social
organization. The implications of a wave may be backwash and resis-
tance as well as transformation in the direction of the wave as well
as hybridization (this is laid out in more detail in Chapter 2.) Waves
are not permanent, they are intrinsically non-linear and unstable
forms of social energy. They may become institutionalized. This insti-
tutionalization may be within civil society, the establishment of asso-
ciations and organizations outside the state. However, many civil
society projects aspire to change the nature of governance and the
nature of society itself. They may become institutionalized in gover-
nance programmes. If they are very successful they become embed-
ded in new social forms, new social systems, but not necessarily in
the way they initially intended. The implications of waves depend on
the context in which they land. In particular, outcomes are different
if there are pre-existing networks, groups, or constituencies that wel-
come, absorb, translate, and sympathetically amplify the content of
the wave. Heterogeneity, divisions, and plural networks should be
expected, although their positioning in an institutional context needs
explanation. This institutional context varies; some are more open to
the project of the wave than others.
Waves are a specific form of civil society project that go beyond
the local and the national to regional and global levels. A series of
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changes has increased the spatial reach of civil society projects in
several ways: rise in economic, organizational, and knowledge-
based resources to facilitate global civil societal activities; growth in
global political opportunities; growth in discursive resources at a
global level.
First, increased global communications, media, and mobilities
shrink the distance in time and space between events, so that live
news footage of a conflict can be beamed to millions around the
world. This increases awareness within quite general publics about
incidents beyond their own country. These facilitate interconnections
between political activists, especially cheaper air travel, faster trains,
and the development of cheaper and more reliable phone, fax, and
email. These facilitate the exchange of ideas and practices between
people located in different countries and regions of the world
(Thompson 1995; Castells 1997; Anderson and O’Dowd 1999b; Timms
2005; Urry 2007). These new forms of mobilities are resources
enabling global waves and global civil societal projects, by ensuring
that distance is no longer an obstacle to action. This is a new form of
developing of the resources that have long been seen as necessary for
political mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977).
Second, the development of global events and conferences has
increased the number of spaces where international interactions,
dialogues, and networking between activists can take place
(Moghadam 2005). These especially include those belonging to the
UN, which has encouraged the growth of events for non-govern-
mental organizations alongside official governmental meetings
(Annan 1999). The development of the World Social Forum and its
regional offshoots provides dedicated locations for the develop-
ment of global forms of civil society (World Social Forum 2007).
This is a different kind of resource, but one that is important for the
development of networks on which a global wave thrives. These
events develop global co-optable communications networks that
facilitate social movements (Freeman and Johnson 1999) to take the
form of global waves.
Third, there is an increase in the knowledge, education, and
expertise to support challenges to the status quo with the global
development of higher education. The university-based knowledge
system globalized early with the development of world journals,
translation, and the global sale of books, internet and email, and
regional and global conferences. This has supported the develop-
ment of global epistemic communities (Haas 1992), in which net-
works of professionals with a recognized expertise and authoritative
claims to policy-relevant knowledge share beliefs and values as to
what constitutes progress in their field.
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Fourth, there has been the development of new organization forms
that can facilitate global organizing. In order to achieve a global form
civil society projects must address issues of difference. In practice there
are many issues that might potentially lead to divisions that could pre-
vent the emergence of a common project. A global civil society is
intrinsically diverse in its ethnicity, gender, standard of living, and
lifestyle, so the building of some form of consensus cannot be on the
basis of a simple homogeneity. Further, traditional forms of organiza-
tion based on democratic centralization or consensus building require
forms of stability of community and levels of resourcing that are incon-
sistent with a global civil society. The development of global civil soci-
eties has invoked forms of coordination that involve networks,
coalitions, and alliance, rather than democratic centralism or consen-
sus. These are able to absorb and constructively address the differ-
ences within and between the constituencies of a global civil society.
They are loose, fluid, flexible, and changeable in the light of changing
circumstances, shifting interests, and foci of attention, able to hybridize
different projects and options (Gilroy 1993; Ferree and Hess 1995;
Jakobsen 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Keane 2003). This is not iden-
tity politics, rather the continual building and modification of projects.
Fifth, there has been the development of political opportunity
structures that are global (Tarrow 2005). This is associated with the
development of global institutions, including the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the UN,
and its various agencies and projects such as the Millennium
Development Goals (Keane 2003; Anheier et al. 2005; UN 2007a),
as well as events involving the global elite, such as the meeting of
G8 leaders or gathering at Davos (Klein 1999; Chesters and Welsh
2006). These provide opportunities for engagement, as well as act-
ing as a focus for global justice and anti-neoliberal capital protests.
In addition, there are within the global inter-state system increased
opportunities for influencing state conduct by argumentation and
shaming. Human rights have become embedded in a variety of
international regimes and organizations and are increasingly defin-
ing what constitutes a ‘civilized state’ as a member of the interna-
tional community in ‘good standing’. The process of argumentation
potentially unsettles fixed identities and perceived interests which
become subject to discursive challenges, potentially leading to
argumentative ‘self-entrapment’ and change (Risse 1999).
Sixth, there is the development of global framings. Waves of civil
societal projects can only become global if they are framed in a way
that is globally relevant. The resources that are needed for global
waves are symbolic as well as economic, organizational, and infor-
mational. Symbolic resources to challenge the existing social order
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are important (Eyerman and Jamieson 1991); the ideas held by a
movement are important to participants and not merely instrumen-
tal (Melucci 1989). The kinds of framings of issues that organize
experiences and events, thus making them meaningful, matter
(Snow et al. 1986; Diani 1996; Della Porta and Diani 1999).
Examples of global framings include universal human rights and
global climate change. The development of UN Conventions that
further articulate the principles behind the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UN 1948) has assisted this process by providing
legitimatation to globally framed projects. The major international
human rights instruments are: the International Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (1948); the International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
(1965); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (1966); the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (1979); the Convention against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (UNDP 2007a). In
addition, the UN world conference on human rights in Vienna in
1993 declared that women’s rights were human rights and that vio-
lence against women constituted a violation of women’s human
rights (UN 1993). Further, there are several UN Conventions on
Fundamental Labour Rights, including: freedom of association and
collective bargaining (87, 98); the elimination of forced and com-
pulsory labour (29, 105); the elimination of discrimination in respect
of employment and occupation (100, 111); and the abolition of
child labour (138, 182) (UNDP 2007).
Claims about what constitutes ‘the good’ are increasingly made at
a global level and draw on a framing in terms of the universal. The
arguments about the importance of context and situation are being
restructured as a result of globalization. There are no longer any
self- contained, homogeneous communities; all know of others
who are both similar in some respects and different in others. This
is re-framing the way in which claims about the goals, values, and
means to achieve these are presented. The appeal to the global
level is often presented as if it were an appeal to a timeless univer-
sal. Yet the global is not the same as the abstract universal. Instead
the global is a practical, special, and time-specific realm, even as it
can be purported to encompass the totality of contemporary human
life. The global and the universal have an uneasy and ambiguous
relationship in many contemporary analyses. This is because many
political projects today make claims to justice on the basis of an
ambiguously defined conception of the global/universal.
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This appeal to a global level is especially occurring in the case of
the appeal to ‘universal’ human rights. A successful elision between
the global and the universal is an important move in contemporary
politics. The ability to claim access to a universal standard of jus-
tice has been used by an increasing number of political projects as
a powerful form of legitimation. The nature of this global framing
is especially important given the ease with which an elision
between the global and the universal can be made. The global is
no more than a specific social construction situated in a specific
time. In this way it is quite different from the universal, which is
usually understood as timeless and lacking spatial specificity.
The elision of the ‘universal’ with the ‘global’ lies at the heart of this
development. It is implied that if the entire world agrees to something
through open debating in forums of persons selected in a represen-
tative manner from each country then the Habermas-type conditions
of procedure have been met, which in turn will mean that truth can
be approached as closely as is humanly possible. Simultaneously
there is an appeal to the liberal principle of universal individual
human rights, as if this is above time-bound and space-bound cal-
culations of interest. In these developing global fora political activists
devise and change those principles of justice that are understood as
human rights. They successfully treat the global as if it is the same as
the universal, all the better to claim authority for their actions.
The re-framing of contemporary politics by globalization has
given rise, not only to the politics opposed to this change, but also
to the creative and innovative adaptation and expansion of the
notion of universal human rights. This new framing elides the dis-
tinction between the global and the universal as part of its legiti-
mation strategy. The attempted reference group for these politics is
that of a common humanity. This opens up a new round of politi-
cal struggles in the construction of such rights, even as they are
held up as timeless and universal.
Examples of waves
Some civil society projects have a moment when there is a burst of
energy, becoming regional or global waves. Before this energy sub-
sides some become institutionalized, some in civil society and oth-
ers deeper than that in governmental programmes or even social
formations. Increasingly waves are becoming global, for the rea-
sons discussed above.
The following list contains several of the more important waves,
though it does not claim to be comprehensive. The discussion on
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each describes their content, the circumstances of their develop-
ment into waves, their varied implications regionally and globally,
and the extent of their subsequent institutionalization. They include:
the Reformation; socialism; first wave feminism; nationalism and
decolonization; fascism; the alternative movement of the 1960s; sec-
ond wave feminism; environmentalism; neoliberalism; global jus-
tice; fundamentalisms; and human rights. Civil society projects are
not all conventionally progressive and the list contains some vio-
lent, sectional, and authoritarian projects. The earlier waves were
regional, focused on Europe or the North Atlantic rim, while the
later waves are increasingly global in range.
The Reformation
The Reformation of the Christian Church in Europe was a regional
wave that was precipitated in 1517 by Martin Luther nailing his cri-
tique of the Catholic Church to the door of a church in what is now
Germany and came to an end in 1648 with the peace of Westphalia.
The Reformation swept through north-west Europe, producing new
forms of Christian doctrine and restructuring the relations between
church and state. It had a particularly strong effect in Scandinavia
in its Calvinist variant, but also extended southwards from Britain
to Switzerland. The unified form of the Catholic Church straddling
state boundaries in Europe and the development of education
along with the utilization of the use of the relatively new practice
of printing helped to spread the Reformation (Cameron 1991). The
resulting boundary with Catholicism opened up a fracture across
Europe that had repercussions in later centuries, from religious per-
secution to intensifying disputes across national boundaries, such
as that between Britain and Ireland.
Socialism
In the late nineteenth century a wave of socialism spread out from
Europe. At its centre were the struggles of organized workers and
their allies in the industrializing core, growing from labourism to
demands for democracy and radical societal transformations. In much
of Western Europe this socialist wave became institutionalized in trade
unions and parties of the left, varying from small communist parties
to the more common social democracy (Kitschelt 1994; Bartolini
2000). While initially European, the socialist wave spread around the
world. There was very limited institutionalization at a global level in
the International Labour Organization in 1919, linked to the League of
Nations, which survives to the present day modestly supporting trade
unions around the world and building campaigns and setting
global standards (Valticos 1969: ILO 2005). More important were the
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revolutions in Russia in 1917 and China in 1949. The social democratic
regimes can be seen as platforms to the next step by Korpi (1983) and
as one part of a spiralling of forms of socialism and capitalism
(Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000), though it is more common to see
social democracy as in retreat (Callaghan 2000).
First wave feminism
The first feminist wave started in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury in Europe and especially Britain, and in North America, espe-
cially the USA, spreading out during the early twentieth century
beyond Europe to Australasia and creating ripples in the emerging
oppositions in the European colonies. This feminist movement
addressed a wide range of issues, from access to employment and
education to regulating prostitution and male violence, but is known
especially for its struggles for suffrage (Gilman 1966; Evans 1977;
Jayawardena 1986). The timing of the development of the women’s
suffrage movement in each country, unlike that for men, was not
associated with the level of economic development (Therborn
1977); rather the movement was part of a regional and then a global
civil societal wave. Women won the vote at the same time in many
countries of Northwest Europe and North America: between 1913
and 1920 in Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, the USA, Canada,
the USSR, Luxembourg, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, the
Netherlands, Poland, Ireland, and the UK (Inter-Parliamentary Union
1997). Although Ramirez et al. (1997) have argued that the suffrage
struggle was national rather than global, they in fact show that
‘Western status’ is the most important explanatory factor – namely,
that it was a predominantly regional phenomenon.
Suffrage for women was later than suffrage for men in those coun-
tries that granted suffrage to men before 1920, that is, the industrially
developed West. A second round of suffrage victories for women at
the end of the Second World War spread across most of southern and
eastern Europe. Thereafter, few if any countries granted suffrage for
men without simultaneously granting it to women: in practice, decol-
onization meant universal suffrage, not only suffrage for men (Inter-
Parliamentary Union 1997). In some locations feminists fighting for
suffrage found allies among socialists and among nationalists fighting
for decolonization, but not everywhere at all times.
What happened to first wave feminism? It changed the nature of
government and government programmes towards gender, at least
insofar as women became recognized as political citizens. Its impact
on social formations is probably not what it intended, contributing to
the transition from domestic to public gender regimes rather than end-
ing gender inequality. Its own civil society organizations faded,
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divided internally by the militarist nationalism of many countries in
the First World War and also divided by contrasting visions of progress
for women, as to whether women should be protected from the worst
of the public domain and excesses of employment by promoting a
better form of domesticity or fighting for further forms of formal
equality. Nonetheless, it continues in less visible civil society organi-
zations such as, in the UK, the Fawcett Society.
Fascism
Fascism was a European fundamentalist project, centred in Germany
and Italy but also important in Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Spain,
marked by a search for racial purity, anti-Semitism leading to con-
centration camps and the genocide of millions of Jews, the violent
and sometimes lethal treatment of gays and the disabled, disapproval
and domesticity for women who were removed from employment
and public positions, and an aggressive nationalist militarism. It has
similarities with other fundamentalisms in its project of ethnic purity
and the domestication of women, but is distinguished by its lack of a
religious component. It was a powerful wave, though of rather lim-
ited duration (the 1930s and 1940s) and limited geographical range,
being restricted to central and southern Europe though expanded by
militarism to a wider part of Europe and over by 1945. There were
ripples and collaborators across Europe, for example Oswald Moseley
and his followers in Britain, and there were outliers in countries asso-
ciated with Europe, such as the development of apartheid in South
Africa in this period. The project seized state power in Germany in
the 1930s and was in the process of transforming the social formation
when it was defeated by the military power of threatened states, espe-
cially Russia but including a broad Western alliance, and eliminated
by the victorious state forces. Attempts to revive it in civil society have
largely met with effective opposition in civil society and states (Koonz
1988; Bauman 1989; Mann 2004).
Nationalism and decolonization
Nationalism and decolonization are important movements with major
effects on state formation, but the timing of the major wave is highly
contested. The earliest dating is Smith’s (1986) location of the origins
of nations in ethnic groups, though this is not quite the same as the
rise of nationalism. Several have associated the rise of nationalism with
the early development of capitalism and especially early technologies
for mass communication such as the invention of printing (Anderson
1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Others have focused on what is
assumed to be the development of nation-states in Europe, with the
creation of Germany and Italy during the nineteenth century (Mann
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1993b). But while these might be precursors of some of the ideas that
are involved in nationalism, these were not yet the major nationalist
wave. In the middle of the nineteenth century most European
countries were or aspired to be empires and not nation-states. A better
dating of the most powerful wave of nationalism is in the mid-twentieth
century, when in opposition to colonial rule nationalism was utilized
as a powerful legitimating discourse, drawing on its earlier intellectual
heritage. The modern conception of a nation depends on a notion of
would-be self-government that is inextricably bound up with modern
notions of democracy; by the mid-twentieth century nationalist con-
ceptions of citizenship involved universal suffrage. Before then democ-
racy was absent and nationalism was little more than a romanticism
used by ruling elites to provide legitimacy for their state-building pro-
jects. The founding of the UN from the ashes of the League of Nations
provided global legitimation to these nation-state building projects,
supported by the emerging global hegemon of the USA at a time that
saw the decline of the former global hegemon, Britain, whose Empire
was thereby delegitimated (Walby 2003; Kelly and Kaplan 2007).
A wave of decolonization between 1947 and the late 1960s saw the
end of the British, French, and Portuguese Empires. This decoloniza-
tion, supported by nationalist rhetoric, was truly a global wave.
The 1960s Movement
This movement was linked to a broader libertarian wave that devel-
oped during the 1960s, especially in the USA, spread to Europe, and
encompassed a range of issues including feminism and opposition to
the US war in Vietnam. 1968 was a key year, with simultaneous events
in Paris, the United States, and many other Western cities. This move-
ment was key to stopping the war in Vietnam, but did not restructure
the militarization of the US state. There was a student movement for
democracy in the universities which frequently changed their gover-
nance structure. The associated feminist movement, discussed below,
sought to change civil societal practices of gender relations as well as
state programmes. Together these movements created a radical cul-
tural wave from the USA that was echoed in Europe and spread
around the world. Its institutionalization into the US state however
was less marked (Tarrow 1998; Freeman and Johnson 1999).
One important component of this movement in the USA, but not
in many other countries, was an anti-racist civil rights movement.
In the USA, the foundations of this movement were laid down in
the 1930s–1950s. It reached its peak in the USA in the 1960s, and
had some effects elsewhere. This movement won effective rights to
vote, some desegregation of schools and other public places, and
equal opportunities legislation in employment (Shapiro 1988;
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McAdam 1999): the consequences of political citizenship are still
developing. While there were some ripples of the wave elsewhere,
such as in South Africa in opposition to their apartheid system, and
the adoption of equal opportunities legislation in the UK, its global
effects were limited, not least because of the specificity of the US
ethnic situation as it derived from the history of slavery.
Feminism
Feminism was a leading part of the radical wave of the late 1960s
in the USA where it took both radical libertarian and liberal forms.
Together these encompassed a wide range of issues from promot-
ing equality in employment to reconstructing sexual behaviour,
confronting men’s violence to women and rethinking the meaning
of the political. In the 1960s and early 1970s the United States led
the world in the development of equal opportunity legislation and
abortion was legalized. But overall the US state was slow to
respond, with relatively low levels of incorporation into political
institutions, and the movement continued to build up its energy.
Feminism spread around the world as a global wave, with move-
ments not only in Europe but also in other continents and in global
fora. The movement took different forms in different countries. In
countries with a socialist or social democratic tradition feminism
hybridized into socialist feminism and thus saw the development of
women’s committees in trade unions and a challenge to incorporate
women’s issues, such as public childcare, into social democratic pro-
grammes. Sweden in the mid-1970s saw the development of public
childcare. There was a wave of equal opportunities legislation in
Europe in the early 1970s including the EU Equal Treatment
Directive in 1975, in Britain in 1970 and 1975, and in Ireland in 1973.
There was a wave of establishing refuges and phone help lines for
women who had suffered male violence, appearing in Europe from the
mid-1970s (with the first refuge in Britain opening in 1973) and spread-
ing around the world. Incorporation into global institutions involved
UN conferences on women starting in 1975, which peaked in the
1995 Beijing conference and its Platform for Action but with continuing
effects in other UN bodies including the World Bank (Hague and Malos
1993; Moser 1993; Nelson and Chowdhury 1994; Murphy 1995;
Hoskyns 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Peterson and Runyan 1999).
A further development has been the hybridization of feminism
with the universal human rights tradition (see below). The claim to
universal human rights has had a long history in feminism (Banks
1981; Wollstonecraft 1992 [1790]; Berkovitch 1999) and is now under-
going a resurgence. It was a legitimating principle during suffrage
struggles. It was present in claims to equal worth, equal pay, and
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equal treatment at work in the European Union from the mid-1970s
(Pillinger 1992; European Parliament 1994; European Commission
1999), in Japan (Yoko et al. 1994), and elsewhere around the world
(Nelson and Chowdhury 1994). This claim to universalism is often
knowing or strategic, by which is meant that the protagonists know
that the ‘universal’ is but a contingent social construct (Bunch 1995).
Indeed, there has been significant feminist activity devoted to
redefining and reconstructing what constitutes ‘universal’ human
rights (Peters and Wolper 1995; UNIFEM 2000a). This occurs in UN
conferences, which attract a massive attendance of feminist activists
from around the world, both North and South, and supplements and
influences the official delegations (UNIFEM 2000b). In 1993 in a UN
conference in Vienna, violence against women was constructed for the
first time as a violation of women’s human rights and thus of human
rights. This was presented as if it was an always and already existing
universal human right, even as it was known that it was being socially
constructed as a result of negotiation and struggle (Davies 1993; Bunch
1995; Peters and Wolper 1995; UNIFEM 2000b; Kelly 2005). A univer-
salist framing was used to promote the significance and generality of
the issue of stopping violence against women as a human right, whilst
knowing it to be contingent and constructed and not absolute.
Feminism has become institutionalized in civil society, in gov-
ernmental programmes at national and international levels, and in
some social formations. In becoming institutionalized, many issues
can no longer gain the high media profile associated with a con-
ventional social movement. This has led some to suggest that fem-
inism is in abeyance (Taylor 1989; Bagguley 2002), or that it is
predominantly interested in recognition rather than redistribution
(Fraser 1997), (though see Hobson 2003). Rather, feminism is becoming
institutionalized.
Environmentalism
Environmentalism is a project with a long history that has recently
built into a global wave. It now has a number of targets, from reduc-
ing pollution to slowing down the rate and harmful effects of human-
caused climate change. These invoke a global solidarity since
pollution crosses borders and affects countries and people other than
those that caused the pollution. Global climate change invokes not
only global solidarity but also inter-generational solidarity, since the
energy systems of the present will affect future generations more
than the present. It has an intrinsic global institutional focus, even
though it states that have to act. One early global event was the UN
conference in Rio in 1992; another was the Kyoto agreement;
more recently was Bali in 2007. It has involved the development of
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an epistemic community acting alongside the civil society project.
Most recently it has become embedded in some government pro-
grammes, at least partly because of the global movement leading to
international agreements (Beck 1992; Lash et al. 1995; Grove 1996;
Yearley 1996; Macnaghten and Urry 1998; Mol and Sonnefield 2000;
Mol 2001; Cudworth 2003, 2005).
Fundamentalisms
Major world religions have always been global in aspiration, even
when accommodating others in practice (Bruce 1996). However, there
have also been radical movements associated with these religions that
have not been so deeply institutionally embedded and which take a
more civil societal form. These include radical and fundamentalist reli-
gious movements seen especially in Islam and Christianity, but also in
Hinduism and Judaism (Marty and Scott 1993). This is not a clash of
civilizations (contra Huntington 1998), but rather of their radical out-
riders, better described as Jihadists. Radical Islamism first made its
impact via the Iranian revolution of 1979, subsided a little, and then
grew in strength and global reach following on from the US invasion
of Iraq (Gregory 2004) and amid repeated failures to resolve the
Palestinian issue, currently taking up new forms of armed struggle in
Al Qaeda and suicide bombing. Fundamentalist Christianity became
established in the USA in the 1980s, especially contesting issues of
gender and intimacy such as legal abortion and gay marriage, and
supporting right-wing presidencies.
Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism arose as a right-wing project opposing socialism and
social democracy during the 1980s in the USA and UK. It urged the
importance of freeing markets from regulatory controls and rolling
back the state, asserting that this would create economic growth and
freedom for individuals. It built on older forms of conservative and
liberal projects, and sought to break the post-war settlements that had
embedded some levels of welfare and state regulation of the econ-
omy. It had a base in right wing think tanks and among a minority of
university economists, including Hayek (1960) and Friedman (1962),
and was then taken up to revitalize the agendas of conservative US
and UK governments under Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s, enter-
ing the global financial institutions and their associated knowledge
creation institutions and becoming hegemonic in the USA. It domi-
nated the economic agenda of the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. The expansion of
global capitalism during and since the 1980s was associated with
the neoliberal project, which sought the development of market
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capitalism in ever newer locations, from public services to the
exploitation of the human genome (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey
2003, 2005; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005; England and Ward 2007).
The suddenness of the arrival of neoliberalism in the former
communist countries of east and central Europe around 1989–1990
surprised many commentators. It was too sudden to be explained via
the diffusion of ideas. There were however already outposts of
neoliberalism within intellectual elites in the countries of eastern and
central Europe, albeit expressed in coded terms (Bockman and Eyal
2002; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). But more important is
the understanding of the processes within a crisis, and the position-
ing of US neoliberals backed by the US state to take advantage of
social and political disorganization. Intervention at the point of disas-
ter was a long-standing practice of US neoliberalism (Klein 2007).
Global justice movement/anti-neoliberal capitalism
The global justice movement arose in the 1990s to challenge neolib-
eral globalization and mutated into an anti-neoliberal capitalist move-
ment as the movement itself became global. It came to world
attention in Seattle, with confrontations over a summit of world eco-
nomic leaders, which inspired many similar events around the world.
Although led by its anti-neoliberal capital agenda it gains its inspira-
tion from many sources and takes on board issues relating to the envi-
ronment, anti-racism, indigenous people’s rights, and feminism. It was
a global wave from its inception, although not comprehensive in its
remit and reach. It has made some impact on some governmental
programmes, especially at a global level, and is partly institutionalized
in the meetings of the World Social Forum (Klein 1999; Rowbotham
and Linkogle 2000; George 2004; Kiely 2005; Timms 2005; Chesters
and Welsh 2006; Hardt and Negri 2006; World Social Forum 2007).
The contestation by the global justice movement wave of the
attempted hegemony of neoliberalism met with some partial success,
for example, policy revisions by the World Bank (World Bank 1992;
Kiely 2005) and the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals
that prioritized human as well as economic development (UN 2007a).
Universal Human Rights
There has been a global wave seeking universal human rights. A long-
standing, initially Western, project for equal rights (Paine 1984 [1791]),
which has been articulated and institutionalized in various stages
(Meyer et al. 1997; Berkovitch 1999), has been reinvigorated and
transformed by global processes and the development of global insti-
tutions. The appeal to universal human rights depends not only
upon a philosophy and commonly accepted rhetoric, but also upon
a set of institutional practices which give it a practical expression
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which is increasing with globalization. There was a critical turning
point in the embedding of the principle of universal rights in inter-
national institutions formed in the aftermath of the Second World War
as part of the rejection of the Holocaust and extreme nationalist and
militarist projects, especially in Europe, the most affected continent,
but also in newly formed global institutions. Human rights were key
to the United Nations Charter signed in 1945 (United Nations 1945),
initially and powerfully codified in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (United Nations 1948), and included and broadened in
several UN Covenants since, such as the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Bill of Human Rights
(Buergenthal et al. 2002). The increasing range of the covenants and
the hybridization of these notions with local traditions may be under-
stood as a broadening of the notion of human rights beyond their
Western origins and also beyond narrower concerns with civil liber-
ties, coming to address wider economic as well as social democratic
concerns (Woodiwiss 1998). Human rights have become an integral
part of the European conception of modernity since 1945 (Therborn
1995). The Council of Europe, founded in 1949, adopted a
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms in 1950, and established a legal authority, the European
Court of Human Rights, in 1963 in The Hague to implement this for
member countries (Council of Europe 2006). This has now been
incorporated into the law of the European Union and is legally bind-
ing on all Member States.
These developments give legitimacy to a set of practices protecting
individuals from the arbitrary and excessive exercise of power. The
human rights discourse is undergoing significant further developments,
both broadening its field of application and increasing the institutional
power available to implement it. The increasing significance of the
global discourse of universal human rights, and their embedding in
international law, tribunals and courts, means that these are no longer
matters on which individual countries can remain autonomous.
Conclusions
Civil society is the institutional domain in which many competing
projects develop. The process of the transformations of meaning
and the emergence of new political projects is not reducible to
either the economic, as has so often happened with class, or the
cultural, as has so often happened with gender and ethnicity. To
include multiple complex inequalities beyond class it is important
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to address the ontological depth of each. Civil society is a terrain of
change, struggle, and innovation in meaning.
The deployment of the concept of civil society by Gramsci (1971)
forged an alternative way of balancing and integrating change at the
level of both social structure and system and the meanings held by
individuals and groups. It avoids the tendency to voluntarism inherent
in the concept of agency (Giddens 1992), and the tendency to stasis
inherent in the concept of habitus (Bourdieu 1984). The concept of
civil society allows for an approach to meaning and social change that
is more dynamic and more open to the complexities of multiple social
inequalities than that of identity (Hall 1996). It leaves open the issue
of the relationship between material position and social action, avoid-
ing either conflation to the economic (as in some reductionist readings
of Marx) or conflation to culture (as in some uses of the concept of
identity), to remember the important distinction between a class in
itself (or other social entity) and an entity for itself. Much previous use
of the concept of civil society, including by Gramsci, neglects the sig-
nificance of complex inequalities. The analysis here widens the range
of regimes of inequalities and the social relations included.
Modernity in civil society is associated with individuation, seculariza-
tion, the development of science and technology, and the transforma-
tion of intimacy. Individuation has been linked to both freedom and
diversity with multiple webs of affiliation and with social isolation and
the erosion of human capital and social solidarity. These processes have
implications for gender relations, partly because secular polities are
more open to democratic governance of intimacy than religious ones,
and partly because the transformation of domestic forms of intimacy
has such significant implications for gender relations. However, there is
no simple set of implications for equality since the nature of these
changes depends on the context within which they occur. The outcome
depends on the form of modernity, in particular as to whether it takes
a more neoliberal or a more social democratic form. The development
of secularization with modernity is likewise varied, with its slower
development in countries with higher levels of inequality. The trans-
formation of intimacy is bound up with changes in the gender regime,
and is implicated in changes in the practice and sanctioning of same
sex relationships. High rates of permeability of households with divorce
and cohabitation do not have to mean high rates of lone-parenting: it
might simply be re-partnering. Attempts to block these transitions by
some forms of polity, such as the Catholic Church, and civil societal
projects such as fundamentalism, can dampen the speed of the transi-
tion. Variations exist in the form of modernity in civil society.
Modernity in civil society does not happen all at once, it emerges
for different social groups at different times. In particular it often
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happens later for women than for men, with contested implications for
intimacy, sexuality, and the domestic sphere. Rationalization and the
development of science and technology have implications for global
processes, speeding and deepening them, but doing so unevenly.
There is no single global civil society, nor is there a world society.
Instead there are global waves carrying a diverse range of civil soci-
etal projects around the world. There is a global component to civil
society which takes a dynamic and diverse form. Civil societal projects
are becoming increasingly global with the development of global
communications and events providing new resources facilitating
engagement at a global level, a shift in forms of organizing to coali-
tions and networks to better address the differences that inevitably
arise in global discussions, the increase in political opportunities at a
global level with the development of global institutions, and the
development of global framings that can interpret issues within a
global horizon. While civil society projects that reach beyond national
boundaries are not new, they are increasing qualitatively in their
depth, range, and significance. The contestation between neoliberal-
ism and its opponents is taking place at a global level. The discourse
of universal human rights is bound up with a global framing of jus-
tice, as is that of the notion that the environment of the planet itself
is in danger.
Global waves are an increasingly important form of civil societal pro-
ject. Some, but not all, become institutionalized in civil society institu-
tions, governmental programmes, and social formations. This is a
contested process involving alliances and contestations among a vari-
ety of forces, each drawing strength from their positioning in the
domains of economy, polity, and violence. Waves are not new to the
twenty-first century, but early instances were more likely to be regional
than global. Waves are increasingly global as communications and
mobilities become faster and more far reaching – as global events facil-
itate networking, as education and expertise become more available, as
coalitions and networking replace more formal types of organizational
form facilitating working across difference, with the development of
global political opportunities with the emergence of global institutions
as well as the development of global framings. These waves may
become institutionalized in civil society, governmental programmes, and
social formations, though some may fade away instead. Their effects will
depend upon the nature of social relations and the institutions that they
encounter. Sometimes they may catalyse changes in social situations that
were already unstable and ripe for change, while in others they may be
resisted with little outcome or will cause only small changes; they may
hybridize to form something new; they may provoke a backlash, which
itself may have diverse effects according to circumstances.
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There are several regimes of complex inequality, including those of
class, gender, and ethnicity. These are complex inequalities, combining
inequality and difference simultaneously. They are analytically distin-
guishable; different forms of complex inequality are not reducible to
each other within one social system, although they intersect and mutu-
ally adapt. Each regime of inequality involves all institutional domains
of economy, polity, violence, and civil society, as well as macro,
meso, and micro levels. Multiple regimes of inequalities, including
those of gender, class, and ethnic relations, coexist within the institu-
tional domains of economy, polity, violence, and civil society, which
establish the ontological depth of the regime. Each regime of inequal-
ity has ontological depth because of its constitution in this range of
institutional domains and levels of abstraction. The traditional concept
of society overstates the degree of cohesion and the alignment of com-
plex inequalities in a country. Rather than an a priori theoretical
assumption of the close coupling of these regimes and institutions,
there is an empirical question to investigate as to the internal cohesion
of each regime of inequality and their intersection. The analytic strat-
egy here is to disentangle systems that were previously overly inte-
grated or even reduced to each other, to analyse them separately from
each other, and then to investigate the extent of their alignment and
which conditions produce this. These potential alignments include the
level of modernization of the social relations in the regime and the vari-
ety of modernity, from neoliberal to social democratic.
This chapter discusses the main types of regimes of inequality,
including those of gender, class, and ethnicity, addressing five major
issues. First, the balance between difference and inequality in the
complex inequality that constitutes the regime of inequality. Second,
7 Regimes of ComplexInequality
Walby-3874-Ch-07:Walby-3874-Ch-07.qxp  23/06/2009  4:05 PM  Page 250
R
egim
es
o
f
C
o
m
p
lex
In
eq
u
ality
251
the ontological depth and cohesion of each regime: the four domains
of economy, polity, violence, and civil society; the micro, meso, and
macro levels; and the nature and extent of the cohesion between
domains and levels especially during processes of change. Third, the
spatial and temporal dispersion and boundaries of regimes – neither
nation-state nor global but somewhere in between. Fourth, the
nature of the path dependent varieties of neoliberalism and social
democracy in each regime, after the transition from premodern to
modern; and the significance of temporal discrepancy and the
sequencing of these developments between regimes. Fifth, the inter-
section with other regimes of inequality and how they mutually affect
each other although this is done asymmetrically.
Beyond Class Regimes
The analysis of systems of inequality has not often distinguished
between different types of inequalities. It is usually led by class, either
implicitly or explicitly, with an assumption that other types of inequal-
ity will tend to follow (Marx 1954, 1963, 1967; Gramsci 1971; Bourdieu
1984; Habermas 1989). The conflation of different forms of inequality
into a single regime is a mistake, since they can have quite different
dynamics. Nevertheless, this is an important literature and has been
extensively drawn on in the chapters on the four domains of economy,
polity, violence, and civil society. The outline of the analysis will be
briefly recapitulated in order to provide the context for the discussion
that identifies the differences between regimes of inequality.
Class can be a complex inequality, although it is often seen as a
simple one. Class is often seen as a simple inequality in which the
defining feature is one of economic exploitation, a presumption of a
common standard of access to income and wealth against which to
measure inequality. However, it can also be a complex inequality in
that some aspects of difference are also present, for example the
positive valuing of forms of solidaristic activity within the working
class, which is linked to the commonality of economic and social
position, is a feature of some historical periods (Thompson 1963).
A class regime is constituted not only in the economy, but also in
the polity, violence, and civil society. Some simpler analyses have
focused on the economic, however, more nuanced accounts have
also included other domains. While accounting for class relations
through a simple base-superstructure model in which the economy
determines the political and ideological superstructure has long been
rejected, there remains a question as to the relative significance of the
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different institutional domains and their degree of cohesion. Many
approaches in rejecting the base-superstructure model have attempted
to theorize the greater significance of economic power without falling
into simple reductionism. The notion of ‘relative autonomy’ was
developed by Althusser (1971) to capture both the ultimate cohe-
siveness of the system (since the economy determinant in the last
instance) and the absence of simple determinism, since the political and
ideological levels were important in shaping any given social forma-
tion. This rejected the simple notion of economic determinism, but did
not answer questions concerning the degree and manner of the oper-
ation of this relative autonomy. Subsequent theorizing of the relation-
ship between the state and capitalism further developed a
non-reductionist account by Poulantzas (1973) that nevertheless notes
the overriding influence or ‘ecological dominance’ of the economic
(Jessop 2002). Nevertheless, there remains a tendency for some aspect
of the old base-superstructure model to sneak in through the back
door occasionally. The development of interest in culture (Bourdieu
1984), the public sphere, the life-world (Habermas 1989), and civil
society (Gramsci 1971; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Cohen and Arato
1992) offers a theorization of class relation that is still further removed
from economic determinism. Other work challenges the reduction of
violence to the state (Mann 1986). However, the focus on the global
level has refocused attention on the power of capital through the
restructuring of economies, raising questions as to whether it is
sweeping away distinct political and civil societal formations. In some
formulations of globalization, the economy resurfaces as the major
institutional domain that restructures all other forms of social relations.
The major theoretical challenge to this increasing pre-eminence of the
economic has come from the development of theories of path depen-
dency, in which political institutions are particularly important as sites
of both critical turning points and the locking in of new paths of
development (Moore 1966; Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990; North
1990; Pierson 2001). Aspects of the cultural turn in social theory are
challenged by globalization, in which economic and political
processes are not reducible to the cultural.
The analysis of global processes has refocused attention on the
power of capital to restructure political and cultural institutions (Crouch
and Streeck 1997; Held et al. 1999). The analysis of path dependency
challenges any simple return to economic determinism in the analysis
of globalization. The expansion of global capital does not have the same
effects on all countries; path dependent trajectories of development
rooted in political institutions have proven resilient to global capital in
some countries. Debates on the significance of path dependency are
simultaneously debates on the relative significance of economy andG
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politics. Further, politics are important in the critical turning points into
different trajectories of development; revolutions and historic class
compromises are not reducible to economics (Moore 1966; Korpi 1983;
Skocpol 1979; Esping-Andersen 1990). Within class theory, organized
violence is often seen as a merely instrumental power deployed by the
capitalist state and hence reduced to it. Such an approach leaves vio-
lence out of focus in much theory of political economy and class, even
when it is noted empirically. When violence is visible it is seen as a
rare occurrence confined to crises, such as moments of revolution
(Moore 1966, Skocpol 1979) or a contestation between hegemons
(Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1999). There are a few exceptions, such as
the analysis of the process of the formation of modern states alongside
the development and concentration of capital (Tilly 1990), and those
who see the military as an important form of power that is non-
reducible to states (McNeill 1963; Mann 1986).
The spatial and temporal boundary of the class regime is much
disputed: for some it is already global (Wallerstein 1974; Robinson
2001) while for others there are still significant differences between
social systems in separate societies or nation-states (Jessop 2002).
Some aspects of different spatial and temporal reach are linked to
different aspects of capital: finance capital has become the nearest
to the global (Strange 1986, 1996), though not quite (Sassen 2001,
2008); industrial capital is more subject to regulation by polities and
states, especially in its employment aspects (Crouch and Streeck
1997); employment and welfare provision can be regulated by
different polities, especially in the EU where employment is pri-
marily regulated by the EU and welfare by the Member States.
There are divergent paths of development of class regimes, of
which the two main forms in modernity are neoliberal and social
democratic. The key distinguishing features concern the extent of
democracy and inequality in each of the four domains of economy,
polity, violence, and civil society. In the economy, neoliberalism
entails high levels of inequality and little democratic regulation. In
the polity it entails shallow rather than deep democracy. While the
nature of neoliberalism and social democracy has been investigated
in the economy and polity (Held 2004; Harvey 2005), it has been
less well specified in relation to violence and civil society. Too often
the self-proclaimed rhetoric of neoliberalism, that it entails a small
state, is uncritically accepted: rather, in the domain of violence,
neoliberalism means a large state apparatus engaged in the deploy-
ment of violence, both in the military and the criminal justice sys-
tem, alongside high rates of interpersonal violence. Neoliberal civil
societies are thinner and more commercialized (Putnam 2000) than
the denser, more mutualist forms in social democracy.
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The nature of class regimes is affected by their mutual adaptation
with other regimes of inequality, as well as by the level of economic
development. At these intersections, class regimes have often been
thought to be dominant, however it is better to consider this to be
a contingent matter, as is shown later.
Gender Regimes
Gender is not an absolute, but exists only as a social relationship
(Hawkesworth 1997; Lorber 2005; Oakley 2005). It is a relationship
that reproduces itself, whether or not the individuals involved are
aware of it, hence it has the key characteristics of a system, a gender
regime. Gender relations are a complex inequality, involving both
inequality and difference, and the extent to which inequality or dif-
ference is prioritized varies (Felski 1997; Fraser 1997).
There is a challenge to theorize gender relations without either
oversimplifying in a reductionist manner or providing so much detail
that it becomes only descriptive. There is a range of approaches
from, at one pole, a base that determines the remaining aspects of
gender, to the other, with the dispersal of gender relations so there
is no cohesive concept of gender let alone woman. In between these
extremes there have been attempts to identify a limited number of
key components, with variations in these being used to explain vari-
ations in the form of gender relations. Throughout this debate lies a
question as to the level of cohesion between different aspects of
gender inequality, as to whether the connections between the dif-
ferent elements are close or loose.
There are four main approaches to the theorization of the degree
of cohesion between the institutional domains that contribute to the
constitution of gender relations. Some theories seek out a single base
to explain gender inequality, reducing other aspects of gender to this.
Early versions of this thesis have been widely rejected as reduction-
ist and essentialist. In response to these difficulties some writers have
rejected notions of gender as a system altogether, either by a second
approach that focuses on the micro level of identities at the point of
intersection with other social divisions or by using a third approach
that disperses the category of gender and prioritizes difference.
Rather than these extreme poles, a fourth approach is to build mod-
els of gender relations made up of several elements – neither a sin-
gle base, nor an infinite number of components.
The first type of approach identifies one key element as the cause
of gender inequality and the changes in it. In early feminist theoryG
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this approach was common although the selection of key element
varied widely, including women’s confinement to the domestic
(Rosaldo 1974), heterosexuality (MacKinnon 1989), sexual violence
(Brownmiller 1976), reproduction (Firestone 1974), a domestic
mode of production (Delphy 1984), and the sexual division of
labour (Bergmann 1986). However, all such models have intrinsic
problems in that with only one causal element they are unable to
theorize variations and changes in gender relations. There has been
criticism of such simple models as being reductionist, even essen-
tialist (Segal 1987; Spellman 1988). These approaches to gender
often have difficulty theorizing the differences between women and
the intersection of gender with other inequalities (Mohanty 1991;
Mirza 1997). There have also been criticisms of the level of abstrac-
tion of this type of approach, its use of the concept of social struc-
ture and system which were assumed to neglect agency (Barrett and
Phillips 1992; Pollert 1996). For some writers even the concept of
agency was considered too essentializing, leading to further frag-
mentation in the focus on performance (Butler 1990).
Despite these criticisms, the practice of identifying a single major
base to explain gender inequality re-emerges in the work of many
contemporary mainline social theorists. Some of these approaches
combine an approach that has a single base explaining gender rela-
tions with a different base explaining class relations and further bases
for other forms of social relations (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999;
Yuval-Davis 2006). For example, Yuval-Davis in her (2006) work on
intersectionality argues that each strand of unequal social relations
has a different but single ontological base: ‘the ontological basis of
each of these divisions is autonomous, and each prioritizes different
spheres of social relations’ (2006: 200). This approach segregates the
bases of each of the categories: class is grounded in the economy; gen-
der is a discourse about sexual and biological differences; ethnicity
relates to discourses about exclusion and inclusion. The conse-
quence is a relatively simple base-superstructure understanding of
each set of social relations, with all of the problems that were iden-
tified in earlier versions of this style of explanatory approach.
A similar re-emergence of a base-superstructure model is found
in modernization theory as applied to gender relations (Giddens
1992; Beck and Beck-Gernseim 1994; Castells 1997; Inglehart and
Norris 2003; Therborn 2004). In this approach economic devel-
opment is seen to increase women’s employment which in turn
erodes the traditional family form and then all other forms of
gender inequality. There is a holistic conceptualization of a social
system in which gender is an integral part – changes in one part
lead to changes in the others. The process is seen as common to
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all advanced industrialized or post-industrial societies, with little
recognition of variations in the forms of gender relations.
In rejection of this approach, others prioritized the analysis of the
differences in gender relations, in particular, by seeking to identify
and analyse neglected groups at the intersection of multiple inequal-
ities (Crenshaw 1991; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Bhopal 1997;
Mirza 1997; Medaglia 2000; Lykke 2004). One route to achieve this is
to focus on a more micro level in order to capture agency, perfor-
mance, subjectification, and the specificity of the experiences of
women from different classes and ethnicities. The differences under
scrutiny became especially those of the intersection of gender with
ethnicity, racialization, and nation, though there were exceptions such
as Skeggs (1997) with an interest in gender and class, and McClintock
(1995) who examined the intersection of sexuality, ethnicity, and gen-
der. This focus on specific groups at the point of intersection has
often, but not always, been associated with the use of case studies
and ethnographic and narrative methods of enquiry (Prins 2006).
There has been a tendency, but not an inevitability, to prioritize sub-
jectivity and lived experience (Skeggs 1997; Acker 2000).
A number of limitations to this body of work can be identified.
One of the tendencies of these studies of specific groups of women
in minoritized ethnic and racialized groups was to focus on the
concept of identity. This focus on the ‘identity’ of specific groups
has a tendency to over-stabilize the category (Fuss 1989; Felski
1997; Squires 1999). There has been a tendency to seek out ever
smaller finer units for analysis, in pursuit of a pure intersecting cat-
egory that does not contain further differences (McCall 2005).
However, this is of course impossible, since all groups will always
be mixed already (Jakobsen 1998). With such a micro approach it
is hard to address larger questions such as those involving a global
horizon (Benhabib 1999) or large-scale institutions such as states and
other policy making entities such as the EU, while the prioritization
of subjectivity and lived experience has tended to be at the expense
of social structure (Risman 2004). In addition there is a tendency to
cultural reductionism alongside a reductionism to a micro level,
leaving out the economic and political constitution of identities and
practices and the use of rather static and essentializing identity cat-
egories. The doxa of difference overwhelms the analysis of com-
monalities (Felski 1997). While the micro is relevant it is but one of
the levels: reductionism to just one level to the exclusion of the
meso (e.g. segregation) and the macro is to be avoided (Ferree and
Hall 1996). Despite these difficulties, these studies provide rich
thick descriptions of the variety of women’s lives and experiences
though not explanations.
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The third approach uses a more abstract concept of difference,
rejecting the strategy of developing categories, rejecting any
conceptions of gender relations as systems, and rejecting large-scale
theorization, generalizations, modernism, and metanarratives (Butler
1990; Barrett and Phillips 1992; Braidotti 1994). This approach draws
on poststructuralism (Foucault 1997), deconstructionism (Derrida
1976), and postmodernism (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). The theo-
retical project is to radically destabilize all analytic categories on the
grounds (Staunæs 2003) that they are not only never adequate rep-
resentations of the world, but are indeed also potentially pernicious
in their potential to sediment these categories in practice. One example
of this approach was the development of the metaphor of ‘nomad’ to
privilege the crossing of borders rather than staying within them
(Braidotti 1994). However, such a radical deconstruction and desta-
bilization of categories makes substantive analysis, which requires
distinctions between categories, rather hard (Felski 1997). Categories
need some stabilization, in a strategic way, in order to be useable for
analysis (Sayer 1997; McCall 2005). This approach makes its contri-
bution as a critique of some aspects of other approaches, but itself is
not a sufficient basis for social science investigations.
The way forward is a middle way between a single base and the
dispersal of gender relations. This means developing a model that
includes a limited number of key elements. This approach rejects the
reduction of gender relations to a single base or to a micro level of
identity, as well as the dispersal and fragmentation of the analysis of
gender. Earlier attempts to build such a model include the gendered
welfare state regime literature, and Connell (1987, 2002) as well as
Walby (1990, 1994b, 1997, 2004a).
Debates on the gendered welfare state regime involved a model of
gender relations that in some ways went beyond one element. A key
focus was on the duality of the family-welfare state relationship to
produce distinctive varieties of male breadwinner regimes. The extent
of welfare provision, especially for care, was seen as central to the
form of the family since state care enabled women’s employment.
This was supported by a dominant ideology that was aligned with the
different forms. In Lewis (1992) there are differences in the extent to
which there is a ‘male breadwinner-female housewife’ model, ranging
from ‘strong male breadwinner’ and ‘modified male breadwinner’ to
‘weak male breadwinner’ (sometimes referred to as ‘dual earner’).
Ireland is taken as most typical of the strong male breadwinner model
(Lewis 1992), with Britain sometimes being included (Lewis 1992),
while others, such as Germany, are seen as modified male breadwin-
ner (Lewis 1993). Sweden is seen to follow a weak male breadwinner
model (Lewis 1992) and sometimes dual earner.
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Despite the ostensible inclusion of more elements, so potentially
enabling an escape from the problems of ‘base superstructure’
models, in practice the model assumed alignment between the
nature of the family and state welfare provision, which along with
an accompanying ideology jointly shaped the remainder of gender
relations. Hence there was in practice a single driver of difference –
the extent of state welfare provision.
There have been multiple revisions to the model, several of which
made further nuanced distinctions within the form of the family/welfare-
state nexus. One was to distinguish between women’s family role as
wives or as mothers, leading to three types of welfare state support
to women: as wives, mothers, or workers (Sainsbury 1996). Related to
this are distinctions between the state resourcing of care as a service,
as money to purchase services, or as money for time at home; and
distinctions between care and unpaid work since care-work may be
paid, thus leading to three distinctions – Who cares? Who pays? How
much is provided (Jenson 1997)? A further addition was to include the
regulation of the labour market, the significance of feminist move-
ments, and state actions in relation to contraception, abortion, and
sexual expression (O’Connor et al. 1999). Another approach to the
issue included an assessment of the outcome for women (Hobson
1994), for example, as to whether the gender welfare regime provides
‘the capacity for a woman to form and maintain an autonomous
household’ (Orloff 1993: 319).
One of the simultaneous strengths and weaknesses of this literature
on gendered welfare state regimes is its relatively narrow focus. On
the one hand the tightness of the focus has assisted the development
of the field, by providing conditions that will facilitate the cumulation
rather than the dissipation of knowledge. On the other hand there are
many aspects of gender relations that are not included, or are
included in only marginal ways (Adams and Padamsee 2001), not
least because of a tendency to focus on issues of primary concern to
working mothers (Brush 2002). Some of the most important omissions
are labour market regulations (Walby 1997, 1999a, 1999b), democ-
racy, and gender-based violence. A further problem with the gen-
dered welfare state regime approach has been a tendency to reify,
even essentialize, the differences between countries with different
gendered welfare state regimes, and to underestimate the theoretical
significance of more general processes that may affect them, espe-
cially those of economic development and globalization.
An alternative approach to the analysis of systems of gender rela-
tions is to start by engaging with all the key dimensions of gender,
not only those focused on the welfare state. In parallel and indepen-
dently, both Walby (1986, 1990, 1997, 2004a) and Connell (1987, 1990,
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1995, 2002) developed such models. In both cases it is the plurality
of such key elements that provides the potential to theorize variations
in the forms taken by the gender system. Connell’s (2002) ‘gender
order’ ‘of a society’ contains four structures: production relations,
power, emotional relations especially sexuality, and symbolic rela-
tions. For Connell, each social institution contains a specific gender
regime. In work on masculinity, Connell (1995) differentiates between
different forms of masculinity, in particular the splitting and then
replacement of the old form of hegemonic masculinity of the gentry
by a new hegemonic form and the emergence of a series of subordi-
nated and marginalized masculinities. However, this richly detailed
account of these diverse forms makes little analytic use of the four
structures and instead deploys a different conceptual repertoire. The
result is that the account is more descriptive than explanatory, as
Connell (1995: 186) notes, ‘only a sketch of a vastly complex history’.
The strengths of Connell’s analysis lie in including a wider range of
elements than are found in the gendered welfare state debate; how-
ever, these are not systematically used to develop an explanation of
variations in the form of the gender order.
In the model developed here, there are four levels or modes of
abstraction. The most abstract level is that of gender regime, by
which is meant a system of gender relations which is analytically
separate from other regimes of inequality.
At the second level, distinctions are made between different forms
and different varieties of gender regime. Gender regimes take both
domestic and public forms, distributed along a continuum between
these two poles. In the domestic form of gender regime, women are
more confined to the domestic arena than in the public form. Within
the public form of gender regime, there is a further distinction between
neoliberalism and social democratic varieties, distributed along a con-
tinuum (there may be further varieties, but these are not discussed
here). The neoliberal variety of gender regime is more unequal and
less democratic than the social democratic one.
Third, distinctions are made between the gender relations in each of
the major institutional domains: economic (divided, in industrial coun-
tries, into market and household); polity (including states, transnational
bodies such as the EU, and organized religions); violence (including
gender-based violence, militias, and armies); and civil society
(including social movements, sexuality, and knowledge-institutions).
These institutional domains are not exclusive to the gender regime,
rather multiple sets of social relations are to be found in each
domain. Different forms of gender relations may be found in each
of the institutional domains. The change from a domestic to a pub-
lic form may take place at different rates and times in the different
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domains. Such uneven development is to be expected, despite the
tendency for these domains to coevolve towards alignment, since
this tendency is likely to be interrupted before it is completed.
Gender relations are constituted in each of these four major domains;
there is no single privileged domain. This is part of what is meant by
the ontological depth of the gender regime.
Fourth, distinctions are made between gender relations at meso and
micro levels in more finely grained social practices, ranging from occu-
pational segregation to the production of the self. At this more empir-
ical level, the intersection with other sets of social relations is important
in constituting particular empirically identifiable practices. Gender rela-
tions are constituted in all levels of abstraction and in all domains.
A gender regime is constituted in all institutional domains (econ-
omy, polity, violence, and civil society) and is not reducible to just
one base. It is constituted at all levels of abstraction: micro, meso,
and macro. This is what is meant by the ontological depth of the
gender regime. The relationship between levels is best understood
as one of emergent effects. As the form of gender relations changes
at any or all of these levels, so do the conceptions as to what con-
stitutes women and men and the perceptions of what might consti-
tute their cultural, political, and economic preferences and projects.
There are significant variations in the form of gender regimes due to
development over time, path dependent development, intersection
with other systems, and international influences. A gender regime is
best regarded as a multilevel macro level concept, for example dif-
ferent countries may have different gender regimes.
There is an important distinction between the domestic and pub-
lic form, the premodern and modern, forms of gender regime. In the
domestic form of gender regime women are relatively confined to
the domestic sphere of the household; in the public form women are
not so confined but can enter the public sphere of employment, edu-
cation, and polity. In the domestic gender regime the technologies of
power are predominantly exclusionary, excluding women from loca-
tions and relations of influence; in the public gender regime they are
segregationary, allowing women into the public sphere but limiting
their operations there. These forms of social relations apply both to
the regime as a whole and to gender relations in each of the specific
institutional domains. In the economy of the domestic gender regime
women’s labour is not free wage labour, but is organized instead
under tied non-market relations in the household; in the public gen-
der regime women’s labour is organized as free wage labour. During
the transition both forms occur. In the polity of the domestic gender
regime women are only rarely present in the formal institutions of
political power, such as parliaments, cabinets, and the governing
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bodies of organized religions; in the public gender regime women
are present in these institutions. Within the domain of violence in the
gender regime there are few fully modern examples, in that many
states do not yet have a complete monopoly of legitimate violence
in a given territory since violence against women is rarely fully crim-
inalized. Insofar as there has been a movement from a domestic to a
public form of gender regime in the domain of violence, it is possi-
ble to identify more neoliberal forms in which there is little polity or
civil societal intervention against violence against women, and more
social democratic forms in which there is much greater polity and civil
societal intervention. The actual level of violence is affected by the
articulation of the gender regime with other regimes of inequality and
the institutional legacy in the violence domain. In the civil society of
the domestic gender regime women’s sexuality is confined to mar-
riage and women are excluded from influential positions in cultural
institutions; in the public gender regime sexuality is not confined to
marriage and women are engaged in cultural institutions.
In most of the developed world there is a tendency towards a trans-
formation of the gender regime from a domestic to a public form. In
most countries the transition to the public form of the gender regime
from the domestic form is not yet fully complete. This means, for
example, that the premodern form in which domestic labour was
the basis of a person’s livelihood is still present to a limited extent
and that the state does not yet have a complete monopoly of legit-
imate violence in its territory. It is possible for this to go into
reverse, with movement from a public towards a domestic gender
regime, but this is uncommon. While there is some unevenness in
the transition to the public form of gender regime across the
domains nevertheless there is an important clustering of forms,
indicative of the coevolution of these domains.
This clustering of the public forms of institutional domains can be
seen empirically across a range of domains. In a public gender regime
women are more likely to be in free wage labour, to be in parlia-
ment, to be in education, and to be able to access legal abortion
than in a domestic gender regime. Using a data set of around a hun-
dred countries, a statistically significant correlation is found between
all of women’s free wage labour, women’s presence in parliament,
women’s educational enrolment, and the legality of abortion. This
means that where one of these practices is found, the others are likely
to be present as well. These aspects of public gender regime cluster
together. (Table 8.12 in the next chapter shows this correlation.)
A second distinction is that between forms of public or modern
gender regimes. There is more than one way of addressing the vari-
eties of modern gender regimes. In the gendered welfare state
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regime literature discussed above there is an underlying assumption
that differences in the form of the family (breadwinner or dual
earner) are predominantly influenced by differences in the extent
to which the state provides welfare, which enables women to enter
employment. However, this account can be challenged in at least
two main ways. First, there are countries where women have high
rates of employment without state welfare, such as the USA.
Second, there are significant changes over time within countries. In
order to meet these challenges it is necessary to differentiate more
fully between the different components of the gender regime, as in
the model of the gender regime argued for here.
While the gender modernization school (Beck 1992; Giddens 1992;
Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003) theorizes differences in
gender relations as stemming almost entirely from differences in the
level of development, the gendered welfare state regime school the-
orizes differences in gender relations as stemming almost entirely
from deeply sedimented institutional differences between countries.
Here it is not a case of one or the other, but rather both: the level
of development and differences in the paths of development matter,
including the intersection and coevolution of the gender regime with
other regimes of inequality and systems of social relations. These
divergent paths of development are often established at critical turning
points or tipping points and the subsequent coevolution of different
social systems. Such critical turning points arise as a consequence of
the struggles between social forces, especially those that involve and
have consequences for the state or polity. These social forces include
not a single set of interests, but an intersection of class, gender, and
ethnic forces. They may be domestic in scope or involve regional or
global influences, stemming from global flows, waves, networks, or
polities, and involving regimes of inequality from elsewhere. The gen-
der regime intersects and coevolves with other regimes of inequality,
other social systems. These regimes of inequality form the environ-
ment within which the gender regimes develop. This relationship with
other regimes may take various forms. The different regimes may be
tightly or loosely coupled (this may vary by institutional domain), they
may be co-equal in significance or asymmetrical (this may vary by insti-
tutional domain). The form of the gender regime varies not only
between countries but between different ethnic, racial, and national
groups within a country (Walby 1990; Bhopal 1997; Medaglia 2000).
Different routes during the transformation of the gender regime
from a domestic to a public form may lead to different varieties of
public gender regime. There is no single simple form of public gen-
der regime, but a continuum from the neoliberal to the social demo-
cratic. The neoliberal and social democratic distinction is not
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confined to class analysis but is relevant to other regimes of inequality
as well, including that of gender. The location on the neoliberal-social
democratic continuum may vary between the different domains of
economy, polity, violence, and civil society, and while there is a ten-
dency to move towards alignment this may be far from complete.
Within the economic domain in the gender regime the most impor-
tant distinction is that between neoliberal and social democratic forms
of employment relations and state welfare provision. Employment
relations may be democratically regulated to promote gender equal-
ity or may not. The state may provide welfare or it may not. It is pos-
sible to identify examples of countries at different ends of the
neoliberal-social democratic continuum in the domain of the econ-
omy. The USA is an example of the neoliberal form where the pro-
vision of the services necessary to support women in employment
takes place through market mechanisms, with childcare and other
services purchased on the market. The high rates of female employ-
ment there cannot be attributed to high levels of state social provi-
sion, contrary to the assumptions of the male breadwinner model. By
contrast, at the social democratic end of the continuum is Sweden
together with the other Nordic countries (Norway, Finland, and
Denmark) in which the development of public services especially but
not only to provide childcare gave women the capacity to increase
their paid employment. There are also many countries in between.
For example, the UK has levels of state welfare that are on the
neoliberal side of average, while as a member of the EU it has high
levels of social democratic equality regulations in employment.
The polity is particularly important in entrenching different paths
of development. This is because the form and institutions of the
state can be deeply sedimented and have effects long after the
moment at which the form of institutions was forged. A key part of
this is whether democracy is deep or shallow for gender relations.
This is not often at the same depth as for other regimes of inequality.
In particular presence democracy varies significantly by regime,
often being achieved much later for gender than for class.
Some institutional domains in the gender regime move towards
the public form more quickly than others. The extent to which this
is the case varies between countries. In several cases the economy
is the first domain to shift towards a more public form, with an
increase in women’s employment before any changes in other
domains. In other cases, changes take place in different domains at
the same time (the reasons for this and the implications involved are
investigated in the chapters comparing the transitions in four coun-
tries). In particular, the significance of the gender democratization of
the polity is of key importance.
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Gender regimes are also shaped by their intersection with regimes
of inequality in other countries. There are international and regional
influences on the development of the gender regime in any one
country. These influences can take many forms – from the effects of
regional and global hegemons such as the EU and USA, to global civil
societal and political waves. There are important international influ-
ences associated with globalization that can affect the form of the gen-
der regime in different countries. These include emergent global
institutions, global hegemons, networks, and waves. Global civil soci-
ety and political waves have been important in the movement of ideas
and political practices from one part of the world to others.
The gender regime has ontological depth: it should be neither
reduced to a single base, nor dispersed in a rejection of categories,
and it has different levels of abstraction that are linked through emer-
gence. Gender is constituted in four major institutional domains:
economy, polity, violence, and civil society. While there is some
cohesion and movement towards alignment, this is rarely if ever
complete. There are significant variations in the form of gender
regime, not only a distinction between domestic and public forms
but also between different forms of public gender regime, including
neoliberal and social democratic forms.
Ethnic Regimes
Ethnicity is not an absolute; it is only meaningful as a social rela-
tion between ethnic groups. Ethnic groups usually perceive them-
selves as sharing a common descent and heritage (Smith 1986) in
contrast to other types of groups. Ethnic relations are complex
inequalities involving both difference and inequality, often in con-
tested proportions (Taylor et al. 1994). There is usually a positive
valuation of the culture of each ethnic group, even when this is
associated with inequality and exploitation by another ethnic
group. Residential segregation is an example of this, in that it often
involves both a positive valuation of living together as a commu-
nity with their own practices even if it also means a lower standard
of living and is partially the result of discrimination by other ethnic
groups (Wilson 1987; Wieviorka 1995). The minoritization of some
ethnic groups is an active process and not pregiven (Omi and
Winant 1994), and involves the economy, polity, violence, and civil
society, even though dominant ethnic groups will often treat them-
selves as the norm without an ethnicity (Kumar 2000). There can
be many ethnic divisions in a country and not just one regime of
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ethnic inequality. This multiplicity of ethnic regimes is unlike class
and gender regimes where there is a primary or singular division.
As in the analysis of other regimes of inequality there is a tendency in
the analysis of ethnicity to flatten the ontology, which should be resisted
in favour of investigating its full depth in economy, polity, violence, and
civil society. One important attempt to theorize ethnic inequality uses the
concept of identity (Taylor 1989; Hall 1996) which has been extended
to other inequalities and especially gender (Young 2000). The concept
of identity has a broad intellectual heritage. It was introduced and devel-
oped within symbolic interactionism, where the focus is on the negoti-
ation of meaning in social interaction (Goffman 1969). It has been
interpreted and developed using Foucauldian notions of discourse and
the Derridian concept of difference (Hall 1996). The concept often rests
implicitly or explicitly on the notion of a community as the social that
supports the identity (Kymlicka 1991, 1995). Substantively the concept
has been developed in analyses of a wide range of non-class phenom-
ena, including ethnicity and post-colonialism (Hall 1996), nation and
gender. This concept of identity can include the notion of a social con-
stituency coming to see itself as an identifiable group and developing a
perception of a set of common interests (Grossberg 1996). However,
sometimes the analysis of this process is truncated, with an assumption
that the interests on which any identified constituency would act are
obvious. In some ways this is parallel to the Marxist analysis of a class
in itself becoming a class for itself, in which some writers address each
step in the process while others use merely a shorthand summary. Such
truncated analyses miss important parts of the process which may have
a variety of alterative outcomes, since it is not in fact obvious how a par-
ticular social constituency should identify let alone advance its interests.
If each step is performed in the analysis then a full ontology will be utilized,
but a shortcut is likely to lead to a flattened ontology disproportionately
emphasizing culture.
A strength of the concept of identity for the analysis of complex
inequalities is its flexibility to engage with any social constituency
that produces an identity, especially one that might produce a basis
for social action. However, this flexibility is a weakness since it
entails a vague and perhaps elusive and amorphous concept
(Brubaker and Cooper 2000). It also has a weakness in that it con-
tains an implicit or explicit assumption of homogeneity within the
identified group – this is always mistaken. It is also hard to analyse
cross-cutting inequalities using the concept of identity even though
there is a need to address intersectionality which may be either
additive (e.g. a double disadvantage in employment) or mutually
constitutive (e.g. gender and ethnicity produce very different out-
comes). It is hard to address such a plurality using the concept of
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identity since it implicitly or explicitly (Castells 1997) accords
priority to a single dimension. It is ironic that a concept that has
been important in ensuring the significance of non-class forms of
social relations in social theory has itself a problem when it comes
to engaging with the plural and cross-cutting nature of these rela-
tions. The use of the concept of identity tends to lead to a cultural
reductionism, to flatten the ontology. It is a mirror image of the
problem facing Marxist analysis. It may well be that sophisticated
users of the concept (e.g. Grossberg 1996) do make distinctions
between the identification of the category, the process of develop-
ing shared values, and the practice of a shared political project, but
others do not. They conflate these processes assuming that politics
can be read off from identity. The deployment of the concept of
identity may lack or leave unspecified any link to wider macro con-
cerns and thus any macro theoretical framework within which iden-
tities are to be analysed. A theory of social changes, of the linkages
between domains, is a necessary ambition.
In conclusion, the concept of identity has been a productive way
of bringing the range of complex inequalities beyond class into
mainstream social theory. Its weakness can lie in its shallow cultur-
alist ontology and a lack of ambition as to its relationship with macro
social change, although specific applications overcome these potential
weaknesses. Ethnic regimes of inequality have ontological depth, just
as class and gender regimes do. The tendency to prioritize the cultural
level in contemporary social theory of ethnic relations, using the con-
cept of ‘identity’ (Hall 1996) and a focus on music, food, and clothing,
among other cultural symbols (Gilroy 1993) at the expense of econ-
omy, polity, and violence, should be resisted as is argued below.
The economy is involved in the constitution of ethnic relations
in many ways. Slavery cannot be understood without an analysis
of its economic dimension, nor the development of English and US
capitalism without an analysis of slavery. The economic exploitation
of African slaves was a key part of the early accumulation of capital
that underpinned the Industrial Revolution in England, providing
cheap cotton for mill owners and cheap sugary food for workers
(Walvin 1992). Free wage labour for minoritized ethnic groups can
develop later than for dominant ethnic groups, as in the case of slav-
ery in the USA. Different ethnicities then make the transition to
modernity at different times. Ethnic relations in employment often
involve the disadvantaging of minority ethnic groups to the advan-
tage of the majority ethnic group (Wilson 1987; Phizacklea 1990).
Industrial and occupational segregation by ethnicity is part of the
process by which ethnic inequality is produced in the economy and
beyond (McCall 2001). Migration for employment opportunities
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restructures ethnic relations in the host country (Hochschild 2000);
post-colonialism as well as colonialism has an economic as well as
a cultural dimension.
The polity is important in structuring ethnic relations. Empires
usually have an ethnic dimension in their structures of subordina-
tion. In the current world, the polity allows or sanctions discrim-
ination and abuse or does not, and this includes policing. States
are also a target for ethnic projects, especially when these are
aligned with national projects seeking a state of their own (Smith
1986). Ethnic relations affect the extent to which the state is used
to provide welfare or not and the forms this takes (Quadagno
1994, 2006), underpinning national and nation-state projects
(Smith 1986). The passions associated with ethnicity are major dri-
vers of political movements and processes, especially when they
overlap with other social divisions such as religion, nation, or
class. State and polity formation involve not only class but also
gender and ethnicity. Ethnicity is a key component of many
national projects and therefore of state formation. The European
Union was formed as a reaction to the excesses of nationalism
and ethnic cleansing of the fascist era. Organized religions are key
polities. War often has an ethnic, national, and religious compo-
nent, not only class; terrorism even more so. Political upheavals
will usually, rather than rarely, include passions related to ethnic-
ity, nation, and religion that can alter the course of these events.
Struggles for national independence focus on nation and restruc-
ture class relations. Major cleavages in current world politics focus
on Islamic/Western tensions with hot spots along Palestinian/
Israeli boundaries. Today conflicts over relations between the UK
and the EU bitterly divide political parties in the UK. Politics in a
global era are not reducible to class, but involve nation, ethnicity,
and religion at the very least.
Ethnic relations may be partially constituted through the deploy-
ment and regulation of violence (Wieviorka 1995). Violence was an
essential part of the institution of slavery (Walvin 1992), genocide
(Bauman 1989), ethnic cleansing (Mann 2005), and lynching
(Shapiro 1988), and everyday harassment may be included here.
Violence is not only a consequence of ethnic divisions, but may
also exacerbate such divisions where they have been in abeyance,
as for example in the Balkans region.
Ethnic relations are constituted at the macro, meso, and micro lev-
els, however the analysis of ethnic relations has tended to prioritize
the meso level, such as segregation (Ferree and Hall 1996). It is bet-
ter to include all levels, indeed without a macro level colonialism
could be left out of focus. The analysis needs both agency and
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structure: there is a need to find a balance between a tendency
to over-stabilize the categories and to de-stabilize, thus making a
comparative empirical analysis very difficult. The conceptualization
of processes of minoritization and racialization (Omi and Winant
1994) adds a temporal dimension to the analysis.
Regimes of ethnic inequality have always been shaped by global
processes, including empires, colonialism, and de-colonization, as
well as in the current global era (Rex 1973; Walvin 1992; Therborn
1995). These processes leave a legacy of enduring effects on the
shape of migration and ethnic inequality in the former colonial
powers as well as the rest of the world (Castles and Miller 2003).
Global flows of people, in voluntary and forced migration, have
long been important in the restructuring of ethnic relations not least
as diaspora (Cohen 1997). The forced migration of peoples from
Africa to slavery in the Americas was a key part of this process
which left its mark in the ethnic inequalities in the USA and
beyond. The current development of globalization is not unique in
this respect, though it increases the speed and scale of these move-
ments. The phenomenon of temporary migration for education,
refuge, and employment, for example global care chains
(Hochschild 2000), and short periods of travel for tourism and
leisure, provide the occasion for the further complex mobilities that
restructure ethnic relations (Urry 2007). Post-colonial social rela-
tions invoke ethnicity and the global. Regimes of ethnic inequality
intrinsically involve global processes, either as part of their legacy
or in their current restructuring.
Regimes of ethnic inequality vary in the extent to which they are
neoliberal or social democratic. This shares similar features with class
and gender regimes as well as with some that are either specific to
or more important for ethnicity. In the economy there is greater
employment regulation for equality and greater state welfare in social
democracy as compared with neoliberalism. In the polity there is a
greater depth of democracy, including the presence of minoritized
ethnicities in governing institutions in social democracy. In social
democracy violence against minoritized ethnic groups is more crim-
inalized and less common, while they are not subject to dispropor-
tionately harsh sanctions from the criminal justice system. In social
democracy civil society is more plural, less dominated by a single
ethnic value system, and less segregated by ethnicity.
The intersection between different regimes of ethnic inequality
takes different forms, including assimilation, cosmopolitanism, and
hybridity. The Chicago School found that there was a shift over time
among migrant groups towards assimilation into the practices of the
dominant ethnic group in Chicago (Park and Burgess 1925).
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However, this is not a universal pattern. An intersection of ethnicities
may mean a mutual adaptation of these complex adaptive systems
rather than one way. The concept of hybridity is used to invoke the
new forms that arise from the conjoining of two or more old forms,
where there is either symmetry between the two forms or at least the
incomplete dominance of the more powerful form. Hybridity is used
by Gilroy (1993) to capture the contribution of African and American
cultures, especially in relation to music, in his notion of the Black
Atlantic. White culture is changed, not only the minority Black cul-
ture. Hybridity can be more than the sum of already existing parts
being something new, formed not just from the addition of existing
elements but also by their transformation during the process of
fusion. The concept of hybridity works because it can evoke the
notion of previously existing boundaries as well as change; with-
out boundaries as predecessors there is no point to the concept of
hybridity (Nederveen Pieterse 2001). A further model is that of cos-
mopolitanism (Held 1995). In other instances ethnic boundaries
are not eroded but rather are maintained or even enhanced, espe-
cially if aligned with other group signifiers such as religion and lan-
guage and when in association with the development of nations and
nationalism in conflictual and contested social settings (Anderson
1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Smith 1986).
Ethnic relations are not reducible to other inequalities, although
they are significantly shaped by an intersection and coevolution
with other regimes of inequality. Ethnicity sometimes intersects and
overlaps variously with ‘race’, nationality, and religion. As a conse-
quence of different histories, in Europe the mutual constitution of
ethnicity and nation is marked, while in the USA the focus is more
often on ethnicity and ‘race’. An alignment of ethnicity with nation,
state, and religion has often been sought not least within the pro-
ject of the nation-state. The political and sometimes violent and mil-
itarized struggles around such projects of alignment can constitute
important critical turning points as a consequence of the sedi-
mentation of the outcome of these struggles in new state institutions.
Regimes of ethnic inequality coevolve with class and gender regimes
of inequality – they mutually adapt, albeit in asymmetrical ways. The
intersection of ethnic relations with class (Rex 1973; Miles 1989), gen-
der (Crenshaw 1991; Collins 1998), and other sets of social relations
including sexuality (McClintock 1995) is important. Some analyses
of intersections with class relations will prioritize an economic
dimension (Wilson 1987), but not always (Walvin 1992; Omi and
Winant 1994). Contestations at their points of intersection are crucial
in understanding the critical turning points to different paths of
development.
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Further Regimes of Complex
Inequalities
There are many different forms of complex inequalities. These can
be specified in a number of different ways. In the EU gender and
ethnicity, disability, belief/religion, age, and sexual orientation are
all deemed sufficiently important inequalities to be subject to legal
(EU) regulation. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000) lists
seven additional grounds – social origin, genetic features, language,
political or other opinion, membership of a national minority, prop-
erty, and birth – though these have not been currently activated in
EU legislation.
Each of these regimes of inequality has ontological depth in the
sense that it is constituted in the institutional domains of economy,
polity, violence, and civil society, and at macro, meso, and micro
levels. Each regime takes all other regimes as its environment and
adapts to this. This is not, however, an argument that they are sym-
metrical in their mutual impacts.
In this section just two examples out of the many further regimes
of inequality are described to illustrate such analyses: disability and
sexual orientation.
Disability
Disability is sometimes primarily considered as a medical matter con-
cerning impaired bodies and as having little to do with society.
However, the implications of a physical impairment for social relations
depend on the social environment: this is not best understood as indi-
vidualized in a person’s body. The environment may be enabling or
disabling. An impaired body is only disabled if the environment is dis-
abling. For example, with contact lenses a person with poor eyesight
is not visually disabled and with appropriate modifications to buildings
and working environments many people with impairments are not dis-
abled. Whether or not an environment is disabling is key to the ques-
tion as to the extent of social inequality associated with physical (or
mental) impairment (Barnes et al. 1999; Swain et al. 2004).
Disability is an inequality, though it may be considered a differ-
ence in some contexts. A reduction in inequality is often associated
with the development of specific targeted policies rather than the
convention of equal treatment.
Disability is constituted in all four institutional domains. There is
an economic dimension: a disabling environment may mean that
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people with impairments have difficulty earning a good income while
economic resources are needed to ensure that an environment is not
disabling. Disability has a political dimension: access to political power
affects whether the economic resources required are made available to
produce a less disabling environment. Disability has a violence com-
ponent: disabled people have an increased vulnerability to violence
from others. Disability has a civil society dimension: the meaning
of disability is highly contested and the development of a social
movement by and for the disabled has challenged old meanings
and generated new ones, not least in shifting the concern from the
individual medicalized body to the disabling social environment
with consequences for politics and the distribution of resources
(Swain et al. 2004).
Environments are highly varied as to whether they are disabling
or enabling. In some cases more resources and technologies are
made available at higher levels of economic development, but this
is not a simple relationship. A neoliberal regime is associated with
greater differentiation of provision of a less disabling environment
linked to the possession of economic resources than is the case in
a social democratic regime.
Sexual orientation
Sexual orientation is a location of both difference and inequality. It
can be a positively valued difference as well as a location of dis-
crimination and stigmatization. The balance between difference and
inequality varies significantly over time and between social locations.
Sexual orientation is a regime of inequality that is analysed here as
socially constituted, though it has sometimes been analysed more as
a matter of biology. There is a tendency to reduce the construction
of sexual preference to the civil societal or cultural level. However, it
is better analysed as a regime of complex inequality with ontological
depth. The civil societal level is important as there are negotiated and
highly contested meanings: social movements have been important
in creating changes to the meaning and implications of being gay,
lesbian, or bisexual. However, the institutional domains of economy,
polity, and violence are also significant in structuring sexual preferences
and opportunities. The economic domain partly structures sexuality:
there can be discrimination in employment and in access to resources.
There can be difficulties in making partnership arrangements to set up
a common household, to share and pass on entitlements to housing
tenure and survivors’ rights in pensions. There are increased risks of
interpersonal violence and harassment against gay and lesbian people,
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an increased, though varying, risk of being the target of violence from
those who are homophobic. The polity is important in the regulation
of discrimination in the economy, in the legal standing of partnerships,
and homophobic violence. There are variations in the extent to which
gay and lesbian sexuality can be openly practised, free from harassment
(Plummer 1975; Richardson 2000; Weeks et al. 2001).
Intersections with other complex inequalities can have mutual
effects. There are significant aspects to the mutual adaptation of
sexuality and gender. The existence of lesbian and gay sexuality
challenges some traditional assumptions about gender relations,
especially those regarding the ‘naturalness’ of heterosexuality. This
is most strongly argued in queer theory (Seidman 1996). However,
a mutual adaptation of practices of gender and sexuality is only
ever partial and never reaches full co-constitution.
Sexual orientation and disability are two examples of several
forms of regimes of complex inequalities. They are best analysed as
having ontological depth rather than as reduced or ontologically
flattened to a single base. There are variations in the forms of these
regimes, associated not only with the level of economic develop-
ment but also with different paths or trajectories of development.
Intersecting Regimes of
Complex Inequality
Regimes of complex inequality while having different temporal and
spatial reach do intersect at points in the same temporal and spatial
location. The regimes coexist, do not saturate the space, and are usu-
ally non-nested. At these points of intersection regimes of complex
inequality adapt to each other. This adaptation of regimes is often
asymmetric; there can be imbalances of power and effectivity and
some regimes will have less developed institutional domains than oth-
ers. Intersecting regimes may be at different levels of development to
and through modernity, even though they inhabit the same territory at
the same time. This analysis goes beyond the traditional approaches to
intersectionality outlined in Chapter 2, beyond reductionism to a sin-
gle master system such as capitalism or to a cultural micro level as in
much identity theory, beyond the rejection of categories and beyond
segregationary reductionism (Esping-Andersen 1990; Crenshaw 1991;
Taylor et al. 1994; McCall 2005; Yuval-Davis 2006).
Regimes of complex inequality coexist in the same territory – they
do not saturate a space but rather overlap, often in a non-nested
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form. The forms of dispersion are varied: women are dispersed
across households; ethnic groups are often residentially clustered in
relatively segregated areas, but may be dispersed as diaspora across
countries; capital is expanding and deepening with globalization.
Regimes of complex inequality have different temporal and spatial
reach. The domestic gender regime has had a very long temporal
duration and a very wide, near global, spatial reach. By comparison
capitalism is more recent and has had a shorter duration. It is
expanding, but not yet fully global. Regimes of ethnic relations are
very varied in their duration and spatial reach: many contemporary
forms developed during the period of empires and have continued,
restructured, in post-colonial locations. The spatial and temporal
boundaries between types of regimes can take varied forms. They
may sometimes be sharp (for example, state frontiers or critical turn-
ing points) and at other times they may be more gradual or uneven.
Regimes of complex inequality can intersect and mutually adapt
during their coevolution in a changing global environment. Each
regime takes all other regimes and social systems as its environ-
ment. As regimes of inequality coevolve in a changing global fitness
landscape they will have mutual effects on each other. The com-
plexity approach provides a conceptual vocabulary that better
enables the analysis of the intersection of multiple regimes of
inequality. It does not a priori make claims as to the nature of this
intersection, instead it leaves open the question as to the nature of
the intersection for empirical enquiry.
In this intersection regimes of complex inequality are rarely
coequal. Often one regime may be more significant than another,
though this is rarely overwhelming. Rather there are complex
asymmetrical intersections between regimes as each regime takes
all others as its environment. This asymmetry has at least two aspects,
the influence of each regime and the extent to which institutional
domains in a regime are thinly or extensively populated by practices.
The way in which regimes may have different levels of influence
can be illustrated by an example of the accommodation and tension
between capitalism and the gender regime. While this has sometimes
been assumed to be one of continuous harmonious accommodation
(Hartmann 1976), it is better understood as sometimes being one of
tension and conflict. There can be conflict between capital and hus-
bands over the deployment of women’s labour, either in the home
or in the factory (Walby 1986). There is a tendency for an expanding
capitalist regime to catalyse a shift from a domestic towards a more
public form as a consequence of the demand by employers for
labour, including that of women. A further example is that of the
relative significance of the dynamics of class and ethnic regimes of
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complex inequality. There is also an issue as to the extent to which
capitalism is the dominant system (Rex 1973; Wilson 1978) and the
extent to which there are mutual effects, especially through the
implications of slavery and the colonial relationship on the development
of Western capitalism up until the present day (Walvin 1992).
A slightly different approach to this question of the relationship
between regimes of inequality is that regarding the extent of the
development of practices in the institutional domains associated
with each regime. In some intersecting regimes there is a dense
development of practices in some institutional domains, while in oth-
ers this may be thinner. An example is Gottfried’s (2000) analysis of
the intersection in terms of a gender contract that is embedded in
a capitalist system: gender contracts are seen as embedded in cap-
italism and women are political actors who are shaped, but not
entirely subsumed, by capital labour relations. In this analysis the
relative importance of capitalism and gender is tilted towards capi-
talism and perhaps too far. Another example of a treatment of the
asymmetrical relationship between regimes of inequality is that of
Medaglia’s (2000) analysis of the intersection of ethno-national
forms of patriarchy in London. Medaglia finds that both English and
Italian forms coexist and interact, but that while the English patri-
archal system utilizes the full range of social domains, the Italian
form involves some institutions from the English system, especially
that of education. This means that there is an asymmetric relation
between the two systems which contributes to changes in the forms
of patriarchy experienced by those younger women who unlike
their mothers experience an English rather than Italian education.
The nature of the asymmetric relationship between regimes of
inequality is not given a priori in theory; it must be investigated on
each occasion.
Regimes of complex inequality that co-habit in the same space
do not necessarily have the same level of modernity, or the same
trajectory of development. They can be modernized to different
extents, and to the extent that they are modern have different posi-
tions on the neoliberal-social democratic continuum. While there is
some tendency towards alignment as they coevolve this is often
interrupted by contesting projects. The extent to which there is an
alignment of paths of development through modernity is empiri-
cally investigated in Chapter 8 on varieties of modernity.
Much development and modernization theory assumes that the
level of development in a country is shared by class, gender, and
other social relations, that economic development drives changes in
all sets of social relations at the same time (Inglehart and Norris
1997, 2003). This is a mistake. Regimes of complex inequality in the
Walby-3874-Ch-07:Walby-3874-Ch-07.qxp  23/06/2009  4:05 PM  Page 274
R
egim
es
o
f
C
o
m
p
lex
In
eq
u
ality
275
same country rarely share the same level of development of modernity.
In particular the modernization of the gender regime is usually
much later than that of class or ethnicity. In most countries free
wage labour becomes the majority form of labour relations for men
long before this is the case for women; men also often gain access
to parliamentary representation before women. The temporal gap in
the modernization of class and gender relations varies significantly
between countries. In some, women entered free wage labour only
a few decades after men; in others, it took many decades. In some,
winning the right to vote occurred simultaneously for women and
men (especially in newly independent countries in recent decades),
while in others (especially North America and Europe), there is a
gap measuring decades. The temporal gap and sequencing of
aspects of modernization between regimes of inequality vary. This
has potentially important implications for all the intersecting regimes
of inequality as they coevolve in a country. The significance of this
different sequencing is explored in the comparative case studies out-
lined in Chapter 10.
Conclusions
Regimes of complex inequality can be separately identified, even
though they affect each other as they intersect. Each regime has
ontological depth, being constituted in the institutional domains of
the economy, polity, violence, and civil society, and at the macro,
meso, and micro levels. Regimes of inequality intersect within each
institutional domain and there are usually multiple regimes within
each such domain. Within each regime of inequality each institu-
tional domain takes all other systems, including other domains, as
its environment, mutually adapting and coevolving. Each regime of
inequality takes as its environment all other systems, including all
other regimes of inequality. Each intersects and coevolves with the
other regimes.
Each complex inequality involves difference and inequality simulta-
neously. However, the balance between these can vary. In many con-
temporary Western countries, it is common to see class more as an
inequality than a positively valued difference since there is broad con-
sensus that disparities in income and wealth are forms of inequality,
than is the case for ethnicity and gender, where the disparities can be
positively valued even as they also constitute inequalities.
Each regime of complex inequality is constituted in the institu-
tional domains of civil society, economy, polity, and violence. When
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addressing class inequalities the most frequent focus has been on the
economy, with only a secondary interest in culture and civil society.
By contrast, when addressing gender and ethnicity there has been a
tendency to theorize culture as the primary location rather than the
economy or polity. The argument here is that both are mistaken
because these analytic strategies flatten the ontology. Rather all
inequalities are partly constituted in each of the economy, polity,
violence, and civil society. However, the relationship between the
domains can vary somewhat between different regimes.
There is a tendency towards an increased coherence of the institu-
tional domains of economy, polity, violence, and civil society within
each regime of inequality. However, this process is rarely completed
before it is interrupted. Similarly there is a tendency for regimes of
inequality within any given territory to move towards coherence, but
this process is also rarely completed before it is interrupted. These
moves towards a coherence of institutional domains and regimes of
inequality constitute the wider process of societalization. This is a
movement towards a coherent society with the alignment of institu-
tional domains and regimes of inequality, but it is rarely completed
before being interrupted by another principle of societalization.
There are significant differences between class regimes and
between gender regimes, as well as between other regimes of
inequality. The sources of difference include not only the extent of
modernity, but also path dependent varieties of development and
intersections with other regimes of inequality in a changing global fit-
ness landscape. The extent to which regimes of inequality are aligned
within a given territory or country varies. Each regime of inequality
has a distinct pattern of development which to some extent takes path
dependent forms, generating different varieties of these regimes. Each
of the domains within a regime may develop at different speeds and
to varying forms. These are predominantly along a continuum from
neoliberal to social democratic. Different regimes of inequality may
have different temporal and spatial reach. Regimes of inequality (for
example, class, gender, ethnicity) do not necessarily directly map onto
each other in any given territory or country. Whether or not they are
aligned with each other is a question rather than something that can
be answered a priori.
Walby-3874-Ch-07:Walby-3874-Ch-07.qxp  23/06/2009  4:05 PM  Page 276
Introduction
Differences between countries are due not only to the level of
development but also to different path dependent trajectories leading
to varieties of regimes of inequality.
A challenge to existing accounts of path dependency is to take
adequate account of complex inequalities in addition to class. Do
varieties of class and gender regimes map onto each other or not?
Most analyses of path dependency have focused on the nexus of
political economy conflating employment and welfare. Are varieties
of employment regulation and welfare provision the same, or are
there distinctions between them? Even more challenging is whether
violence constitutes a third type of path dependency which does
not map onto that of political economy.
The concept of nexus is used to specify a set of institutions that
have been found to be inter-related in order to draw attention to the
intersection of a range of institutions that are not conventionally
regarded as being clustered in the same domain.
Each of the key concepts is operationalized using indicators that
are supported by quantitative data that are available for cross-
national comparisons. An indicator is not a direct and full repre-
sentation of the concept, but merely the best that can be found in
the current state of knowledge. It is a sign or representation of the
concept being investigated. An indicator may be constituted from
several items of information. The data and definitions of several of
the indicators in the political economy section have been developed
by the OECD (1997a, 2006). However, in the case of most of the
gendered distinctions, and the nexus of violence, the indicators are
specifically developed here. The definitions of indicators are pro-
vided in tables 8.1, 8.13, and 8.17. The locations of the data sources
8 Varieties of Modernity
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are provided in the Appendix to this chapter while the data are
available on Sylvia Walby’s web-site.
The unit of comparison is ‘country’. This is chosen on pragmatic
grounds and is constrained by the available data sources. ‘Country’
is an empirical category, identified in data sources. It is not the same
as the theoretical concept of society. No assumption is made here
as to the closeness of the empirical category of country to the the-
oretical category of society. This is addressed in the more historical
and qualitative analysis in Chapter 10.
Comparative data on countries at both a global scale and also a
sub-set of the 30 rich countries in the OECD are used to identify and
investigate the clusters of countries following specific path dependent
trajectories, as well as to discover the extent of more general
processes of development. The near global data set is used where
possible, but some of the comparative data needed to support some
distinctions are only available from the OECD. Using data at a coun-
try level unavoidably leaves out of focus certain processes, especially
global ones. Chapter 10 compares the trajectories of development in
a limited number of countries, bringing into focus political struggles,
critical turning points, and positioning in relation to global processes,
to explore the temporal development of these phenomena.
This chapter investigates the extent to which there are clusters of
countries with the same varieties of modernity by examining corre-
lations. The search for statistically significant correlations is consis-
tent with complexity thinking on coevolution, in that it seeks to
identify associations without the presumption of a one-way causal
direction that is so often implied by multiple regression analysis. For
example, the analysis of correlations allows for the coevolution of
polity and economy and not merely the one-way impact of one
upon the other. Possible causal pathways are reviewed in the earlier
chapters on institutional domains and also in Chapter 10 on com-
parative trajectories of development. In this chapter, the focus is
trained more narrowly on establishing the extent of associations
between different types of institutionalized practices in order to iden-
tify the extent and nature of clusters in paths of development.
Neoliberal and Social Democratic
Varieties of Modernity
Drawing on the theoretical reviews in the chapters on the economy,
polity, violence, and civil society, a distinction has been established
between neoliberal and social democratic forms of modernity andG
lo
b
al
iz
at
io
n
an
d
In
eq
u
al
iti
es
278
Walby-3874-Ch-08:Walby-3874-Ch-08.qxp  23/06/2009  4:05 PM  Page 278
detailed in each of the four institutional domains. Central to the
distinction between neoliberalism and social democracy is the
depth of democracy and the degree of inequality.
In the economy the distinction between neoliberal and social demo-
cratic forms is made separately for welfare provision and for employ-
ment regulation, each of which is further separated for class-oriented
and gender-oriented practices. Class-oriented state welfare provision is
indicated by the extent of general public social expenditure, gender-
oriented welfare provision by the extent of public expenditure on
childcare. Class-oriented employment regulation is indicated by the
strictness of employment protection, gender-oriented regulation by
employment regulation for equality. Further there is a distinction related
to inequality – indicated in particular for class by the Gini index of eco-
nomic inequality between households – and for gender by the propor-
tion of top jobs held by women and the female share of earned income.
In the polity the distinction between neoliberal and social democ-
ratic forms lies in the depth of democracy, a continuum of ten dimen-
sions. The depth of democracy is indicated by its ten dimensions
grouped into three levels: suffrage democracy, presence democracy,
and broad democracy. The achievement of suffrage democracy is
operationalized by the use of the Freedom House indicators of polit-
ical rights and civil liberties, the achievement of presence democracy
by the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women.
In violence the distinction between neoliberal and social democ-
ratic forms lies in the extent of the deployment and regulation of
violence. The neoliberal form has a greater deployment of violence
by individuals, groups, and the state, and the narrower regulation of
violence: the social democratic form has less violence and greater,
criminalization of violence against women and minorities. Indicators
of the extent of violence are the rates of homicide, imprisonment, use
of the death penalty, state spending on law and order, and state
spending on the military.
In civil society the distinction between neoliberal and social
democratic forms lies in the extent of personal freedoms, including
sexual and reproductive rights, and whether interpersonal engage-
ments are marked by commercialization and inequality or by mutu-
ality and equality. Indicators include the Freedom House list of civil
liberties and the availability of contraception and abortion.
While the four institutional domains have been separately identi-
fied in the operationalization of the concepts of neoliberalism and
social democracy, there are additional levels of aggregation and
abstraction that are important. In particular, this chapter will examine
the extent of path dependency at the economy/polity nexus, at the
violence nexus, and in the gender regime.
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Path Dependency at the
Economy/Polity Nexus
Accounts of path dependency in the social sciences have predomi-
nantly focused on issues of political economy. The analysis of path
dependency has been a challenge to the notion that processes of
social transformation are predominantly driven by economic
changes with uniformity in the nature of development being a con-
sequence. Instead, social and political institutions are seen to lock-
in social transformations leading to the divergence of paths or
trajectories of development. This is a central issue about the nature
of political economy, of the greater importance of markets or polit-
ical institutions (David 1985; Esping-Andersen 1990; North 1990;
Arthur 1994; Hall and Soskice 2001). The conclusion of these studies
is that both economic development and path dependency are rele-
vant to the explanation of forms of political economy.
Other aspects of this debate are not so clearly settled. In particu-
lar, the relationship between employment regulation and welfare
provision and the relationship between class and the gender dimen-
sions of path dependencies. To address these questions two dimen-
sions are separated here in order to avoid conflations that have
obscured the underlying processes.
First, a distinction is made between employment regulation and
welfare provision in order to investigate whether or not this dis-
tinction makes a difference to the analysis of path dependency.
Some writers have suggested that the same dynamics affect both
employment regulation in capitalist production and the extent of
state welfare provision (Hall and Soskice 2001). For example, Huber
and Stephens (2001: 315) argue that ‘there has been an overall cor-
respondence between these production relations and the welfare
state regimes’ because ‘welfare state regimes with generous replace-
ment rates are embedded in production regimes supporting high-
skill-high-wage production and having highly regulated labour
markets’. Others have argued that the integration of the typologies
of regulation in capitalist production and the form of the welfare
state regime is more challenging (Ebbinghaus and Manow 2001).
The analysis below investigates whether or not there is path depen-
dency separately for employment regulation and state welfare pro-
vision, and then asks if the typologies map onto each other.
Second, the analysis of class relations is separated from that of
gender relations in order to investigate whether this makes a differ-
ence to the analysis of path dependency. Do different paths of
development in political economy for class and for gender relationsG
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map onto each other? Some writers have suggested that there is no
difference in the typology used for class from that for gender in either
the analysis of state welfare (Esping-Andersen 1999) or employment
and production relations (Estevez-Abe 2005). Others have argued
that there may be different dynamics for class and for gender; states
may support different levels of gender inequality or class inequal-
ity in welfare provision (Korpi 2000: 142) and in employment reg-
ulation (Walby 2007b). The analysis below investigates whether
class and gender map onto each other. In order to take the first
dimension into account, the analysis is conducted separately for
employment regulation and for state welfare provision. Data limi-
tations preclude extending this analysis to ethnicity.
The analysis below addresses not only whether there is path
dependency in the development of the political economy nexus,
but also addresses this in a more nuanced way by separately
analysing employment regulation from state welfare provision and
by separately analysing class and gender practices.
The indicators used in the analysis of political economy are listed in
Table 8.1. Correlations on specific issues are provided in subsequent
tables. Any correlation marked with ∗ or ∗∗ is statistically significant; the
larger the number (Pearson coefficient), the closer the association. Any
number not marked ∗ or ∗∗ is not statistically significant. Sources are
provided in the Appendix to this Chapter.
Welfare provision
Introduction
The main debate over differences in the forms of welfare provision has
contrasted state and market forms of provision (together with some
intermediary forms). The debate addresses whether the differences
stem from levels of economic development or from path dependent
varieties originating in class-based struggles. There is a question here
as to the potential significance of gender as well as class forces.
There is a question about the relationship of the class and the
gender dimensions of welfare provision. While education and
health have gender as well as class components, the state funding
of childcare has a more sharply gendered focus. Does gendered
state welfare spending map onto class-focused state welfare spend-
ing, or is there a separate gender dynamic?
The restriction of welfare provision to state and market forms is
challenged by the addition of a third category in which the provision
of welfare takes place in the home by the unpaid labour or care-
work of women. Is this the result of deeply sedimented institutional
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Table 8.1 Political economy indicators
Income per person
Income per person is measured as Gross National Income per capita. This is often used to indi-
cate the level of economic development.
Women in the workforce
Women in the workforce is the percentage of the non-agricultural workforce that is female. It
can indicate the level of gendered economic development.
Public social expenditure
Public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP is used as an indicator of state welfare provi-
sion. The OECD (2006: 180) definition used here, includes ‘cash benefits, direct “in-kind” provi-
sion of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes’. Such benefits may be ‘targeted
at low-income households, the elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed or young persons’, while such
programmes involve ‘redistribution of resources across households, or compulsory participation’.
Childcare public expenditure
Public expenditure on childcare as a percentage of GDP is an indicator of the gendering of state
welfare.
Childcare use
Childcare used by those under three years of age can be provided by either the state or the mar-
ket; it is confined to childcare in a non-domestic setting.
Trade union organization
There are five measures of trade union organization: trade union density (the extent to which
workers are individually members of trade unions); trade union bargaining coverage (even if not
all workers are members of trade unions, sometimes unions have the right to bargain on their
behalf); centralization of collective bargaining (dispersed bargaining is usually seen as weaker
than when it is centralized); coordination of collective bargaining (more coordinated bargaining
is usually seen as stronger); and women in trade unions: the percentage of trade unionists that
are women (a measure of the gendering of the trade union movement, though only at the level
of individual membership, not governance of the union).
Women in parliament
Women in parliament indicates the percentage of parliamentary (lower house only if two cham-
bers) representatives that are female.
Employment protection strictness
The strictness of employment protection legislation is measured by the OECD indicator summa-
rizing 18 items concerning ‘employment protection of regular workers against individual dismissal
e.g. months of notice, severance pay’, ‘regulation of temporary forms of employment e.g. num-
ber of successive fixed term contracts that are allowed’ and ‘specific requirements for collective
dismissals e.g. delays before notice can start’ (OECD 2004: 102). It indicates the regulation of
employment with a focus on class relations.
Equality legislation
The strength of equality legislation is indicated by the breadth and depth of equal treatment regu-
lation, the range of inequalities addressed (in the EU: gender, ethnicity, disability, religion/faith, age,
and sexual orientation), the use of enforcement mechanisms beyond individual complaints, and the
extension to indirect routes to inequality including working time. This is estimated from the litera-
ture: the Nordic countries have the highest ranking 3, the rest of the European Union 2, USA and
Canada 1.5, other countries 1. (See Chapter 4 on economies for details.)
Gini inequality
Economic inequality between households is indicated by the Gini coefficient; the lower the num-
ber the less the inequality. This has a class focus because of the use of the household rather than
the individual as the unit of analysis.
OECD
The information on political economy is provided for countries in the OECD only; there are up
to 30 countries.
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differences between countries or is there any association with
economic development in addition to path dependency?
State welfare
While several previous investigations of state welfare have focused
on very specific aspects (e.g. pensions in Esping-Andersen 1990)
the focus here is broader, encompassing a wider range of welfare
spending and provision. The indicator is that of social expenditure
by the state as a percentage of GDP. The OECD (2006: 180) defin-
ition of social expenditure used here includes ‘cash benefits, direct
“in-kind” provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with
social purposes’; such benefits may be ‘targeted at low-income
households, the elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed or young per-
sons’, while such programmes involve the ‘redistribution of
resources across households, or compulsory participation’.
The extent of state welfare provision is partly driven by the level
of economic development and partly dependent on the pathway
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Wilensky 2002). In the OECD there has
been an increase in state social expenditure from 17.9 per cent of
GDP in 1990 to 20.7 per cent in 2003, which is associated with eco-
nomic growth (OECD 2007b: 193). However, differences in the
level of economic development are not significant in distinguishing
between those countries with higher or lower levels of state expen-
diture on welfare: there is no significant correlation between a
higher income per person (Gross National Income per person,
Purchasing Power Parity) and higher proportions of national
income devoted by governments to social expenditure in OECD
countries in 2003, as shown in Table 8.2 and Table 8.3.
Nevertheless there are significant differences in the extent to
which states spend on welfare provision (see Figure 8.1). In the
OECD the average percentage of GDP used for state social expen-
diture is 20.7 per cent in 2003. Countries that spend more than this
are counted as ‘high’, while those that spend less than this are
counted as ‘low’ (see Table 8.2).
Differences between countries with high and low levels of social
expenditure are associated with the classic institutional markers of
working-class organization, the strength of trade union organiza-
tion. There is higher state spending on welfare where there is a
high coverage, centralization, and the coordination of collective
bargaining. This is consistent with the varieties of capitalism and
welfare state literature.
However, there is not only an association here with working-class
mobilization. There is also an association with women’s mobilization
via their representation in parliament. State expenditure on welfare
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is path dependent and associated with particular types of political
institutions and mobilization, not only class but also with gender forces.
Increased state spending on welfare is associated with economic
development and path dependent varieties of political economy.
Gendered state social expenditure
State welfare expenditure, such as education and health, has implica-
tions for both class and gender relations. However, some aspects of
social expenditure are more focused on gender relations than others.
Table 8.3 Public social expenditure, income per person, trade unions and
women in parliament, OECD
Public Income Trade Centralization Coordination
social per union of collective of collective Women in
expenditure person coverage bargaining bargaining parliament
Public social
expenditure
Income per .323
person
Trade union .751∗∗ −.119
coverage
Centralization .756∗∗ −.017 .865∗∗
of collective
bargaining
Coordination .512∗ −.020 .488∗ .528*
of collective
bargaining
Women in .524∗∗ .372* .531* .492* .132
parliament
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Figure 8.1 Public social expenditure as percentage of GDP, OECD
OECD, 2003.
Source: OECD (2007: 193) Statlink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/030338861358
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In particular, state expenditure on childcare provision is very important
for the nature of gender relations, not least because such expenditure
supports the transition from a domestic to a public gender regime.
Data on public childcare expenditure are newly available in a robust
comparable form from the OECD (2007a).
The issue here is whether gender aspects of the welfare state
are aligned with, or map onto, the generic or class-oriented
aspects of the welfare state. One approach suggests that they
would be in alignment because of a theoretical claim that class
and gender are aligned more generally (Esping-Andersen 1990,
1999). A different approach is to reject class and gender alignment
on the grounds that these are conceptually distinct systems and
that any alignment is merely contingent (Korpi 2000). The gen-
dered welfare state debate has suggested that there are very
deeply sedimented differences between countries in relation to
their patterns of gender welfare (Lewis 1992; O’Connor et al.
1999). However, there is a question as to whether there is a gen-
eral developmental logic to the increase in state provision of
childcare as well as a path dependent one.
First, does the extent of state social expenditure correlate with the
extent of state expenditure on childcare? The answer here is no. There
is no statistically significant correlation between state social expendi-
ture and state spending on childcare (see Table 8.2 and Table 8.4).
In Table 8.2 it is possible to discern the traditional Nordic cluster
(Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway) joined by France, Luxembourg,
and Portugal, which has both high social expenditure and high state
expenditure on childcare. In this cluster of countries there is an align-
ment of class- and gender-oriented aspects of state welfare. There is
also a cluster of countries that have both low social expenditure and
low state expenditure on childcare: Australia, Ireland, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, New Zealand, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, and
the UK (although the UK is close to average on both). However, there
are countries that represent important exceptions to these two clus-
ters: one in which low social expenditure is combined with high or
average state spending on childcare (Iceland, the USA), and another
in which high social expenditure is combined with low state spend-
ing on childcare (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland). The United
States is notable in having low state public spending yet also the
OECD average state expenditure on childcare.
Class-oriented and gender-oriented expenditure on state welfare
are not aligned; they do not systematically map onto each other.
Are the variations in state spending on childcare associated with
a developmental process or one that is path dependent?
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Gender aspects of welfare states have a development component
as well as a path dependent component. There is a correlation
between higher levels of state expenditure on childcare and higher
levels of economic development (GNIpc), as well as with higher
levels of women’s political representation in parliament and of
women’s membership of trade unions. While social expenditure
correlates with trade union bargaining coverage, centralization, and
coordination, state childcare expenditure does not.
Both generic and gender-oriented state expenditures correlate
with an increased female presence in parliament. Thus while social
expenditure is associated with both class and gender forces, child-
care is predominantly associated with gendered forces.
Insofar as women’s political mobilization in parliaments and trade
unions is a path dependent form of development of the gender
regime, then state-funded childcare has a gendered path dependent
component (see Table 8.4).
Gender and public or domestic welfare
Bringing gender into focus widens the range of forms of welfare
provision that are made visible. Not only can welfare be provided
in the state and market, but it can also be provided in the home by
the unpaid labour of women. The domestic relations under which
such care-work is performed are not only an important part of the
gender regime, but are also an important part of the understanding
of the welfare system as a whole. The assumption behind the
Table 8.4 Childcare, public expenditure on childcare, public social expenditure, income
per person, and women’s presence in employment, parliament, and trade unions, OECD
Children Childcare Public Women Women Women
<3 in public social Income in in in trade
childcare expenditure expenditure per person workforce parliament unions
Children <3
in childcare
Childcare .810∗∗
public
expenditure
Public .232 .348
social
expenditure
Income .417∗ .377∗ .385∗
per person
Women .453∗ .387∗ .388∗ .367∗
in workforce
Women .593∗∗ .504∗∗ .558∗∗ .372∗ .487∗∗
in parliament
Women in .468 .725∗∗ .189 −.020 .683∗∗ −.002
trade unions
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conventional debates is that welfare is provided either by the state or
market. Most of the debate concerns nuances about welfare provi-
sion by collective bodies that are somewhere between state and
market, such as worker/trade union/professional bodies as in the
conservative corporatist (Esping-Andersen 1990) and wage-earner
forms (Castles and Mitchell 1993). But there is a large additional and
very different form of provision – that of domestic provision in the
home with the unpaid labour of women.
There are three major forms of welfare provision: state, market,
and domestic (as well as a myriad of intermediate forms). This has
the implication of splitting the category of ‘liberal’ in the conven-
tional distinction between liberal and coordinated/social democratic
forms of welfare provision. The category ‘liberal’ has often hidden
the important distinction between the provision of welfare by the
market and its provision by domestic labour. There are two alterna-
tives to state provision, both domestic labour and market provision.
The indicator of the domestic provision of childcare is the
absence of public childcare (state or market). It is important to note
that childcare can be obtained through the market; state funds are
not the only way in which public childcare is provided. The aver-
age percentage of children aged under 3 using childcare in the
OECD is 22.7 per cent. Countries with more than this are counted
as ‘high’ and countries with less than this are counted as ‘low’. As
before, countries in which the state uses more than the average
20.7 per cent of GDP on social expenditure are counted as ‘high’,
while those that use less are counted as ‘low’.
Do countries cluster? Is there an association between high social
expenditure and non-domestic childcare? Are the countries that are
traditionally considered social democratic those that have high levels
of non-domestic (state or market) childcare? There is no correlation –
the high social expenditure countries are evenly divided as to whether
or not they have high or low levels of domestic childcare. Those that
have class-oriented ‘high’ social expenditure on welfare and combine
this with high levels of non-domestic childcare include the classic
Nordic cluster (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) as well as
Belgium, France, and Portugal. But there are other countries that are
combining a high class-oriented social expenditure on welfare with
high levels of domestic childcare (Austria, the Czech Republic,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Luxembourg).
Countries that are traditionally considered liberal are also divided as
to whether or not there are high or low levels of domestic childcare.
One set of countries that are conventionally considered liberal, with
low levels of social expenditure, combines this with domestic childcare
(Canada, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and the Slovak Republic).
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However, another set of countries that are conventionally considered
liberal, with low social expenditure, combines this with non-domestic
welfare and high rates of childcare outside the home (Australia,
Iceland, New Zealand, the UK, and the USA; see Table 8.2).
There is no correlation between class-oriented distinctions between
high and low state spenders on welfare and the gender-oriented
distinction between high and low levels of non-domestic childcare.
Instead of two clusters, there is a roughly even distribution between
the four possibilities. Even Esping-Andersen’s conservative corporatist
cluster is broken up, with Belgium and France having high social
expenditure and high childcare and with Austria, Germany, and Italy
having high social expenditure and low childcare.
The overall conclusion here is that the domestic provision of wel-
fare can be present in the same country as either liberal or demo-
cratic social expenditure patterns. This means that class and gender
relations do not map onto each other in this area.
Is the distinction between domestic and non-domestic welfare asso-
ciated with children a developmental or a path-dependent clustering?
It is both. Higher rates of non-domestic (state or market) child-
care as compared with the domestic provision of this form of wel-
fare are associated with higher levels of economic development,
especially gendered economic development. It correlates with high
GNIpc, high rates of women in employment, a high percentage of
women in parliament, a high proportion of women in tertiary edu-
cation. There is a developmental component to the increased use
of non-domestic childcare, associated not only with generic eco-
nomic development as measured by income per person, but also
with gendered economic development as measured by the propor-
tion of women in the workforce. This means that it is associated not
only with the level of economic development, but also with the
transition of the gender regime from a domestic to a public form.
Are there any indications of path dependency in addition to these
developmental components? It has already been shown that it does
not map onto class-oriented path dependent varieties of welfare.
Does it represent gender-oriented varieties of welfare?
A correlation can be seen between the use of childcare for children
under 3 years of age and the public expenditure on childcare (see
Table 8.4). This suggests that state expenditure is an important part of
this provision. In several countries there are high or moderate rates of
both use of childcare for under 3s and high levels of state expendi-
ture on childcare (high Nordic countries – Iceland, Denmark, Sweden,
Norway, Finland; see Table 8.2). There is a further association
between high rates of non-domestic childcare with women’s political
mobilization in parliament. This is consistent with a state-supported
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path dependent form of the public gender regime that is different
from a market-supported pathway.
Conclusions on welfare
There are three forms of delivery of welfare: domestic, market, and
state. Using a gender lens makes visible the domestic as a form of
delivery of welfare additional to the traditional interest in state and
market forms. Whether welfare takes a domestic market or state
form depends on gender as well as class forces.
When class-oriented welfare is the focus, in relation to the dis-
tinction between state and market forms, the differences cannot be
accounted for by the level of economic development, with the
implication that differences are associated with divergent paths of
development. These divergent paths in state social expenditure are
associated not only with the working class forces associated with
trade union organization, but also with gender mobilization in both
trade unions and in parliament.
The class and gender dimension of welfare are not aligned.
Patterns of state social expenditure do not map onto patterns of
state expenditure on childcare. There is both developmental and
path dependency in gender aspects of welfare. Thus unlike class-
oriented social expenditure, gender-oriented expenditure increases
with the level of economic development across the OECD.
Gendered trajectories do not routinely align with class trajectories,
though there are some contingent points of overlap.
Domestic welfare, as indicated by the domestic or public (state
or market) forms of childcare, decreases as the level of economic
development and women’s employment increase. In addition to
this developmental component there is a path dependent compo-
nent. The path dependent component is associated with the
increased representation of women in parliament.
The amount of welfare provision has both developmental and
path dependent components. Class and gender paths of develop-
ment are not aligned, except contingently.
Employment regulation
Employment regulation is a second part of political economy, which
is here investigated separately from welfare rather than conflated with
it. The regulation of employment concerns the intervention of the state
or polity into the workings of labour markets and the conditions of
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employment, affecting the relations between employers and workers.
There are three issues. First, are differences in the strictness of employ-
ment protection legislation associated with the level of economic
development, or are they path dependent? Second, is there a separate
gender dimension to employment regulation and if so does this map
onto the class dimension? Are class and gender patterns aligned? Third,
are variations in the strictness of employment protection legislation
associated with variations in the varieties of state welfare or not? Is
there a close link between varieties of capitalist production and vari-
eties of capitalist welfare or not?
The indicator of employment regulation used here is that pro-
duced by the OECD and focuses on the strictness of employment
protection legislation. It summarizes 18 items concerning the
‘employment protection of regular workers against individual dis-
missal e.g. months of notice, severance pay’, ‘regulation of temporary
forms of employment e.g. number of successive fixed term contracts
that are allowed’, and ‘specific requirements for collective dismissals
e.g. delays before notice can start’ (OECD 2004: 102).
Path dependency?
There is stricter employment protection legislation among the less
economically developed countries of the OECD. However, the
strongest correlations are with trade union organization – trade
union coverage, centralization, and the coordination of collective
bargaining (see Table 8.5). This is consistent with variations due to
both economic development and path dependency.
Regulating employment: the gender focus
The OECD indicator of employment protection concerns the regu-
lation of individual and collective dismissal and temporary work,
thereby focusing on the class relations between employers and
workers. There are in addition to these other regulations of employ-
ment that concern gender relations in employment, some of which
have been extended to the protection of other minoritized groups.
There are two types of these regulations of complex inequalities
beyond class. First are regulations concerning equal treatment or
equal opportunities in employment. These make illegal the treat-
ment of a minoritized group that is worse than the majority group
in employment practices concerning recruitment, promotion, dis-
missal, and payment. They include gender and complex inequalities.
In the EU they extend to gender, ethnicity, disability, religion/faith,
age, and sexual orientation, while in the USA they principally cover
ethnicity and gender, with some extensions to age and disability but
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not to religion/faith or sexual orientation. In the EU, but less
frequently in the USA, they extend to practices that might indirectly
treat one group worse than another, e.g. the requirement to treat as
equal part-time workers with full-time workers in the EU but not in
the USA. A second type of gender equality regulation concerns the
regulation of working time so as to enable the combination of
employment and care-work, with particular benefits to working par-
ents. This type of regulation includes the legal entitlement to (paid
and unpaid) maternity, paternity, and parental leave across the EU,
but only unpaid leave for some workers in the USA, and the right
of parents of young children to reduce their working hours (the EU
and not the USA). The ranking for OECD countries presented below
combines both types of complex equality regulations and is esti-
mated here on the basis of a reading of the laws themselves as well
as the literature. The Nordic countries have the highest ranking of 4;
the rest of the European Union is 3; the USA, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand are 2; the rest are at 1. The phrase ‘(gender) equality’
is used to denote the centrality of gender to these forms of regula-
tion, which in some instances are extended to non-class inequalities
in addition to gender, especially but not only ethnicity.
A series of questions can be raised here. First, does the pattern
of (gender) equality regulation change with the level of economic
development, or is it path dependent? Second, do variations in
these non-class regulations map onto variations in class regulations?
Table 8.5 Strictness of employment protection legislation, trade unions, income per
person, public social expenditure, and equality legislation strength, OECD
Employment Trade Centralization Coordination Income Public Equality
protection union of collective of collective per social legislation
strictness coverage bargaining bargaining person expenditure strength
Employment
protection
strictness
Trade union .700**
coverage
Centralization .750** .865**
of collective
bargaining
Coordination .581** .488* .528*
of collective
bargaining
Income per −.408* −.119 −.017 −.020
person
Public social .142 .751* .756** .512* .385*
expenditure
Equality .095 .677** .640** .175 .294 .717*
legislation
strength
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While there is no statistically significant correlation between
(gender) equality regulations and the level of economic develop-
ment between countries today, there has been a substantial
increase in these regulations over time. There is no statistically sig-
nificant correlation between (gender) equality regulations and
class-oriented strictness of employment protection legislation (see
Table 8.5). Variations in class and gender forms of employment
regulation do not map onto each other. Gender cannot be reduced
to class.
The extent of (gender) equality regulations does correlate with the
extent of women’s political mobilization, as indicated by the percent-
age of parliamentary seats held by women and the percentage of trade
union members who are women, as well as with trade union organi-
zation (see Table 8.6). The most important part of this is women’s
mobilization: a regression equation with (gender) equality regulations
as the dependent variable and the percentage of parliamentary seats
held by women and the percentage of trade union members who are
female accounts for 90 per cent of the variance and is significant at 000
level, with an F score of 59. This suggests that there is path depen-
dency in the development of these regulations and that this is gen-
dered as well as being associated with working-class mobilization.
Employment and welfare
The extent of the strictness of employment protection does not
map onto the extent of state welfare spending (see Table 8.5).
There is no significant correlation between the two. This is a chal-
lenge to the version of the varieties of capitalism thesis
that attempts to integrate both employment regulation and state
welfare into the same system.
Table 8.6 Equality legislation, trade unions, women in parliament, trade unions,
and employment, OECD
Trade Centralization Women Women Women
Equality union of collective in in trade in
legislation coverage bargaining parliament unions workforce
Equality legislation
Trade union .677∗∗
coverage
Centralization of .640∗∗ .865∗∗
collective bargaining
Women in .600∗∗ .531∗ .492∗
parliament
Women in trade .719∗∗ −.066 .010 −.002
unions
Women in .498∗ −.114 −.194 .487∗∗ .683∗∗
workforce
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While there are examples of the traditional view of a clustering
between a high state social expenditure and a high state regulation of
employment, there are too many exceptions for this to be statistically
significant in the OECD. There is high state social expenditure and
more strict employment protection in Belgium, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden (see
Table 8.2). There is low state social expenditure and less strict
employment protection in Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, Korea,
New Zealand, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland, the UK, and the
USA. But there is high state social expenditure and less strict
employment protection in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
Hungary, and Poland. There is low state social expenditure and
more strict employment protection in Mexico, Spain, and Turkey.
The countries that are the exceptions to the traditional view of the
clustering of high levels of state expenditure and employment
protection particularly include either newcomers to the EU (join-
ing in 2004) and OECD that were previously communist (the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) or relatively poor (Mexico
and Turkey). A focus on a narrow range of countries enables the
specific path dependency thesis linking social expenditure and
employment regulation to be sustained while widening the range of
countries disrupts this thesis. The post-communist European countries,
perhaps not surprisingly given the history of restructuring of their
states, have a distinctive pattern that is different from the countries of
the west and north of Europe, which combines low levels of regula-
tion of employment with higher levels of state expenditure.
With a focus on gender, there is a significant correlation between
the amount of social expenditure, the amount of childcare expen-
diture, and the strength of (gender) equality employment regulation
(see Table 8.7). With a gender-lens, the practices of high social
expenditure, high gendered social expenditure on childcare, and
Table 8.7 Inequality, employment regulation, public social expenditure,
childcare public expenditure, OECD
Employment Public Childcare
Gini Equality protection social public
inequality legislation strictness expenditure expenditure
Gini inequality
Equality legislation −.540∗∗
Employment .212 .095
protection strictness
Public social −.537∗∗ .717∗∗ .142
expenditure
Childcare public −.408∗ .617** .050 .348
expenditure
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(gender) equality employment regulation do map onto each other.
There is cohesion in these parts of the gender regime.
Inequality
A lower level of inequality between households, as indicated by the
lower size of the Gini coefficient, is associated with higher levels of
social and childcare expenditure and with stronger equal opportu-
nities legislation, but has no statistically significant relationship with
stricter employment protection legislation (see Table 8.7).
Conclusions on political economy
Four different dimensions of the polity/economy nexus have been
identified: the regulation of employment in terms of the strictness
of employment protection; the regulation of employment for (gen-
der) equality; state welfare as indicated by state social expenditure;
gendered state welfare as indicated by state spending on childcare.
While economic development is associated with some differences,
the dominant picture among the OECD countries is one of path
dependency. In the class-focused part of the analysis employment
regulation and state welfare were sometimes divergent, only mapping
onto each other in a limited number of countries (predominantly
those in EU15 and North America) but not in the newer members of
the EU and OECD. High levels of spending and regulation were asso-
ciated with trade union organization. In the gender-focused part of
the analysis there was a significant overlap between the employment
and welfare aspects of political economy; these were associated with
women’s political mobilization in parliaments and trade unions.
Lower levels of economic inequality between households were asso-
ciated with higher levels of state expenditure (gendered and ungen-
dered) and with higher levels of equal opportunity legislation, but not
with class-oriented employment protection legislation.
There is considerable divergence between class and gender dimen-
sions of varieties of political economy. This is especially the case in
employment regulation. The one location of alignment was in state
welfare expenditure.
This confirms the case for path dependency, but not to the exclu-
sion of all aspects of change associated with economic and human
development. It shows the necessity of analytically separating the
class and gender dimensions of these developments, especially in
relation to employment regulation, where the class and gender
forces produce different outcomes.
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Path Dependency at the
Violence Nexus
Modernity and path dependency
There is a further path dependent nexus which is associated with vio-
lence. The deployment and regulation of violence varies partly as a
result of modernity and partly as a result of different path dependent
trajectories. There are four major ways in which a link between the
rise of modernity and a reduction in violence has been argued. One
is that violence, especially legitimate violence, becomes concentrated
in the state rather than being more widely dispersed (Weber). This is
linked to a specific argument that violence against women and eth-
nic, religious, national, and sexual minorities might be reduced if it
were to become effectively criminalized. The second is that the use
of violence by the state as a form of social control (e.g. via the death
penalty) gives way to a wide variety of disciplining techniques based
in civil society (Foucault). This is linked to a third theme, that in a
civilized society violence in civil society as a form of expression is
suppressed in the emerging modern forms of personality (Elias). A
fourth is that mature democracies, a form of governance that devel-
ops with modernity, do not launch wars on each other.
However, there are some voices of hesitation about the thesis of
a decline in violence in modernity – that modernity may simply
organize violence more efficiently, as in the Holocaust orchestrated
by the Nazis (Bauman), and that there has been a recent turn away
from penal welfare towards a more punitive criminal justice regime,
at least in the USA and the UK, associated with changes in the bal-
ance of class forces (Garland 2001).
An alternative thesis is that the deployment and regulation of vio-
lence takes a path dependent form of development. This can be argued
in two ways. First, that there is a clustering of the different forms of vio-
lence as one form feeds off another through a series of interconnections
in social institutions especially that of the state. Second, that higher lev-
els of violence are associated with higher levels of economic inequal-
ity. The latter has been previously and effectively argued in the link
between social inequality and violent crime. But the argument here is
that the nexus of violence is broader than that of violent crime and
inequality and encompasses a wider range of forms of violence, includ-
ing the tendency to resort to violence in settling matters between
states which is witnessed through the build up of the military. Path
dependent trajectories of the deployment and regulation of violence
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include forms that are not only inter-personal, but also those between
the state and the individual, and those between states.
So does the rate of violence decline with economic and democ-
ratic development? Are there different paths of development, asso-
ciated, for example, with inequality? In order to investigate this
comparatively, it is necessary to have some measures of the vio-
lence deployed in civil society and the state, as well as those of
economic development and inequality.
Indicators
Five aspects of violence can be measured in a way that is sufficiently
robust for comparable analysis. First is homicide, as the rate per
100,000 population. This is indicative of the rate of violence in civil
society, since it correlates well with other forms of violent crime. This
is the most reliable of the official measures of violent crime, since
homicide is one of the few under-reported crimes and this measure
is reasonably robust for comparisons across countries. Second is the
number of prisoners per 100,000 population. This is a measure of the
degree of coerciveness in the state criminal justice system. Third is use
of the death penalty. Fourth is state spending on law and order, mea-
sured as a percentage of GDP. This is indicative of the priority use of
the resources by the state in its pursuit of law and order. Fifth is state
spending on the military as a percentage of GDP, which is indicative
of the extent of militarization of the state. Sixth is a summary indica-
tor of government expenditure on law and order and the military as
a percentage of GDP. Seventh are gendered homicide rates. While
there are not yet reliable comparative statistics on the full extent of
violence against women and minorities, it is possible to differentiate
between the rates of homicide of women and men. Since around half
of female homicide victims are killed by their partners or former part-
ners, the rate of female homicide may be taken as an approximate
proxy of domestic homicide and domestic violence. By contrast most
homicides of men are by other men.
An indicator measure of economic development is Gross
National Income per person. An indicator of economic inequality is
the Gini statistic, which rises with income inequality between
households. An indicator of women’s political mobilization is that
of the proportion of women in parliamentary seats. (The indicators
are shown in Table 8.8). These data are available for most OECD
countries; a sub-set is available at a global level.
In the analysis several questions are posed. To what extent is
there an association between levels of development (economic and
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human) and the extent of violence? To what extent is there path
dependency in the extent of violence? Does gender make a differ-
ence to the answers to the questions about development and path
dependency? Is there a relationship between the violence nexus
and economic inequality?
Development, inequality, and violence
At a global level, there is a statistically significant negative correlation
between homicide and the level of economic development, as mea-
sured by GNI per capita (–.416**). This means that the homicide rate
is higher in poorer, less developed countries than in richer countries.
With increasing levels of economic development there is a lower level
of homicide. This is consistent with the thesis that modernity reduces
the level of inter-personal violence.
There is a positive correlation between homicide and the level of
economic inequality as measured by Gini (see Table 8.9). There is
Table 8.8 Indicators in the violence nexus
Homicide
Homicide, as the rate per 100,000 population. There are two sources for this: one for developed
OECD countries, a second for a more global data set provided by the World Health Organization.
Prisoners
The number of prisoners per 100,000 population.
Death penalty
Use of the death penalty.
State spending on law and order
State spending on law and order, measured as a percentage of GDP.
State spending on the military
State spending on the military, as a percentage of GDP.
Military spending, as a percentage of government expenditure
Gendered homicide rates
Homicides of men as the rate per 100,000 population.
Homicides of women as the rate per 100,000 population.
Economic development
A measure of economic development, Gross National Income per person.
Economic inequality between households
A measure of economic inequality is the Gini statistic, which rises with income inequality
between households.
Women’s political mobilization
An indicator of women’s political mobilization is that of the proportion of women in parliamentary
seats.
These data are available for most OECD countries. A sub-set of these data is available at a global level.
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a higher rate of homicide in countries that are more economically
unequal.
Gendered violence
Are there any differences between the homicide of men and the
homicide of women? The homicide of men correlates with
inequality, as indicated by Gini, which measures income inequal-
ity between households, while the homicide of women does not
(see Table 8.9). The Gini measure of economic inequality used
here in taking a household as the unit tends to capture the
inequality between men rather than that between women and
men. So the homicide of men correlates with economic inequal-
ity between men, while the homicide of women does not.
The homicide of women inversely correlates with the percent-
age of women in parliament. The homicide of women is lower
when women are better represented in parliament, indicative of an
association between forms of female empowerment and reduced
violence against women.
Path dependency of the violence
nexus in OECD countries
The pattern of violence is slightly different among the small group of
richer countries in the OECD than that at a global level. These coun-
tries have reached a relatively high level of economic development,
and differences associated with income do not emerge in this group.
Among this group of rich countries, there is no correlation between
homicide and the indicator of economic (GNIpc) development.
Among countries at this higher level of economic development, there
is no longer a significant correlation between violence and further
economic development: this is associated with a narrower range of
variance of the violence indicators of the richer countries.
Table 8.9 Homicide, gender, and inequality, global
Homicide of Homicide of Women in
men women Gini inequality parliament
Homicide of men
Homicide of women .727∗∗
Gini inequality .513∗∗ .239
Women in parliament −.247 −.294∗ −.190∗
Walby-3874-Ch-08:Walby-3874-Ch-08.qxp  23/06/2009  4:05 PM  Page 299
G
lo
b
al
iz
at
io
n
an
d
In
eq
u
al
iti
es
300
Among the richer OECD countries other divergences emerge
associated with path dependency. There is a striking set of correla-
tions between the various aspects of violence (see Table 8.10). If
there is a higher homicide rate, then there is also more likely to be
a higher rate of imprisonment, use of the death penalty, and a
higher expenditure on law and order (as a percentage of GDP) and
on the military (both as a percentage of GDP and as a percentage
of government expenditure). There is a cluster of phenomena of
violence: homicide, prisoners, death penalty, expenditure on law
and order and expenditure on the military. If any one of these is
higher in a country, then it is likely that the others will be also.
Among rich countries there is a clearly identifiable violence nexus,
in which some countries are more violent (along a series of dimen-
sions) than others. This violence nexus is not associated with the
level of economic development.
Among the richer countries of the OECD, this nexus of violence
does not change with economic development. There is no statisti-
cally significant correlation between any of the measures of violence
and the level of income per person among these countries. So are
there other phenomena to which it is related?
Violence, economic inequality, and
the polity/economy nexus
Violence and economic inequality are related along some dimensions
but not all. There are correlations between economic inequality, as mea-
sured by Gini, and some, but not all, aspects of violence. The higher the
level of economic inequality, the more likely a country is to have higher
Table 8.10 Correlation between aspects of violence, OECD
Military spend Military spend Law spend
Death as per cent govt as per cent as per cent
Homicide Prisoners penalty expenditure of GDP GDP
Homicide
Prisoners .851∗∗
Death penalty .454∗∗ .589∗∗
Military spend as .681∗∗ .629∗∗ .787∗∗
per cent govt
expenditure
Military spend .658∗∗ .614∗∗ .332 .786**
as per cent of GDP
Law spend as .671∗∗ .660∗∗ .037 .121 .551∗
per cent GDP
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rates of imprisonment and higher levels of military expenditure as a
percentage of GDP. The correlation between the Gini measure of
economic inequality and the level of military expenditure is .454*. There
is no correlation with the level of regulation of employment.
The homicide rate is negatively correlated with social expendi-
ture: the more a country is spending on social matters, the lower
the homicide rate will be on average. The Pearson correlation here
is .447* (significant at the 0.05 level).
Conclusions on violence
At a global level, amongst a wide and economically diverse set of
countries, there is an association between economic development
and lower levels of violence. In addition, there is a specific corre-
lation between the homicide of women and women’s level of rep-
resentation in parliament. This is consistent with the thesis that
violence reduces with modernity and that there are different trajec-
tories for different sets of complex inequalities.
Within the smaller group of richer, more developed countries
within the OECD a path dependency can be seen to emerge, rather
than an association with further increases in the level of economic
development. This can be drawn from the correlation of indicators of
different dimensions of violence: homicide, use of the death penalty,
imprisonment, government spending on law and order, government
spending on the military.
Among the richer countries of the OECD there is considerable path
dependency in the deployment and regulation of violence. In these
countries there is not the association of violence with economic
development as is seen at the global level. Instead there is a strong
clustering of countries in the extent to which they are violent in a
series of inter-related aspects.
Gender Regime
A gender regime is a set of inter-related gendered social relations and
gendered institutions that constitutes a system. There are different
forms of gender regime. Gender regimes may have more or less
unequal gender relations. One distinction in the forms of gender
regime is that between a domestic and a public gender regime; during
the transition to gendered modernity there is a transformation
of a domestic to a public form of gender regime. There are further
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distinctions between the forms of public gender regime: neoliberal and
social democratic forms. Different trajectories through the transition
from domestic to public gender regime and coevolution with other
regimes of inequality lead to different forms of public gender regime.
The gender regime theory developed here is different from other
models of gender relations in several ways. First, there is a greater
range of domains and institutions. For example, unlike the ‘male/dual
breadwinner’ typology found in much of the gendered welfare state
debates it includes gendered participation in parliament, education,
civil society, and violence. Second, there is not only a continuum from
the domestic to the public, parallel to male to dual breadwinner form,
but also a set of distinctions among the forms of public gender regime.
There is more than one possible route for the transition from a
domestic to a public gender regime. The difference between the
routes affects the form of the public gender regime. The provision of
publicly-funded childcare is only one route among three. There are
three possible routes to a public form of gender regime: first, market
led; second, polity provisioning led; third, polity regulatory led. The
extent to which these different routes can be identified empirically is
the first focus of this section. This approach challenges the assump-
tion in much gendered welfare state literature that publicly-funded
childcare is the main route by which gender relations as a system are
transformed. There are other routes including, in particular, that of the
market.
Degrees of inequality are potentially important in the differentiation
of different types of gender regime. Is the public form more or less
unequal than the domestic form? Do the different forms of public
gender regimes have different levels of gender inequality?
This analysis analytically separates gender regimes from class
regimes. However, this does not imply that class relations are irrel-
evant for the development of different forms of gender regime. The
question of whether different forms of gender regimes and class
regimes map onto each other is treated here as an issue for empiri-
cal investigation. There is also a further issue of the dynamic coevo-
lution of the different regimes of inequality, which is addressed in
Chapter 10.
The analysis builds on the theoretical and conceptual work in
earlier chapters on theorizing multiple social systems, economies,
polities, violence, and civil societies. The task here is to see first if
it is possible to empirically identify sets of inter-related gendered
institutions associated with either a domestic or a public gender
regime, and then to distinguish between different forms of public
gender regimes. From there it falls to investigate the extent to
which these different forms of gender regime are associated with
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inequality and to then investigate the extent to which different
forms of gender regime map onto different forms of class regime.
The investigation of these issues using a cross-sectional quantita-
tive methodology requires indicators that distinguish these different
forms of gender regime. Chapter 10 addresses the issues over time
and with a global perspective that is necessarily excluded from this
chapter by the nature of the data used. (Indicators of the gender
regime are shown in Table 8.11.)
Table 8.11 Indicators of the gender regime
Women in the workforce
Women in the workforce is the percentage of the non-agricultural workforce that is female. It can
indicate the level of gendered economic development. A high level indicates a public gender
regime.
Gendered inequality in employment
Gender pay gap.
Female share of earned income.
Managers, legislators, and senior officials, percentage women.
Professional and technical workers, percentage women.
Gender employment gap.
Equality legislation
The strength of equality legislation is indicated by the breadth and depth of equal treatment regu-
lation, the range of inequalities addressed (in the EU: gender, ethnicity, disability, religion/faith, age
and sexual orientation), the use of enforcement mechanisms beyond individual complaints, and the
extension to indirect routes to inequality including working time. This is estimated from the litera-
ture: the Nordic countries have the highest ranking 3, the rest of the European Union 2, USA and
Canada 1.5, other countries 1. (See Chapter 4 on economies for details.)
Childcare use
Childcare used by those under three years of age can be provided by either the state or the mar-
ket; it is confined to childcare in a non-domestic setting. A public gender regime is indicated by
high use of childcare for children under three.
Childcare public expenditure
Public expenditure on childcare as a percentage of GDP is an indicator of the gendering of state
welfare.
High level indicates social democratic form of public gender regime.
Gendered education
Educational enrolment of women, percentage of the possible.
Tertiary education of women, percentage of the possible.
High level indicates public gender regime.
Women in parliament
Women in parliament indicates the percentage of parliamentary (lower house only if two cham-
bers) representatives that are female.
High level indicates public gender regime.
High level indicates social democratic form of public gender regime.
Women in trade unions
The percentage of trade unionists that are women (a measure of the gendering of the trade union
movement, though only at the level of individual membership and not governance of the union).
Gendered civil liberties
Whether abortion is legal or not.
Legality indicates public gender regime.
Legality indicates social democratic form of public gender regime.
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Public and domestic gender regimes
The distinction between domestic and public forms of gender regime
can be found in each of the institutional domains of economy, polity,
violence, and civil society, as well as at the level of the gender
regime as a whole. Within the economy, the public form is that
women are free wage labourers rather than domestic labourers. This
is indicated by the extent to which women are in non-agricultural
employment (excluding agriculture, where employment may not
take the form of free wage labour but instead may be under domes-
tic relations) and the extent to which childcare is public rather than
domestic. Within the polity the public form is indicated by the extent
to which women are present in parliament and not merely by
whether they have the formal right to be, and is measured by the
proportion of parliamentary seats that are held by women. Within
the domain of violence, the public form would be indicated by the
extent to which violence against women, especially domestic vio-
lence, is effectively criminalized; however, there is no comparable
robust indicator available to measure this across countries, so it is not
included here. Within civil society, the public form is indicated by the
extent to which women are fully engaged in education and have the
full range of civil rights, including bodily integrity, such as the right
to avail of abortion and contraception. It is here measured by the
extent to which young women are enrolled in education at all levels
as a percentage of what is possible and by whether abortion is legal.
One question is whether the public form of gender relations in each
of the institutional domains of economy, polity, violence, and civil
society is aligned. Features of the public gender regime can be found
to be associated in the near-global data set. High levels of women’s
(non-agricultural) employment are associated with greater female rep-
resentation in parliament, higher levels of educational enrolment at all
levels, and a greater likelihood of abortion being legal (see Table 8.12).
The implication of this finding is that it is possible to distinguish
between the domestic and public forms of gender regime, that there
is coherence to the public form across diverse institutional domains.
Table 8.12 Public and domestic gender regimes, global
Women in Women in Women in
workforce parliament education Abortion legal
Women in workforce
Women in parliament .397∗∗
Women in education .566∗∗ .403∗∗
Abortion legal .409∗∗ .257∗∗ .486∗∗
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Development and the public gender
regime
A more public gender regime is partly associated with economic devel-
opment. A higher level of income per person is associated with the
public gender regime. In the near global data set higher levels of
women’s employment, the educational enrolment of women, the pres-
ence of women in parliaments, and the legality of abortion, are all cor-
related with both economic development and human development.
In countries with higher levels of economic development there is
more likely to be a public form of gender regime than among coun-
tries with lower levels of economic development (see Table 8.13).
Domestic and public gender regimes
and gender inequality
Is the public form of gender regime less gender unequal than a
domestic gender form? The conceptualization of the distinction
between the domestic and public forms of gender regime used here
does not necessarily imply that the public form of the regime is less
unequal than the domestic one. This is deliberately left open for
empirical investigation.
Investigating whether or not there is an association between the
form and the degree of inequality requires the separation of indica-
tors of the public form of gendered institutions from indicators of
gender inequality. This process is complicated by some degree of
Table 8.13 Development and public gender regimes, global
Women in Women in Women in Abortion Income per Life
workforce parliament education legal person expectancy
Women in
workforce
Women in .397∗∗
parliament
Women in .566∗∗ .403∗∗
education
Abortion .409∗∗ .257∗∗ .486∗∗
legal
Income per .284∗∗ .460∗∗ .640∗∗ .378∗∗
person
Life .347∗∗ .215∗ .746∗∗ .421∗∗ .563∗∗
expectancy
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overlap between indicators that might be used and by conceptual
debates as to whether some forms of difference are also forms of
inequality.
Some indicators of gender inequality overlap with indicators of
the public gender regime. These include higher levels of women in
employment (non-agricultural), parliaments, and education. In these
instances the increased presence of women is simultaneously a mat-
ter of the form of the social relations and also an indicator of gen-
der inequality. The inclusion of women in employment as an
indicator of gender inequality, though sometimes considered con-
troversial, was established earlier. Indicators that more unequivo-
cally indicate gender inequality include the proportion of women in
top jobs (professions and management) and the ratio of women to
men in education.
A public gender regime is less gender unequal than a domestic
gender regime. Indicators of gender equality (higher proportions of
women in management and professions and in tertiary education)
correlate with the greater presence of women in employment, edu-
cation, and parliaments.
Does gender inequality map onto class inequality? Gini is a measure
of income inequality between households rather than a measure of
gender inequality. The level of inequality of the gender regime over-
laps with the level of class inequality in some areas but not others.
It overlaps in relation to the proportion of women in professional
jobs, the proportion of women in the workforce, and the proportion
of women in parliaments, but not in relation to the proportion of
women in managerial jobs nor the level and proportion of women’s
presence in education (see Table 8.14).
Table 8.14 Domestic and public gender regimes and inequality, OECD
Women in Women Women Women
Women as Women as tertiary in the in in Gini
managers professionals education workforce education parliament inequality
Women as
managers
Women as .747∗∗
professionals
Women in .426∗ .382∗∗
tertiary
education
Women in .721∗∗ .789∗∗ .571∗∗
the workforce
Women in .449∗ .282 .761∗∗ .610∗∗
education
Women in .390∗ .265 .474∗ .487∗∗ .574∗∗
parliament
Gini inequality −.007 −.446∗ −.255 −.451∗ −.218 −.381∗
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Varieties of public gender regimes
Differences do exist between the forms of public gender regime.
There are two main forms: neoliberal and social democratic. The
transition to a public gender regime may involve the substitution of
the domestic economy by the market or the provisioning state, or
by the removal of discriminatory barriers to women’s employment,
or by some mix of the three. In addition it involves transformations
within the polity, violence, and civil society.
While the extent of social expenditure by the polity is consistent
with the distinction between the neoliberal and social democratic sub-
stitutions for the domestic economy, more important, and with a
tighter focus on gender issues, is the extent to which childcare for the
under-3s is provided by the polity or bought privately. The main indi-
cator of the distinction between neoliberal and social democratic forms
of public gender regime is that of the extent to which formal childcare
is provided by the polity rather than privately on the market and is
measured as the percentage of GDP spent on public childcare for the
under-3s. A newly emerging third potential route is the removal of bar-
riers to employment by the gendered regulation of employment by the
polity, as indicated by the strength of equal opportunities laws.
The data set used here is restricted to the more developed countries
of the OECD, since the information is not available for the wider data
set. Contrary to frequent assumptions, the public expenditure route to
formal childcare is not the only one – childcare that is privately pur-
chased on the market is important in contributing to the total amount
of childcare and in some countries this is the main route. Among those
countries that have above average levels of use of childcare, half fall
into the traditional state provisioning route (Denmark, Iceland,
Finland, Norway, Sweden, and France), while the other half have a
low state expenditure on childcare (Australia, Belgium, Netherlands,
New Zealand, and the UK). The USA, with a high level of childcare,
has an average state expenditure on childcare (see Table 8.15).
Table 8.15 Varieties of gender regime, OECD
Women in Public childcare
workforce Childcare (any) expenditure
Women in workforce
Childcare (any) .453∗
Public childcare expenditure .387∗ .810∗∗
Both the use of childcare and its public provision correlate with
high rates of female employment. But what difference does the pro-
vision of childcare by polity or private means make? The difference
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here should not be exaggerated. However, there is a nexus of cor-
relations between polity expenditure on childcare for the under-3s,
the strength of equal opportunities legislation, women’s presence in
parliaments, women’s organization in trade unions, and a lower level
of income inequality between households. This is consistent with the
thesis that the political mobilization of employed women is associated
with policies that facilitate their employment, including greater public
social expenditure, especially on childcare, as well as supportive
employment regulations (see Table 8.16).
There are two forms of state-led policy for gender equality: child-
care provisioning and the regulation of employment for equality.
Democracy and Inequality
There are three indicators of the depth of democracy: political rights,
civil liberties, and the presence of women in parliaments. These three
correlate among themselves, especially political rights and civil liberties.
There are four indicators of policies towards equality, two gender-
focused and two class-focused: polity childcare expenditure; general
public social expenditure; equal treatment laws; and employment
protection legislation.
The greater the depth of democracy, the more likely a country is
to have class- and gender-focused public expenditure and strong
equal treatment laws (see Table 8.17).
Three indicators of inequality are used: the class-focused Gini
index of economic inequality between households; the gender-
focused percentage of managers who are women; and the gender-
focused female share of earned income. Four indicators of polity
policy towards equality are used, of which two are gender-focused –
childcare expenditure and equal treatment laws – and two are class-
focused – general public social expenditure and employment
protection legislation.
Table 8.16 Gendered polity policies and women’s political mobilization, OECD
Childcare public Equality Women in Women in Gini
expenditure legislation parliament trade unions inequality
Childcare public
expenditure
Equality legislation .617∗∗
Women in .504∗∗ .600∗∗
parliament
Women in .725∗∗ .719∗∗ −.002
trade unions
Gini inequality −.408∗ −.540∗∗ −.381∗ −.511
Walby-3874-Ch-08:Walby-3874-Ch-08.qxp  23/06/2009  4:05 PM  Page 308
Table 8.18 Inequality and polity policies, OECD
Women Women’s Childcare Public Employment
Gini in share of public social Equality protection
inequality management income expenditure expenditure legislation strictness
Gini
inequality
Women in −.007
management
Women’s −.358 .399∗
share of
income
Childcare −.408∗ .026∗ .448∗
public
expenditure
Public –.537∗∗ .367 .296 .348
social
expenditure
Equality −.540∗∗ .401∗ .200 .617∗∗ .717∗∗
legislation
Employment .212 −.396 −.397∗ .050 .142 .095
protection
strictness
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While the two indicators of gender inequality are correlated, there
is no statistically significant correlation between the class-focused
and gender-focused indicators of inequality (see Table 8.18). The
lesser the Gini measured economic inequality between households,
the more likely there is to be public social expenditure, public child-
care expenditure, and strong equal treatment laws. There is a posi-
tive association between equal treatment laws and women as
managers, and between women having a higher share of earned
income and state childcare expenditure.
Table 8.17 Democracy and polity policies, OECD
Childcare Public Employment
Political Civil Women in public social Equality protection
rights liberties parliament expenditure expenditure legislation strictness
Political rights
Civil liberties .922∗∗
Women in .630∗∗ .621∗∗
parliament
Childcare public .503∗∗ .543∗∗ .504∗∗
expenditure
Public social .630∗∗ .508∗∗ .558∗∗ .348
expenditure
Equality .598∗∗ .440∗ .600∗∗ .617∗∗ .717∗∗
legislation
Employment −.315 −.398∗ .021 .050 .142 .095
protection
strictness
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Conclusions
Much of the conventional class-based analysis in both the employ-
ment regime and welfare state regime literature discussed above
has assumed or claimed that class is the dominant social relation
and that gender does not significantly alter the basic categories of
analysis (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1999). But do differences in gen-
der regimes actually map onto differences in class-based regimes
or not? Do the distinctions made here produce a different answer
to this question as to the relationship between class and gender?
The distinction between domestic and public gender regime is partly
associated with the level of economic development, while the distinc-
tions between varieties of class regime (welfare or employment) are
not. The transition from a domestic to a public gender regime is the
transformation of gender relations from premodern to modern. It has
similarities with the transition to capitalism for class relations. It is thus
to be expected that there is a relationship with economic development
for these forms of gender relations as there was for class relations.
A more appropriate question is whether the varieties of public
gender regime map onto the varieties of class relations. Overall
there is no simple mapping of the varieties of gender regime onto
varieties of class relations. However, at a more detailed level, where
state welfare is differentiated from the regulation of employment, a
more nuanced answer about interconnections appears. When the
focus is on the regulation of employment there is little association:
polity intervention to regulate employment protection in relation to
temporary work and individual and collective dismissals has quite
a different pattern among countries than that found for polity inter-
vention to promote gender equality in employment. When the
focus is on state welfare there is a more complex picture. In some
cases there is an overlap between generic state welfare expenditure
and gendered state welfare expenditure on childcare, but it is far
from a complete mapping. While for class relations there is a dis-
juncture between employment regulation and welfare spending, for
gender relations employment regulation and state spending are
aligned.
This chapter has identified forms of path dependency in the greater
or lesser regulation of employment, the greater or lesser provisions of
state welfare, and the extent of violence. These differences map onto the
distinction between neoliberalism and social democracy. Unregulated
employment is neoliberal, regulated employment is social democratic;
little state welfare is neoliberal, much state welfare is social democratic;
a lot of violence is neoliberal, a little violence is social democratic.
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The link between neoliberalism and scant employment regulation
and state provision of welfare is well established. The neoliberal pro-
ject seeks to limit the extent of democratic state involvement in the
economy, including employment and welfare.
A distinction is made between the class and gender components of
social democracy. The provision of state welfare may be class oriented
or may include gender-oriented aspects, especially the state provision
of childcare; the employment regulation may be class-oriented protec-
tions or may include gender equality components. The gender compo-
nents are essential for the welfare and regulations to be categorized as
fully social democratic. Narrow class- or labourist-oriented welfare and
regulations are not sufficient for social democracy though they may be
a step towards this, perhaps even proto-social democracy.
The link between neoliberalism, social democracy, and violence is
newly made here. One link is through equality and democracy.
Countries that are less equal and less democratic have higher rates of
violence; these are characteristics of neoliberal rather than social demo-
cratic countries. However, the violence nexus is not fully reducible to
the political economy nexus – there is a further path dependency here.
There are path-dependent varieties of modernity. Modernity takes
different forms as a result not only of economic development but also
of its path dependent trajectory. A path dependent nexus has been
identified in the extent of employment regulation, state welfare pro-
vision, and violence. These map onto the distinction between neolib-
eralism and social democracy, though with some important variations.
The inclusion of complex inequalities other than class makes a sig-
nificant difference to the analysis of the varieties of modernity. Varieties
of gender regime do not simply map onto varieties of class regime,
though there are some specific points of alignment in some countries.
Gender regimes and class regimes intersect and mutually adapt.
They intersect in all institutional domains. The conventional focus
on care-work as the primary locus of this intersection is too limited.
There is more than one institutional nexus that leads to path depen-
dency. The analysis of path dependency in political economy needs to
differentiate between those forms that centre on employment regula-
tion and those that centre on state welfare expenditure. While these
are aligned for gender relations, they are not aligned for class relations.
A further basis for path dependency is found in violence: political
economy is not the only set of institutions that provide the ‘lock-in’
needed for path-dependent trajectories of development. Some coun-
tries have a more violent trajectory of development than others.
Variations in regimes of inequality are the consequence of
both economic development and path dependent development. In
particular, the gender regime is still in transition from a domestic
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(premodern) to a public (modern) form; the public form may be
more neoliberal or more social democratic.
Democracy and inequality are associated with some aspects of the
violence nexus in that less democratic countries tend to spend more
on the military and more unequal countries tend to have higher rates
of homicide. They are associated with some aspects of the
polity/economy nexus in that more democratic countries tend to
spend more money on social matters and are more likely to have equal
opportunities legislation.
The polity is important to these path dependent varieties of moder-
nity, especially in its different depth of democracy and its openness
to political pressure from the working class and employed women. A
more democratic polity is associated with a more social democratic
variety of modernity.
Appendix: Data Sources
The data set used in the analysis in this chapter and others is available on Sylvia
Walby’s web-site: http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/sociology/profiles/34/
The data may be used for further analyses with appropriate citation of
this data set and the original providers of the data, who retain the title and
ownership of the data. Any citation should include details of this book
(author, title, publisher, date of publication), together with the original
title and details of the data.
One part of the data set is confined to the OECD; other parts are near-
global. The analysis is centred on 2003, since this was the latest date for
which key parts of the OECD data were available in 2008.
Childcare expenditure: public expenditure on childcare (for under 3s)
as a percentage of GDP, 2003. OECD (2008) OECD Family Database
http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3343,en_2649_34819_37836996_1_1_
1_1,00.html PF10 Public spending on childcare and early education. Table
PF10.1. Public expenditure on childcare and early education services, per
cent of GDP, 2003. Updated 30/03/08.
Social expenditure: public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP,
2003: OECD (2007) OECD Factbook 2007. (Paris: OECD). Page 193. http://
miranda.sourceoecd.org/vl=1880195/cl=21/nw=1/rpsv/factbook/index.
htm
Strictness of employment protection legislation, 2003: Summary indicator
including regulation of regular employment, temporary employment and
collective dismissals. OECD (2004) Employment Outlook. (Paris: OECD).
Table 2.A2.4. page 117. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/4/34846856.pdf
Trade union density, bargaining coverage, centralization of collective
bargaining and the coordination of collective bargaining (1994): OECD
(1997) Employment Outlook. (Paris: OECD.)
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Trade union membership of women, 2003: European Industrial Relations
Observatory On-Line (2004) Trade Union Membership 1999–2003. EIRO.
Accessed on 27 September 2006 at http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2004/
03/update/tn0403105u.html
Equality legislation strength: Estimated from laws and literature: Nordic 3;
other EU 2; US, Canada 1.5; the rest 1.
Women as a percentage of professional and managerial employment: UNDP
(2005) HumanDevelopment Report 2005. (New York: Oxford University Press.)
Life expectancy (2004), Women as a percentage of non-agricultural
workforce (2003), Gini (most recent year), Gross Domestic Product, Gross
Domestic Product per person, PPP, World Bank (2006b) World Development
Indicators. (Washington DC: The World Bank.) Accessed via ESDS
International, (MIMAS) University of Manchester.
Divorce rate per 1,000 population, 2003: United Nations Statistics Division
(2006). Divorces and Crude Divorce Rates. Available at http://unstats.un.
org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/DYB2003/table25.xls
Women as percentage of parliamentary representatives (2003) (lower
house if there are two houses): Inter-Parliamentary Union (2006) Statistical
Archive: Women in National Parliaments. Available at http://www.ipu.org/
wmn-e/world-arc.htm
Law, order and defence expenditure as percentage of GDP, 2003:
OECD (2006) OECD Factbook 2006. (Paris: OECD.)
Rates of homicide per 100,000 population, and homicide of women
(global): Krug et al. (2002) World Report on Violence and Health. (Geneva:
World Health Organization.)
OECD homicide and prisoners: Rates of homicide per 100,000 population
recorded by the police (OECD), average of 1999–2001; Prisoners as per-
centage of 100,000 in 2001; Barclay, Gordon and Tavares, Cynthia (2003)
‘International comparisons of criminal justice statistics 2001’. Accessed on 13
May 2006 at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/hosb1203.pdf
Death penalty, whether legal, 2006: Amnesty International (2006) The
Death Penalty. Available at http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty
countries-eng. Accessed on 02/10/2006.
Abortion, whether legal, around 1998: Kenworthy, Lane and Malami,
Melissa (1999) ‘Gender inequality in political representation: A worldwide
comparative analysis’, Social Forces, 78, 1, 235–269. Data set available at
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/sf99-gender.htm
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Introduction
The meaning of progress is contested. As described in the introductory
chapter, there are four major types of approach to progress in the con-
temporary global era: economic development; equality; human rights;
and capabilities. The goal of economic development is often the pre-
eminent goal of governments and the global institutions of financial
governance. This has long been seriously contested by the projects of
equality and of human rights. More recently it has been challenged by
the capabilities project. All of these have very significant variations.
What are the implications of using one rather than another of these
contested framings of progress? When different definitions are used,
how do countries fare? The assessment of these diverse framings of
progress is investigated here using robust comparable data. In order
to simplify this process complex data are transformed into simpler
indicators. The process of operationalizing concepts of progress into
indicators is itself highly contested; there is always a distinction
between the concept and a quantitative measure that is intended to
represent the concept. There is no simple mapping, only closer or
more distant approximations to be argued over and improved.
There is a long history of the development of indicators in an
increasing range of domains of social life that are cross-nationally
comparative (Berger-Schmitt and Jankowitsch 1999; Noll 2002). There
are now diverse indicators operationalizing different approaches to
progress, including: the UNDP Human Development Index; the
UNDP Gender-related Development Index; the UNDP Gender
Empowerment Measure; the UN Millennium Development Goals;
the EU Laeken Indicators of Social Exclusion; the EU Indicators of
Equality between Women and Men; and the FreedomHouse index
of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. While each set contains a mix
9 Measuring Progress
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of underpinning theoretical framings, they are generally built around
a primary framing.
There are four major challenges in the development of indicators
of progress. First, how can they encompass complex inequalities?
The conventional indicators of progress within each of the major
framings rarely include aspects that are central to complex inequal-
ities other than class; frequently, they will require revision in order
to achieve their stated aim. The second challenge is to include the
whole range of domains – economy, polity, violence, and civil soci-
ety. While all frames aspire to be relevant for outcomes in most
domains, some are focused relatively narrowly. Third, do different
framings of progress overlap or map onto each other, or are they
alternatives with trade offs? Fourth, how do countries and social
groups compare when different indicators of progress are used?
What are the implications of different indicators when answering
the question as to whether globalization has led to progress or not?
In this chapter there is a focus on five geographic levels – the
world; the regions of the world, the OECD, the USA, and the EU;
and the USA, UK, Ireland, and Sweden. Countries are pragmatically
used here as convenient empirical categories of territorial units; they
do not signify societies, nor that there is congruency of economy,
polity, violence, and civil society in that territory.
Economic Development
The concept of economic development is centred on the level of pro-
ductive resources used for the standard of living. It is widely invoked
as an indicator of progress, especially by national governments and
international bodies. Its use as such rests on the assumption that
increases in economic development are linked to increases in other
aspects of the good life. The main challenges to the use of these indi-
cators of economic development as measures of progress are that
using the average across a country hides the inequalities in accessing
these living standards between different people, and that there are
other matters that are more important including human rights and a
broader notion of human and not just economic development. There
is also a further challenge to the assumed link between economic
development and progress in non-economic domains.
There are several small but significant differences between the indi-
cators of economic development. First, is the difference between the
achieved level of economic development and the rate of economic
growth. Both are pertinent, but it is important not to conflate them. For
example, current high levels of economic development may be due to
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growth spurts in the past rather than to current high growth rates.
Second, indicators may concern a country or an individual, per
capita (pc). A focus on the individual is more appropriate when the
interest is in the standard of living. Third, the measure may be the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or the Gross National Income (GNI).
The difference between them is rarely great, but the latter is prefer-
able since it takes into account transfers of money across national
boundaries. For example, the repatriation of profits will reduce the
GNI relative to the GDP which is significant in the case of Ireland
where significant profits are transferred to the USA. However, it is
technically harder to get the information needed for the GNI than for
the GDP, so while the GNI is available for the OECD data used here
it is not similarly available for the global data sets. Fourth, is the use
of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) or not. This adjustment is included
in order to take account of the differences in what the same amount
of money can buy in different countries. PPP is important in global
data sets where such differences can be large, while the differences
between most OECD countries are relatively small so the adjustment
need not be made here.
Which regions and countries have the highest income per person?
Global inequalities in income per person (GDPpc) are shown in
Figure 9.1 and Table 9.1. People in the countries in the OECD have
the highest incomes, those in Sub-Saharan Africa the lowest. A com-
parison of incomes in the USA, the EU, Sweden, the UK, and
Ireland, as shown in Table 9.2, finds that people in the USA have
significantly larger incomes (GDPpc) than those in the EU, but that
there is considerable variation between the three countries of the
EU under comparison with people in Ireland having more income
than people in the UK and Sweden.
Where has income increased most rapidly? Comparisons will look
different depending on the unit of measurement used – country or
individual (see Table 9.2). The World Bank measures the rate of
economic growth as the rate of increase in GDP of a country per
year. On this measure the US economy outperforms that of the EU
over the period 1975–2005: the USA sustained an increase of 260
per cent over this period as compared with 199 per cent for the EU.
However, when the rate of increase in GDP per capita is compared,
then the USA and the EU have very similar rates of growth over the
periods 1975–2005 and 1990–2005. The GDP per capita in the EU
rose to 181 per cent of its 1975 level in the 30 years to 2005, as com-
pared with a rise of 189 per cent in the USA. During 15 years, 1990–
2005, the US GDP per capita PPP grew at 2.1 per cent a year, as
compared with 2.1 per cent in Sweden, 2.5 per cent in the UK, and
6.2 per cent in Ireland.G
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Table 9.1 Income per person in world regions
Middle
High East Europe & Latin East & Sub-
income Asia & Central America & North South Saharan
World OECD Pacific Asia Caribbean Africa Asia Africa
Income per 4834 15750 806 5581 3980 1101 1945
person $
1975 (1)
Income per 8476 29997 5284 8398 7575 5506 2825 1849
person $
2005 (2)
2005 GDPpc 175 190 856 136 138 257 95
as per cent
of 1975 (3)
GDPpc 1.4 2.1 6.1 1.4 0.7 0.7 2.6 −0.5
annual
growth rate
1975–2005 (4)
1. Gross Domestic Product per capita, Purchasing Power Parity based on constant 2000 international dollars.
Source: World Bank (2006c).
2. GDP per capita, PPP, constant 2000 international dollars. Source: World Bank (2006c).
3. Calculated from data in table.
4. Source: UNDP (2007a).
Figure 9.1 GDP per capita around the world, 2008
Source: Sbw01f (2008a).
Which is the better indicator – country or per person? If the
point of the comparison is to understand the changes in the living
standards of people then the best indicator is income per person
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(GDP per capita), but if the point of the comparison is to compare
the power of countries on the world stage then the GDP of the
country is the best indicator. It is only when countries are consid-
ered as wholes that the US economy seems to be getting bigger
than the EU economy. When the focus is on the implications for
individuals’ standard of living, then there is very little difference
between the EU and the USA. When the focus is on people, the
best measure of economic growth is the rate of increase in GDP
per capita per year. This is the headline indicator of economicG
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Table 9.2 Economic growth, 1975–2005, world, USA, EU, Ireland, Sweden, the UK
World USA EU Ireland Sweden UK
GDP per capita $, 4834 19830 14359 8544 16993 15506
1975 (1)
GDP per capita $, 8476 37437 26038 36621 27784 28628
2005 (2)
Increase in GDP 175 189 181 429 164 185
per capita $: 2005
as per cent of
1975 (3)
GDP per capita 1.5 2.1 6.2 2.1 2.5
annual growth
rate, 1990–2005 (4)
GDP 1975 PPP$ 14592 4277 3299 27 148 798
billion (5)
GDP 2005 PPP$ 36411 11141 6562 122 266 1607
billion (6) (7)
Increase in GDP 250 260 199 452 180 201
PPP$: 2005 as
per cent of 1975 (8)
Population 1975 4061399 215973 279739 3177 8193 56226
million (9)
Population 2005 6437784 296497 310597 4151 9024 60203
million (10)
Population 2005 159 137 110 131 110 107
as per cent of
1975 (11)
(1) GDP per capita, PPP, constant 2000 international dollars, 1975. Source: World Bank (2006c).
(2) GDP per capita, PPP, constant 2000 international dollars, in 2005. Source: World Bank
(2006c).
(3) Calculated as the percentage increase in GDP per capita (PPP constant 2000 international $)
using data in this table. EU is European Monetary Union.
(4) GDP per capita annual growth rate, 1990–2005. Source: UNDP (2007a) Table 14.
(5) GDP per capita, PPP, constant 2000 international dollars. EU is EMU. Source: World Bank
(2006c).
(6) GDP per capita, PPP, constant 2000 international dollars. EU is EMU. Source: World Bank
(2006c).
(7) The GDP for EU27 is larger than for EMU, at $12,886,810. Calculated from World Bank
(2007b).
(8) Calculated from data in this table.
(9) Source: World Bank (2006c).
(10) Source: World Bank (2006c).
(11) Calculated from data in this table.
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growth used by the European Commission (European Commission
2004: 29 final/2 Graph 16).
The reason for the difference between the two measures is that
increases in the total GDP in a country are driven not only by
increases in GDP per person, but also by increases in the number
of people living in that country. In the case of the USA, there has
been a substantial increase in its population size during the period
1975–2005, such that in 2005 its population was 137 per cent of its
1995 size. By contrast, the increase in population of the EU over
this same period was smaller, growing to 110 per cent of its 1975
population size. Most of these increases are due to immigration,
since the fertility rate has not been above the replacement rate for
either the USA or the EU during this period (World Bank 2006c).
Hence, the difference between the EU and the USA in rates of
growth of the overall GDP is associated with the higher rate of
immigration into the USA than the EU during this period.
There is a widespread impression that the US is not just richer,
but that it has a more successful economy; this is mistaken. The US
economy is getting bigger, but it is not delivering increases in
income to its citizens at a faster rate than the EU. There is very little
difference between the rate of growth in GDP per capita between
the USA and the EU.
As discussed more fully in Chapter 10, the higher income per person
in the USA is a consequence not of its current economic performance,
but of spurts of economic growth in the past. It is not uncommon
that countries experience economic growth spurts at certain points of
their history that then subside (Maddison 2003). Ireland experienced
such an economic growth spurt during the 1990s and early 2000s
(see Table 9.2), as is also the case for China (8.4 per cent GDPpc a
year during 1975–2005) (UNDP 2007a: Table 14). Sometimes there is
a coincidence between these growth spurts and changes in social
relations other than class, for example, the increased employment of
women or migrants. War and regime change both tend to reduce the
rate of economic growth.
Equality
Equality is the main challenge to the conceptualization of progress as
economic development. Economic growth can be of little benefit to
the most disadvantaged if the rewards of economic development are
confined to those who already have the most, while inequality can be
inherently damaging to health, happiness, and other aspects of human
well-being. It is the leading concept among a series of justice-oriented
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framings of progress. Equality is a relational concept in that it always
implies the relative standing of two or more groups.
There are many challenges in the interpretation and operational-
ization of this concept. First, how is the difference component of
complex inequalities to be addressed within the equality frame?
Second, is equality better understood as an outcome or a process,
such as equal opportunities? Third, what is the appropriate range of
domains and practices to which the principle of equality should be
applied? Fourth, in a globalizing world is the country or the world
as a whole the more appropriate unit within which to analyse
inequality? Fifth, in the context of the transformation of the gender
regime, is the traditional use of the household rather than the indi-
vidual as the unit for the analysis of economic inequality any longer
appropriate?
Complex inequalities constitute a difficulty for the equality approach
to progress because they contain positively valued differences as
well as negatively valued inequalities. How are positively valued
differences that produce or are entwined with inequality to be dealt
with? The vast field of responses to this dilemma, from philosophy
to practice, was described in the introduction to this book. One
response is to argue for the equal valuation of different contribu-
tions, which means finding a common standard against which to
measure things that only superficially appear different. Another is
that equality can only be achieved when there is a transformation
in which differences are eradicated or reduced. When operational-
izing equality, however, this requires a single standard for each
issue otherwise it is impossible to measure.
The strongest approach to equality addresses it as an outcome,
while more modest approaches address it as a process, as equal
opportunities or equal treatment. Many policies that are framed by
equality in practice address it as a process, with equality of out-
come a rather shadowy presence. For example, equality legislation
in the EU and USA often focuses on the equal treatment of differ-
ent people in employment.
The range of domains and practices for which equality is consid-
ered a legitimate goal varies widely, with equality often regarded as
justified in some but not in others. The application of the principle
of equality to issues in civil society and political process is wide-
spread, especially in the West. For example, the concept of equality
is invoked within the concept of universal human rights as one of an
equal entitlement to access to these rights. An application of the prin-
ciple of equality to the economy is less common, and here it is more
often applied as a principle for process than one for outcome – equal
opportunities but not equal ownership.G
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Sometimes a category of ‘excessive’ inequality is distinguished
whereby while some levels of inequality are regarded as acceptable
but higher levels are not. This lies behind the use of the concept of
poverty, which is treated as if it were an unacceptably high level of
economic inequality and distinguished from inequality in general.
The unit within which equality is measured makes an important
difference to its significance and scale. Global processes are chang-
ing the balance between the significance of the country or the
world as the unit of analysis; while changing gender inequalities are
changing the balance of the significance of the household or indi-
vidual as the unit of analysis.
Global processes challenge the conventional practice of using a
country as the unit within which inequalities are analysed. If the
world is globalized, should not the unit within which inequalities
are analysed be the whole world instead? The choice of either
country or world as the unit within which inequality is measured
makes a profound difference to the answer to the question of
whether inequality is increasing or decreasing. Of course the world
is neither fully compartmentalized into countries, nor fully global-
ized into one unit, but rather is something in between. Insofar as
globalization increases, then the relevance of the global rather than
the country as the unit for analysis of inequality also increases.
Changes in gender relations challenge the conventional practice of
using the household as the unit between which inequalities are
analysed. Changes in gender inequalities in employment and the
gendered structure of households mean that gender processes as
well as class processes will shape inequalities between households.
The more public the gender regime becomes, the more appropriate
it is to use individuals rather than households as the unit of analysis.
Economic inequality
The size and direction of the change in economic inequalities varies
with the measures that are used. Economic inequality can be mea-
sured not only as income but also as wealth; income can be restricted
to wages or can include taxes and benefits; it can be counted for
individuals or averaged across households; it can be analysed sepa-
rately for different types of inequality or not; it may involve compar-
isons between people within the same country or around the whole
world. Taking complex inequalities, especially gender, into account
challenges the conventional use of the household as the unit of
analysis, while a global perspective challenges the conventional
focus on inequalities within countries.
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Measuring income inequality between households using the Gini
coefficient is common among academics, but relatively rare in global
indicator sets. This measure takes the range as 0 to 100, where the
larger the number is the higher is the inequality; it takes into account
inequality across the whole spectrum. The Gini index measures the
difference between a Lorenz curve – which plots the cumulative
percentages of income against recipients – and a hypothetical line
of perfect equality. A Gini index of 0 would be perfect equality,
while 100 is perfect inequality. The data on income and size of
household to support the index are derived from surveys of house-
holds, hence the coefficient will vary depending on the survey used.
Usually all of the income is included, though this can vary as to
whether this includes benefits or not. Usually the household is the
unit and this is equivalized for household size (the EU uses the mod-
ified OECD scale: 1st adult = 1; additional household members 14
years+ = 0.5; additional household members <14 years = 0.3)
(Deininger and Squire 1996; Alderson and Nielson 2002; Goodman
and Shephard 2002; Brewer et al. 2006; World Bank 2008).
There are other measures of income inequality, including the
ratio of incomes of richest 10 per cent to poorest 10 per cent
(UNDP) and the share of the poorest 20 per cent in the national
income (MDG Goal 1, Indicator 3).
Poverty is a concept related to economic inequality. However, it is
a threshold concept rather than one centred on the social relation-
ship of inequality between groups. In practice it usually means
extreme or ‘excessive’ economic inequality and is often used in a
context where some inequality is regarded as legitimate to demarcate
it from that which is not. Poverty is an important concept in the UN
Millennium Development Goals and the EU indicators of social inclu-
sion. Poverty can be understood as absolute or as relative. The first
MDG indicator concerns absolute poverty, measured as the propor-
tion of the population living on less than a dollar a day. In devel-
oped economies it is more usual to use a relative measure: the EU
indicators of social inclusion use 60 per cent of the median income.
Economic inequality within countries and regions around the world
Economic inequality between households as measured by the Gini
coefficient (a low number means less inequality than a high num-
ber) varies considerably between different countries around the
world, as is shown in Figure 9.2. As can be seen from this map, in
some countries inequality is much higher than in others. Further
there is some clustering of patterns of inequality into global regions
with some global regions more unequal than others. Latin America
and southern Africa have some of the highest rates of inequality.G
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A target of the Millennium Development Goal 1 was to eradicate
extreme poverty, between 1990 and 2015 halving the proportion of
people living on less than a dollar a day. In 1990 nearly half (47 per
cent) of people in Sub-Saharan Africa lived in such poverty, as did 41
per cent of those in Southern Asia, and a third (33 per cent) of those
in South-Eastern Asia. During the period 1990 to 2004 there has been
a significant reduction in the proportion of people in such extreme
poverty living in developing regions, dropping from 32 per cent to 19
per cent. However, this drop in extreme poverty has not been paral-
leled by a similar drop in inequality. During the same period there has
been a slight fall from 5 per cent to 4 per cent of the share of the
poorest quintile (fifth) of the population in developing regions in
national consumption (if there were equality this fifth would consume
20 per cent of the national total, MDG 1.3: see Table 9.3).
This pattern of regionally clustered inequality varies over time.
Covering the period 1950–1999, and using Gini data from WIID,
Mann and Riley (2006) have described the changing degrees of eco-
nomic inequality between households across world regions. Latin
America is consistently the most unequal region; South Asia is of
middle-high inequality; East Asia has middling levels of inequality
which decrease then increase over the period; the Anglo-Saxons
are middling, but there has been a significant move from relatively
low to relatively high inequality; in Continental Europe there has
been a significant movement from relatively high inequality to
Figure 9.2 Economic income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient
around the world
Source: Sbw01f (2008b)
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relatively low inequality; the Nordics are least unequal and with
decreasing inequality over this period.
Within the OECD, a group of 30 of the richest countries of the
North, there is considerable variation in the degree of inequality in
(see Table 9.4). There is a gradient from the most unequal neo-
liberal (Anglo-Saxon: 30.5, 30.1, 30.4, 33.7, 32.6, 35.7) to the less
unequal social democratic (Nordic: 22.5, 26.1, 26.1, 24.3), with con-
tinental Europe (25.2, 27.3, 27.7, 34.7, 26.1, 25.1) in between but
closer to the social democratic Nordics than the liberal Anglo-Saxon.
The neoliberal USA (Gini 35.7) is the most unequal of the developed
countries in the OECD (only Mexico and Turkey are more unequal);
social democratic Sweden is the second least unequal (24.3: only
Denmark is less unequal); and the UK (32.6) and Ireland (30.4) are
in between and close to the OECD average of 31.0.
Within the OECD countries, there has been an average increase
in inequality since 1980 at the same time as the recent wave of
globalization. As measured by the Gini coefficient, the level of
inequality rose from 29.3 to 31.0 between the mid-1980s and 2000
(OECD 2006a), as shown in Table 9.4. While the overall pattern is of
a slight increase in economic inequality, the changes vary between
countries. There is an increase in the more neoliberal Anglo
economies, including the UK and the USA, in the UK rising from 29
to 33, and in the USA from 34 to 36. There is also an increase in
inequality in some social democratic countries, especially the
Nordic countries; for example, Sweden rose from 20 to 24 although
even at the end of this period the Nordics are less unequal than theG
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Table 9.3 Poverty and inequality, world regions, 1990, 2004
Share of Share of
Per cent Per cent poorest poorest
population population fifth in fifth in
living on living on national national
<$1 a day <$1 a day consumption consumption
1990 2004 1990 2004
Sub-Saharan Africa 47 41 3 3
Southern Asia 41 30 7 7
Eastern Asia 33 10 7 5
South-Eastern Asia 21 7 6 6
Latin America and the Caribbean 10 9 3 3
Northern Africa 3 1 6 6
Western Asia 2 4 6 5
Commonwealth of 1 1 8 6
Independent States
Transition countries of 0 1 8 8
South-Eastern Europe
Developing regions 32 19 5 4
Source: UN (2007a: 6–8).
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average OECD country – this is a break from the pattern identified
by Mann and Riley (2006). The continental European countries
show a mix of stability and increased inequality (a break from the
pattern of declining inequality found by Mann and Riley). There are
exceptions to these clusters, for example, Ireland (often identified
as an Anglo neoliberal economy) has seen a decline in inequality,
with a fall in the Gini coefficient from 33 to 30.
Table 9.4 Inequality and poverty in household incomes, OECD: Gini, mid-
1980s to 2000; per cent of households with less than 50 per cent and 60 per
cent median income
Per cent Per cent
households households
with less with less
than 50 than 60
per cent per cent of
of median median
income income
Mid-1980s Mid-1990s 2000 2000–2004 2006
Australia 31.2 30.5 30.5 12.2
Austria 23.6 23.8 25.2 7.7 13
Belgium 8.0 15
Canada 28.7 28.3 30.1 11.4
Czech Rep 25.7 26.0 4.9 10
Denmark 22.8 21.3 22.5 5.6 12
Finland 20.7 22.8 26.1 5.4 13
France 27.6 27.8 27.3 7.3 13
Germany 28.3 27.7 8.4 13
Greece 33.6 33.6 34.5 14.3 21
Hungary 29.4 29.3 6.7 16
Ireland 33.1 32.4 30.4 16.2 18
Italy 30.6 34.8 34.7 12.7 20
Japan 27.8 29.5 31.4 11.8
Luxembourg 24.7 25.9 26.1 6.0 14
Mexico 45.1 52.0 48.0
Netherlands 23.4 25.5 25.1 7.3 10
New Zealand 27.0 33.1 33.7
Norway 23.4 25.6 26.1 6.4 11
Poland 38.9 36.7 8.6 19
Portugal 35.9 35.6 18
Slovakia 7.0 12
Spain 36.7 33.9 32.9 14.2 20
Sweden 19.9 21.1 24.3 6.5 12
Switzerland 26.7 7.6
Turkey 43.5 49.1 43.9 26
UK 28.6 31.2 32.6 12.5 19
USA 33.8 36.1 35.7 17.0
OECD average 29.3 30.9 31.0
EU 25 16
Sources:
Gini: OECD (2006: 219).
50 per cent median income: (UNDP 2007a).
60 per cent median income: Eurostat (2008) At-risk-of poverty rate.
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There are wide variations in the proportion of the population
living in poverty, defined here using the UNDP standard of less
than 50 per cent of median income and an EU standard of less than
60 per cent of median income. Among OECD countries, using the
UNDP threshold of 50 per cent of median income, the USA has the
most people living in poverty.
Wealth inequalities within countries
Income inequality is not the only form of economic inequality,
there are also differences in the extent to which households (and
individuals) own wealth, such as houses, shares, and savings.
These tend to show greater inequalities than income (Davies et al.
2008), including along ethnic divisions (Oliver and Shapiro 1997).
The median Gini value of wealth inequality within countries around
the world is 0.7 (Davies et al. 2008: 21).
There are significant variations in the extent of wealth in different
world regions (see Table 9.5).
Table 9.5 Wealth in world regions, 2000
Wealth per Population share Wealth share
World region adult (US$) per cent per cent
North America 190653 6 34
Latin America and Caribbean 17892 8 4
Europe 67315 15 30
Africa 3415 10 1
China 3885 23 3
India 1989 15 1
Rich Asia-Pacific 165008 5 24
Other Asia-Pacific 5889 18 3
World 33875 100 100
Source: Davies et al. (2008: 8).
There are also significant variations in the inequality of wealth
distribution in different countries (see Table 9.6). In the USA,
33 per cent of the wealth is owned by 1 per cent of the population
and 70 per cent by the top 10 per cent (Gini 0.801); in the UK, 23
per cent of the wealth is owned by the top 1 per cent and 56 per cent
by the top 10 per cent (Gini 0.697); in Ireland, 10 per cent is held by
the top 1 per cent and 42 per cent by the top 10 per cent; in Sweden
59 per cent is held by the top 10 per cent (Davies et al. 2008: 4, 9).
Global economic inequality
One new way to think about economic inequalities in the world is
to treat the whole world as the unit within which the analysis is
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Table 9.6 Wealth shares within countries, 2000
Country Share of top 10 per cent Share of top 1 per cent Gini
Australia 45 0.622
Brazil 0.784
Canada 53 0.688
China 41 0.550
Denmark 76 29
Finland 42
France 61 21 0.730
Germany 44 0.667
India 53 16 0.669
Indonesia 65 29 0.764
Ireland 42 10
Italy 49 17 0.609
Japan 39 0.547
Korea, South 43 14 0.579
Mexico 0.749
New Zealand 52
Norway 51
Spain 42 18 0.570
Sweden 59
Switzerland 71 35 0.803
Turkey 0.718
UK 56 23 0.697
USA 70 33 0.801
Source: Davies et al. 2008: 4, 9.
made. This is different from the more traditional way of thinking
about global inequality as the summation of the inequalities within
each country. In a globalizing era is it better to think of inequalities
on a truly global scale, or are our horizons and reference groups
still effectively limited by the countries in which people live? The
answer is that both are relevant: for many people the country in
which they live is the most relevant unit for analysing socio-
economic inequalities, but as globalization proceeds then there is
an increasing number of people and processes for which the whole
world is the more relevant unit.
If global economic inequalities are the summation of changes in
national inequalities, then this would mean that there is a global
increase in class economic inequality, since many countries have
had an increase in these inequalities though not an increase in gen-
der economic inequality.
If the world as a whole is taken as the unit of analysis for global
economic inequality, then global economic inequality is made up
of two elements – not only inequality within countries, but also
inequality between countries. The best way to place individuals in
the global economy hierarchy then is to combine both inequality
within their own country and also the position of their country in a
global hierarchy (Milanovic 2005). The larger component is that of
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inequality between countries, accounting for between 67 per cent
and 90 per cent of overall global inequality (Korzeniewicz and
Moran 1997; Firebaugh and Goesling 2004). Hence analyses of
changes in global inequality that take the whole world as the unit
focus on inequality between countries rather than within countries.
When the whole world is taken as the unit of analysis for inequal-
ity, then the popular assumption that there is increasing global eco-
nomic inequality (Mazur 2000) is engaged by rival theories and
empirical evidence (Wade 2004; Milanovic 2005) as to whether this
is the case (Korzeniewicz and Moran 1997) or not (Dollar and
Kraay 2001; Firebaugh and Goesling 2004).
Increasing global economic inequality is predicted by the thesis that
the rich core countries of the global economic system shape the rules
of the global system in matters such as trade and finance so that they
advantage themselves. Unequal terms of trade and investment mean
the rich countries in the core of the world system grow more rapidly
at the expense of development in the periphery (Wallerstein 1974;
Chase-Dunn 1998). Decreasing global economic inequality is pre-
dicted by the thesis that the neoliberal wave of deregulation of global
trade and finance allows the economies of poorer developing coun-
tries to thrive and catch up with the older industrialized countries, as
they are able to specialize in economic niches no longer blocked by
protectionist tariffs (Ohmae 1990; Dollar and Kraay 2001).
During previous waves of globalization, global economic inequal-
ities between countries have grown substantially. Average incomes
in the richest countries were four times more than those in the poor-
est countries; this had risen to around 30 times more by the end of
the twentieth century (Firebaugh 1999).
But has this increase in global economic inequality stopped, and if
so has it stopped for reasons associated with the recent wave of
globalization? The case for a continued increase in world income
inequality since 1965, especially during the 1980s, is made by
Korzeniewicz and Moran (1997). They use data for 46 countries from
the World Bank – accounting for 68 per cent of the world’s population –
comparing the changes in the Gross National Product per capita
(GNPpc) using exchange rate data from 1965 to 1992. Using the Gini
coefficient, they find that there is a considerable increase in the gap in
GNPpc between countries in this period, rising from .682 in 1965 to
.738 in 1992, a growth in inequality of 8.2 per cent.
But the detailed assumptions on which they base their statistical
analysis have been challenged. There are two major contested
assumptions. First, how is income to be compared when the same
amount of money can buy different amounts of goods and services in
different countries? The same amount of money, measured in officialG
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exchange rates, will typically buy more things in a poor country than
in a rich one (as most global tourists are well aware). There is a tech-
nical device to address this – introducing a ratio so as to bring the
effective purchasing power into alignment, called ‘Purchasing Power
Parity’ or PPP. Based on research as to how much it takes to buy the
same basket of goods in different countries, PPP brings monetary
income into alignment with what it will buy in a country rather than
what it will do in terms of foreign exchange. When PPP is applied the
value of the incomes in poor countries increases, and the increase in
global economic inequality found using exchange rates disappears in
the recent period (Firebaugh 1999; Wade 2004).
The second contested assumption concerns the significance of
population size. If this is taken into account, instead of treating
each country as equally significant, then the picture shifts because
of China and India. The economies of these two countries are
growing very quickly and they have very large populations, jointly
making up 38 per cent of the world’s people. When the analysis
takes population size into account, people in the poorer parts of
the world are catching up just a little with those in rich countries.
However, if just China (let alone China plus India) were excluded,
then there is a widening of the economic inequalities between
people in the developed and developing parts of the world
(Firebaugh and Goesling 2004; Wade 2004; Milanovic 2005).
A different point of view starts from this concern for China and
moves to a wider consideration of regional differences more broadly.
Growth rates are very uneven between regions. It is not all of the
poor South that is doing well, just China, India, and East Asia.
Between 1980 and 2000, there has been higher economic growth with
accompanying falls in the rate of poverty in China, India, and East
Asia, while in Latin America economic development has stagnated
and the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe together
with Sub-Saharan Africa regressed with increases in poverty (Wade
2004). Incomes have grown rapidly in the ‘core’ countries of North
America, Western Europe, and Japan, while in others they have stag-
nated and in some cases fallen.
Is the rapid growth of China a sign that globalization has led to
more economic growth and a reduction in poverty and economic
inequality as Dollar and Kraay (2001) claim? They would argue that
globalization – here operationalized as increasing world trade and
understood as driven by neoliberal type concerns for deregulation –
has produced economic growth in such a way as to decrease global
economic inequality. However, the changes in China’s trajectory of
development are probably more linked to changes in internal than
external relations.
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This analysis has so far been restricted to inequalities between
households, thereby making gender inequalities invisible. The
introduction of gendered economic inequalities has implications for
the analysis of inequalities on a global scale.
The global distribution of wealth is more uneven than the global
distribution of income (Davies et al. 2008). The percentage of
global wealth held in different regions and countries is shown in
Table 9.5. North America holds 34 per cent of the wealth despite hav-
ing only 6 per cent of the world’s population (within which the USA
holds 33 per cent of global wealth despite having only 5.5 per cent
of the world population), while Europe holds 30 per cent of the
global wealth with 15 per cent of the global population.
It is clear that global economic inequalities have been increasing
for decades and indeed centuries, but the current picture is more
opaque. Whether class-based global economic inequalities are con-
sidered to be increasing or decreasing today depends on a series of
issues concerning the unit of analysis and the definition of con-
cepts. If global economic inequality is considered to be the sum-
mation of class-based inequalities in each country, then inequality
is increasing. However, if the whole world is taken as the unit, then
rapid economic growth among the large populations of China and
India means that the inequalities between countries that make up
the majority part of global inequality are reducing a little, and with
them global economic inequality overall.
Beyond the household
Most of the internationally comparative data on economic inequality
use the household as the unit of analysis. Changes in this measure of
inequality are usually assumed to be driven by changes in the struc-
ture of employment, capital-labour relations, and welfare transfers.
Comparisons and changes over time in inequalities between house-
holds are not a good guide to changes in class inequality since the
household is a social entity at the intersection of class and gender
inequalities. While measuring economic inequality using the house-
hold as the unit has the advantage of a robust supply of widely avail-
able comparable data over time, it has several disadvantages
associated with the conflation of the divergent dynamics of change
of class-based and gender-based inequalities and the obscuring of
their separate trajectories of change. The class and gender changes
are better if at least initially separated for analysis: this requires an
analysis of the class and gender changes using the individual as the
unit. There is then the option of considering them separately as well
as examining their intersection at the household level.G
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The major changes are class-based and gender-based. A key part
of the class-based changes is the change in wage dispersion, both
at the top and bottom ends; a second part is the change in tax and
benefit systems. There are two major ways in which changes in gen-
der relations will have implications for changes in the inequality of
income distribution between households – changes in gendered
employment rates and gender pay gaps, and changes in gendered
household composition and structure.
Since the 1980s there has been an increase in wage inequality
along with an increase in the dispersion of wages in many coun-
tries, though this is varyingly so. This is due to processes at both
the bottom and the top of the labour market. There is a relative
decline in some countries among those who are already the least
paid, partly as a result of the attack on and decline in trade union-
ism and minimum wages (DiNardo et al. 1996; Lee 1999; Card and
DiNardo 2002). There has also been a relative increase in wages
among those who are already better paid, in part due to changes
in the skills required in the knowledge economy and also due to
significant increases in executive pay (Glyn 2001; Smeeding 2002).
Gendered economic inequalities
Gendered economic inequalities are important in two ways: they
are important forms of inequalities in their own right, and they
contribute to inequalities between households. They include the
gender gap in employment rates (an indicator for gender equality
for the UN MDG and the EU); the gender gap in unemployment
rates (an indicator for gender equality for the EU); the gender pay
gap (an EU indicator for gender equality); women’s share of earned
income (a component of the UNDP gender-related development
index); occupational segregation (an EU indicator for gender equal-
ity); and the proportion of women in managerial and professional
jobs (a component of the UNDP Gender Empowerment Measure).
Gender employment gaps
Gender employment gaps are a component of gender economic
inequality. While the division between free wage labour and domes-
tic care-work has sometimes been treated as a matter of difference
rather than inequality, here it is treated primarily as an instance of
inequality whilst also recognizing that it can simultaneously be
regarded as a difference. However, it is noteworthy that the inequal-
ities are more obvious in economies that are more fully marketized,
as in the North, than where the economy is less marketized and
more agriculturally based, as in (though to a declining extent)
some of the South. In order to take into account the different social
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relations in agriculture, the analysis is confined to the more marke-
tized relations in non-agricultural production. In the global data sets
this requires a specific adjustment, though in the case of the OECD
and EU data sets this is not so necessary since agriculture is such a
small part of these economies. (See Chapter 3 for a fuller account of
these arguments.)
The gender gap in employment (non-agricultural) varies signifi-
cantly between world regions: the global average female percent-
age in the labour force was 39 per cent in 2005 and it is highest in
the North (see Table 9.7). There has been an increase in women’s
employment between 1990 and 2005 in all world regions save for
northern Africa where it has remained static.
Female employment has also been increasing overall in the
OECD countries, rising from 39 per cent to 44 per cent between
1980 and 2006 (see Table 9.8). In all countries except two, there has
been an increase or plateauing of female employment between
1980 and 2006. The Czech Republic had a small (2 per cent) drop
following marketization in 1989, but the trend is now one of
upward recuperation. Turkey has also had a decline, but this is typ-
ical of a country that has reached this stage of industrialization.
There is convergence in these rich countries of the North towards
a near equal presence (47 per cent) of women and men in the
labour market. This is common to both social democratic and
neoliberal countries with the only caveat that the Nordic social
democratic countries are reaching a plateau earlier; furthermore the
former communist countries have a legacy of high female employ-
ment rates that has proved largely resilient despite marketization.
This increase in female employment – which narrows the gender
employment gap – is a significant decline in one aspect of gendered
economic inequality.G
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Table 9.7 Women as a percentage of employees (non-agricultural wage
employment) 1990 and 2005, world regions
1990 2005
Southern Asia 13 18
Northern Africa 20 20
Western Asia 16 21
Sub-Saharan Africa 28 32
Oceania 28 38
South-Eastern Asia 38 39
Eastern Asia 38 41
Latin America and the Caribbean 37 42
Developed regions 44 47
Commonwealth of Independent States 49 51
World 36 39
Source: UN (2007c: 12).
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The gender pay gap
The gender wage gap has declined very slowly in many advanced
economies since the 1980s, though in several it remains substantial.
The reduction in the gender pay gap in the EU between 1996 and
2006 is shown in Table 9.9.
The EU has a smaller gender pay gap than the USA, with
15 percentage points for the EU and 22 for the United States. Among
the EU countries, smaller gaps are found in southern Europe as
compared with northern Europe. Although the gender pay gap is a
widely agreed measure of gender inequality, there are some techni-
cal weaknesses in its construction that make it open to misleading
interpretations when used in cross-country comparisons (Juhn et al.
1991; Grimshaw et al. 2002). Smaller gender pay gaps are often
found in countries with lower rates of female employment (as is the
case in southern as compared with northern Europe). This, perhaps
Table 9.8 Labour force, per cent female, OECD, 1980–2006
1980 2006
Australia 37 45
Austria 38 44
Belgium 36 44
Canada 40 46
Czech Rep 47 45
Denmark 45 46
Finland 47 47
France 40 45
Germany 39 45
Greece 33 41
Hungary 43 45
Iceland 44 46
Ireland 28 43
Italy 33 40
Japan 39 41
Korea 37 41
Luxembourg 35 42
Mexico 27 35
Netherlands 37 44
New Zealand 40 46
Norway 41 47
Poland 45 46
Portugal 39 46
Slovakia 45 45
Spain 28 41
Sweden 47 47
Switzerland 37 46
Turkey 35 26
UK 41 45
USA 41 46
High income OECD average 39 44
Source: World Bank (2008).
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surprising, finding is most likely a side-effect of the lower rates of
female waged labour, which means that the women who would be
paid least are least likely to be in employment. In economies where
there is fuller female employment, the low paid as well as high paid
women are compared with men (Blau and Kahn 2003).
Given the weakness of the gender pay gap as a measure of gen-
der economic inequality because of its sensitivity to differences in
female employment rates, it is appropriate to consider alternative
indicators that will better measure the concept of inequalities in
access to income from employment. One such measure is that of the
female share of earned income, constituted by both the extent
of female employment and the size of the gender wage gap. This
is used by the UNDP as a component of the Gender-related
Development Index. The ratio of female to male earned income for
the OECD is presented in Table 9.10. There is an increase in the pro-
portion of income earned by women in the OECD on average from
47 per cent to 59 per cent between 1995 and 2005. There are varia-
tions among the OECD countries. While the average shows an
increase, there are declines in the former communist countries that
are now members of the OECD (the Czech Republic, Poland, and
Slovakia), with the exception of Hungary which has remained static.
A further measure of gender inequality in employment is that of
occupational segregation by sex. However, in a manner parallel toG
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Table 9.9 Gender wage gap EU, USA, 1996, 2006
Country 1996 2006
EU (27 countries) 17 15
Belgium 10 7
Denmark 15 17
Germany 21 22
Ireland 21 9
Greece 15 9
Spain 14 13
France 13 11
Italy 8 9
Luxembourg 19 14
Hungary 23 11
Netherlands 23 18
Austria 20 20
Portugal 6 9
Romania 24 10
Slovenia 15 8
Finland 17 20
Sweden 17 16
United Kingdom 24 21
USA 22
Sources: EU: Eurostat (2008) Gender Pay Gap; USA: OECD (2002) Employment Outlook 2002,
Table 2.15. For 1998.
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that of the gender pay gap, it is sensitive to variations in female
employment rates, thereby producing odd outcomes in a compara-
tive analysis. A more robust measure of comparative gender posi-
tions in employment is that of the proportion of women in top jobs,
such as managerial and professional jobs. The wide variations appar-
ent in the proportion of managers, legislators, and senior officials that
are female in OECD countries are shown in Table 9.10. These are
Table 9.10 Gendered economic inequality: ratio of female to male earned income,
1995, 2005; per cent managers female, OECD, medium developed countries
Ratio of female Ratio of female Managers, legislators,
to male earned to male earned senior officials
income, c.1995 income, c.2005 per cent female, c.2005
Australia .56 .70 37
Austria .51 .46 27
Belgium .38 .55 32
Canada .41 .64 36
Czech Rep .68 .51 30
Denmark .66 .73 25
Finland .68 .71 30
France .56 .64 37
Germany .58 37
Greece .29 .55 26
Hungary .64 .64 35
Iceland .72 27
Ireland .29 .53 31
Italy .38 .47 32
Japan .50 .45 10
Korea .28 .40 8
Luxembourg .30 .51
Mexico .29 .39 29
Netherlands .34 .64 26
New Zealand .45 .70 36
Norway .61 .77 30
Poland .65 .60 33
Portugal .43 .59 34
Slovakia .66 .58 31
Spain .23 .50 32
Sweden .71 .81 30
Switzerland .37 .63 8
Turkey .43 .35 7
UK .45 .66 34
USA .53 .63 42
Average OECD .47 .59 29
Average medium .49 28
development
Sources: UNDP (1995: Table 3.1); (UNDP 2007a: Table 29).
1995: Year most recently available in 1995.
2005: Year most recently available in 2007/8.
Average OECD: The average is of the OECD countries listed in the table.
Average medium development: average of UNDP medium development countries (managers
N = 28; income N = 79).
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positively associated with high rates of female employment.
Interestingly, this is one of the few measures of economic equality
where the USA does well.
Is it the case that economic development and increased rates of
female employment drive reductions in gender inequality in other
aspects of employment? This can be investigated by comparing an
average of the highly developed countries of the OECD and
medium developed countries (UNDP definition) see Table 9.10.
The average ratio of female to male earned income in the highly
developed countries of the OECD at .59 is significantly higher
than the ratio of .49 in countries of medium development (UNDP
classification). Part of this difference is due to the higher rate of
female employment in the non-agricultural sector in the more
developed countries. However, a different picture emerges when
the proportion of women in managerial jobs is compared. The
highly developed OECD countries have an average of 29 per cent
of women among managers (managers, legislators, and senior
officials) as compared with 28 per cent among those countries
listed by the UNDP as of medium development. This is a near
identical level of gender equality in terms of presence in man-
agerial jobs in the countries of only medium development with
those in the OECD.
Table 9.11 compares the USA with the EU, and its member states
of Sweden, the UK, and Ireland. The female employment rate in
each is just less than 50 per cent. The USA does poorly on indica-
tors of pay gap and income share as compared with the others, but
better on the proportion of women in managerial jobs.
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Table 9.11 Gendered economic inequality, USA, EU
USA EU Ireland Sweden UK
Female per cent of workforce (1) 46 45 43 47 45
Female per cent of non-agricultural workforce (2) 48 45 48 51 49
Gender pay gap (3) 22 15 9 16 21
Ratio of female to male earned income (4) .63 .53 .81 .66
Female per cent of legislators, senior officials 42 31 30 34
and managers (5)
(1) Female per cent of the workforce, 2006. EU is EU27 (calculated from WBI). Source: World
Bank (2008).
(2) Female share of non-agricultural workforce, 2004. EU is EMU. Source: World Bank (2007b).
(3) The gender pay gap is the difference between the average gross hourly earnings of male paid
employees and female paid employees. The population is paid employees aged 16–64 work-
ing 15 or more hours a week. EU is EU27. Source: Eurostat (2008). Data for the USA are 1998,
for persons aged 20–64, from OECD (2002a: Table 2.15).
(4) Data for most recent year 1996–2005. The estimates are based on the gender pay gap and
gender gap in employment rates. Source: UNDP (2007a: Table 29).
(5) Female per cent of legislators, senior officials and managers. Data for most recent available
year 1994–2005. Source: UNDP (2007a: Table 29).
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Gender-based changes in employment show decreasing inequality:
decreases in the gender employment gap and the gender pay gap,
the disproportionality of share of earned income and of presence
in top jobs.
The Intersection of gender and class inequality in the household
Inequalities between households are the outcome of the intersec-
tion of class and gender inequalities in the household; the confla-
tion or reduction of these to class-based inequalities is a mistake.
With the transformation of the gender regime from a domestic to a
public form, there is an increase in the relative importance of the
individual rather than the household as the unit of analysis because
of the increased significance of the complicated changes in gender
relations for overall changes in economic inequality.
The household is at the intersection of class-based and gender-based
changes. Class-based changes in employment are tending to increase
inequality at least in the spread of wages at both top and bottom ends
of the labour market. Gender-based changes in employment are
decreasing gender-based inequality: there are decreases in the gender
employment gap, the gender pay gap, male disproportionality in
earned income, and male over-representation in top jobs. However,
increases in the overall wage spread in most countries have encom-
passed the narrowing of the gender gaps within this overall change.
The intersection of class and gender in households is affected by
the composition and structure of the households in several ways,
including two major forms: the differential distribution of female
employment across the pay and household distributions, and the
changing composition and structure of households.
First, in those countries where there is not yet full female
employment, those women who are in employment are dispropor-
tionately at the upper end of the educational and wage distribu-
tions. Since partners and spouses tend to be from the same position
in socio-economic hierarchies, this differential female employment
has the consequence of boosting the household incomes of the
households in the upper part of the distribution relative to those at
the bottom, thereby increasing the inequality between households.
Second, there has been an increase in lone mother households,
which are disproportionately poor. This aspect of the process has
often been linked to a thesis of the feminization of poverty (Pearce
1978; Northrop 1990). An increase in the proportion of lone mother
households is likely to lead to an increase in inequalities between
households, since these are typically poor with at best one female
income. This form of household has been growing in many countries
in the last half century as a consequence of a series of changes in the
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gender regime (for example, the percentage of births out of wedlock
rose from 11.5 per cent to 41.5 per cent in the UK between 1980
and 2003, as compared with a rise in Ireland from 2.4 per cent to
11.3 per cent between 1960 and 2003), though to widely varying
extents, especially in countries that have a more public gender
regime and a more neoliberal form (lone mother households make
up 23 per cent of households with dependent children in the UK as
compared with 17 per cent in Ireland and 7 per cent in Spain). The
extent of the impact of the growth in lone mother households on the
income distribution between households varies with the extent to
which this household form is supported not only by female employ-
ment but also by state welfare transfers: they are less well supported
and more in poverty in neoliberal countries (for example, over 50
per cent of lone mother households in Ireland and just over 30 per cent
in the UK are in poverty as compared with just over 10 per cent in
Sweden: these data are from Trifiletti 2007). The implication of these
changes in household structure is that an important part of the increase
in inequality between households is due to the intersection of changes
in the gender regime with class relations. It is not a class issue alone.
The rise in lone motherhood is a significant contributor to both gen-
der inequality and to inequality between households. While this has
been a widespread development, especially in the North, it is highly
uneven. There are several contributory factors. It might be thought that
high rates of divorce and high rates of births outside of marriage would
be important. However, in a comparison of the USA with Sweden, the
UK and Ireland (see Table 9.12), Sweden – despite the highest rate of
births outside of marriage and a moderate divorce rate – has the low-
est rate of single parent households. It is Ireland that has the highest
rate of single parent households, despite a very low divorce rate and
the lowest rate of births outside of marriage. A key reason for the low
rate of single parenthood in Sweden and its high rate in Ireland is the
rate of cohabitation, which is high in Sweden and low in Ireland. In
Sweden most parents live in partnerships, even though these may well
not be marriages. The permeability of marriage and partnerships in
Sweden is a protection against lone parenthood and not its cause. This
is supported by the high level of state expenditure on children, so that
a significant part of the costs of raising children is borne collectively
rather than by specific parents. Perhaps the permeability of marriage
and partnerships with low risks of poverty and lone motherhood might
be seen as an indicator of progress. The social democratic family and
household forms reduce the risk of poverty and lone parenthood as
compared with practices in more neoliberal countries.
The use of the household as a unit in the analysis of inequality
needs to be rethought. It is often interpreted as if it were a measureG
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Table 9.12 Household forms, sexual and reproductive rights, USA, Ireland,
Sweden, UK
USA Ireland Sweden UK
Household form (1)
Single parent households 8.7 11.7 5.8 6.0
Per cent births outside of marriage 33.2 31.8 55.3 39.5
Divorce rate 6.2 1.0 3.8 4.0
Co-habitation as per cent of all couples 7 4 23 11
Fertility rate (2) 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.7
Sexual and reproductive rights
Abortion rights (3) 3 4 1 2
Restriction of contraception (4) 1 2 1 1
(1) Source: Martin and Kats (2003).
(2) Fertility is births per woman, 2004. EU is EMU. Source: World Bank (2006b).
(3) In this ranking, 1–5, a low number indicates little legal restriction on abortion, while 4 indicates
great legal restriction on abortion. Sources: USA: Ferree et al. (2002b). USA allows abortion in
the first trimester (first three months of pregnancy) with varying forms of restriction; in the USA
there is variability between states; in the UK there is legal abortion for the first two trimesters
dependent upon easily obtained medical judgement there is a medical or (effectively) social
need, except for Northern Ireland where abortion remains illegal; in Ireland abortion has barely
emerged from a constitutional ban even in cases of rape.
(4) In this ranking, 1–4, a low number indicates little legal restriction on contraception, while 4
indicates a great legal restriction on contraception. Contraception is legal in the USA, and
the UK, legal but opposed by the church in Ireland.
of class-based inequality that is predominantly determined by
changes in male employment patterns. Instead it is a site of the
complex intersection of class-based and gender-based changes in
both the employment structure and the household structure. The
dynamic of the gender changes is often in contrary directions: the
increase in women’s employment and presence in top jobs – with
a narrowing of the gender gaps in employment and shares of
earned income – reduces gender-based inequalities, while the
increase in the proportion of households headed by women – both
as elderly single households and younger lone mothers – increases
gender inequality. The intersection of these gendered changes with
changes in class-based employment produces a complex outcome
which is not reducible to class. The household should not be used
as the sole or primary unit in analyses of economic inequality,
although it remains useful and relevant. It is important to use indi-
viduals as the unit of analysis as well as the household.
Economic inequalities and flows
Not all economic inequalities are easily measured within country-
based units or the whole world. Flows of people around the world
have significant impacts on inequalities. Some flows are of elite
Walby-3874-Ch-09:Walby-3874-Ch-09.qxp  23/06/2009  4:05 PM  Page 339
groups that are able to cross frontiers with ease to conduct business
and politics at a global level. Other flows concern people who are
considered as not legally entitled to cross borders yet do so
nonetheless, but at the expense of their loss of citizenship rights and
their ensuing vulnerability to unscrupulous profit-hungry employers
and people-traffickers. Many flows are in between – neither illegal
nor performed with ease but generating complex patterns of advan-
tage and disadvantage, increasing and decreasing specific inequali-
ties. These include long-term and short-term economic migrants,
receiving wages that are low relative to the host country but high
relative to their country of origin, with the flows of remittances pro-
ducing further complex effects on patterns of inequalities.
Economic inequalities in summary
Is the unit in which we should think of inequality that of specific
countries or the whole world? The answer is both: we live neither
in hermetically sealed nation-states nor in a fully globalized world.
Both units of analysis are relevant, not just one or the other. The
most important reference groups for most people are still country
specific, though for transnational migrants and finance capital the
world is a more pertinent unit. The whole world will become more
relevant to more people as the unit with which to think about
inequality as global flows increase. In the meantime both frames of
reference are pertinent. Changes in economic inequality are due to
both global and national changes, as is indicated in Chapter 3.
Global processes both increase and decrease economic inequali-
ties in an interaction with national processes. Within country
inequality has increased in some but not all countries. Global eco-
nomic inequalities would have continued to increase, except that
China is narrowing the gap with the North and is thereby reducing
the average global inequality. Some of these changes are due to
global economic processes; some are due to the spread of neolib-
eral forms of capitalism, a political rather than economic process;
some come from country-level processes. There are some countries
where economic inequality has not increased as well as those where
it has. There are differences in the trajectory of class and gender
inequality and other complex inequalities which are not reducible
to each other. Diverse global processes – including global flows,
networks, hegemons, institutions, and waves – restructure economic
inequality, not as a single linear process but rather by coevolving.
Changes in gendered economic inequality do not map simply onto
changes in class-led forms of economic inequality. There are reductions
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in gendered economic inequality in many places, consequent on the
transformation of the gender regime and the increase in women’s
waged labour. This has often been left out of focus not only as a con-
sequence of theoretical and conceptual priorities, but also because of
the tendency to measure empirical economic inequality in terms of
inequalities between households rather than inequalities between
individuals. Using the household as the unit in these analyses
obscures or even erases the gender dimension to inequality.
Global processes are not simply increasing or decreasing eco-
nomic inequalities, but instead are restructuring them in regionally
differentiated and path dependent forms.
Inequalities in non-economic domains
While the economic domain is the area to which the principle of
equality is most often applied, it is not the only one. There are
equality issues in all domains, including the polity, violence, and
civil society. However, while equality has been applied to some
aspects of the polity, its application to civil society and violence has
been very restricted. Many of the issues concerning progress in
relation to the intersection of civil society and the polity have been
addressed through the frame of human rights and so are addressed
in the next section. Issues concerning violence are addressed in a
later section in which their relationship with equality and other
progress framings is considered.
Are non-economic inequalities increasing or decreasing? Are
these changes associated with global processes? The main issue of
equality in the polity is that of equal access for all citizens to polit-
ical power, as is aspired to though rarely fully achieved in democ-
racies. In violence there are inequalities in its deployment and
regulation (addressed later). In civil society there are inequalities in
access to civil liberties such as free speech and association
(addressed in the section on human rights).
Democracy
Is there an increase in democracy around the world? Using the defin-
ition of democracy as suffrage-democracy, there has been an increase
in democratic aspects of government during and since the twentieth
century. Using data from Freedom House on civil liberties and politi-
cal rights, Rummel (2008) finds a steady increase in democracy during
the twentieth century. Similar findings of an increase in democracy are
located using slightly different data and concepts from the Polity IV
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Project, as shown in Figure 9.3. Substantial evidence exists that there
has been an increase in suffrage-democracy over the last century.
However, the definitions of democracy used in these analyses are
fairly minimal – they focus on universal suffrage, free elections, free
speech and association, and an absence of hereditary power. They do
not include deeper aspects of democracy, such as the presence in par-
liament or the breadth of application of the democratic principle.
Three main levels of democracy using ten aspects were identified in
Chapter 4 on polities: suffrage-democracy (1–5), presence-democ-
racy (in addition 6–9) and deep-democracy (in addition 10).
A key aspect of presence-democracy is the election of members
of parliament that are proportionate to their presence in the popu-
lation. In the case of gender there has been a slow and uneven
increase since women were first entitled to vote. The proportion of
women elected to the lower house of parliaments around the world
was 12 per cent in 1997 and rose to 18 per cent in 2008 (Inter-
Parliamentary Union 2008).
Using these criteria of the deepening of democracy, the compara-
tive trajectory of the USA, the UK, Ireland, and Sweden, together with
the EU institutions, is summarized in Table 9.13 (for sources here see
Chapter 4 on polities), which shows the uneven development of
democracy in these countries, with the deepest being in Sweden.G
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Figure 9.3 Increase in democracy and decline of autocracy, 1946–2006
Source: Polity IV Project (2008) http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
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Table 9.13 Depth of Democracy: USA, Ireland, Sweden, UK, EU
USA Ireland Sweden UK EU
No hereditaries Yes 11/60 appointed Monarch, no Monarch, Yes
or unelecteds to 2nd chamber; powers since few powers;
Republic 1937 1975; very hereditary and
few since appointed
1907/9 2nd chamber
No colonies Yes (but Yes Yes Since 1970s Yes
territories:
American
Samoa, Guam,
Marianas
Islands, Puerto
Rico, US Virgin
Islands);
Guantanamo
Bay
No religious Yes, but some Catholic Church Yes Yes Yes
governance fundamentalism
Suffrage Majority ethnic Men Men Men Men,
men 1776 1884/1918/1922 1909/1918 1884/1918 women
Majority ethnic Women 1922 Women Women 1979
women 1920; 1918/1920 1918/1928
African-American
1968
Free elections Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Low-cost High cost Low cost, Low cost, Low cost, Low cost,
electioneering legal cap custom legal cap custom
Proportional No Yes Yes No Yes
representation
Quotas No No Yes No No
Proportionate (a) 16 per (a) 13 per (a) 47 per (a) 20 per (a) 30
presence (a) cent women cent women cent women cent women per cent
parliamentary 16/31 per (b) 21.4 per 1994: >40 2/10 per cent women
(b) ministerial cent ethnic cent women per cent ethnic
(1) (b) 14.3 per (b) 52.4 per (b) 28.6 per
cent women cent women cent women
Range of Very narrow Narrow Broad Medium Narrow
institutions
1. No hereditary or unelected positions, including monarch and members in either chamber of
Parliament.
2. No colonies; i.e. no governance of territories that do not also meet these criteria.
3. No powers of governance held by additional non-democratic polity, e.g. organized religion.
4. Universal suffrage, de facto as well as de jure.
5. Elections, especially those that are free, fair, and competitive; in a context of free speech and
free association and developed civil society associations.
6. Low cost of electioneering, either by law or by custom.
7. Electoral system with proportional representation.
8. Electoral system with quotas for under-represented groups such as women.
9. Proportionate presence in parliament of women and minorities.
10. Wide range of institutions (e.g. welfare services) governed by the democratic polity.
(1) Data for 2005. Source: UNDP (2007a: Table 33); original source: Inter-Parliamentary Union.
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There has been a decline in political inequalities due to the increase
in suffrage democracy around the world over the last century, which
is substantial despite variations and setbacks. There have also been
increases in deeper forms of democracy, especially presence-
democracy, in the increase in women’s presence in parliaments
around the world. However, the developments in presence-
democracy and in the application of the democratic principle are
highly uneven. They are more common in the developed world,
but are not confined to there – for example, Rwanda has a higher
proportion of women in its parliament than any other country. In
the developed world they are more commonly to be found in
more social democratic countries, such as the Nordics, than
neoliberal countries, such as the USA and UK.
Human Rights
The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948,
remains the defining statement on the content of human rights,
despite some additions in later years. The 30 Articles proclaim every-
one’s right to: dignity; life, liberty, and the security of the person; the
absence of slavery; the absence of torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment; to legal personhood; to equal-
ity before the law; to the absence of arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile; to a fair trial; to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; to
privacy; to freedom of movement and residence; to asylum; to a
nationality; to own property; to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; to freedom of opinion and expression; to peaceful assem-
bly and association; to take part in government where the will of the
people expressed in free elections by universal suffrage is the basis
of the government’s authority; to the economic, social, and cultural
rights needed for dignity and the free development of one’s per-
sonality; to the right to work, without discrimination, to equal pay
for equal work, to just remuneration, to form and join trade unions;
to rest, leisure and reasonable working hours; to a standard of liv-
ing that is adequate for health and well-being, including security in
the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old
age, and other circumstances beyond control; to education; and to
participate freely in the cultural life of the community.
These universal human rights have been clarified and expanded in
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966,
nine core international human rights treaties, and many universalG
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human rights instruments. Two key additions have been on violence:
one declaring violence against women to be a violation of women’s
human rights in 1993, and one aiming at the abolition of the death
penalty in 2007. There is significant variation in the extent to which
states have signed up to these conventions – sometimes signing with-
out ratifying, sometimes signing only with reservations.
The extent to which civil liberties and political rights are realized in
practice has been assessed by Freedom House (2008) using indicators
that are based on an interpretation of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UN 1948) by Gastil (1982). There are two scales, one
for political rights and the second for civil liberties, each with an index
from 1–7, based on specific questions about their practical existence.
According to the Freedom House approach, between 1972 and 2007 a
substantial number of countries around the world improved their rank-
ings on these indicators. Most developed countries (including the USA,
the UK, Sweden, and Ireland) have achieved the highest levels of civil
and political liberties – one on both counts. However, there are several
areas where the Freedom House interpretation of political rights and
civil liberties might underestimate the current breadth of the human
rights covered by the UN instruments. For example, they do not
include recent additions such as the abolition of the death penalty or
violence against women. Nor do they include recent expansive inter-
pretations such as those on sexual and reproductive rights.
Many countries have given up the use of the death penalty in law
or practice during the last half century. In 1948 only eight countries
had abolished the death penalty; in 1977 this had risen to 16; in 2006
to 87; and in 2007 to 133 when non-use is included. No country can
join the EU without renouncing this punishment (Amnesty
International 2006; Council of Europe 2006). In 1976, and against the
global trend, the USA reintroduced the death penalty (Clark County
Prosecuting Attorney 2007). In 2006 only 25 countries carried out the
death penalty, with 91 per cent of these 1,591 executions in China,
Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan, and the USA (Amnesty International 2006).
A further area of contestation over the interpretation of human
rights concerns the sexual and reproductive rights of women. These
have been repeatedly raised in the UN Conferences on women,
including the major conference in 1995 in Beijing which produced
the Platform for Action (UN 1995). There is wide variation in the
extent of legal restriction on abortion. The United States allows
abortion in the first trimester (the first three months of pregnancy)
with varying forms of restriction, and there is variability between
states; in the UK there is legal abortion available for the first two
trimesters, dependent upon an easily obtained medical judgement
that there is a medical or (effectively) social need, except for
Walby-3874-Ch-09:Walby-3874-Ch-09.qxp  23/06/2009  4:05 PM  Page 345
Northern Ireland where abortion remains illegal; in Ireland abortion
has barely emerged from a constitutional ban even in cases of rape.
Sweden has the least restrictions on abortion (Ferree et al. 2002b;
Center for Reproductive Rights 2007) (see Table 9.12).
While marriage and divorce are available in most countries, there
are severe limitations on divorce in some. While divorce is readily
available in the USA, Sweden, and the UK, it has only recently been
legalized in Ireland and the conditions attached to this preclude
clean breaks. The right to freely express one’s sexuality is restricted
in those countries that limit or make illegal gay and lesbian sexual-
ity. There are variations between the four countries above in the
extent to which same sex partnerships are recognized in institutional
settings.
While there have been many instances of increases in the practi-
cal availability of human rights since the 1948 UN Declaration,
these have been and remain uneven both between countries and
over time. In some countries there have been reductions in specific
human rights during this period (for instance, coercive interrogation
techniques utilized by the USA in Guantanamo Bay and various
outsourced locations, which many consider extend to torture, is
one example of regress).
Human Development, Well-Being,
and Capabilities
The fourth framing of progress is the newest: human development,
well-being, and capabilities are its various names. It includes a range
of issues beyond economic development yet more economically ori-
ented than human rights; it is concerned with excessive inequalities,
not equality in general. The human development approach, some-
times referred to as well-being or capabilities, is a major challenge to
a singular focus on economic development and growth – there is
more to the quality of life than having more money. This approach
does not intrinsically reject economic development, rather it subor-
dinates economic development to being one of the means by which
these wider goals are to be reached. It is no longer an end in itself.
Analytic work on this vision of progress has taken disparate forms,
in particular there is a division between the development of its opera-
tionalization in quantitative indicators of outcomes by the UNDP
(1990) and the UN Millennium Development Goals projects (2007c)
and their analysts (Bardhan and Klasen 1999; Abu-Ghaida and Klasen
2004), and the development of nuanced distinctions between variousG
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capabilities and functionings in the more philosophical literature. The
theoretical work most often seen to underpin this approach to progress
is led by Sen (1997, 1999) and developed by others (Nussbaum 2000;
Robeyns 2003). Sen, however, has hesitated to endorse any given list
of capabilities, at least partly because of the priority that he gives to the
processes of democratic deliberation in their determination. Nussbaum
by contrast has offered a list of ten central human capabilities derived
from the philosophical literature: life and not dying prematurely;
bodily health, including good health, reproductive health, and shelter;
bodily integrity, including the freedom to be mobile, to be secure
from violent assault including domestic violence, and opportunities
for sexual satisfaction; being able to use the senses, imagination, and
thought in a way that is informed and cultivated by education, as well
as freedom of expression and religion; being able to have emotional
attachments; being able to engage in practical reason and reflection;
being able to affiliate with others and to receive social respect, what-
ever one’s race or sex; being able to live with other species success-
fully; being able to play; being able to participate politically, to hold
property, and to enter decent employment.
The distinction between capability and functioning derives from
Sen. Capabilities are what we could do or ‘substantive freedoms’;
functionings are what we actually do. This distinction embeds choice
between a diverse range of possible goals into the heart of the frame-
work. Such diversity among possible preferred goals or outcomes is
hard to reconcile with the notion of a single standard against which
an outcome can be assessed. Choices are also notoriously open to
influence from the powerful: indeed Sen himself notes that people
often adapt their preferences to the current balance of power, which
means that subjective preferences are not the best way to set stan-
dards against which to measure progress. Further, is there any prac-
tical way of measuring a capability except as an outcome, that is, by
taking functioning as an indicator of capability? The answer here
must be no, or at least that one has not yet been developed
(Equalities Review 2007). Hence the UNDP and MDG approaches to
the operationalization of the concepts of human development and
well-being as outcomes are the ones utilized here.
One key indicator of human well-being is that of longevity or
how long people live. More complex hybrid indicators have been
proposed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP
2007b), and within the United Nations Millennium Development
Goals (UN 2007a). The EU has an Employment Strategy that incor-
porates social cohesion alongside economic growth (European
Commission 2007f). The UK Equalities Review (2007) drew on a
capabilities framing for developing indicators.
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Life-expectancy is the simplest, most meaningful, and most
robust indicator of human well-being. It commands much consen-
sus as a value which is perhaps closer to a universal agreement
across cultures than any other. It is also methodologically robust,
being well-recorded and hence easier to measure than many of the
other concepts associated with human well-being, lending itself to
reliable comparisons over time and between countries. However,
one limitation is that it is not always equally recorded for different
equality groups.
Life-expectancy has increased over time around the world, but
remains highly uneven between global regions (see Table 9.14).
Among the world’s regions, the high income OECD countries have
the longest life expectancy in the world.
There are significant differences between OECD countries. Americans
live on average two years less than people in the EU (77.7 years as com-
pared with 79.7); and as compared with the UK and Ireland, people in
Sweden live the longest (80.6 years on average) (see Table 9.14).
Longevity is perhaps the most important form of inequality. Being
on the wrong side of class and ethnic inequalities shortens your life.
Men in the lowest social class in the UK live seven years less than
men in the highest social class (78.5 years for Class I professionals
and 71.1 years for Class V unskilled). In the UK, men from social
class, I, professionals, have a life-expectancy of 78.5 years, while
men from the social class, V, unskilled workers, live on average 7.4
years less, at 71.1 years. This is based on life-expectancy at birth,
(1997–1999: ONS 2002). African-Americans live five years less than
white people in the USA (72.3 years for African-Americans and 77.7
years for white people). This is based on estimates of life-expectancy
at birth in turn based on estimates of the postcensal US resident pop-
ulation and data from death certificates (Health, United States 2004).
Are countries becoming less or more unequal? In the USA the White-
Black gap in life-expectancy, while substantial, is narrower than it was.
A hundred years ago the US White-Black gap in life-expectancy was
15 years – nine years more than it is today. In 1900 the gap between
White and Black life-expectancy was 14.6 years instead of 5.4 years in
2002 – 47.6 years for whites and 33.0 for Black or African-Americans
in 1900 (Health, United States 2004b). However, the class gap in
longevity for British men has widened by nearly a year in the last 30
years. In 1999 the class gap in longevity for UK men was 0.7 years
larger than it was in 1972 (Office for National Statistics 2002). The
dynamics of class and ethnic forms of inequalities are not the same.
While length of life is usually measured as the entire length of
the life-span, there are significant variations in mortality in infancy
and for mothers during childbirth (see Table 9.15). Rates of infant,G
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child, and especially maternal mortality (MDG indicators 4.2, 4.1
and 5.1) are much higher in the world as a whole than those in the
USA and EU. The USA has nearly double the rate of infant and child
(under five years) mortality of the EU. It also has rates of maternal
mortality that are eight times those in Sweden, three times those in
Ireland, and somewhat more than rates in the UK.
An emerging health problem in the developed world is that of
over-weight, which is linked to a series of health problems
including premature death. Americans are much more likely to
be obese than Europeans. In the USA 39 per cent of people are
obese as compared with 11 per cent in Sweden, 10 per cent in
Ireland, and 23 per cent in the UK (World Health Organization
2007; see Table 9.15). The USA, the most neoliberal country with
perhaps the least regulation of food production and marketing,
has the highest rate of obesity.
Living longer is only one part of human capabilities. The UNDP
Human Development Indicator (HDI) is made up of three parts:
longevity, income per capita, and education (both achieved
literacy and the current educational enrolment). The annual
HDR report has expanded to include detailed alternative perfor-
mance indicators and statistics on many diverse aspects of
human well-being.
The UN Millennium Development Goals (UN 2007a) intro-
duced in 2000 are oriented towards human development,
while also including economic development and a commitment
to reduce excessive inequality. This range of eight goals, 18 targets
and 48 indicators significantly extended the range of issues that
were to have policy priority. The eight goals are to: eradicate
extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education;
promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mor-
tality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria andG
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Table 9.15 Child and maternal mortality, obesity, world, USA, EU, Ireland,
Sweden, UK
World USA EU Ireland Sweden UK
Infant mortality (1) 51 7 4 5 3 5
Child (under 5) mortality (2) 75 8 5 6 4 6
Maternal mortality (3) 410 17 5 2 13
Per cent obese (4) 39 10 11 23
(1) Infant mortality rate, per 1,000 births. 2004. EU is EMU. Source: World Bank (2006c).
(2) Child (under five years) mortality rate, per 1,000 births. 2004. EU is EMU. Source: World Bank
(2006c).
(3) Maternal mortality, per 100,000 live births. 2000. Source: World Bank (2006b).
(4) Per cent of population over 15 years is obese, BMI >30. 2005. Source: World Health
Organization (2007).
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other diseases; ensure environmental stability; and develop a global
partnership for development.
Developing education is a key component in most accounts of
human development, well-being, and capabilities. It is part of the
original UNDP Human Development Indicator and one of the
Millennium Development Goals. The targets for developing countries
are focused on primary education and on literacy. Primary education
completion rates have increased between 1999 and 2005, though
considerable variations remain between global regions and in some
countries girls are less likely to go to school than boys (UN MDG
2007a) (see Table 9.16).
In developed countries the focus is more on tertiary education.
While the USA has higher enrolments in tertiary education than the
EU, this level is matched by Sweden. The ratio of women to men in
tertiary education is similar in the USA and the EU, though higher in
Sweden (in all these countries more women are enrolled than men)
(see Table 9.17).
While the full operationalization of the framing of progress as
human development, well-being, or capabilities is not yet com-
plete, the key indicator of longevity provides a robust challenge to
a simple approach to economic development. While people do
tend to live longer in richer countries, the association between
income and longevity is loose rather than tight. People in the EU
live longer and on less income than those in the USA. The social as
well as economic system matters for human well-being.
Table 9.16 Primary education completion rates (%), by sex, 1999, 2005,
world, developing, and developed regions
1999 1999 2005 2005
Boys Girls Boys Girls
World 86 80 90 85
Developing regions 84 77 89 83
Developed regions 98 99 99 97
Source: UN (2007a). Indicator 2.2.
Table 9.17 Tertiary education, USA, EU, Ireland, Sweden, UK
USA EU Ireland Sweden UK
Tertiary education enrolment (1) 83 62 59 84 60
Ratio of female to male tertiary education (2) 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.4
(1) Gross enrolment in tertiary education, as a percentage of potential enrolment. 2004.
Source: World Bank (2006c).
(2) Ratio of female to male tertiary education enrolment, 2004. EU is EMU. Source: World Bank
(2006c).
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Key Indicator Sets: What
Indicators? What Underlying
Concepts of Progress?
There are sets of indicators of progress that are intended to have
global relevance. The point of departure for most of these is eco-
nomic development and growth. This has been the premier goal for
many national and international governmental bodies such as the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and for many this is
still the case. However, there have been several attempts to move
beyond this rather narrow concept of economic development towards
the broader concept of human development. These moves have taken
place in particular on a global level in UN bodies, such as can be
found in the United Nations Development Project, though there are
in addition some significant developments in the EU. An alternative
approach is one based on human rights which is focused on civil lib-
erties, excessive violence, and suffrage-democracy, rather than on the
economic domain.
From its first Human Development report in 1990 and every year
since, the UNDP has sought to broaden the goal of development
from a narrow economic focus to a broader human development.
The annual report presented by the United Nations Development
Project constitutes an alternative assessment of global economic
progress to that of the global financial institutions, drawing on the
intellectual work of Amartya Sen. Its first indicator – the Human
Development Indicator – combined income per person with
longevity and education (literacy as well as educational enrolment).
In 1995, this was gendered in the Gender-related Development
Index, with the female share of earned income, gendered longevity,
and gendered education, and the Gender Empowerment Measure,
with the proportionate female presence in top jobs (managers and
professionals) and parliamentary seats (UNDP 1995). One disad-
vantage of the GDI is that it conflates the absolute level of devel-
opment with a gender relationship in a single index (Dijkstra 2002;
Dijkstra and Hanmer 2002). Second, for technical reasons, differ-
ences in the level of countries’ GDI is overwhelmingly driven by
one component – income share – which is itself predominantly dri-
ven by the employment rate (Bardhan and Klasen 1999). It is
preferable to analyse the components of the indices separately, as
is done here. Recent reports include key statistics on a range of
aspects of the human condition, including environmental sustain-
ability. They are predominantly outcome indicators: just a few areG
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policy focused, such as governmental expenditures on education
and the military. The UNDP indicator analysis is supported by a
global social science epistemic community around development,
which provides analytic expertise and policy support. This is fed by
the more radical social movements that are pro global justice and
anti-capitalist, especially when they have taken the form of global
waves, challenging if not overcoming the distinction between the
field of ‘development’ and that of ‘globalization’.
The UN Millennium Development Goals launched in 2000 were the
next stage of development for global indicators of human development.
These contained more goals than HDI, and a more complexly defined
relationship between goals, indicators, and targets. Most important was
the wider buy-in into this set of goals, which extended beyond the
development community that supported the UNDP indicators and also
included the global financial institutions of the IMF and World Bank and
the rich countries club of the OECD (Millennium Development Goals
2004). The Millennium Development Goals represent a compromise
between the focus on economic growth and that on human well-being.
Economic development is included, but is also centred on human devel-
opment. Poverty is a more important concept than inequality in this indi-
cator set, although one measure of inequality exists as an indicator of
poverty and the gender goal is defined in terms of equality. Again the
focus is led by the economic domain though this is inclusive of its wel-
fare aspects. The goals are outcome and well-being focused, with a con-
cern for poverty, education, and health that is consistent with a
capabilities approach. There is some limited concern with equality,
including gender equality in education, employment, and parliamentary
representation, and also with the extent of poverty. One other goal con-
cerns environmental sustainability. Gaps however remain in the areas
covered by the MDG. There is little on human rights, especially sexual
and reproductive rights, and nothing on violence. Several of the goals
and almost all of the targets are primarily concerned with developing
countries. Nevertheless, comparable data exist on the issues raised by
the MDG at levels that are relevant to developed countries. These
include: education (tertiary); child and maternal mortality; disease/health
(obesity); and environmental sustainability (emission of carbon dioxide).
A contrasting indicator set is that of the Freedom House Index of
Civil Liberties and Political Rights, published since 1972. This is
based on Gastil’s interpretation of UN Universal Human Rights and
as a result is centred on a free civil society, suffrage-democracy, and
the avoidance of excessive violence. As such it is often considered
to be part of the Western liberal individualist tradition. But while the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes a small reference to
economic issues, this is omitted from the Freedom House index.
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Neither does it include the issues of excessive violence included in
the Human Rights declaration, nor the 1993 UN extension of the
concept of human rights to violence against women.
The OECD produces indicators based on syntheses of research
and data (e.g. protective legislation: OECD 2002a), against which
evaluations can be made, however, it does not have its own pre-
ferred indicator list.
The EU has generated several sets of indicators, including:
Indicators of Social Inclusion (European Commission 2006);
Indicators for the European Employment Strategy (European
Commission 2007f); and Indicators of Equality between Women
and Men (European Commission 2008). The focus for the indicators
of social inclusion is poverty rather than inequality; poverty is seen
as an excessive inequality that is a major factor in social exclusion.
The employment guidelines contain minor components concerning
gender and age components that are simultaneously about equal-
ity, inclusion, and the increased productivity of the economy.
However, the indicators on equality between women and men are
led by the concept of equality. The EU institution of Eurostat
ensures harmonization in data collection and the production of
indicators, though the prioritization of indicators is highly political.
Development of the transnational indicator sets draws simultaneously
on contesting visions of progress and detailed technical work. The early
focus of indicators on economic growth and development was chal-
lenged and replaced by a broader set of concerns including human
development and justice, though important omissions still remain.
Extending the Frameworks and
Indicators of Progress: Where do
Environmental Sustainability and
Violence Fit?
Two major issues that are not well articulated within the major fram-
ings of progress are environmental sustainability and violence. It is
possible to squeeze them in, but they cannot be comfortably located.
In the case of environmental sustainability this is partly due to its rel-
atively recent arrival on the political and hence social theory land-
scape, but the same cannot be said of violence which has long been
a political issue but yet remains marginal in social theory. How might
they each be conceptualized within different framings of progress?G
lo
b
al
iz
at
io
n
an
d
In
eq
u
al
iti
es
354
Walby-3874-Ch-09:Walby-3874-Ch-09.qxp  23/06/2009  4:05 PM  Page 354
M
easu
rin
g
P
ro
gress
355
Environmental sustainability
Environmental sustainability concerns the present and the future,
both immediate and in the longer term. Certain forms of economic
development are not sustainable, including in particular those that
increase the gases that create the greenhouse effect, heating up the
world and leading to extreme weather conditions and regionally
specific drought and flooding, with adverse outcomes for food pro-
duction, health, and survival (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change 2007). Environmental sustainability fits best within the
frame of (in)equality (though this is only rarely recognized) and
could be fitted into the outcome-oriented version of human devel-
opment and well-being, though less so into the capabilities version.
While it impacts on economic development it is marginal to its def-
inition; it is hard to fit into human rights.
Economic development will be brought to a halt unless it takes
a form that is environmentally sustainable. Environmental catastro-
phes, such as global heating, would bring an end to economic
growth and would replace it with economic decline. However,
while environmental sustainability constitutes an important limit to
economic development it is not part of its usual operationalization,
which is limited to current levels of economic development and
rates of growth.
A decline in global environmental sustainability is a matter of
equality because it is the poor and future generations who will suf-
fer most from environmental degradation (Roberts and Parks 2007).
The people who are most subject to the worst effects of a decline
in environmental quality are those in the global South, those who
are already poor, and future generations. Those who have the least
resources are most vulnerable to the consequences of the rise in
sea level that follows global warming, to shortages of food, and
other aspects of environmental degradation. There is also inequal-
ity between generations, as those in the future will run out of fos-
sil fuels (peak oil production is about now) and will suffer the
long-term consequences of irreversible global changes (IPCC 2007;
Roberts and Parks 2007; Stern 2007; UNDP 2007a).
It is hard to fit environmental sustainability into the frame of
human rights, except in the abstract and general way as compro-
mising the right to life.
The human development and well-being approach is perhaps
the most flexible way of framing progress in encompassing new
challenges, of which environmental sustainability is a key exam-
ple. The degradation of the quality of life and the limits to human
development consequent on the loss of environmental quality can
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be conceptualized as a loss in human capabilities. This is better
approached as an outcome, rather than as an opportunity.
The importance of avoiding global warming (or heating) is rec-
ognized at a global level as a consequence of pressure from a wave
of environmental activism combined with rigorous scientific evi-
dence, and a change in some governmental policies, leading to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. In the Kyoto
Protocol in 1997 (Kyoto Protocol 1997), produced under the aus-
pices of the United Nations, developed countries agreed to reduce
their emission of greenhouse gases by at least 5 per cent below
1990 levels during the period 2008 to 2012 if enough countries
signed on. Today most countries – with the current notable excep-
tion of the USA – have signed the Protocol and it came into force in
2005 (United Nations FCCC 2007). A new round of negotiations took
place in Bali in 2007, following the report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (2007).
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Table 9.18 Carbon dioxide emissions, world, developing and developed
regions
1990 2004
World 4.3 4.5
Developed regions 10.3 12.4
Developing regions 1.7 2.4
Per capita emissions (metric tons)
Source: United Nations (2008) Indicator 7.2.
Table 9.19 Carbon dioxide emissions, USA, EU, Sweden, UK, Ireland
USA EU Sweden UK Ireland
Carbon dioxide emissions, metric tons per 19.9 8.2 5.9 9.4 10.4
person (1)
Carbon dioxide emissions, Kg per $ of GDP (2) 0.56 0.32 0.22 0.34 0.30
(1) Carbon dioxide emissions as a result of burning fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement,
per capita. Data for 2003. EU is EMU. Source: World Bank (2007b).
(2) Carbon dioxide emissions as a result of burning fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement,
per international dollar of GDP, adjusted for PPP. Data for 2003. EU is EMU. Source: World
Bank (2007b).
The emission of carbon dioxide, the most important of the green-
house gases, is varied between different countries, as is shown in
Table 9.18 and Table 9.19. The developed world produces around
three times as many CO2 emissions per person as the developing
world. The USA produces more than double the amount of carbon
dioxide per inhabitant than the EU. This is only partly as a result of
a higher level of economic development and standard of living; per
dollar’s worth of goods and services produced, the USA produces
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nearly twice as much CO2 than the EU and two and a half times
that of Sweden. Social democratic countries have lower emissions
of carbon dioxide not only per person, but also for the production
of a standardized amount of goods and services.
Violence
While violence has many implications for economic development,
human well-being, equality and human rights, it is rarely integrated
into any of these framings of progress in a systematic way. Violence
by the state, groups, or by individuals has not been included within
conventional indicators of well-being, equality, or human rights con-
structed by the UN in the HDI, GDI, or MDG projects. Violence is most
relevant to the visions of progress as equality and human well-being.
Violence is not part of the definition of economic development: within
the human rights framework only ‘excessive’ violence is included.
Violence is relevant for economic development and growth,
since it has significant detriment for these processes. However, it is
not part of the core definition.
Violence is rarely conceptualized as central to the frame of equality.
Even though violence is recognized as a form of power, which is cen-
tral to the frame of equality, it is rarely translated into an issue of equal-
ity. One of the reasons for this is that the framing of equality as part
of progress is often part of a socialist heritage which prioritized eco-
nomic issues and treated violence merely as an instrument of power
rather than as important in its own right. Further, in a criminological
understanding of violence it is treated primarily as a response by the
most disadvantaged to social inequality rather than as something vis-
ited by the powerful on the powerless. This book has challenged this
exclusion of violence from social theory and the neglect in crimino-
logical analyses of the violence of the powerful towards the vulnera-
ble. Instead violence is a central dimension of social inequality and
intricately interrelated with inequality in other domains.
Violence is conceptualized within the human rights tradition,
but only when it takes the form of ‘excessive’ rather than rou-
tine violence. ‘Excessive’ forms of violence are seen as a viola-
tion of human rights, especially when carried out by states
against vulnerable individuals and involving torture and exces-
sive forms of punishment and limits to freedom. More recently
this tradition has been expanded to encompass violence against
women as a violation of women’s human rights. In these ways
excessive violence – but not all violence – is included within the
human rights tradition.
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Writers in the human development, well-being, and capabilities
approach rarely refer to violence, except to include it occasionally
in their abstract lists. It is not included in any of the human devel-
opment influenced indicator sets such as the UNDP HDI and MDG,
or those produced by the EU. However, potentially this framework
is flexible enough to include violence even while it has not yet
been operationalized within it.
How might the concept of violence be operationalized in indicators
that can be used to make comparisons between countries? Since the
range of phenomena that can be included within the concept of vio-
lence can vary significantly according to both theoretical interpretation
and social context, it is important to select as indicators only those
measurements where the agreement on definitions is clear. The most
straightforward indicator of individual violence in a country is homi-
cide, since the data are robustly and routinely collected because it is
more usually reported to the police than most other violent crimes,
and is available for international comparisons (Krug et al. 2002; Barclay
and Tavares 2003). While there is considerable developmental work
on indicators and statistics on violence against women, there is as yet
very little data to support the indicators that are internationally com-
parable (Walby 2005, 2007). However, one indication of the extent of
state regulation of violence against women is the timing of the crimi-
nalization of rape in marriage (Russell 1990) (see Table 9.20). The
extent to which the criminal justice system is coercive can be indicated
by whether or not the death penalty is used and the relative size of the
prison population. The death penalty is decreasingly used in the
world, and has been rejected on human rights grounds by the
European Union and the UN (Amnesty International 2006). The extent
of government expenditure on law and order as a percentage of GDP
is a measure of the priority given to this policy area over other uses of
resources, though it is not strictly a measure of the coerciveness of the
criminal justice system. The level of militarization is indicated by the
extent of government expenditure on the military as a percentage of
either government expenditure or GDP.
The level of violence is in general less in the developed world
than the developing world (see Table 9.20). Aspects of modernity,
such as democracy, appear to reduce violence. However, there are
very wide variations in the rates of violence among developed
countries. The USA has a homicide rate over three times that of the
EU and an imprisonment rate nearly eight times as high as the EU’s
(see Table 9.20). The USA is one of only 25 countries in the world
that still use the death penalty. Among the three EU countries
Sweden has the lowest homicide and imprisonment rates. The USA
spends over four times as much of its central government budgetG
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on the military as compared with countries in the EU: this is almost
one fifth (19.3 per cent) of government expenditure and amounts
to more than twice as much of its GDP as compared with countries
in the EU. Among the three EU countries, the UK spends most.
Countries in the EU spend below, and the USA spends above, the
global average on the military.
The Achievement of Visions of
Progress: Comparing
Neoliberalism and Social
Democracy
What is the relationship between the four major visions of
progress – economic development, equality, human rights, and
Table 9.20 Violence, USA, EU, Ireland, Sweden, UK, world
USA EU Ireland Sweden UK World
Homicide rate per 5.56 1.59 1.42 1.11 1.61
100,000 (1)
Death penalty (2) Yes No No No No 25 countries
Prison population per 689 87 79 69 129
100,000 (3)
Law and order 2.7 1.5 1.8 2.2
expenditure as per cent
of GDP (4)
Military as per cent of 19.3 4.6 1.9 4.3 6.3 11.1
central government
expenditure (5)
Military expenditure as 4.1 1.7 0.6 1.6 2.6 2.5
per cent of GDP (6)
Year rape in marriage Late 1970s varies 1990 1965 1994
illegal (7) by state
(1) Homicides (intentional killing of a person excluding attempts: murder, manslaughter,
euthanasia, and infanticide) per 100,000 population, average per year 1999–2001, as recorded
by the police. UK is England and Wales (Northern Ireland is 2.65 and Scotland is 2.16). EU
is EU15. Source: Barclay and Tavares (2003).
(2) Source: Amnesty International (2006).
(3) Rate per 100,000 population in 2001. UK is England and Wales (Northern Ireland is 59 and
Scotland is 120). EU is EU15. Source: Barclay and Tavares (2003).
(4) Data for 2003. Source: OECD (2006).
(5) Data for 2005. EU is EMU. Source: World Bank (2007b).
(6) Data for 2005. EU is EMU. Source: World Bank (2007b).
(7) USA: National Center for Victims of Crime (2007); Sweden: Diana Russell (1990); UK:
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994: Nicole Westmarland (2004) Rape Law Reform
in England and Wales. Working Paper 7 (Bristol: School of Policy Studies); Ireland:
Galligan 1998.
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human well-being/capabilities – and the projects of neoliberalism
and social democracy?
Economic development: neoliberalism
vs. social democracy
Economic development and economic growth are central to the
neoliberal project. The achievement of economic development is
used as the justification of other less popular aspects of neoliber-
alism such as inequality. If neoliberalism does not achieve eco-
nomic development, then the legitimation of its more pernicious
aspects unravels. Economic development is also part of the social
democratic project; but this is conditional on the form of eco-
nomic development, the nature of its production, and the distrib-
ution of its rewards. The achievement (or not) of economic
development is part of the contestation between the neoliberal
and social democratic projects. Neoliberals accuse social democrats
of putting restrictions on the nature of this development which
will stifle or slow it down. Social democrats insist not only on the
democratic regulation of economic development in order that all
may benefit, but also that these regulations do not impede eco-
nomic growth. Hence one of the empirical tests of the relative
success of neoliberalism or social democracy is whether or not
neoliberalism is able to generate faster economic growth.
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that neoliberalism
does not generate faster rates of economic growth than social
democracy. The USA is not experiencing faster growth than the EU,
rather the rates of growth in per capita income have been very
similar. The only way in which the USA appears to have had faster
economic growth is if the measure is that of the economy as a
whole rather than per person, because population growth due to
in-migration increases the overall size of the economy without
increasing the income per person and the standard of living.
Neoliberalism does not deliver higher rates of economic growth.
Economic growth can be assisted by appropriate state actions,
by appropriate levels of regulation. But at least as important in
determining levels of economic development historically have
been two further phenomena: positive engagement with the
increase in female employment and avoiding the destruction of
war. First, under some circumstances an increase in female
employment that is consequent on the transformation of the
gender regime from domestic to public form can generate an eco-
nomic growth spurt as there can be a spiralling of changes in theG
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gender regime with economic development. This occurred most
dramatically in Sweden in the 1970s, but can also be seen in the
USA in the 1960s and in Ireland around the 1990s. Second, since
war is highly destructive of economic infrastructures as well as
human beings, avoiding war is important for sustained economic
development. The nationalist militarism that led to so many wars
in Europe during the nineteenth and especially the first half of the
twentieth centuries was highly destructive of their economy as
well as their lives; during this time economic growth in the USA
surpassed that of Europe. Without these disparities in warfare
between the USA and Europe in the twentieth century the USA
would not have a level of economic development that is so much
higher than that of Europe today.
Equality: neoliberalism vs. social
democracy
Within the neoliberal project, equality is most often treated as
either irrelevant or as a limit on the project of economic growth,
except for the specific and limited issues of human rights and suf-
frage-democracy. These narrowly defined forms of equality – more
often conceptualized as freedom, as process more than outcome –
are attributed to the success of the neoliberal project of economic
growth.
By contrast, equality is central to the social democratic project.
However, even here there are debates and nuances as to the extent
of its application and it is rarely applied to all domains and prac-
tices, even in the socialist tradition. The balance between equality
as process and outcome is more weighted towards outcome than
in the neoliberal project, but not exclusively so. While the principle
of equality is more often centred on economic issues, it is applied
elsewhere. In the polity, social democracy advocates a deeper form
of democracy than neoliberalism, including not only practices to
ensure the representation of women and minoritized groups, but
also the extension of the democratic principle to the governance of
a wider range of institutions. Social democracy could potentially
include environmental sustainability and violence within its con-
cerns for equality, although these are often under-developed.
In the European Union Treaty of Lisbon equality is named as a fun-
damental value of the European Union in Article 2, alongside human
dignity, freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human
rights including those of minorities; in addition there is the specific
naming of equality between women and men (European Council
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2007). In practice, however, much of the emphasis is on the process
of equal treatment rather than on equal outcome.
Human rights: neoliberalism vs. social
democracy
Human rights are routinely championed by both neoliberalism and
social democracy. Human rights contain a component of equality
but one that is minimalist, often but not always understood to be lim-
ited to civil liberties and suffrage democracy. For neoliberalism the
minimal version is enough, but this is not so for social democracy.
Human development, well-being, and
capabilities: neoliberalism vs. social
democracy
The claim of the neoliberal project is that its core component of
economic growth does deliver human development, well-being,
and capabilities: without economic development these will be at a
much lower level. The claim of the social democratic project is that
it more effectively and directly delivers human development, well-
being, and capabilities because it has a democratically-assisted
capacity to create these directly and not merely indirectly.
If longevity and the mortality rates of infants, children, and
birthing mothers are taken as a key indicator of human develop-
ment and well-being, then the neoliberal USA is much less suc-
cessful than the more social democratic EU. Americans live shorter
lives than EU citizens, and their rates of infant, child, and maternal
mortality are higher, as was shown earlier in this chapter.
Trade-offs or complementary?
Do all the good things go together – are they alternatives, or are
there trade-offs? Is economic development a means to the achieve-
ment of well-being, equality, and human rights, or is it in tension
with these goals – or is it just different?
The prioritization of the goal of economic growth is usually jus-
tified on the grounds that it increases human well-being by raising
the standard of living. The main reason most people want to
increase their incomes is to improve the quality of their lives. DoesG
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economic development deliver this? Comparing the USA and the
EU, it might appear not. In the USA people have higher incomes
than in the EU, but they live shorter lives: in the EU there are fewer
economic resources than in the USA, longer lives.
However, this does not mean that there is no association between
income and longevity. Within any given country people will live
longer as the country gets richer, and richer people will live longer.
Across the world as a whole over time, people have become richer
and lived longer, with life-expectancy rising by six years from 62 to
67 between 1977 and 2005, while income has risen by 74 per cent.
In the USA and the EU both income and average life-span have
been rising. In the USA average income in the 30 years between 1975
and 2005 increased by 88 per cent, compared with a similar but very
slightly lower 81 per cent in the EU. The gap in personal incomes
between the USA and EU was established before 1975, and this
widened only by a very small amount in the following 30 years to
2005. By contrast, the increase in average life-expectancy between
1975 and 2005 was 5.1 years in the USA and 7.4 years in the EU.
While in 1975 there was little difference between the EU and the USA
in life-expectancy, by 2004 a gap had emerged (see Table 9.21).
How can it be true both that people in some of the richer coun-
tries live shorter lives than in some less rich countries and also that
there is an association between income and life-expectancy within
countries? The reason for this apparent paradox is that different social
systems have different levels of success in converting economic
Table 9.21 Life-expectancy and income over time, world, USA, EU, Ireland,
Sweden, UK
World USA EU Ireland Sweden UK
Life-expectancy (1)
1975 (2) 61.7 72.6 72.3 71.7 75.0 72.7
2005 67.6 77.7 79.7 79.4 80.6 79.0
Increase in years of 5.9 5.1 7.4 7.7 5.6 6.3
life, 1975–2005
Per cent increase in years of 9.6 7.0 10.2 10.7 7.5 8.7
life, 1975–2005
Income per person $ (3)
1975 4867 19830 14359 8544 16993 15506
2005 8477 37436 26037 35685 27783 28628
Increase in income, 3610 17606 11678 27141 10790 13122
1975–2005
Per cent increase in income, 74 89 81 318 63 85
1975–2005
(1) Life-expectancy at birth. EU is EMU. Source: World Bank (2004, 2006c).
(2) Date for world is 1977 not 1975.
(3) Income per person is GDP per capita, PPP based on constant 2000 international dollars. EU
is EMU. Source: World Bank (2006c), except world which is World Bank (2007b).
Other figures are calculated from those in the table.
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resources into human well-being. The European social system is
more effective in doing this than that of the USA. It is the differences
in social systems that are crucial to understanding the implications for
individuals. Some of the components for the differences in life-
expectancy can be seen in the data on health and violence. Americans
have higher rates of infant and maternal mortality than the EU as
well as higher rates of obesity. Americans are more violent than
Europeans, both interpersonally and collectively. The European and
US social systems also link economic resources to human well-being
in quite different ways. This is as a result of the different paths of
development taken by these different countries and regions – one
more neoliberal and the other more social democratic.
Are economic development and equality alternative and compet-
ing frames and forms of progress? Equality is often treated as an
alternative framing of progress from that of economic development.
However, this is not supported by the evidence. Equality does not
necessarily limit economic development. The more developed or
modernized countries are not necessarily more unequal. This can
be seen in the similar levels of economic growth rates in neoliberal
and social democratic countries, and that the level of economic
development is only partly related to differential stable growth rates
but is also related to growth spurts and the destruction of human
and fixed capital in times of war.
Does economic development deliver less violence? The previous
chapter, by using data sets with many countries, showed that there
tends to be less violence in those countries that are more economi-
cally developed and more violence in those countries that are more
unequal; and that there was some path dependency in evidence.
This chapter has also shown that the USA is substantially more
violent than the EU on each of the indicators of violence: homicide,
use of the death penalty, imprisonment, and spending on the mili-
tary as a proportion of central government expenditure and of GDP.
The USA is thus an exception to the general finding that modernity
is associated with reduced violence, but is consistent with the find-
ing that inequality leads to greater violence. The particularities of
its path dependent development are discussed in the next chapter.
Does economic development lead to secularization and the
decline of religious polities that exclude women from governing
positions? In much of Europe, economic development has been
associated with a decline in religiosity and the authority of orga-
nized religion to govern intimacy. However, the USA has been an
exception to that trend of secularization.
Does economic development lead to more human rights? In the
EU economic development has been associated with the increasingG
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institutionalization of human rights in legal codes, enforcement
institutions, and civil societal practice; this includes human rights
that are relevant to women and to minorities. However, there are
exceptions, as in the lack of rights shown in women’s access to
abortion in Ireland. In the USA the development of human rights has
been more uneven in matters such as the reintroduction of the death
penalty and the uneven access to sexual and reproductive rights.
Conclusions
Is there progress? For each of the four major visions or framings of
progress there are some positive advancements with the develop-
ment of modernity, though unevenly so and with some backward
moves. In several instances the answer to this question depends
upon the definitions of the concepts and indicators and the units
within which they are assessed.
Increasing sophistication in both theories and indicators is
needed, each to interrogate the other. The development of indica-
tors and the data to support them constitute a critical link between
social theory and the empirical world. Robust, valid, and reliable
indicators of changes over time and between countries are needed
for the assessment of social theories.
The unequal and more violent conditions of life in neoliberal
modernity are not compensated for by more rapid economic growth.
The income per person is not growing more quickly in the USA than
in the EU. There is a historic difference in the levels of economic
development between these two hegemons as a consequence of
growth spurts in the past in the USA, but there is not currently faster
economic growth per person in the USA than the EU. It is the case
that the US economy as a whole is growing more quickly than most
of the economies of the EU, but this is because of greater immigra-
tion and not greater increases in the economic resources available for
each person. The justification of greater inequalities in the economy
on the grounds that it leads to more rapid economic growth is
unfounded. The USA may be richer than the rest of the world today,
including the EU, but its rate of economic growth has been little dif-
ferent over the last 30 years. If the goal here is economic growth,
emulating its practices is unlikely to achieve this. If the goal however
is human well-being, then the USA is less successful in deploying its
economic resources to ensure human well-being (as measured by
life-expectancy) than the EU. Additionally, if the goal is equality and
human rights then the USA delivers less than the EU.
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Are inequalities increasing or decreasing? Class-based economic
inequalities within countries are increasing in many countries,
while gender-based economic inequalities within countries are
often declining. When the whole world is taken as the unit within
which to analyse inequality rather than individual countries, then
the centuries-long increase in global economic inequalities has
stopped as a result of the surging economic growth in China and
to a lesser extent India. There has been an increase in the democ-
ratic access to power, not only an increase in a narrowly defined
suffrage-democracy but also the increased presence of women in
parliaments (though this is not so everywhere). There has been
some reduction in the use of violence as a form of power against
women and minoritized groups in some locations, as a result of the
increased criminalization of such violence, but the neoliberal wave
has tended to increase state coercion in those countries where it
has been significant. There has been some increase in some civil
liberties, but unevenly so.
G
lo
b
al
iz
at
io
n
an
d
In
eq
u
al
iti
es
366
Walby-3874-Ch-09:Walby-3874-Ch-09.qxp  23/06/2009  4:05 PM  Page 366
Introduction
Path dependency entails a distinctive chain of inter-connected
events over time in a social system in which an event at one point
in time has implications for later events. The implication of path
dependency is that there is neither a single route to modernity, nor
so many that distinct patterns cannot be identified. It is a concept
that is situated in the tension between general social theory and the
analysis of particularism. This chapter compares path dependent
trajectories in order to develop theoretical aspects of path depen-
dency and to investigate the explanation of specific trajectories.
The thesis of path dependency depends upon the divergence of the
paths being sustained over time; if this divergence is only of a short
and temporary duration, then the significance of the path dependency
thesis is diminished. The path dependency thesis also postulates that
the sequencing of events over time makes a difference to their degree
of influence over the path, with events early on more significant than
those that happen later. This is investigated in two ways – the impli-
cations of the sequencing of economic growth and war for the global
power of hegemons; and the implications of the sequencing and gaps
between the development of free wage labour and democracy for
pathways taken by different regimes of inequality in a country.
The concept of critical turning point is crucial to this analysis,
since it is at these events that pathways start, diverge, or turn. This
concept is further developed here by making a distinction between
critical turning point and tipping point: the former may be sudden,
while the latter depends upon a slow build up. A further concep-
tual addition is that of catalysts and dampeners: catalysts speed the
iterations of change in a system, while dampeners slow them.
10 Comparative Paths ThroughModernity: Neoliberalism
and Social Democracy
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Much of the analysis of path dependency that has invoked
inequalities has been restricted to the implications of class. A major
challenge to this position is that forces associated with complex
inequalities in addition to those of class make a significant difference
to the path dependent trajectories of countries. The extent to which
complex inequalities other than class are not merely the outcome of
these events but part of the causal processes is investigated.
Global processes potentially erode path dependent developments
in different countries, so one question here is whether the social
democratic path of development is sustained despite global flows of
capital, trade, and people, a neoliberal global hegemon and a global
neoliberal wave. Non-economic global processes are also investi-
gated, in particular the implications of global civil societal waves for
national trajectories of development.
The main path dependent forms of modernity in the global North
are neoliberalism and social democracy (see Chapter 8 on varieties
of modernity). These can vary between different institutional
domains (see Chapters 3–6 on economies, polities, violence, and
civil society) and regimes of inequality (see Chapter 7) even in the
same country. The main loci of these path dependent forms of
modernity are political economy and violence (see Chapter 8). Of
further interest is the path dependent development of neoliberal and
social democratic forms of gender regimes. Entwined throughout are
issues of democracy and inequality, which are key to the distinction
between neoliberalism and social democracy.
Four countries (the USA, Sweden, the UK, and Ireland) are selected
for their contrasting development, together with relevant aspects of
the European Union. Sweden is the most social democratic of the four
and the USA the least, with Ireland and the UK in between as regards
the regulation of employment, the state provision of welfare, and the
regulation and deployment of violence. While the USA has one major
polity in its state, in Sweden, the UK, and Ireland there is a second
polity in the EU, and in Ireland a third in the Roman Catholic Church.
They contrast in their economic and human development, democracy,
violence, equality, and human rights. There is also a comparison
between the USA and the EU (Sweden, the UK, and Ireland being
members of the EU), global hegemons that have considerable power
to shape the global fitness landscape. They contrast in their degree of
modernity, in their positioning on a continuum between neoliberal and
social democratic varieties of modernity, and in their welfare provision,
employment regulation, violence, and regimes of inequality.
Contrasting polities are involved – hegemon, former empire, states, EU,
organized religions, and nations – with contrasting histories of
societalization and of the relations between nations and states. TheG
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countries have contrasting positionings in relation to global flows of
capital, trade and people, global waves, networks, institutions, and
hegemons, as makers and takers of the global fitness landscape.
These countries are neither ‘societies’ nor ‘nation-states’. They are
empirically and territorially defined units as they exist in the early
twenty-first century, each with a leading state. There is no presump-
tion that these countries are societies or nation-states, rather there are
competing societalization projects in each country that are far from
complete. The extent to which processes of societalization have pro-
duced consistency between the institutional domains and regimes of
inequality in these countries is varied. Each country has a history in
which the territorial boundaries have changed significantly. The main
focus of the analysis is that of the last century, though some longer
time-frames include processes of polity formation.
This chapter compares the path dependent trajectories of the USA,
the UK, Ireland, and Sweden, together with relevant aspects of the
EU, with a focus on the loci at political economy, and violence and
comparative gender transformations, and then considers the impli-
cations of this comparison for the theorization of path dependency.
Political Economy
Introduction
While the level of economic development makes a significant differ-
ence to the social relations involved in political economy, it is far from
sufficient. There are important differences in the regulation of employ-
ment and the state provision of welfare, further differentiated by class,
gender, and other inequalities, which are key to the distinction between
the neoliberal and social democratic forms of political economy.
Divergences in the depth of democracy and the degree of various
inequalities make significant differences to these paths of develop-
ment. Established ways of explaining the differences between neolib-
eral and social democratic (or similar) forms of political economy have
focused on the power of organized labour and socialist movements,
with some further interest in the organization of employers and the
form of institutionalization of the state (Korpi 1983; Evans et al. 1985;
Lash and Urry 1987; Esping-Andersen 1990; Lipset and Marks 2000;
Hall and Soskice 2001) and key political struggles.
These are indeed important sources of difference but they are not
sufficient. It is important to consider a wider range of social forces and
not to restrict these to class. Other complex inequalities, including
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gender, ethnicity, nation, and religion, can make significant differences.
Taking these complex inequalities into account provides a further
challenge to the notion of a single historical moment being key, since
transformation of diverse regimes of inequality do not usually occur at
the same time. It is important also to consider the depth of democ-
racy, especially but not only for regimes of inequality other than class,
by not treating the formal attainment of suffrage as a sufficient marker.
Global processes are a potential challenge to the continuation of
diverse paths of development. It is often argued that globalization
erodes such differences, in particular social democratic forms of
employment protection and state welfare provision. But the process of
globalization needs to be treated in a more differentiated way, distin-
guishing between global flows of capital, trade, and people, global
and regional hegemons and empires, and global civil societal waves.
Different global processes have potentially different implications for
the erosion or continuation or restructuring of established paths.
The depth of democracy is a key aspect of the variations in the
form of political economy, for the development of either neoliberal
or social democratic pathways. Differences in the development of
democracy are themselves linked to different patterns in the devel-
opment of free wage labour, the organizational capacity of the work-
ing class, minoritized ethnic groups and employed women, the
strength of anti-democratic forces, the forms of polity restructuring
especially during war and conquest, and global civil societal waves
such as those of women’s suffrage. These processes involve critical
turning points, some of which are tipping points, as well as catalysts
and dampeners of the relationship of democracy with other practices.
The four countries vary significantly in their political economies: the
USA is the most neoliberal with Sweden the least; the UK and Ireland,
both members of the EU, are in between. They also vary in their depth
of democracy: while all have achieved suffrage-democracy, the USA is
limited to this, Sweden alone has achieved presence-democracy and
a broad range of institutions subject to democratic governance, while
Ireland and the UK have uneven combinations of elements. A brief
summary of some of the differences, which will be referred to in the
following text, is shown in Tables 10.1 to 10.4. In the following analysis
of the trajectory to diverse forms of political economy, each country is
considered in turn.
The USA
The US political economy is the paradigmatic example of neoliber-
alism. There is limited employment regulation and state welfareG
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Table 10.1 Economic inequality: Gini coefficients, mid-1980s to c.2000: USA,
Sweden, UK, Ireland
Mid-1980s 2000
USA 33.8 35.7
Sweden 19.9 24.3
UK 28.6 32.6
Ireland 33.1 30.4
OECD average 29.3 31.0
Distribution of household disposal income: 0–100, the higher the more unequal.
Source: OECD (2006: 219).
Table: 10.2 Public social expenditure as per cent of GDP, 1990, 2003: USA,
EU, Sweden, UK, Ireland
1990 2003
USA 13.4 16.2
EU average 21.9 23.9
Sweden 30.5 31.3
UK 17.2 20.1
Ireland 15.5 15.9
OECD average 17.9 20.7
Source: OECD (2007b: 193).
Table 10.3 Comparative trade union density 1970–2003, USA, EU, Sweden,
UK, Ireland
1970 1980 1990 2000 2003
USA 23.5 19.5 15.5 12.8 12.4
EU15 37.8 39.7 33.1 27.3 26.3
Sweden 67.7 78.0 80.8 79.1 78.0
UK 44.8 50.7 39.3 29.7 29.3
Ireland 53.2 57.1 51.1 36.6 35.3
Source: Visser (2006: 45).
Table 10.4 Trade union membership patterns, 2004, USA, Sweden, UK,
Ireland
USA Sweden UK Ireland
Public 36.4 93.0 58.8 68.0
Private 7.9 77.0 17.2 30.4
Manufacturing 12.9 95.0 24.6 40.0
Density 12.5 82.2 28.8 37.7
Coverage 13.8 92.0 35.0
Source: Visser (2006: 46).
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provision extends across all regimes of inequality – class, gender,
and ethnicity. The USA has the most developed economy with the
least remaining premodern elements, although religion still remains
strong.
Neoliberalism in the USA is often explained as due to the weakness
of labour and socialist movements as a result of internal disagree-
ments and organizational failures (Lipset and Marks 2000), especially
racialized divisions and white racism in the context of post-slavery
ethnic inequality (Quadagno 1994; Manza 2000). An additional com-
ponent is that of the strength of employers and their organizational
capacity and sophistication, the opposition of various stakeholders
(Quadagno 2006), and the mobility of capital and its ingenuity in
finding new and more successful forms (Lash and Urry 1987). A fur-
ther element is that of the nature of the state and political organiza-
tion (Evans et al. 1985; Weir et al. 1988).
A curiously neglected aspect in the explanation of the variety of
political economy is that of democracy. The USA has a shallow suf-
frage-democracy; this has not extended to presence-democracy, nor
is there a wide range of institutions subject to democratic governance.
Suffrage-democracy has not significantly deepened beyond suffrage-
democracy into presence-democracy, although there have been some
small increases in the proportion of women and minoritized ethnic
groups in the legislature and executive in recent years. Without depth
to democracy, it is hard for sections of labour marked by gender and
‘race’ to access the political power necessary to win the state regula-
tion of employment and state welfare provision. A further neglected
element is that of violence, which was important in the breaking up
of early trade unions in the nineteenth century (Smith 2003).
While suffrage-democracy was achieved very early on for men of
the majority ethnic groups, it occurred much later for women of the
majority ethnic groups, indeed at the same time as in the other
three countries, and very much later for African-Americans. This
wide temporal disjuncture has had significant effects. There were sev-
eral critical turning points: the War of Independence and the creation
of the constitution; the civil war and the end of slavery; the transna-
tional feminist wave of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury; and the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s.
The USA broke free from most forms of hereditary governance
and formally excluded religious organizations from government
when it won independence from Britain through the War of
Independence. Its new Constitution of 1776 provided the basics of
suffrage-democracy, but only for the men of the dominant ethnic
groups. It left outside of democracy women, African slaves, and
those groups including the Native American Indians who had been
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subject to conquest. Indeed, as far as the slaves were concerned, the
hereditary principle in governance was very much still present until
they were freed in 1865 after the civil war. The early history of the
USA is one of conquest of most of the North American continent,
albeit none of this today has the status of colonies, though there
remain some small ‘territories’ (with voting rights) outside the main
landmass – American Samoa, Guam, the Marianas Islands, the US
Virgin Islands, and Guantanamo Bay.
The extension of suffrage-democracy to all US inhabitants took
centuries. In 1920 women from the majority ethnic groups gained
suffrage, at the same time as many other countries in Northern
Europe after a transnational feminist movement, and 144 years after
US men of the same ethnicity. Although African-Americans were for-
mally granted the right to vote after the ending of slavery in 1865,
in the southern states of the USA they were de facto excluded from
voting until the civil rights movement in the 1960s, thus winning their
suffrage around 190 years after white men. The USA has few of the
electoral mechanisms that other countries have introduced to move
beyond suffrage-democracy to presence-democracy. Elections are
highly expensive; the voting system is first past the post; there are no
quotas. The presence of women in parliament and the executive is
low despite the high rates of female employment, as is also the pres-
ence of minoritized ethnic groups. The range of institutions which
are governed democratically is narrower than in other countries. In
particular, there is limited democratic regulation of the economy, of
finance capital, and of employment, and limited state welfare.
The modern form of free wage labour arrived at different times
for different ethnicities and genders. While the north of the USA
was industrializing in the nineteenth century, producing free wage
labour for men and a few women, African-Americans in the south-
ern states were still subject to slavery. Even when slavery was abol-
ished in 1865, at the end of the civil war, the replacement form of
labour relations (share-cropping) did not deliver much freedom in
practice. Only later was there mass male free wage labour for
African-Americans in the southern states. It was not until the 1970s
that more than 40 per cent of employees were women.
Although the USA appears as the quintessential neoliberal politi-
cal economy in the early twenty-first century, there were at least
four moments when social democratic projects were mobilized. The
first was the feminist movement from the middle of the nineteenth
to the early twentieth century. This was not a purely US moment
but part of a wider international wave, more regional than global,
that was focused on Europe, North America, and Australasia, with
a special strength in the UK. Often remembered only in terms of its
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suffrage victory in 1920, it was in fact a much broader project,
although it declined steeply at the point of winning the vote,
divided between different strategies. Second, was the New Deal
response to the Depression of the 1930s, in which state welfare and
job schemes were offered to the workless: this social democratic
moment did not survive the strident and well-orchestrated post-war
attacks on social democracy as if it were communism and alien.
Third, was the movement from the 1960s, originating in the Civil
Rights movement against racism in the US south, the anti-war
movement opposed to the US military engagement in Vietnam, a
resurgent feminism, and a student and libertarian movement. This
won the right to vote for African-Americans, equal treatment
employment legislation on grounds of ‘race’ and gender, and affir-
mative action programmes. Fourth, is the emergence of a social
democratic project rooted in the constituency of employed women,
noticeable in the gender gap in voting in which employed women
voted more left than men – a key set of supporters not only for
Hilary Clinton in her attempt on the US Presidency in 2008, but also
for Obama’s election, when he won the support of 56 per cent of
women voters as compared with 43 per cent for McCain.
The neoliberal wave rose in the 1970s, partly in response to the
successes of the movements of the 1960s. During the Reagan presi-
dency (1981–1989) affirmative action for women and minorities was
challenged, the move for the Equal Rights Amendment was
defeated, monetarist financial policies challenged Keynesianism and
squeezed the poor, and the trade union movement was successfully
attacked. Reagan sacked the striking air traffic controllers in 1981 at
the start of a series of attacks on trade unions, changing the climate
for industrial relations and the trade unions (Nordlund 1998):
aggressive and anti-union campaigns by employers have since had
significant impact (Logan 2006). The weak social democratic forces
in the barely institutionalized 1960s movement, a poorly unionized
workforce, and only a shallow institutionalization of democracy in
the legislature and executive, have proved unable to resist success-
fully despite the Democratic Clinton presidency and the emergence
of new social democratic forces in employed women, but who
found insufficient allies and too many enemies to institutionalize
their project in government. The Bush presidency in the early
twenty-first century saw the return of an aggressive neoliberal
agenda on all fronts.
Promoted by the world’s most powerful hegemon, neoliberalism
developed into a global wave with various consequences for
global financial policy as well for countries around the world,
increasing economic inequality and attacking the institutional
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bases of social democratic forces. The USA is a major locus of global
flows of capital, trade, and people, which feed both income growth
at the top and increase those (especially undocumented in-migrants
with few rights and income) at the bottom. The United States,
despite some moments when social democratic projects began to
mobilize, has a pathway to neoliberalism in political economy.
Sweden
Sweden is the classic example of a social democratic political
economy. It had a strong labour movement quite early on in its
industrialization, a broad alliance involving first agricultural workers
and later employed women, organized employers who were not
hostile to state welfare development, and a rapidly deepening
democracy. Global pressures led to a reduction in the generosity of
state welfare provision but not at a greater rate than elsewhere,
partly because of the emergence of employed women as the new
champions of social democracy and partly because of the depth of
democracy.
Sweden has developed the deepest democracy of the four – suffrage-
democracy and presence-democracy, as well as a broad range of
institutions governed by democratic means. Critical turning points in
the development of Swedish democracy included the thorough
going Reformation of the sixteenth century; suffrage-democracy for
both men and women by 1918; and a tipping point of presence-
democracy for women around 1994; increased depth in the 1930s and
1980s; and decreased depth in the 1990s rounds of political economy
restructuring. The 1970s and 1980s were a time that saw a rapid spi-
ralling of gendered presence-democracy and economic growth.
The powers of the Swedish monarchy were largely removed in
1907–1909, with the final elements in 1975, even though it formally
remains. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Sweden,
like its European neighbours, was involved in attempts for the dom-
inance and colonization of adjacent territories but no colonies remain
from that time. Sweden experienced the thorough Lutheran version of
the reformation of Christianity that swept across Europe, undergoing
between 1527 and 1544 a reconstruction of Christianity and a restruc-
turing of the relationship between Church and State. Organized reli-
gion is not a significant polity in Sweden today as a consequence.
Suffrage-democracy came for men in stages – 1866, 1896, 1907–1909,
and 1918 – and for women a little later in 1918–1920. This is the short-
est temporal gap in gendered suffrage-democracy among the four
countries, though it was still of a significant duration. The procedures
Walby-3874-Ch-10:Walby-3874-Ch-10.qxp  23/06/2009  4:06 PM  Page 375
G
lo
b
al
iz
at
io
n
an
d
In
eq
u
al
iti
es
376
for presence-democracy for women, low-cost electioneering, propor-
tional representation, and quotas for women, developed in the years
from 1975 during the time of women’s rapidly increasing employment.
From 1994 women have constituted over 40 per cent of members of
parliament, rising to 47 per cent by 2008, and 52 per cent of gov-
ernment ministers. Sweden has a significant breadth of democracy in
that a wide range of institutions are subject to democratic control.
This developed from the political restructuring and re-settlements in
the 1930s (class-led) as well as in the 1970s (gender and class-based)
and reduced a little during the neoliberal wave that reached Sweden
in the 1990s.
The first critical turning point that is key to Swedish distinctive-
ness was the class compromise between workers of both industrial
and agrarian bases and employers in the 1930s. The maturation of
Swedish capitalism enabled the working class to develop the
resources to gain political power, but only in alliance with agricul-
tural workers. The agrarian workers in Sweden and other Nordic
countries were already somewhat distinctive in their level of edu-
cation resulting from a network of schools established during the
first half of the nineteenth century. It is this three-fold set of class
relations, employers, industrial proletarians and agrarian workers,
which underpins the specificity of early Nordic social democracy
(Sandberg 1979; Korpi 1983; Lash and Urry 1987; Esping-Andersen
1990; Rojas 1991).
There were two main events in the historic compromises of the
1930s. The first established a long-standing cooperation between
the Social Democratic Party and the Peasant Party. This was initi-
ated in 1933 when the Social Democrats supported better prices for
the peasants and the peasants supported public relief works.
(Similar compromises occurred in Denmark in 1933, Norway in
1935, and Finland in 1937.) The second social compromise was
between the Swedish Labour movement – as represented in the
Swedish confederation of trade unions, the LO – and the Swedish
employers – as represented in the Swedish Employers Federation,
the SAF – and was first established in 1938, when industrial peace
was granted in exchange for reforms (Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen
1990; Rojas 1991; Therborn 1992). This historic class compromise
had implications for the development of the Swedish economy and
polity, facilitating Swedish economic growth by reducing the con-
flict between capital and labour while requiring high levels of pro-
ductivity to maintain the bargain and facilitating the development
of Swedish welfare.
These developments in political economy were locked in through
a series of institutional developments. The density of membership of
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trade unions, their coverage, bargaining power and coordination,
were very high by international standards and have remained high.
This was aided by particular institutional devices, such as the Ghent
system, by which trade unions had responsibility for the administra-
tion of social insurance. It was supported and taken forward by a
political party organized around the social democratic project. It was
further supported by the development of state welfare, by the conse-
quent vested interests of the workers in these services and by a high
level of popular support (Huber and Stephens 2001; Visser 2006).
While this conventional account of the critical turning point in
class relations in the Nordic countries is authoritative, the additional
attempt to subsume changes in other complex inequalities such as
gender to this dynamic is highly problematic. It has been suggested
that the distinctive gender relations in Sweden (and other Nordic
countries) countries are a consequence of this development of social
democracy (Ruggie 1984; Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). Esping-
Andersen (1990) suggests that social democracy is key to gender
equality because of its universalist inclusionary character while
Ruggie (1984) considers women to be policy takers rather than
policy makers and argues that the difference in gender relations in
the UK and Sweden can be explained as a result of the social demo-
cratic nature of the Swedish state as compared with the liberal state
in the UK. However, such an approach underestimates the signifi-
cance of tipping points in which gender relations are central.
The critical turning point associated with the development of
women’s free wage labour and their effective political citizenship
was different from and later than the critical turning point led by
changes in class relations. Women were not initially welcomed into
the process of establishing social democracy and instead were
excluded. Later on they fought their own way into the political
establishment by utilizing their own resources drawn from their own
emerging free wage labour. Ultimately, employed women became
an important political force which turned a labourist project (for the
sectional interests of male workers) into the universalist inclusion-
ary project for which Sweden is renowned. Gender politics, espe-
cially employed women’s political voices, became an important
input into the making and defence of Swedish social democracy,
but not at its start in the 1930s moment of historic class compro-
mise (Qvist 1980; Dahlerup and Gulli 1985; Dahlerup and Haavio-
Manila 1985; Haavio-Manila 1985; Ravn 1995; Skard and
Haavio-Manilla 1985; Dahlerup 1986, 1988, 1993; Eduards 1992,
1997a, 1997b; Lundgren 1992; Ohlander 1992; Wikander 1992;
Tyyska 1994; Karvonen and Selle 1995; Gustafsson 1997;
Gustafsson et al. 1997; Hedlund 1998; Karlsson 1998).
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The transition in the labour movement from labourism to a social
democracy that was inclusive of employed women only took place
several decades after the class compromise of the 1930s. During the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century the male-led labour
movement was not receptive to feminist demands. The early lead-
ership of the Social Democratic Party and LO chose, as with
the labour movements in the UK and elsewhere, to prioritize the
interests of working-class men, and so during the 1920s the women
of the proletarian women’s movement – despite wanting a more
equal distribution of labour, equal pay, a general workers’ protec-
tion law, and just representation within trade union bodies, and
despite protests – saw collective agreements which preserved the
division of labour and the wages gap, witnessed their male party
comrades supporting the prohibition of night work for women,
were passed over in elections and their idea of a women’s section
received little support. Indeed at this time trade union benefits such
as strike pay and for sickness and unemployment were paid
women at half the rate for men. Women’s efforts at creating poli-
cies which recognized women’s position as both mothers and
workers were hard to develop (Qvist 1980; Ohlander 1992). So the
male working-class movement was not (at least in the period
through the 1920s), supportive of the inclusionary demands of
women. At this point there was little to distinguish Sweden’s gender
politics from that of other European countries. Thus doubt must be
cast on the significance of suggestions that we should look back a
long way in time for either a long continuous Swedish tradition of
egalitarian gender relations or for a gender-equal labour tradition.
The extent of family-friendly policies in the mid-twentieth century
Sweden should not be exaggerated. During the 1940s and 1950s, the
labour needed for the rapid growth of the economy was not met by
the employment of women, but rather by immigration from the
other Nordic countries and from southern Europe. In Sweden in
1960, women’s proportion of the labour force was close to the
OECD average as well as to that of the USA and UK. While the prin-
ciple of equal pay was finally adopted by the Social Democrats in
1944 and the LO in 1946, policies to implement this were diffuse and
weak with little more than recommendations to constituent unions,
with the consequence that the wages gap among workers covered
by bargaining between the LO and the Swedish employers federa-
tion was greater in 1960 than in 1950 (Qvist 1980; Ohlander 1992).
While today Sweden has one of the highest rates of female
employment in the developed world, this has only been the case
since the 1970s – before then, the Swedish pattern was similar to
that in the rest of the OECD. It was not until the 1960s and 1970s
Walby-3874-Ch-10:Walby-3874-Ch-10.qxp  23/06/2009  4:06 PM  Page 378
C
o
m
p
arative
P
ath
s
T
h
ro
u
gh
M
o
d
ern
ity
379
that there was a critical turning point for gender relations in
Sweden. There were a series of interacting changes in the gendered
economy and polity that fuelled a positive feedback loop, or spiral,
that drove these changes forward at an accelerating pace. These
were: rapid economic growth; an increase in women’s employ-
ment; an increase in women’s parliamentary representation; the
impact of a global feminist wave; an increase in publicly funded
childcare; and an increase in gendered regulation of the employ-
ment regime. During these few years a series of changes in each of
these interacting domains took place that projected Sweden (and its
Nordic neighbours) onto a path of development that has marked
them out as singular and distinctive. This spiralling transformed the
gender regime from a domestic to a public form, establishing what
has become the global economic model for combining fairness and
efficiency with a gender equal (or less unequal) society.
This surge in employment was matched by a surge in women’s
presence in formal and informal politics. During the 1960s there was
a large increase in the proportion of women as members of trade
unions (to 29 per cent in the LO and 43 per cent in the TCO by
1970), thereby encouraging the leaders to concern themselves with
women’s issues (Qvist 1980). The trade unions, especially the LO,
revised their policy to one of solidarity to ensure that their high wage
strategy was not undercut by pockets of low pay, such as that among
women workers. Although this was part of an overall economic
strategy that aimed to remove pockets of low productivity and pay
from the economy (Qvist, 1980), women’s voices were part of this
process of change. Women’s presence in the Swedish parliament
doubled between 1970 and 1980 from 14 per cent to 28 per cent of
elected representatives, with the 1973 election being especially
important (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1995). This sudden change
drew Sweden away from other countries. In 1918–1920 women had
won the vote in Sweden at the same time as most other countries in
north-west Europe. Yet by 2002 they had 45 per cent of the seats,
higher than any other country, with only other Nordic countries com-
ing near. This greater representation of women in the Swedish par-
liament than other countries was a sudden development between
1970 and 1990 and not a long-standing Swedish particularity. In
Sweden the proportion of women in parliament rose at the same
time as the proportion of women in the workforce. In most non-
Nordic countries there is a significant temporal gap between the two.
The political environment in the 1960s and 1970s was affected
not only by developments in Sweden but also by an emerging
global feminist wave, originating predominantly in the internal gen-
der politics of the USA, but picking up power, energy, and breadth
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as it swept around the globe. For Swedish feminists this provided
the additional boost of legitimation, ideas, and practices, via books,
media, visits, and conferences. This wave of energy, consistent with
some of the ideas and practices of Swedish feminism while differing
in other respects, such as its evaluation of the potential of the state,
made a contribution to the development of Swedish gender politics
(Qvist 1980; Dahlerup 1986; Hernes 1987; Hirdmann 1994;
Karvonen and Selle 1995; Von der Fehr et al. 1998). Within this
global feminist wave ideas and practices spread rapidly between
different countries, taking advantage of developing global commu-
nications both in the distribution of books and pamphlets and in the
television reporting of movement activities. The development of
Swedish gender politics was part of this wider international move-
ment, contributing to and drawing from its innovations and exper-
tise; both part of a global development and part particular.
Feminists in Sweden and other Nordic countries were distinctive
in the extent to which they were already engaged with and to some
extent were already inside the state by the 1970s (Dahlerup 1983;
Tyyska 1994). In many countries the boundary between civil society
and the state was hard for women to cross, but in Sweden women
did cross this line, and relatively high proportions, by international
standards, of feminist organizations saw themselves as having a
positive relationship with the state (Tyyska 1994). This was at least
partly a result of the earlier entry of women into parliamentary
representation in Sweden and other Nordic countries than else-
where, which meant that there were women inside the system with
whom alliances could be made and who would be more respon-
sive to political pressure from women. In contrast, in some other
countries such as the UK the feminist wave from the 1970s devel-
oped a strong separatist element that ignored an unresponsive state
where there were few women insiders. Thus this global feminist
wave had different implications in different countries, at least partly
affected by whether or not women had already gained an effective
presence within a state at that time.
These interacting developments further catalysed the spiralling
social change. There were changes in state policy that further facili-
tated the employment of women, especially mothers, by reducing dis-
crimination against women (in 1960 employers and unions agreed to
abolish separate wage rates for women and men and in 1969 schools
were encouraged to adopt equal opportunity); by facilitating the com-
bination of parenthood and employment by legislating for various
kinds of leaves from employment for childcare (in 1979 the right to a
six hour day was granted to parents of small children, in 1980 a law
was introduced that made sex discrimination in employment illegal,
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and in 1995 the parental leave policy changed so that men would
have to take some or lose the benefit to the household); by changing
the tax-benefit system so as to increase the incentives for wives to
work (in 1971 separate taxation was introduced for husbands and
wives); and finally by a significant increase in publicly-funded child-
care (although this was not until the 1970s) (Statistics Sweden 1995).
The extent of public provision and the funding of childcare, now
much emulated, was once one of the distinctive features of the
Swedish gender regime, but it only dates from the 1970s.
The effects of these changes in employment, the state, and other
institutions were an increase in the wages for women and an
increased willingness by women to enter the labour market. The
Swedish gender wage gap narrowed earlier than that in many other
countries, though today it is still not completely eradicated. In par-
ticular, during 1960–1990, there was an impressive reduction in the
wages gap between women and men wage earners in the manufac-
turing sector that resulted in women in this sector earning 91 per cent
of men’s wages. This is sometimes attributed to the trade union
solidarity policy, but the timing of the increase – starting before the
solidarity policy – and the extension of the wages gap closure to
white collar workers – who were not subject to the LO policy –
means that the solidarity policy cannot be the total explanation
(Svensson 1995). Instead the increase in wages is better understood
as part of a wider change in the gender system transforming from
a domestic to a public and more equal form.
In the 1980s, Sweden was subject to the same global economic
pressures as other European countries. At this time there were
changes in the state provision of welfare and in the political system.
Is globalization causing the demise of the distinctive social democra-
tic path and state welfare provision in Sweden (Lindblom 2001)? The
Swedish economy has a high dependence on international trade and
its leading industries trade globally, so global economic conditions
are felt directly. Global pressures on Swedish social democracy
include: global economic competitive pressures that encourage
politicians to seek to reduce state welfare expenditures and reduce
the strictness of employment protection laws in order to keep foot-
loose capital within their countries; a neoliberal wave that provides
discursive support for the reduction of state welfare and services; and
entry into the European Union in response to global pressures with
a consequent pressure on the Swedish fiscal regime to reduce its tax-
ation and spending. There were domestic pressures also, including a
decline of those industries that traditionally generate labour move-
ments and a shift away from the local democratic governance of
services where women are strongly involved in decision making to
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privatized services run by corporations that have few women in
senior positions (Hedlund 1993, 1998). There were global flows of
people, including levels of in-migration that were highest just at the
moment of a highest level of unemployment (Palme et al. 2002),
breaking the traditional ethnic homogeneity and thereby potentially
contributing to a decline in solidarism and a rise in racism (Pred
2000), though this was largely absorbed (Palme et al. 2002).
However, despite the pressures from global and domestic processes,
reductions in social well-being in the period associated with global-
ization were relatively small. There have been cuts in the level of pay-
ments for those workers who become sick or unemployed and
reductions in the funds given by central government to local govern-
ment to support the high quality of services, so in childcare services
the worker–child ratios have worsened. The party named after social
democracy no longer has an unbroken electoral record (44 years of
continuous rule were interrupted in 1976: Swedish History 1999).
Public social expenditure in 2001 at 30 per cent of GDP is lower than
the 37 per cent present in 1993. But the historically high rate of social
expenditure and state welfare provision remains high. Sweden spent
30 per cent of its GDP on public social expenditure in 2001, almost
50 per cent higher than the OECD average of 21 per cent, more than
any other country in the OECD, and little different from the 31 per cent
spent in 1990. The OECD average in 2001 is 21 per cent, also peaking
in 1993 at 22 per cent. Sweden actually added new benefits to its port-
folio (for example, paternity and parental leave) and childcare provi-
sion was protected (Palme et al. 2002; OECD 2006; Rauch 2006).
Social democracy remains strong in Sweden, albeit in a restruc-
tured form, for two main reasons. First, there is lock-in from trade
unions, welfare institutions, and the social democratic party. Second,
there are new champions of social democracy in employed women.
This new political constituency is key to the continuity in social
democracy. They more than replace the men lost to this project as
the economy restructured away from those industries where tradi-
tional men’s support was centred. They develop and extend the
social democratic project of developing state public services and reg-
ulating the labour market so as to ensure simultaneously equality and
efficiency. In this way the employed women of Sweden have come
to the rescue of the welfare state, otherwise potentially eroded by the
changing balance of class and global forces. They enter and re-
develop the organizations and institutions first established around
men’s labourist interests, such as the trade unions and their national
confederations, and the political party initially established to extend
the labourist influence throughout state policy. It is not merely an
alliance of separate feminist and labourist projects, but more than
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this. The Swedish social democratic project today depends upon this
new synthesis of feminist and labourist agendas and institutions.
The public and less unequal gender regime in Sweden is not
merely an outcome but is also a cause of social democracy. There
is coevolution rather than one-way impact. The development of
social democracy as a universalist inclusionary project rather than
as mere labourism depended on the active participation of and
pressure from employed women. While class and gender are
always entwined, there are two temporally distinct critical turning
points in the development of free wage labour and effective polit-
ical citizenship – one led by class, the other by gender.
The UK
The UK, while often considered neoliberal in the early twenty-first
century, is a more complex case than the USA, with some parts of
its political economy somewhat social democratic. This is partly
because there are two major polities governing the economy, not just
one – the EU as well as the British state, in which the EU governs,
most aspects of employment regulation, and the British state which
governs most aspects of state welfare provision. There is a diver-
gence between class and gender regimes of inequality in some
domains: the different timing of the transition to modernity of the
class and gender regimes of inequality, the gender transformation
being much later and not yet complete. The UK is currently pulled
in two directions by the greater neoliberalism of the British state
and the greater social democracy of the EU polity.
In the days of the British Empire Britain was once a global hege-
mon setting the rules of world trade and finance largely to suit itself.
The development of the British hegemon was an early example of
the extension of global capital roaming the world in search of sites
for profitable activities (Marx 1954; Wallerstein 1974). Economic
power was both part cause and part consequence of empire, asso-
ciated with the development of institutions that set the global rules
that further supported the development of British capital (Hirst and
Thompson 1996). Although those days have been over since the
middle of the twentieth century, they have left a legacy in British
institutions as well as in those of the former colonies. As a result of
this history London is a centre of global finance capital, with con-
sequences for economic inequality in the UK as well as the rest of
the world. It is this history of industrializing before the first vestiges
of democracy that is at least partly responsible for the neoliberal
path taken in political economy.
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From the eighteenth century the British hegemon promoted and
structured global free trade. The rise of the British hegemon involved
not only capitalism and class relations, but also particular constitutions
of ethnic and gender relations. The trade was sometimes in luxuries,
such as coffee, spices, and silk; other times it was in British manu-
factures, such as textiles. Sometimes it was in slaves, and the com-
modities produced by slaves, such as cotton, sugar, and tobacco.
Such trades and economies produced super-profits, thereby fuelling
the British Industrial Revolution. This trade in slaves and the goods
they produced, food (cheap sugar) and the raw materials for the
Industrial Revolution (cotton), was a critical component in the devel-
opment of British power (Walvin 1992). There were legitimating ide-
ologies in which British civil societal practices were valued more
highly than those of the conquered peoples: extending civilization
and Christianity was presented as a reason to support the enterprise
while liberalism was represented as progress (Ferguson 2004). The
empire depended upon a construction of ethnicity in which the dom-
ination of other peoples was considered legitimate, requiring their
treatment as ‘other’ than the inhabitants of the imperial power (Said
1978). This in turn was entwined with conceptions of gender rela-
tions that bolstered the European view of themselves as morally
superior (Enloe 1989; McClintock 1995).
The UK has a suffrage-democracy, though with some small
aspects of hereditary power still remaining. It has not achieved
presence-democracy though some small procedural steps have
been taken since 1997, such as some all-women short lists in
national elections. The EU is also an important polity. The range of
institutions governed by democracy is moderate and this changes
over time. Several of what might have been critical turning points
are better described as being constituted by a sequence of events –
such as the decline in the power of the hereditary monarch and
aristocracy and the development of full male suffrage – rather than
a single moment in time. The Second World War was a critical turning
point in the process of decolonization and the development of
democratic control over a wider range of institutions. Joining the
EU in 1973 was also an important moment. The UK is now gov-
erned through more than one polity: the EU is important, especially
for the governance of the economy, and is of increasing signifi-
cance over a range of policy areas. The EU itself has a complex
form of governance that includes a directly elected parliament,
which has proportional representation and has nearly achieved
presence-democracy for women, but also institutions of indirect
representation for the Member States, including the European
Council (of Ministers) and the European Commission.
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In the UK there has been a slow decline in the power of the
hereditary monarchy and aristocracy for several centuries, reducing
in steps at crisis points, but the monarchy still has a minor consti-
tutional place and significant symbolic pull. In 2008 the House of
Lords still had 92 hereditary peers and several bishops. The cen-
turies-old British Empire was reduced in stages by the decoloniza-
tion of the settler societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the independence of Ireland in 1922, and following the
Second World War, of India and then of most of Africa by the late
1970s. This was a consequence of both vigorous, sometimes armed,
nationalist movements in the colonies and the coincidence of the
decline in British military power as a consequence of the Second
World War, as well as domestic democratic developments. There are
some small remaining territories (with voting rights) such as the
Falklands/Malvinas. There is a small religious (Protestant) presence
within the institutions of governance, maintained since the
Reformation that was part of the European wave of reformation.
Male suffrage was won in steps that widened the limitations of the
franchise on property grounds over many decades if not centuries,
building on the tradition of parliamentary representation of the
powerful. Important reform acts came in 1832, 1867, and 1884, and
were consolidated in a final act in 1918. Women over 30 with some
small property gained the vote in 1918, and all women thereafter in
1928. The gap between the dates on which women and men gained
full suffrage is shorter than in the USA, from 10 to 44 years, depending
on whether male suffrage is dated as 1884 or 1918 and presuming
that female suffrage is dated at 1928. Both male and female suffrage
were won as a result of increasingly well organized mass civil soci-
etal movements, with each involving some violence on both sides.
Each had transnational components, most especially for female suf-
frage. By the time that suffrage was universal in 1928, the full range
of practices for free and fair elections had been established. Only
in 1900 was the Labour Party formed to represent class interests,
forming minority governments in 1924 and 1929 before the land-
slide victory of 1945 secured their effective power for the first time
(Labour Party 2006), followed by further Labour governments in
1964, and from 1997 to 2008 and beyond.
The development of a class-led social democratic tendency in
British welfare and employment regulation was associated with the
rise of the labour and trade union movement from the late nine-
teenth century, long after industrialization. The development of state
welfare started during the early twentieth century, influenced by
pressure from organized labour, the new Labour Party formed in
1900, the German Bismarckian model, and practical pressures from
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a modernizing economy. Social insurance was introduced in 1911,
rent control in 1915, council housing in 1919, state secondary
schooling in 1944. The 1945 Labour government introduced the
National Health Service, proudly free at the point of use, and further
developed the welfare state. The post-war period saw the develop-
ment of the regulation of the labour market, partially protecting
employees from risks such as illness and redundancy. These benefits
were differentiated by gender. The model of welfare treated married
women as dependents of their husbands and denied them benefits
in their own right. Those women who worked part-time were
excluded from the new employment protections.
This social democratic trajectory for class-based issues was inter-
rupted by the sudden rise of neoliberalism in the late 1970s. The
development of neoliberalism in the UK is partly attributable to a
response to pressures from globalization and partly due to domestic
conflicts, especially those involving industrial disputes and pressures
on state welfare expenditures. This challenge to the post-war settle-
ment, initially led by Thatcher, reduced certain forms of welfare pro-
vision, denationalized state-owned industries, privatized public
services and utilities, introduced market principles within public
services, diminished certain employment protections, and reduced
trade union organizational power, not least through an attack on the
miners (Walby and Greenwell et al. 1994; Newman and Clarke 1997;
Pierson 2001). The regulation of the environment in which trade
unions work was also tilted away from unions, for example the out-
lawing of ‘closed-shop’ agreements and secondary picketing
(Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999). Dex and McCulloch (1997: 187–188),
argued that as a consequence Britain was ‘sliding into being a low
wage, low skill economy in which the quality of jobs is declining’.
These changes have had long-lasting effects on British political econ-
omy, even though there has been a Labour government in power
since 1997. The New Labour project has sought to find a new bal-
ance, or ‘third way’, between earlier conceptions of social democracy
and the neoliberal wave (Giddens 1994, 1998). Most importantly, the
trade union base for social democracy has been diminished in
strength. Through privatization, neoliberal policies have reduced the
range of institutions over which there was once direct democratic
control. Economic inequality has risen.
There are few practices to promote presence-democracy in the UK.
Before the New Labour victory in 1997, Labour used a device in
which competition for the parliamentary candidacy in particular seats
was restricted to women only; this was temporarily defeated by legal
challenge by male would-be candidates but was then restored by leg-
islation. The new Parliament in Scotland and the General Assembly in
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Wales set up following the 1997 election successfully used electoral
devices to ensure the greater presence of women. The presence of
women in the UK Parliament remains low, though not as low as in
the USA. The minority ethnic presence in the UK parliament also
remains low. The range of institutions that are subject to democratic
control has varied. During most of the twentieth century up until 1979
there was an expansion in such institutions associated with the devel-
opment of the welfare state and employment regulation, with a key
moment being the post-Second World War 1945 Labour government
that established the National Health Service and nationalized key util-
ities and industries. The neoliberal wave initiated in the USA and in
the UK with the election of Thatcher in 1979 led to a steady decline
in the range of institutions subject to democratic control, being
replaced by the market and capital.
There have been some changes in gender relations that are con-
trary to those for class: gendered developments in employment regu-
lation and welfare provision are not aligned with changes in class
relations. This is a consequence of the increase in employed women
as a political constituency and the increased power of the European
Union. The increase in women’s employment alongside other changes
in the gender regime have created a new political constituency with
a distinctive interest in social democratic politics, for the increased
provision of public services including not only childcare but also edu-
cation and health. There is an increased representation of this political
voice with an increased presence of women in parliament, in the gov-
ernmental machinery, and in civil society organizations such as trade
unions, where women are now just as likely to be members as are
men (see Table 10.6). Most importantly, the legislation and policy
from an increasingly powerful European Union requires equal treat-
ment in employment on the grounds of gender, ethnicity, disability,
religion/belief, age, and sexual orientation. This has very significantly
increased the regulation of gender relations and other complex
inequalities in employment, even at a time of the declining regulation
of class-based issues. These policy changes led by the EU did not go
unchallenged by the UK, which attempted to resist the full transposi-
tion of the Directive on equal pay for work of equal value into UK
law, failing however in the European Court of Justice and thus being
obliged to introduce the domestic legislation that would bring it into
line with EU law (Walby 1999b). The EU was a catalyst for change in
the UK gendered political economy.
The late 1970s saw two contrasting critical turning points in the
development of employment regulation and welfare provision in
the UK. The class-based trajectory towards social democracy was
challenged and sent in a neoliberal direction. The transformation of
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the gender regime from a domestic to a public form continued,
with an increased turn in a social democratic direction. The out-
come for the UK is an uneven oscillation between neoliberal and
social democratic pathways of development, varying over time,
between regimes of inequality and between employment regulated
by the EU and welfare provided by the UK state, though currently
with tendency towards neoliberalism.
Ireland
Contemporary Irish political economy is often summarized as
neoliberal though it is more complicated than this, not least due to
the relevance of several polities and not the Irish state alone. Ireland
has one of the lowest levels of government social expenditure in the
OECD. It is also one of the few OECD countries to have experi-
enced a decline in economic inequality between households (as
measured by Gini) between the mid-1980s (33.1) and 2000 (30.4)
(OECD 2006). The labour movement has historically been weak:
late industrialization due to its history as a British colony, plus a
rapid move to service employment, meant that the typical base of
trade unionism and socialism in heavy manufacturing was never
significantly developed and the trade unions have historically been
fragmented and poorly organized. Capital is strong as a result of its
internationalism and US connections, and hence so is its potential
mobility. The Catholic Church has trenchantly opposed the provi-
sion of welfare by the state rather than the family. In the Irish state,
the political party system has been organized more around nation-
alist issues than those of class divisions. However, the European
Union has been a major force for the modernization of the gender
regime and for the regulation of employment for gender equality.
During the period of British colonial rule the Irish economy, trade,
and the public sphere were regulated by the British state. British rule
involved the regulation of the Irish economy in British interests,
such as by tariff restrictions and forcing all Irish trade through British
rather than Irish ports. These policies curtailed Irish industrial devel-
opment (Crotty 1986; Coulter 1990; Munck 1993; O’Hearn 1994).
Ireland has a suffrage-democracy that is devoid of hereditary and
colonial elements, however, there is a strong religious polity that gov-
erns intimacy for many. While it has proportional representation, this
has not led to the achievement of a presence-democracy. The EU is
also an important polity. The range of institutions subject to democ-
ratic control is the narrowest of the four countries. Critical turning
points in Irish democracy are: its colonization by Britain; the creation
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of a national project entwined with a Catholic project; the success of
a national project in securing de-colonization and a state of its own;
and joining the EU. A potential tipping point in the future might
follow the slow development of presence-democracy for women.
The Catholic Church has acted as a dampener in the development of
presence-democracy, while the EU has been a catalyst for the
employment that promotes women’s presence in parliament.
Most of Ireland won independence from Britain in 1922, follow-
ing the long build up of a national project and a short period of
militarized contestation. Ireland was never part of the European
reformation of Christianity. The transnational Catholic Church
retains considerable powers of direct governance of intimacy,
including divorce and abortion, for the many Irish people who fol-
low their teachings, as well as a significant influence over the state
and civil society. The achievement of democratic self-rule
depended upon the building and success of an Irish national pro-
ject. The Irish national project became closely entwined with
Catholicism during this period of nation formation (Larkin 1975,
1978, 1987, 1990), with considerable power granted to the Catholic
Church which has had enduring consequences.
On independence, full suffrage was granted to both men and
women in 1922. This might be considered as simultaneous suffrage,
however, men had been granted the right to vote for MPs sent to the
Westminster parliament in the same stages as men in Britain, so it was
not quite a simultaneous suffrage-democracy for both sexes.
Nevertheless the gap is slightly shorter than in the UK, since all women
gained suffrage in 1922, none having to wait until 1928. After 1920, it
became usual for newly de-colonized countries to grant suffrage to
both men and women simultaneously on independence day. The
removal of the hereditary British monarch as head of state took place
with the adoption of the new Constitution in 1937 (Bromage and
Bromage 1940). Ireland has almost all the procedures for suffrage-
democracy (except that not all members of the Senead or upper par-
liamentary chamber are directly elected). It has some but not all of the
procedures for presence democracy, with low cost electioneering and
proportional representation but no quotas. Ireland does not have
presence-democracy for women: very few women have ever been
elected to the Irish parliament, but their numbers have been slowly ris-
ing since the 1990s (8 per cent in 1990, 12 per cent in 2000) following
the increase in women’s employment, itself at least partly consequent
on joining the EU in 1973. The position of the Catholic Church in Irish
governance has come under challenge since the 1980s. Critical
moments in this have included sexual scandals, in particular the pro-
tection of a paedophile priest from prosecution by the church and state
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which led to a civil societal protest that challenged this closeness of
church and state, in particular the protection of the church by the state.
This erodes the authority of the governance of intimacy by the Catholic
Church, but does not stop it. There have been repeated contestations
over the constitutional legality of abortion and whether there are any
exceptions to its illegality, but the Catholic Church’s preferences on
abortion have prevailed thus far.
After decolonization, the Irish government sought to develop its
economic independence from Britain and an Irish national identity.
Developing the Irish national project entailed a domestic gender
regime: the model of womanhood inscribed in the national project
was that of wife and mother, not of worker and political citizen. This
was a consequence of the entwining of the national project with
Catholicism. The strategy of economic independence meant autarky.
De Valera, the Irish First Minister, yearned for a self-sufficient utopia
free from ‘contaminating’ contact with Britain (Lee 1989: 17). By 1932
Fianna Fail, the governing party, was ideologically committed to self-
sufficiency, involving a policy of a shift from livestock to tillage agri-
culture to increase agricultural employment, as well as a protectionist
tariff barrier behind which indigenous industry could develop (Lee
1989: 193). The outcome was little economic growth (O’Malley 1992).
A new constitution in 1937 enshrined the position of the Catholic
Church as a key political force in Ireland: indeed Article 44 explicitly
recognized the ‘special position of the Catholic Church’ (Durphy 1995)
by institutionalizing and codifying Catholic doctrine, especially its
teaching on the family, women, and education (Beale 1986; Farrell
1988; Scannell 1988). Article 41 stated that the state recognized the
family as the natural primary and fundamental group in society, that
women should not have to work outside the home, and that marriage
was indissoluble (Beale 1986; Jackson 1993). A marriage bar came into
operation in some areas of paid work so that women were sacked on
their marriage (Beale 1986; Curtin 1989). Even in the post-war period,
the economic development agency refused to assist international firms
to locate in Ireland if they intended to employ women (Pyle 1990).
The Catholic Church insisted on its own control over welfare and
education services and opposed the state financing of medical assis-
tance for mothers and their children, on the grounds that this was the
responsibility of the family and not the state. By the 1920s all Catholic
women primary teachers were being trained in teacher training col-
leges run by nuns, and secondary schooling for girls up until the
1960s was provided almost exclusively by convent schools run by
nuns. Nuns ran the largest Irish hospitals and most nurses were
trained in nursing schools attached to these hospitals. Growth in the
female religious orders continued unabated: from 1,500 in 1851, to
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9,000 in 1911, and peaking at 16,000 in the mid-1960s (Clear 1987;
Fahey 1992; Luddy 1995a, 1995b). The Catholic Church resisted the
development of welfare services by the state. A key example of
this was the resistance of the church to the state financing medical
services for mothers and their children (Whyte 1971; Inglis 1987). In
most European countries the provision of health care for vulnerable
citizens is seen as appropriate to the remit of the state. However, in
Ireland this extension, in the Mother and Child Scheme of 1951 under
the auspices of the 1947 Health Act, for free medical services for
pregnant women and children, was fiercely opposed. While there
was opposition from the medical profession, which feared their loss
of control over fee-paying work, the strongest opposition came from
the Catholic Church on grounds of subsidiarity. The head of the
Catholic hierarchy in Ireland wrote to the head of the Irish state, the
Taoiseach, on 5 April 1951 thus: ‘To claim such powers for the pub-
lic authority, without qualification, is entirely and directly contrary to
Catholic teaching on the rights of the family, the rights of the Church
in education, the rights of the medical profession and of voluntary
institutions’ (Whyte 1971: 460; Fahey 1995).
Much of the time between the founding of the Irish state and 1970,
the Catholic Church and Irish state practised an uncontested division
of respective arenas of authority. They divided institutions within the
borders of Ireland into those to be governed by either the Church or
the state. The Church in Ireland governed a wider range of institu-
tions than is typical in many other advanced industrial countries,
including most of those concerned with the provision of welfare, as
well as dominating policy on the family. In those instances where the
state attempted to expand its area of activities, the Catholic Church
strongly, and largely successfully, resisted. In the immediate post-war
period there was a social democratic wave across Britain and many
other countries in Northern Europe, for example the UK building its
National Health Service. The Irish did not share in this social demo-
cratic impulse. Today its state welfare expenditures are not only less
than those of the UK, but also less than those in the USA.
After several decades of economic stagnation came a radical
change of policy to engage internationally and to join the EU. As
part of this process Ireland applied to become a member of the
then European Economic Community in 1961, finally joining in
1973 (Commins 1995). This was indeed a critical turning point.
Economic growth took off, the gender regime began a sudden
transformation, relations between church and state fractured. The
Irish state opened up its economy to the world economy, moving
from protection to free trade, from the discouragement to the
encouragement of foreign investment in Ireland.
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Ending this strategy of economic autarky was partly due to a per-
ception that this was desirable for growth in the Irish economy, and
that it would provide an escape route from being locked into an
unequal and asymmetrical relationship with Britain, and partly due
to international pressure. Lee (1989: 341) locates the origin of the
changed orientation to the domestic/international issue by govern-
ment and ministers as taking place in 1957/8, seeing the policy doc-
uments Economic Development and The First Programme by the
new Finance Secretary Whitaker as the instruments of these historic
shifts. This is a view shared by Breen et al. (1990: 31), who refer to
‘The turning point of 1958, when the State seized the initiative as the
main force in Irish society’. It was also partly due to outside pres-
sures. Once Ireland accepted Marshall Aid, which was offered as a
US contribution to the rebuilding of post-war Europe, it was pres-
surized by the USA into dismantling its industrial protection and into
acting to attract export-oriented foreign firms (O’Hearn 1995).
However, in relation to the gender regime the Irish state
attempted, but ultimately failed, to resist the modernizing impulse of
the EU. The Irish state was legally compelled by the EU to change
its policy in the regulation of gender relations in the labour market.
On joining the EU in 1973, the Irish were obliged to abandon the
ostensibly core values of the Irish nation and the Catholic Church as
to the domestic location of women. The EU had a different set of
policies on gender from that of Ireland (Whyte 1988; Curtin 1989;
Walby 1997, 1999b) requiring equal treatment for women and men
in employment by all new Member States. The Irish state was
obliged to remove the marriage bar which had prevented married
women from working in certain occupations and to introduce legis-
lation outlawing discrimination against women in employment
(Whyte 1988; Curtin 1989). This was an unintended gendered con-
sequence of joining the EU. While the change in gendered employ-
ment policy was determined by the EU, there was also an active
local voice pressing for these changes. A feminist movement pushed
for the implementation of equal pay legislation, for instance, in the
1977 Equal Pay Campaign, where 36,000 signatures for an equal pay
petition were collected in ten days, contributing to the passing of the
legislation (Smyth 1988). Nevertheless, without the EU it is unlikely
that the grass-roots movement would have won equal pay at that
time (Robinson 1988).
The labour movement in Ireland has historically been weak. This
is despite the lack of ethnic divisions that in other countries, such as
the USA, have hindered solidarity. Here the labour movement has
been fragmented and poorly organized at the national level,
although a moderate number of workers have been members of
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trade unions. There were many (more than 80) small unions, which
tended to compete for members rather than focus on alliances.
Progress on the several attempts at amalgamation into larger indus-
trial unions has been slow though ongoing. United action at a
national level was further made difficult by the existence of signifi-
cant numbers of unions outside the Irish congress of Trade Unions
(Breen et al. 1990). One reason for the weakness of the labour
movement was the absence of the kinds of manufacturing that had
elsewhere generated strong trade unions, such as iron and steel
making and car plants. This was at least partly due to late industri-
alization that in turn was due to the restriction of Ireland’s economic
development when it was in a dependency relationship with Britain.
There were further comparative weaknesses in the development
of labour and socialist politics. The employers did not form an
effective national body of the kind necessary to take forward a
centralized national level of collective bargaining. The three such
bodies (of which the most important was the Federated Union of
Employers) had insufficient authority over diverse members to
make national agreements (Breen et al. 1990). Party politics were
not crystallized along class lines; nationalist politics took prece-
dence leaving less space for the articulation of working-class inter-
ests. The Catholic Church actively opposed the development of
the state welfare that elsewhere was a significant part of the
social democratic project, as described above. The development
of employed women as a constituency to support the social demo-
cratic project came very late as compared with the other countries:
in 1980 women were only 29 per cent of the workforce rising to
just 35 per cent only in 1990, though since then it has risen rapidly
to 43 per cent in 2005.
Unlike many other countries such as the UK and Sweden, which
have seen a decline in corporatist-type arrangements during the glob-
alizing decades since the 1980s, Ireland has had a very unusual and
very late developing form of corporatism from 1987. This has been
referred to as ‘competitive corporatism’ rather than ‘social corpo-
ratism’ (Rhodes 1998, 2001) and as ‘neo-liberal corporatism’ (Boucher
and Collins 2003). The 1987 form was the culmination of a slow
development of corporatist forms from the 1940s in the form of social
partnerships (Boucher and Collins 2003). The early bargain was for
income tax cuts, even though this entailed curtailing some public ser-
vices. It is more voluntarist than most corporatism since parties can
drop out and it is not legally binding until it is passed as legislation
by parliament – a usual but not inevitable following step. The first
bargain was struck around the agenda of economic growth and
lowering unemployment and is credited with making a significant
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contribution to these achievements by producing stability (Baccaro
and Simoni 2007). A particularly distinctive feature of the bargain
is the agreement to cut taxes and social expenditure. The deal was
struck at a time of perceived crisis, but has since been replicated
several times even when the economy was the fastest growing in the
EU. While overall state social expenditure as a percentage of GDP
has not fallen between 1990 (15.5 per cent) and 2003
(15.9 per cent), it has remained low by OECD standards where the
levels have risen slightly between 1990 (17.9 per cent) and 2003 (20.7
per cent) (OECD 2007b).
Globalization has affected Ireland in complex ways. The inflow
of global, especially US, capital has been a factor in its rapid
economic growth since the 1980s. The OECD estimates that trade
accounts for 76 per cent of its GDP, so Ireland is a site of flows.
The capital built branch plants, especially for manufacturing com-
puter components for international markets, exporting high levels
of profits out of Ireland. Ireland is one of the few countries where
there is a significant difference between the Gross Domestic
Product per person ($40,942) and the Gross National Income per
person ($40,942), with the gap being largely made up of expatriated
profits (World Bank 2006c). The benefit here has been high rates of
economic growth and, despite the expatriated profits, a rapidly
rising standard of living until the crash of 2008.
Ireland initially successfully navigated the increase in global cap-
ital flows. The rapid growth of the Irish economy earned it the
name of Celtic Tiger (O’Hearn 1998), though it might be more
appropriate to say Celtic Tigress in recognition of the rapid increase
in female employment. While the Irish political economy may be
summarized as neoliberal, it is important to make distinctions
between the dynamics of change for gender and class relations and
in different policy areas. The regulation of employment by the EU
has meant that there has been an increase in equality regulations
which are part of a social democratic project. However, state social
expenditure remains low. There has been a rapid transformation of
the gender regime from domestic towards public, led by the
changes in employment, but this is far from complete in most
domains. Relative to the other countries compared here Ireland has
the most domestic gender regime.
The critical turning points are the absence of a Reformation; the
colonization of Ireland by Britain; the growth of a nation project
entwined with Catholicism; decolonization and suffrage-democracy;
joining the EU and internationalizing the economy; and the devel-
opment of neoliberal corporatism. The rapid increase in economic
growth spirals with the rapid increase in female employment, with
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each catalysing the other. The Catholic Church acted as a dampener
to change, especially through its opposition to the modernization of
the gender regime. The EU was a catalyst for change, removing the
restrictions on women’s employment whose increase was necessary
for rapid economic growth. However, openness to global flows con-
tributed to the crash of 2008.
Conclusions
The rise of social democracy in political economy during the twenti-
eth century was uneven and its fall is more uneven still, being resilient
and even renewed in some places and dimensions but not in others.
Many claims that globalization must undermine social democracy have
been shown to be exaggerated. In response some have suggested that
this is a simple case of path dependency, with social democracy
locked into institutions in some countries. But this underestimates the
significance of the rise of a new social democratic project which is sup-
ported by the new constituency of employed women.
Much work on divergent paths of social development has
focused on the balance of class forces. The distinctiveness of the
approach here is to consider the implications of complex inequali-
ties in addition to class; a wider range of polities, not only states
but also organized religions and the EU; not only national but also
global processes. It also differentiates between the welfare and
employment aspects of political economy, not least because they
are governed by different polities in the Member States of the
European Union. A longer and different list of critical turning points
emerges when these additional inequalities, domains, and spatiali-
ties are taken into account.
While the four countries have different depths of democracy, they
share several critical turning points. These include: Reformation or
not of the Christian church in the sixteenth century – a regional
European wave; male suffrage-democracy in the late nineteenth
century – a regional European wave; female suffrage-democracy
around 1920 (1918–1928) – a regional north European and North
American wave; and a slight decline in depth in the 1990s as a result
of a global neoliberal wave. In addition, there are some that are
specific, including a decolonization of the USA from Britain and a
new constitution in 1776, and a decolonization of Ireland from
Britain in 1922 with a new constitution in 1937. There are signifi-
cant differences in the length of the temporal gap between the
achievement of suffrage-democracy on the basis of class, gender,
and ethnicity. The longest temporal gap in suffrage-democracy
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between different groups is in the USA, which had the earliest
majority male suffrage, and the shortest is in Sweden.
Violence
There is a tendency for violence to decline with modernity, with
a link through increases in democracy rather than increases in
economic development. There is also a countervailing tendency
for violence to increase with inequality. Most important are sig-
nificant variations in the level of violence between varieties of
modernity: it is much higher in neoliberal than social democratic
forms. This contradicts the popular thesis that neoliberal states
are smaller than social democratic ones – neoliberal states spend
more on the military and on law and order, including prisons.
There are additional institutional components to the path depen-
dency of violence including, especially, the history of warfare.
The four countries vary in the path of development of the vio-
lence nexus. In general, neoliberal countries with high levels of
inequality and shallow forms of democracy have higher levels of
violence than social democratic countries where inequality is less
extreme and democracy is deeper. The neoliberal USA contrasts
sharply with the more social democratic EU and especially
Sweden across the range of forms of violence, including homi-
cide, use of the death penalty, the coerciveness of the criminal
justice system, and the degree of militarization. The UK and
Ireland are in between, with Ireland less violent than the UK (see
Table 10.5).
The USA has a homicide rate (5.56) over three times that of the
EU (1.59) and an imprisonment rate nearly eight times as high (689)
as that of the EU (87). The USA is one of only 25 countries in the
world that still use the death penalty. Among the three EU coun-
tries, Sweden has the lowest homicide (1.11) and imprisonment
rates (69). The USA spends over four times as much of its central
government budget on the military as compared with countries in
the EU; this is almost one fifth (19.3 per cent) of government expen-
diture and amounts to more than twice as much of its GDP as coun-
tries in the EU (4.6 per cent). Among the three EU countries, the UK
spends the most (6.3 per cent). The USA (2.7 per cent) spends more
than the three European countries on law and order with the UK
(2.2 per cent) closer to the USA than Sweden (1.8 per cent) and
Ireland (1.5 per cent).
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The USA
Despite being the most economically developed country, the USA has
the highest rate of violence on all indicators. Why is the USA so violent?
It has been a violent country since its origins in conquest. Many
European countries, once also very violent, experienced either a crit-
ical turning point during state reconstruction or the end of a war or
else slow processes of modernization leading to tipping points in the
reduction of violence. The high rates of deployment of violence and
its low level of regulation by democratic polities is linked to its mil-
itary history, slavery, culture, and criminal justice system.
The legacy of violence in the USA starts with the conquests by the
various groups of European settlers who sought land to settle and
exploit, their expansion across the North American continent, and
their destruction of the peoples who opposed this. For several cen-
turies from 1620, there was armed struggle between the colonizers
and the original nations of Native Americans, during which the major-
ity of natives lost their lives (they are now less than 1 per cent of the
Table 10.5 Violence: USA, EU, Sweden, UK, Ireland
USA EU Sweden UK Ireland
Homicide rate per 100,000 (1) 5.56 1.59 1.11 1.61 1.42
Prison population per 100,000 (2) 689 87 69 129 79
Increase in prison population 61 26 17 45 43
1990–2001 as per cent (3)
Military as per cent of central 19.3 4.6 4.3 6.3 1.9
government expenditure (4)
Military expenditure as per cent 4.1 1.7 1.6 2.6 0.6
of GDP (5)
Law and order expenditure as 2.7 1.8 2.2 1.5
per cent of GDP (6)
Year death sentence abolished (7) Still legal 1921 1973 1990
Year rape in marriage became Late 1970s 1965 1994 1990
illegal (8)
(1) Homicides (intentional killing of a person excluding attempts: murder, manslaughter, euthanasia
and infanticide) per 100,000 population, average per year 1999–2001, as recorded by the police.
UK is England and Wales (Northern Ireland is 2.65 and Scotland is 2.16). EU is EU15. Source:
Barclay and Tavares (2003).
(2) Rate per 100,000 population in 2001. UK is England and Wales (Northern Ireland is 59 and
Scotland is 120). EU is EU15. Source: Barclay and Tavares (2003).
(3) UK is England and Wales. EU is EU15. Source: Barclay and Tavares (2003).
(4) Data for 2005. EU is EMU. Source: World Bank (2007b).
(5) Data for 2005. EU is EMU. Source: World Bank (2007b).
(6) Data for 2003. Source: OECD (2006).
(7) Source: HighBeam Research (2007).
(8) USA: State by state reform, starting in the late 1970s, source: National Center for Victims of
Crime (2007); Sweden: source: Russell (1990); UK: Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994;
source: Westmarland (2004); Ireland Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1990, source: Galligan (1998).
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population: see CDC 2006). This was a long process of full-scale war,
attrition, and disease, in which treaties were signed and abandoned,
and alliances were made and betrayed, resulting in the defeat of the
native peoples of the USA by European settlers (Graymont 1972). US
military history continued with the successful war of independence
from the British Empire conducted in 1773–1776. This was followed
by the violent subduing of French settler groups who had colonized
the middle of the continent along waterways such as the St Lawrence
and the Mississippi. There were also border disputes with Mexico
over which tracts of land were within the USA and which were within
Mexico in which the Mexicans were militarily defeated and vast tracts
of land in the south and west were added to the USA. This included
the US–Mexican war in 1846–1848, which led to the US annexa-
tion of Texas, California, and New Mexico from Mexico. Next
was the military crushing of the attempt at independence by the
southern confederacy in the civil war of 1861–1865. The military
history of the USA continues, with engagements in the European
Second World War followed by wars in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, and
most recently Iraq and Afghanistan (Murphy 1967; van Alstyne 1974;
Beringer et al. 1986; Reid 1996).
Slavery was an inherently violent institution that used force to cap-
ture and move millions of people from Africa to subdue them and to
coerce them to work for no wages. Rebellions were few and harshly
put down (Mullin 1992). Slavery was not only an economic institu-
tion, but also depended upon the use of violence, polities that
legalized the practice, and legitimating ideologies. There was military
violence in Africa at the point of the extraction of slaves, the violence
of the transportation of the slaves during which many died, and the
use and threat of violence in the everyday maintenance of labour
relations. Slavery depended upon racialized discursive constructions
of the other that rendered black people as ‘other’ than the slave-
owning population (Walvin 1992). During the civil war the
Confederacy in the south fought to gain their independence from the
rest of the USA in order to sustain their own way of life, especially
its racialized practice of slavery based on a supposed constitutional
claim to the primacy of states rights over national or federal rights,
which had been fudged in the early wording of the Constitution.
But there were continuing attempts to continue the subordination
of African-Americans, including through lynching, in which the state
provided little protection for the victims (Shapiro 1988).
This legacy of violence has had implications for its use in a series
of related institutions. The lethal arming of individual citizens in the
USA follows unbroken from the tradition of violence by settlers
against the former inhabitants and has its consequences in the high
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rate of homicide. This violent history contributes to a legacy in which
the widespread possession of guns is constitutionally as well as prac-
tically embedded and a cultural history of glorification of the indi-
vidual and collective armed struggle (for example, in the Hollywood
genre of ‘cowboys and Indians’). Violence is also part of the history
of industrial relations: in the late nineteenth century there were bru-
tal violent attempts at breaking strikes and unions, with employer’s
own forces or with the assistance of local police and national guards
(Smith 2003). The USA is almost unique among developed nations in
allowing and using the death penalty (Amnesty International 2006).
Corporal punishment of children is still allowed in the home, schools
(though exceptions in some states), and as a form of discipline in
around half the states in the penal system, though not as a sentence
for a crime (End All Corporal Punishment of Children 2006).
There had been a major attempt to reduce violence by the radical
social movements of the 1960s, which have continued in some
restricted areas including in relation to gender-based violence. The
1960s saw considerable grass-roots protest against and in opposition
to the US military engagement in Vietnam and adjacent countries,
which slowly contributed to US withdrawal. This same period also saw
the emergence of a feminist movement and groups committed to
action to end violence against women. These were the pioneers of the
rape crisis phone lines, the refuges and shelters for the survivors of
domestic violence, support for the survivors of child sex abuse, legal
strategies to tackle sexual harassment in the workplace, and the nam-
ing and challenging of a multiplicity of forms of violence against
women. This movement took a dual form in the development of both
autonomous feminist institutions and challenges to the laws and prac-
tices of the criminal justice system and other agencies of the state. The
law on rape was changed, state by state, and starting in the 1970s, so
that it was no longer legal to rape a woman in marriage. The move-
ment continued even as the political climate changed, for example,
gaining exceptions for battered women from the curtailing of benefit
payments to only three years (Martin 1987; Russell 1990; National
Center for Victims of Crime 2007). This US movement launched a
global feminist wave against violence against women which reverber-
ated around the world and found new forms in various locations
(Bunch 1995; Peters and Wolper 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998).
However, this social democratic moment was short-lived and
little institutionalized at the level of the state. By the 1970s a counter
wave was up and running – neoliberalism. This has a significant
component that addresses issues of violence and crime. Rather than
the social democratic forms of penal welfare there was a turn to
more punitive and violent forms of criminal justice system (Garland
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2001). In 1976, and against the global trend, the USA having
previously suspended use of the death penalty reintroduced it.
The number of executions per year rose from one to five during
1977–1983, to 98 in 1999, and then fell back down to 53 in 2006
(Clark County Prosecuting Attorney 2007). Between 1991 and 2001
the rate of imprisonment in the USA rose by 61 per cent as
compared with 26 per cent in the EU, reaching levels ten times of
that in Sweden (Barclay and Tavares 2002, 2003).
In the context of war in Iraq and the growth of terror attacks by
jihadists around the world, including those on 9/11 in New York
and elsewhere, there was a general increase in securitization. War
and the fear of terror fed a perception that it was appropriate to
increase surveillance, especially over those people who travel by
air, to justify the use of coercive interrogation techniques on sus-
pects, and to hold enemy combatants in legal limbo in Guantanamo
Bay. This erosion of human rights and freedoms was a conse-
quence of militarization and the fear of terrorism (Gregory 2004).
The USA is unique among the four countries examined here in its
trajectory of violence in that there have been no significant turning
points away from this pathway of violence. There is one regime of
inequality where opposition has gathered, concerning gender-based
violence, which is ongoing and has translated into a global wave.
But the turn to neoliberalism exacerbated the violence spiral.
Sweden
Sweden has a low level of violence relative to other countries. Of
the four being compared it has the lowest homicide and imprison-
ment rates and the earliest abolition of the death penalty and ille-
gality of rape in marriage. However, it does have a history of
militarist nationalism, though this stopped very early, which has left
a legacy of average EU expenditure on military (though this has
been put to uses other than war). A less coercive criminal justice
system and depth of regulation of gender-based violence is associ-
ated with the depth of its democratization.
Sweden once had repeated militarized conflicts with its European,
especially Nordic, neighbours. The turning point came two centuries
ago in 1814, when Sweden fought its last war. Sweden has had a
history of alternate warring and alliance with its Nordic neighbours
and during this period there was established a strong Swedish state
as well as strong Nordic alliances. Between 1397 and 1521 there was
a union of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden – the Kalmar Union. In
1523 the Nordic region split into one alliance of Sweden and Finland
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and another of Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Greenland, and the
Faroe Islands. This started a series of conflicts and the seventeenth
century saw near continuous war. In 1809 Russia attacked and occu-
pied Finland thereby ending Swedish domination. In one last war
Sweden attacked and defeated Norway, creating a union between
the two in 1814. This ending of war was associated with a change
in Sweden’s internal politics, not least the development of greater
powers for parliament at the expense of the monarch. Greater coop-
eration between the Nordic countries was secured with the found-
ing of the Nordic Council in 1952, between Sweden, Denmark, and
Norway, with Finland joining in 1956. Sweden was neutral in both
of the twentieth century’s World Wars and afterward joined NATO
when it was founded in 1947. Neutrality was one of the reasons for
not joining the EU at its foundation (Swedish History 1999; Nordic
Council 2006).
Swedish legislation saw early limits to the use of official violence
against its citizens. It abolished the death penalty in 1921
(HighBeam Research 2007), much earlier than many other countries,
and 1950 saw the start of process by which corporal punishment
was forbidden by law (Swedish History 1999), which was completed
in the 1979 amendment to the Parenthood and Guardianship Code
(End All Corporal Punishment of Children 2006).
Sweden made rape in marriage illegal in 1965 long before many
other countries (Russell 1990). The country has repeatedly
upgraded its legal interventions on male violence against women,
for instance, in 1982 by passing a law to ensure that all assault and
battery against women is subject to public prosecution and is not
merely a civil matter (Statistics Sweden 1995), and this was slightly
ahead of many other Western countries. While there is some con-
troversy as to whether Sweden has lower rates of violence against
women than similar countries (Lundgren et al. 2001), it has one of
the most developed legal systems to address the issue. As in the
other countries examined here, these reforms were the conse-
quence of feminist pressure focused on the issue of violence
against women; unlike the other countries women were present in
the state to facilitate the revision of state policy and law.
Sweden did catch some of the neoliberal wave, but this had less
effect than in many other countries. The rate of imprisonment did
rise by 17 per cent between 1990 and 2001 (Barclay and Tavares
2003), but this was much less than the other three countries and the
EU as a whole.
Sweden has a social democratic version of the violence nexus,
with lower rates of the range of forms of violence. This pathway
started with the ending of the last war fought by Sweden in 1814,
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much earlier than the other countries. The regulation of violence
towards women did increase at the same time as the global femi-
nist wave on these issues. The neoliberal global wave was merely
a ripple in relation to violence in Sweden, consequently increasing
the differences between path dependent trajectories of violence in
Sweden as compared with the USA and UK.
The UK
The UK has undergone several turning points rather than following
a single simple path of violence. Violence was used routinely in
the acquisition and maintenance of empire. It decreased after
decolonization, the pacification of Europe by EU, the ending of
terrorism over the disputed partition of Ireland, and the feminist
wave from the 1970s that led to increased regulation of gender-
based violence and thereby its reduction. However, this was
followed in the 1980s by the turn to neoliberalism, with wars in
the Falklands/Malvinas, Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the rise of
jihadist terrorism, the resecuritization of civil society, and the
increased coerciveness of the criminal justice system.
The legacy of the military in the UK centres on empire – the con-
quest and defence of territory and slave trading – and the end of
empire removed many of the reasons for war. From the sixteenth
century onward, the UK conquered and ran, through military force,
a large empire covering nearly a quarter of the world at its height
in the late nineteenth century. The military conflict that is associ-
ated with empire continued until its end during the late twentieth
century, when former colonies became independent states.
The European continent was marked for many centuries by wars
between states and other entities, in which Britain played a major
role. From the eighteenth century, these wars became increasingly
saturated with nationalist ideologies which purported to be seek-
ing to bring into alignment national and state boundaries. National
projects were frequently partially mapped onto religious, ethnic,
and linguistic groups, which provided added meaning to these
projects (Smith 1986). However, since ethno-national and religious
groupings have been thoroughly mixed during the course of
European history (Therborn 1995), purity-seeking projects, such
as nations seeking a state of their own, would inevitably fail. This
did not prevent war and irregular collective violence, including
pogroms (Walby 2003).
Britain became a global hegemon during the seventeenth century
and relinquished this position by the mid-twentieth century. The
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British state subordinated many different countries containing many
diverse nations, religions, and ethnicities, altering their economies,
polities, and cultures so as to benefit Britain, or at least those who
were dominant in the UK. The British Empire ruled through formal
political hierarchies supported by military force based on economic
power and supported by legitimating ideologies. British state power
was visibly underpinned by military force – without navies and armies
there would have been no Empire. These were used both in initial
conquest and to put down rebellions. The profits of the resulting trade
returned to the British imperial elite contributed to their interest in
expanding and maintaining the British Empire. However, the cost of
maintaining the military forces needed to support these specific enter-
prises were met by a wider section of the British population than
were in receipt of the resulting profits (Davis and Huttenback 1986).
The British Empire came to an end in the latter half of the twen-
tieth century as a result of changes across the range of domains. Its
economy was overtaken by the USA in the early years of the twen-
tieth century and by 1910 the average American was richer than the
average Brit. The two World Wars (1914–1918 and 1939–1945)
drained Britain’s resources and potential for economic development
relative to the USA. The ideological legitimacy of the Empire was
undermined by a near global wave of nationalism, drawing on
emerging views of democratic entitlements from the nineteenth cen-
tury onwards (Kedourie 1966; Smith 1986). The whites-run settler
societies gained their independence by 1910, while during the 1950s
and 1960s most of the colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean
and beyond were able to establish their independent statehood.
The struggle for Ireland’s independence from Britain and the loca-
tion of the border was a source of sporadic collective violence and
terrorism. The settlement of Catholic Ireland by the Protestant British
was contentious and violent rebellion was followed by violent
repression, with a key moment being during the time of Cromwell in
the seventeenth century. The independence granted to Ireland in
1922 did not include the six counties in the north which had an
overall Protestant majority: these remained as part of the UK to the
present day. This has been disputed ever since, both politically and
by force of arms, with consequent terrorism in the north of Ireland
and the mainland UK. The 1960s and 1970s saw the height of these
‘Troubles’. From time to time the global media chose to elevate the
issue of Northern Ireland to the global political stage. The difficulty
in resolving the non-congruity of nation and state in Northern
Ireland is to the detriment of many aspects of life there, including a
lack of economic development and higher rates of violence – for
example, the homicide rate in Northern Ireland (2.65) in 1999–2001,
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was 65 per cent higher than that in England and Wales (1.61). There
are ongoing attempts to consolidate the peace agreement (Whyte
1971; Anderson and O’Dowd 1999a, 1999b; Barclay and Tavares
2003). Of these various attempts at peaceful settlements, the Good
Friday Agreement of 1998 was the most important, initiating a peace
process that is still active. This violent conflict is thus an example of
both the legacy of empire and the legacy of the impure and contested
boundaries of nation and state in Europe. This is despite countless
attempts at sophisticated political solutions with a plethora of innov-
ative interpretations of the concept of sovereignty (Kearney 1997).
During the 1970s, the UK like the USA developed a feminist move-
ment, one part of which addressed violence against women (Hague
and Malos 1993). The first shelter for battered women was estab-
lished in London in 1973 (Pizzey 1974), followed by the develop-
ment of a national network of such refuges – Women’s Aid. A rape
crisis phone line was established shortly after, followed again by a
network of regional centres. The movement drew inspiration from
developments in the USA as well as parallel developments occurring
nearly simultaneously in other European countries. In the early years
the orientation was one of building new separate institutions to help
women, in the absence of any expectation that the state would be
responsive to these feminist demands. Later, demands were placed
upon the state to provide funding and to revise the relevant legisla-
tion (Taylor-Browne 2001); rape in marriage was made illegal in 1994
(Westmarland 2004). The most important revisions of the law took
place in the decade following the election of the new Labour gov-
ernment in 1997, concerning domestic violence, sexual assault,
female genital mutilation, and forced marriage (Hester and
Westmarland 2005). From the 1980s onwards there were initiatives to
get the criminal justice system to address violence against other
minoritized groups, including African-Caribbeans and gays and les-
bians, in response to demands from those communities.
From the 1980s the turn to neoliberalism, following the election
of Thatcher in 1979, was associated with an increased coerciveness
of the criminal justice system and an increased propensity to go to
war. The orientation of the criminal justice system was changed
from a penal–welfare focus on reform to a more punitive approach
(Garland 2001): the rate of imprisonment soared, rising 45 per cent
during 1990–2001 alone (Barclay and Tavares 2003). The UK went
to war with Argentina over the Falklands/Malvinas – small islands
off the coast of Argentina that were still a British colony – with a
significant loss of life. The UK also joined the war against Iraq over
Kuwait and then went to war in Iraq as an ally of the USA, followed
by Afghanistan, again.
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The UK became a target for jihadism, radical Islamic terrorist
actions sometimes but not always linked to Al Qaeda. There was a
major suicide bombing in London on 7 July 2006 and attempted
bombings on 21 July 2006, as well as other events. These jihadists were
second generation British-born Muslims of Pakistani descent, Pakistan
having once been part of the British Empire colony (3 per cent of the
population were Muslim in 2001). Britain’s involvement in the US-
led war in Iraq, a history of other disputes with Islamic entities such
as the Palestine/Israel conflict, and wider fears have all contributed
to the development of this new form of terrorism. There are now
significant numbers of convicted jihadists in British jails. The non-
congruence of religion, nation, and state for the Islamic diaspora in
Britain had led to a complex cross-cutting of understandings of cit-
izenship (Hussain and Bagguley 2005) and conflicts (Bagguley and
Hussain 2008).
In the neoliberal climate, fears regarding the new terrorism have
led to new and more intense forms of securitization which involve
various erosions of civil liberties. In 2008 the number of days that
a terrorist suspect could be held without charge was extended to
28 days (the longest time-span in the West). There is a proposal to
introduce ID cards, not merely with a name, number, and photo,
but with considerable additional items of information. Travel, espe-
cially air travel, is subject to increased security checks and surveil-
lance. This deepening of securitization in this period is in contrast
to the more low-key response to the earlier terrorism from the IRA,
when neoliberalism was less entrenched.
The UK has undergone more than one critical turning point in its
trajectory of violence. The development of Empire was associated
with an increase in violence. Most of the twentieth century was
marked by a decline in violence, with decolonization, the political
settlement represented by the European Union, and the rise of social
movements winning an increased regulation of violence against
women and minorities. Towards the end of that century the rise of
neoliberalism was associated with an increased propensity to go to
war, an increased coerciveness of the criminal justice system, and an
increased securitization of civil society, with the exception of the
continuing increase in the regulation of violence against women
and other minorities.
Ireland
Ireland has a low level of violence. It has no history of military con-
quest of its own, only irregular militarized resistance to colonization
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by Britain. It uses fewer resources for the criminal justice system
and the military than many countries. As with the other countries
being compared here there has been an increase in the regulation
of gender-based violence. So despite its neoliberal political econ-
omy, Ireland does not have a conventional neoliberal violence
nexus.
Ireland was effectively a colony of the British state, part of the
British Empire, from the seventeenth century until its indepen-
dence in 1922. English attempts at colonization began around 1169
and involved the establishment of plantations of settlers, with the
most serious of these conquests coming during the middle of the
seventeenth century. After the rebellion of 1641, Cromwell’s con-
quest during 1649–1653 led to a confiscation of lands belonging
to native Catholic landowners and their handing over to British
settlers. A second rebellion (1689–1691) led to further bloodshed
and subordination. Britain had had a Protestant reformation by
this time, so the struggles in Ireland mapped nationality onto reli-
gion. As a British colony Ireland had no significant serious legacy
of an army of its own and only occasional militias to fight (or
help) the British.
The movement for Irish independence or ‘Home Rule for
Ireland’ was pushed forward by both political and violent means,
with the period 1916–1921 especially marked by politically-
inspired violence. The British state conceded Home Rule for
Ireland, passing the Government of Ireland Act, in 1914, under
which the whole of Ireland would have elected a devolved
parliament. However, the two Irish sides – nationalist and unionist –
could not agree as to whether the predominantly Protestant coun-
ties of Ulster in the north of Ireland were to be included, so it was
not implemented. The Easter Uprising in 1916 was a failed insur-
rection in Dublin but the brutality used by the British in its sup-
pression increased support for the nationalist project. In the 1918
election, held under the old rules, the nationalist party, Sinn Féin,
won most of the seats. Its MPs assembled not in London but in
Dublin, and unilaterally declared the independence of the whole
island from Britain. The new regime’s armed forces, the Irish
Republican Army, waged war with Britain from 1919 to 1921, until
a truce in that year agreed a highly controversial settlement in
which the north was allowed to opt out, which it did. In 1922 the
Irish Free State was founded while the six counties in the north
stayed as part of the UK. This militarized conflict over the north of
Ireland, perhaps surprisingly, did not militarize the state in the
Republic of Ireland. Though the location of the boundary remains
contested because of the mixing of ethno-religious-national groups
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in the north of Ireland, generating a militarized conflict and terrorist
violence until the peace settlement of the 1990s, this was fought in
Northern Ireland and Great Britain and not in the Republic
(Kearney 1997).
Ireland has not had any significant engagement in any war since
its independence. It remained neutral throughout the Second World
War, and has not joined in since with any other war. The institu-
tional development of the military remains small and its expendi-
tures are low by international standards.
During the 1970s in Ireland, as with the other countries, there
developed a feminist movement one part of which addressed vio-
lence against women. As elsewhere there were two wings to this
movement – one autonomous, building new organizations to sup-
port women who had experienced male violence, and the other
oriented towards the state and the revision of the legal system. In
1978 a campaign started around rape, involving the establishment
of a rape crisis centre in Dublin and leading to two revisions to the
law, the first in 1981, and the second in the 1990 Criminal Law
(Rape) Act, which made rape in marriage illegal for the first time.
From 1969 there were campaigns around domestic violence, estab-
lishing refuges to assist women to escape violent homes and intro-
ducing new legal instruments in the Family Law (Protection of
Spouses and Children) Act in 1981. The reduction in civil society
tolerance to sexual abuse had implications for both church and
state. One government lost office over the issue of whether they
were right to protect a paedophile priest from justice at the hands
of the secular courts, as Irish public opinion moved more quickly
than the government with its new demands for the subordination
of the church to secular law (Prendiville 1988; Smyth 1988, 1992;
Reid 1992; Byrne and Leonard 1997; Kenny 1997; Galligan 1998;
O’Connor 1998).
The neoliberal turn affected Ireland as well as the UK and the
USA in leading to a more coercive criminal justice system in its
imprisonment practices. Between 1990 and 2001 the rate of impris-
onment increased by 43 per cent, which was more than the EU
average of 26 per cent but less than that of the USA at 61 per cent.
However, Ireland did abolish the death penalty in 1990
as EU law requires this (Barclay and Tavares 2003; HighBeam
Research 2007).
Ireland’s low rate of violence is at least partly due to its absence
of history as either a colonial power or as a player in European
nationalist militarism. The other changes are consequent on global
and EU developments. The increased regulation of gender-based
violence is part of a transnational feminist wave starting in the 1970s.
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The ending of the death penalty was linked to its membership of the
EU. Its increased imprisonment is part of the neoliberal turn.
Conclusion
There are identifiable trajectories in the nexus of violence.
Differences present between the countries mentioned here are at
least partly due to path-dependent processes: polity formation and
restructuring; colonization and slavery; war; the mapping (or not)
of nation and state; inequality; democratization; and global waves
of feminism and neoliberalism.
In the eighteenth century three of the four countries had mil-
itarized states engaged in colonizing, conquest, and militarized
nationalism: the USA, the UK, and Sweden. Only Ireland was absent
from this because it was itself a colony of Britain, so it did not
have a military of its own and nor did it ever develop a signifi-
cant one. The critical turning points that differentiate the paths of
violence are predominantly turning points that lead to decreases
in violence. Sweden was the first, with its last war in 1814 that
was associated with internal political changes and a political set-
tlement with its Nordic neighbours: never again would it return to
its high levels of militarization and violence. The UK was next,
with decolonization especially during the twentieth century and
the ending of nationalist-militarism in much of Europe with the
establishment of the European Union following the nationalist
militarism and Holocaust of the Second World War. The USA has
never had a critical turning point out of its violence nexus; it
remains the most violent country.
From the 1970s all four countries experienced the global femi-
nist wave that sought to reduce and end violence against women,
including both the provision of services and revisions to the law.
This was seen first in the USA, but it then spread rapidly to the
other three countries. It had the deepest implications in Sweden
where women had established presence-democracy and not only
suffrage-democracy, and hence were part of the state’s democratic
institutions.
All four countries from the 1980s experienced the global neolib-
eral wave, which increased the harshness of the criminal justice sys-
tem alongside thinning civil society and increasing inequalities. In all
four countries the use of imprisonment increased during the 1990s,
but this increased most in the USA, which already had the highest
rate, and least in Sweden which had the lowest. Thus the neolib-
eral wave, although global, did not erode the differences between
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the path-dependent trajectories of the violence nexus, but instead
exacerbated their differences.
Gender Transformations: The
Emergence of Employed Women
as the New Champions of Social
Democracy
Most accounts of the rise, fall, and resilience of social democracy are
too narrowly focused on class, inappropriately marginalizing the
implications of gender and other complex inequalities. There are at
least four aspects to this: first, the definition and achievement of
social democracy; second, the contribution of the modernization of
the gender regime to the resilience and future of social democracy;
third, the variations in the entwining of class and gender projects;
and fourth, the significance of gender in the constitution of violence.
The conventional definition of social democracy is often ambigu-
ous as to whether the full employment of women is a necessary
component, or can be restricted to the class-based issues of welfare
and employment only. The definition of social democracy used in
this book (see Chapter 8) incorporates gender and other complex
inequalities as well as domains beyond economies and polities.
Early steps towards social democracy were often of a narrow
labourist proto-social democracy type, with a focus on employ-
ment, state welfare, and suffrage-democracy. In some countries,
there have also been fuller developments in the project of social
democracy, incorporating the perceived interests of employed
women into the projects of full employment, state provision of wel-
fare, and employment regulations for equity, and extending the
projects to deeper forms of democracy and the reduction of vio-
lence. Only if the project encompasses gender and other inequali-
ties can it be considered fully social democratic. Fully developed
social democracy is still largely an aspirational project, though it
can be found to some extent in the Nordic countries.
There are several inter-related changes in gender relations: an
increase in women’s paid employment; a shift in women’s average
political preference towards social democracy as a result of this
change; an increase in the number of women in trade unions; an
increase in the number of women in parliament and government; an
increased capacity of state welfare in gendered areas; an increased
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regulation of employment in relation to equality issues; and increased
regulation of men’s violence towards women (see Chapters 3–6).
These changes are inter-related aspects of the modernization of the
gender regime (see Chapter 7 on regimes of inequality). There is a
tendency for these to occur in both neoliberal and social democra-
tic countries, but they have much greater consequences in those
countries that already have more social democratic institutions. In
Table 10.6 Female share of employment, trade union membership, and
parliamentary seats, 1960–2005
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Sweden
Labour force 30 36 47 48 47 47
per cent female
Trade unions 32 50 52
per cent female
Parliament 14 14 28 38 43 45
per cent female
USA
Labour force 32 36 41 44 46 46
per cent female
Trade unions 24 36 45
per cent female
Parliament 4 2 4 6 13 15
per cent female
UK
Labour force 32 37 39 43 46 46
per cent female
Trade unions 25 38 51
per cent female
Parliament 4 4 3 6 18 20
per cent female
Ireland
Labour force 26 26 29 35 41 43
per cent female
Trade unions 28 32 50
per cent female
Parliament 2 2 4 8 12 13
per cent female
European Union
Labour force 31 33 36 40 41 44
per cent female
Parliament 30
per cent female
(1) Female percentage of the labour force. Source for 1960, 1970: World Bank (2005) for 1980–
2000: World Bank (2006c), 2005 (World Bank 2007b).
(2) Sources: OECD (2004:116); Visser (2006: 46).
(3) Percentage of those in Parliament (lower house if two) who are women. Source: 1960–1990,
Inter-Parliamentary Union (1995), thereafter Inter-Parliamentary Union (2007).
(4) EU is EMU.
(5) Percentage of those in European Parliament who are women. Source: Inter-Parliamentary
Union (2007).
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some countries these changes can contribute to the completion of
the project of social democracy: in others, where there are fewer
allies and more enemies, contrary trends can open up in the devel-
opment of gender and class regimes.
In all four countries here there has been an increase in the
proportion taken by women of employment, trade union mem-
bership and parliamentary seats, and the regulation of men’s vio-
lence against women (see Table 10.5 and Table 10.6). The
changes in the four are all in the same direction, but these have
taken place at different rates. In 1960 there was little difference
between women’s employment in the USA, Sweden, and the UK,
nor in their very low rates of parliamentary representation (apart
from a very slightly higher rate of women in parliament in
Sweden): by 1970 the USA, Sweden, and the UK had all increased
their female employment, but evenly so. There was nothing dis-
tinctive about Swedish women’s employment in 1970. However,
by 1980 in Sweden there had been a large increase in women’s
employment and parliamentary representation. The USA and UK
increased their female employment more slowly, but by 2000 had
caught up with Sweden. However, the parliamentary representa-
tion of women in the USA and the UK increased much more
slowly and by 2005 the rates are barely higher than the Swedish
rate in 1970 before the growth spurt. Change in the Irish gender
regime occurred later: female employment grew after 1980,
almost drawing level with the others in 2005, but women’s par-
liamentary representation remains at no more than the Swedish
level in 1970. The female share of trade union membership was
similar in all countries in 1970: by 1990 it was equal to men’s in
Sweden and by 2005 this was the case in the other countries. An
indicator of the increased regulation of men’s violence against
women is the year in which rape in marriage was made illegal:
in Sweden in 1965; in the USA from the late 1970s, varying by
state; in Ireland in 1990; and in the UK in 1994.
This pattern of change contains both changes in the same direction
in all four countries in employment and parliamentary and trade
union representation, and also significant differences in trajectories.
In 1970 and 2005 each of the four had similar female shares in
employment, rising from low (average 30 per cent) to high (average
46 per cent), but Sweden got there much more rapidly. In 1970 and
2005 the four had similar female shares of trade union membership (ris-
ing from an average of 27 per cent to 50 per cent), but again, Sweden
got there much more quickly. In parliamentary representation, unlike
these other areas, very great differences remain: while in Sweden women
make up nearly half (45 per cent) of all members of parliament, in the
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other countries the rate is much lower – with the USA at 15 per cent,
the UK at 20 per cent, and Ireland at 13 per cent.
An increase in female employment is part of the modernization of
the gender regime in its transition from a domestic to a public form:
it is not a marker of the distinction between different varieties of
modernity – it is high in the public forms of both neoliberal and social
democratic regimes (the USA, Sweden, the UK, and Ireland). While
the depth of gendered democracy has increased in all four countries,
there are very significant differences between the neoliberal and social
democratic forms: it is much deeper in social democratic Sweden,
where women make up 45 per cent of MPs, than the neoliberal USA
(15 per cent of MPs are women) and Ireland (13 per cent), with the
UK in between (20 per cent). The proportion of female trade union-
ists has risen in all four countries to around 50 per cent but this has
very different consequences in different countries because of the vari-
ation in the density and coverage of trade unions in these countries
(OECD 2004; Visser 2006). This transformation of the gendering of
trade unions is important in Sweden where trade union density is 82
per cent and coverage is 92 per cent, of moderate significance in the
UK (trade union density 30 per cent, coverage 35 per cent) and
Ireland (density 38 per cent), and of little significance in the USA
(density 13 per cent, coverage 14 per cent) (Visser 2006).
In social democratic Sweden, the rapid increase in female
employment was linked to a rapid increase in women’s represen-
tation in both formal politics (parliament and cabinet) and in civil
society (such as trade unions). This was aided by the introduction
of new electoral and democratic devices such as party quotas for
women that moved Sweden from suffrage-democracy to presence-
democracy. These changes facilitated the increase in gendered state
welfare provision, such as publicly financed childcare and equality
measures in employment regulation. Together they constituted a
rapid spiralling of economic and political changes that not only
modernized the gender regime but also developed its social demo-
cratic form. These processes were aided by the allies that employed
women had in the trade unions and social democratic movement,
albeit after some struggles (see earlier in this chapter for details).
In the more neoliberal countries, increases in female employ-
ment were not linked to the deepening of gendered democracy in
the same way. There were small and slow increases in women’s
presence in parliament which were linked to moderate changes in
gendered state welfare provision and the regulation of employment
for equality. In the USA in the 1960s and 1970s there was the intro-
duction of basic elements of equality regulation in employment as
a consequence of an alliance of feminism with anti-racist forces,
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which succeeded in getting such provisions on racial equality
through the US political system on the back of a strongly mobilized
civil rights campaign. When this movement faded there was no sig-
nificant institutionalized basis of feminist interests in the formal
political system to replace it. In the UK and Ireland equality regu-
lation in employment was linked to their entry into the European
Union in 1973, aided by some feminist mobilization. In the UK, and
only after 1997 with the introduction of some small electoral devices
to move towards gendered presence democracy and an alliance
between feminism and the labour movement, was a strategy to
develop publicly funded childcare adopted. In Ireland women’s
presence in formal politics remains small, while the Catholic
Church mobilizes strongly in favour of a domestic rather than a
public gender regime.
Employed women as the new
champions of social democracy
There has been concern that social democratic politics and polities
are in widespread decline (Callaghan 2000), at least partly because
of a decline in traditional male trade unionism. Yet the data on union
membership do not show the predicted decline in all countries (see
Table 10.3). This is because of the increasing unionization of women
(see Table 10.6).
Because of the traditional association of trade unions with social
democracy (Korpi 1983), a drop in trade union membership has
been linked to this suggested decline in social democracy. There
are two major reasons that have been put forward for this decline –
the changing structure of the economy and changes in political
approaches to unions.
The first reason for the purported decline is that those indus-
tries in which traditional trade unions developed and forged their
experiences of class struggle are in decline. In the countries of
the North heavy manufacturing industries, such as steel, ship-
building, and car manufacturing, together with mining, have
been in serious decline, though unevenly so, from the 1950s
onwards. A decline in industries where trade unions had tradi-
tionally been strong is thus seen to lead to a fall in trade union
membership and strength and hence to a decline in social democ-
racy (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). However, despite the change
in industrial structure away from heavy industry being common to
most of Europe and North America, this decline in trade union
power is not uniform partly because the public sector is now the
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most unionized area (Visser 2006). For example, in Sweden the
unions have increased their membership and strength (Visser 2006);
and in Ireland, despite some decline in trade union membership,
there has been the development of corporatist-type institutions with
government, employers, and civil societal organizations (Rhodes
1998, 2001; Boucher and Collins 2003; Baccaro and Simoni 2007).
It is in the USA and the UK that trade union membership and
power have fallen most (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999; Visser 2006).
A second major reason for decline is that of strong attacks on trade
unions associated with the neoliberal wave. In those countries that
have been the most susceptible to the neoliberal wave, there have
been attacks on trade unions both by government and employers
(Nordlund 1998; Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999; Logan 2006).
Yet despite a decline in the industrial base of the traditional male
trade unionist and attacks on trade unions as the neoliberal wave has
entrenched itself in governments, the oft-predicted decline in trade
unionism and social democracy has been greatly exaggerated. A key
reason for the resilience of trade unionism and social democracy has
been the influx of new participants in these projects – employed
women. Female employees have been joining trade unions, com-
pensating to some extent for falling numbers of men, and in so doing
are radically changing the gender composition of these trade unions,
which in several countries have now become populated by women
and men equally. Politically, employed women support public
services more than other social groups. This means that employed
women prefer social democratic policies and are more likely to vote
left than are non-employed women and men. The ongoing increase
in the numbers of employed women therefore increases the amount
of support for such policies and parties.
This growth in women’s employment is strongly correlated with
changes in state gender policy (Ferree 1980; Manza and Brooks 1999;
Huber and Stephens 2000). In the USA, Manza and Brooks (1999)
found that there was a gender gap in voting in the USA that is asso-
ciated with the increase in women’s employment in that employed
women are more likely to vote in a leftwards (non-Republican) direc-
tion than other women or the average man. In the UK, the gender
gap has emerged as a generational divide – it is younger women,
who are most likely to be employed, who are more left voting, while
older women, who are less likely to be employed, are not, produc-
ing a small gender gap in Labour’s favour (Norris 1996b; Inglehart
and Norris 2000). The gender gap in Sweden is compounded further
by the greater presence of women in the more heavily unionized
public sector. Similar patterns are emerging in most other Western
countries. The effect is further increased when increased women’s
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employment is combined with social democratic government (Huber
and Stephens 2000). The increase in women’s employment is also
strongly correlated with changes in state gender policy (Manza and
Brooks 1999; Huber and Stephens 2000). This process is also medi-
ated by the presence of women politicians (Thomas 1991) and the
extent and organization of feminist allies in adjacent institutions
forming a ‘velvet triangle’ (Vargas and Wieringa 1998; Woodward
2004). Whether this emergent social democratic constituency makes
a difference depends on the circumstances, in particular on the pres-
ence and power of different types of allies. One set of potential allies
is that of sympathetic civil society organizations, including feminist
organizations and feminists in universities, trade unions, and the legal
profession, as well as the development of state machineries and insti-
tutions to promote gender equality (Woodward 2004; Lovenduski
2005; Verloo 2005, 2006).
Employed women are emerging as the new champions of social
democracy. Their effect on politics depends on specific circum-
stances, but they are growing in numbers and organizational
strength. Employed women are the growing present and future base
for social democracy. In Sweden, where they are most established
as a political constituency, they have been key to the resilience of
state welfare provision despite the pressure of global flows of
capital and the neoliberal political wave. The old forms of social
democracy and their associated constituencies are not so resilient:
only with the additional constituency of employed women is the
political support sufficient to maintain, renew, and further develop
the social democratic project.
Dampeners and Catalysts of
Economic Growth: War and
Gender Regime Transformations
Americans are richer than Europeans, with the current US income per
person at around 40 per cent higher than that in Sweden, the UK,
Ireland, and the rest of the EU. This gap is sometimes used as evi-
dence that the US economy is better organized than those in Europe
and in particular that neoliberalism delivers on economic growth and
that social democracy does not. However, the gap in current income
is not the result of post-war rates of economic growth, which have
been about the same at around 2 per cent each year in the USA and
the EU (see Chapter 9), until the financial crash of 2008.
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The difference in income between the USA and Europe is a result
of economic growth spurts in the past and not current practices.
The historic growth rates of the USA, UK, Sweden, and Ireland since
the middle of the nineteenth century are shown in Table 10.7. In the
nineteenth century people in the UK had the highest average
incomes in the world, as a consequence of the UK leading the
Industrial Revolution in the previous century. During the last part
of the nineteenth century the average income level in the USA
caught up with that of the UK.
There are many complex reasons for changes in the rate of eco-
nomic growth. Two are singled out for attention here which seem
unduly neglected in the orthodox literature: war as a dampener of
economic growth, and the transition in the gender regime as a cat-
alyst of economic growth.
Average income in the USA leapt ahead of that in the UK while
the latter was fighting in the 1914–1918 war (the Great War, or First
World War) that was to devastate so much of Europe. Between 1910
and 1920 US GDPpc grew from $4964 to $5552, while that of the
UK dropped from $4611 to $4548. A further surge in US economic
growth rates as compared with those in the UK and Europe took
place during the 1939–1945 war (the Second World War), which
again was to devastate much of Europe. Between 1940 and 1950 US
GDPpc grew from $7010 to $9561 while that of the UK changed
little, being $6856 in 1940 and $6939 in 1950. By 1950 the US aver-
age income was 38 per cent greater than that of the UK. The scale
of the gap in incomes changed little in the next 50 years, even
though incomes in both countries nearly tripled in size during this
period. In 2001 the US average income was 39 per cent greater than
that of the UK – the gap in income levels is little more in 2001
than it was in 1950. The USA surged ahead of the UK while
Europe destroyed itself by war, but not during the next 50 years
nor during the height of neoliberalism. Within Europe, the average
income level in Sweden (which avoided the 1939–1945 war) surged
during the 1940s, almost closing the gap with the UK by 1950.
Those countries which had been involved in the European wars of
1914–1918 and 1939–1945 rarely grew economically during the
decade of the war, while other countries in North America and
Europe continued to grow While US soldiers were involved, their
homeland was not. Thus the destruction of war acts as a significant
dampener for economic growth.
Why had there been so much war in Europe before 1945 and
why has there been so little since?
Sweden and Ireland have had surges of economic growth that
coincided with a rapid modernization of the gender regime and
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increased female employment – during the 1970s and 1980s for
Sweden and since the 1980s for Ireland. In Sweden during the 1970s
and 1980s the rates of economic growth, female employment, and
use of childcare had surged upward. In Ireland, before entry to the
European Union and the removal of the barriers to married women’s
employment, its economic growth rate was low: however, since the
1980s Ireland has had higher economic growth rates than the USA,
Sweden, and the UK, and since 2000 it had a higher income per per-
son than Sweden or the UK. Economic growth can be catalysed by
the transition of the gender regime from domestic to public.
Why have there been such gendered economic growth spirals in
Sweden? Why did female employment in Sweden suddenly increase
in the 1970s, overtaking that of more economically developed coun-
tries including both the USA and the UK? In 1960 Swedish women
had the lowest proportion of employment of the four countries: they
made up 30 per cent of the workforce as compared with 32 per cent
in the USA and 37 per cent in the UK. If female employment patterns
are determined by generic economic development, then the highest
employment rates should be in the USA and not Sweden. In Sweden
in the 1970s there was a rapid spiralling of economic growth and
female employment, each feeding an increase in the other and
catalysing both economic development and the modernization of the
gender regime. Why did a similar (in the UK) or greater (in the USA)
level of economic development not lead to a similar modernization
of the gender regime in the UK and USA? A key difference here is
that the rise of female employment in Sweden led to an increased
political participation by women in formal politics – they entered par-
liament, with numbers rising rapidly to 38 per cent of members by
1990. This did not occur in the other three countries (the USA, UK,
and Ireland). While in general, and as shown in Chapter 8, there is
an association between increased female employment and female
political representation there was divergence in the paths taken by
these countries. Before 1970 Swedish gender relations were not dis-
tinctive; but the new path of development that began in the 1970s is
now deeply institutionalized.
Conclusions
The two main paths through modernity (neoliberal and social
democratic) do not necessarily affect the whole of a country; they
may differ by nexus and by regime of inequality. The main nexi
identified here are political economy, differentiated by employment
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relations and welfare provision, and violence. Each of these is
linked with different depths of democracy in the relevant polities
which affect the processes of lock-in. There can be differences
between regimes of inequality in the pathway followed as well as
in the extent to which it is modern or not.
These paths differ from those conventionally identified. The
nexus of path dependency does not only rest on a singular con-
ception of political economy, political economy is also divided into
at least two major nexi – employment regulation and welfare pro-
vision. There is a further nexus in violence at the intersection of
violence, polity, and civil society. Much of what has been previ-
ously considered ‘conservative’ is understood here not as a form of
modernity but as premodern, especially in relation to the gender
regime. A further key difference from preceding accounts is the dif-
ferentiation of pathways according to the regime of inequality; this
means that there can be more than one level of modernity, more
than one pathway, coexisting within the same country. This also
means that it is not necessarily the whole of a country that has a
path dependency, though of course averaging across the regimes is
possible: this theoretical move is essential if complex inequalities
are to be identified at the heart of theories of social change.
One of the main challenges to the significance of the concept of
path dependency has been whether the paths are significant
enough to merit such an identification, whether they can last long
enough before they either rejoin the mainstream/average (Kiser
and Hechter 1991; Liebowitz and Margolis 1995) or become some-
thing new (Crouch 2001). Are there too few paths of significant
duration, or too many? The analysis in Chapter 8 showed that while
there are many minor nuances these do not detract from the find-
ing of major paths. The analysis of paths in this chapter provides
evidential support for the claim that paths are significant: they make
a difference for significant periods of time, typically lasting for
decades, before being restructured into something new, rarely
returning to the mainstream or average.
There are two major potential challenges to the maintenance of
contemporary forms of path dependency and the consequent pres-
sures for convergence: first, global processes, and second, general
processes towards the completion of modernity. The question as to
whether globalization is eroding the distinctiveness of different
countries – by undermining their distinctive forms of political econ-
omy in employment regulation and welfare provision – can be
answered in the negative. While there has been some increase in
economic inequalities, this has not occurred disproportionately in the
more social democratic countries (although it has happened in these
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as well) but instead has happened to a greater extent in the more
neoliberal countries. This means that global processes have inter-
acted with the divergent paths in a way that does not erode their
differences, rather it exacerbates them. This applies to the nexus of
path dependency in violence as well. The evidence is that there is
increased divergence between the paths of the four countries rather
than convergence: as the USA becomes more heavily militarized the
EU, since its foundation and since decolonization, becomes much
less so, and while the neoliberal countries of the USA and UK are
increasing the harshness of their criminal justice systems social
democratic Sweden does not.
A second potential pressure for convergence arises from the mod-
ernization of the gender regime from a domestic to a public form.
This process is common to all countries and generates the emer-
gence of a new constituency of employed women which tends to
support social democratic rather than neoliberal projects. However,
while this is a common process it does not generate convergence,
since its effects depend upon its interaction with pre-existing path
dependent nexi. In particular, these effects are much greater where
an established social democratic pathway already exists, generating
new and deeper forms of social democracy and an increased
resilience against its erosion by global processes.
A critical turning point is an event that changes the trajectory of
development onto a new path. It is an event at a point in time that
has effects upon the balance within a system, resulting in its internal
reconfiguration so as to establish a new path or direction of devel-
opment. The event results in a change in institutionalized forms of
social practice. It is this new institutionalized configuration that
‘locks-in’ the new trajectory of development.
Several critical turning points have been identified. These
include: the Reformation; the rise and fall of Empire, colonies, and
slavery; state and other polity formation, especially in relation to
adjacent entities of nation and organized religion; the development
of free wage labour within each regime of inequality; the develop-
ment of democracy within each regime of inequality; war; and eco-
nomic growth spirals.
There are two important related concepts to that of the critical
turning point. First is that of the ‘tipping point’ – a special case of a
critical turning point in which it becomes clear that there has been
a slow build up of changes that have eventually reached a point at
which the system as a whole has tipped into a new form, a new
path of development. A tipping point has a distinctive temporality
in that, while a point of change can be identified, so also can the
slow build up of forces within the system that mean that it is ready
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and available for tipping. A second related concept is that of a polity
as a ‘catalyst’ or ‘dampener’ of a path of development. Here the
notion is not that of an event of short duration, but rather an insti-
tutional form that either speeds up or slows down development
along a particular path. By catalysing (speeding) or dampening
(slowing) the rate of development, attaining a tipping point may be
sooner or later. So the main concept of interest is that of a critical
turning point, of which a tipping point is a special case where the
implication is that there is a change in the path of development. The
concepts of catalyst and dampener are slightly different and pre-
dominantly concern the rate of change rather than its direction.
The concept of a critical turning point is important in facilitating
the analysis of multiple forms of modernity while retaining the con-
cept of system. The concept is needed to identify and define the
event at which new paths of development start. Critical turning
points interrupt paths of development and the tendency towards
societalization. The concept of a critical turning point derives from
complexity theory and draws many of its connotations from these
theoretical developments, as is outlined in Chapter 2. At its heart
lies the notion of non-linearity, that a small cause can have large
consequences. However, this is non-linearity in the context of a
specific analysis of a system which is already finely balanced on the
edge of chaos or criticality, a system that is already far from equi-
librium. It is important not to over-state, or take out of context, the
notion of the lack of proportion between a small cause and large
consequences. A ‘small’ ‘cause’ is only important in the context of
a large system that is already on the edge of criticality.
A critical turning point may derive from processes within a system,
for example, as in the slow build up of pressures that leads to a
tipping point, or they may derive from outside a system, for exam-
ple, as in the case of a global wave.
One of the distinctive claims made for the concept of path
dependency is that the sequencing of events through time makes a
difference to social development. The order of events makes a dif-
ference to the path dependent outcome; in addition, the earlier in
the path dependent trajectory that an event takes place, the more
important it is in determining the nature of that path. The sequenc-
ing issues drawn together here include the relationship between
economic growth and war for a global hegemonic position, and the
relationships between the development of democracy and free
wage labour in the range of forms of regimes of inequality.
Does it make a difference if democracy or free wage labour occurs
first, if they are simultaneous or if there is a short or long gap between
them? Does it make a difference if their achievement for diverse
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regimes of inequality is simultaneous or if there is a short or long gap?
For dominant ethnic men there is a well established correlation
between suffrage-democracy and economic development with free
wage labour usually coming earlier, though the USA is a special case
with settler male suffrage on the establishment of their new state. Does
this link apply to women? Suffrage-democracy for women largely
arrived in three main waves – 1920, 1945, and decolonization – which
do not link to the development of free wage labour for either women
or for men. And does it apply to minoritized ethnic groups? Most
minority ethnic groups access suffrage-democracy alongside the dom-
inant ethnic group (divided by gender), with the major exception of
enslaved African-Americans who, in the southern states of the USA,
even after formal emancipation, did not access de facto suffrage-
democracy until the rise of the civil rights movement of the 1960s.
However, when the operationalization of democracy is shifted to take
into account the dimensions of deep democracy a different picture
emerges. For women, there is then an association between the dimen-
sions of deep democracy, especially represented by presence in
parliament, and the development of women’s free wage labour. This
produces a complex pattern of sequencing of the development of
democracy (both narrow suffrage-democracy and deeper democracy)
and free wage labour among the various regimes of inequality.
There is no single point in the development of democracy and thus
in the nexus of political economy or that of violence, but potentially
several. The USA has had the longest gaps in suffrage-democracy
between different social groups – early for white men, average for
majority ethnic women, very late for African-Americans in the
southern states. For the UK the gap in suffrage-democracy is long
because of late de-colonization, but this is not as long as in the USA.
Sweden has the shortest gaps between groups. Ireland is in between
Sweden and the UK. For women the relationship between democracy
and free wage labour is particularly seriously affected by the depth
of democracy: suffrage-democracy often occurs much earlier than
presence-democracy; the regulation of intimacy by organized religion
or by a democratic state affects the extent of democracy. For women,
the Swedish case of a near simultaneous gender presence-democracy
and free wage labour catalysed the rapid modernization of the gender
regime thus producing rapid spirals of change. This is in contrast to the
later increase in gender presence-democracy in the USA, UK, and
Ireland, despite the early development of free wage labour for women
in the USA and UK. In these three countries, the modernization of the
gender regime has been slower and more uneven.
The sequencing of economic growth and war has made a signif-
icant difference to which polity emerges as global hegemon. For a
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couple of centuries the combination of economic and military
power made Britain the global hegemon. The violence of the two
‘World’ Wars in Europe in the twentieth century that so damaged the
British economy made a significant contribution to the USA taking
over this position from 1945, since that economy grew more rapidly
than those in Europe during these destructive periods of war. Today,
it is often wrongly assumed that the US economy is growing more
quickly than those in Europe. Instead the level of economic devel-
opment is higher in the USA as a result of differential growth rates
in earlier years, especially when Europe was destroying itself in
repeated bouts of nationalist militarist violence. So while the USA is
not more economically efficient than Europe it is still the leading
global hegemon, with a disproportionate influence over the global
rules for economic and military conduct as a consequence of those
earlier violent events when its economy surged ahead.
The development of the concept of path dependency has sig-
nificant implications for social theory. It means that there is neither
a single modernity nor an infinite number of different and unique
instances. This is one example where complexity theory enables a
synthesis that goes beyond the old polarities of modernism and
postmodernism.
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There are contested futures, contested forms of modernity. The finan-
cial crisis of 2007–2009 and the ensuing recession/depression in the
real economy create the potential for a global tipping point away
from neoliberalism. There may be an alternative form of global
modernity that is either social democratic or one that is nationalist,
protectionist, authoritarian, and xenophobic. Whether the future is
neoliberal, social democratic or something else depends in part on
whether the USA or the EU leads in the creation of the new finan-
cial architecture that is constructed to replace the old. While the
global South has been increasing its influence in global governance,
at this moment the key contesting forces are still the hegemons of
the USA and EU, although these hegemons have varying levels of
internal cohesion. A tipping point in the balance of power of the
USA and EU had been on the horizon before the development of the
2007–2009 financial crisis, but has not yet occurred. This potential
tipping point from a more neoliberal USA to a more social democ-
ratic EU is key to the wider global futures. This pathway has impli-
cations for the extent and nature of inequalities and globalization.
Financial and Economic Crisis
2007–2009
The crisis of 2007–2009 is the latest and largest of a series of finan-
cial crises. Its current impact on the ‘real’ economy and social rela-
tions is already enormous and its potential impact is cataclysmic. A
range of policy and political responses have been developed, drawing
11 Contested Futures
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from different projects and visions of society including neoliberal,
social democratic, and premodern. These have different implica-
tions for (de)-globalization and inequalities.
The significance of the crisis of 2007–2009 depends upon whether
this becomes a tipping point in the global financial and economic sys-
tem, or whether it is just the bursting of yet another bubble, though with
wider effects than previously because of the extent of global processes.
Bursting financial and asset bubbles are not uncommon in the history
of capitalism. Since the Dutch tulip bulb mania in seventeenth-century
Holland and the South Sea Bubble in England in 1720, there have been
a long series of bubbles (Morris 2008). During the 1990s, financial crises
laid low the economies of East Asia and Latin America, followed by the
bursting of the dot.com bubble (Stiglitz 2002; Krugman 2008).
The most important financial crisis in the twentieth century was
the bursting of the stock market bubble in 1929, which led to deep
depression in the USA and Europe (Galbraith 1975; Krugman 2008).
This produced a critical turning point in which the countries of
Europe diverged: the Nordic countries produced a social democratic
settlement while much of central Europe descended into fascism.
While social democracy in the Nordic countries has been locked-in
through the development of a wide range of supporting institutional
formations, fascism in central Europe was defeated by war. There is
thus a historic precedent for financial crises and their consequent
depressions to produce new alternative pathways of development.
The 2007–2009 financial crisis is larger and deeper than previous
crises (except 1929), with the simultaneous global bursting of bubbles
in housing and the stock market and consequently larger effects on the
real economy (Fleckenstein and Sheehan 2008), together with effects
that are spread further and faster as a consequence of globalization and
electronic communications. The depth of this latest financial crisis is
exacerbated by the effects of deregulation and the emergence of a non-
regulated shadow banking system (Stiglitz 2006; Haseler 2008;
Krugman 2008). The relative absence of regulations on the financial
sector was part of the neoliberal orthodoxy (Greenspan 2008).
There are several features of the 2007–2009 financial crisis that
are relatively new, consequent upon developments in a much less
regulated financial environment.
Controls upon the conduct of banks were lightened with conse-
quences in the extension of credit to ever riskier projects. One key
example of this was the growth of the ‘sub-prime’ housing market in
the USA, in which people with low and precarious incomes were
granted mortgages to buy homes, which were only repayable if
housing values were to continue to escalate (Fleckenstein and
Scheehan 2008; Krugman 2008; Shiller 2008). The bubble in housingG
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values affects more people than the bubble in stock markets in those
countries where the level of home ownership has increased to very
high levels and where equity withdrawal became commonplace,
such as in the USA and UK.
The most important of the changes has been the growth of a
shadow banking system that is not subject to regulation, which
rivalled the regulated banks in size. Hedge funds operate largely out-
side the regulatory framework set up for banks. Private equity operates
largely outside the regulatory framework set up for limited liability com-
panies publicly quoted on the stock exchange. In 2007, while the total
assets of the top five US banks was around $6 trillion, that of the five
major ‘investment’ banks was around $4 trillion and the hedge funds just
under $2 trillion (Krugman 2008). The new financial derivatives
included synthetic securitizations or collateralized debt obligations and
credit default swaps. Since the 1990s, until the crash of 2007–2009, there
was a rapid increase in the scale of this market. In 1990 the size of the
collateralized debt obligation market was estimated at $2.2bn, rising to
$250bn in 2002, of which 75% is estimated to be the new synthetic
CDOs (Tavakoli 2003), further rising to $600bn in 2007 (Treanor 2008).
The collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) use a special purpose
company or vehicle, with assets, liabilities, and a manager, to transfer
risk between financial institutions such as banks (Picone 2002), osten-
sibly tiering the level of risk so that it could be separately costed. The
risks in this system were compounded by poor assessment of the risk
by the ostensibly specialized risk-rating agencies (Fleckenstein and
Sheehan 2008; Morris 2008). By 2007 the combined size of asset-
backed commercial paper conduits in structured investment vehicles,
auction-rate preferred securities, tender option bonds, and variable
rate demand notes in the USA was around $2.2 trillion (Krugman
2008). The period of light financial regulation also saw the increased
use of tax havens and banking regimes that permitted secrecy and
hence the possibility of tax avoidance and evasion, which permitted
corporations and wealthy individuals to avoid tax obligations in the
countries where they had earned or created their wealth (Murphy
2007). There has been some variation between countries and regions
in the extent of regulation of the financial sector, but the global sys-
tem is now highly inter-connected. For example, the financial pack-
ages that contained poor quality US mortgage debt were sold to banks
around the world. Hence the financial crisis is global in reach.
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 was precipitated by the collapse of
the sub-prime mortgages in the US housing market, triggering a gen-
eral collapse in that market. This was followed by a collapse in the
value of the financial derivatives that contained US sub-prime debt
and, when it became clear that no one really knew which financial
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packages contained this poor debt, a collapse in confidence and value
of a range of financial derivatives. This in turn provoked a collapse in
the bubble in the stock market. Each of these has global consequences
because of the extent of global interconnections.
The collapse in this series of interrelated bubbles in the valuation
of financial assets caused the collapse of a series of financial insti-
tutions, including banks. Some of these financial institutions went
bankrupt, such as Lehman Brother. In the UK there was a run on
Northern Rock (a housing bank) before it collapsed. Mergers were
arranged for weaker institutions, such as Lloyds and HBOS in the
UK. Vast quantities of public funds were used to support financial
institutions, including banks and insurance companies linked to the
housing market (such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG in the
US), often resulting in part or occasionally full public ownership
(Fleckenstein and Sheehan 2008; Morris 2008; Shiller 2008).
The crisis in the financial sector caused a crisis in the ‘real’ econ-
omy in several ways. The rapid depreciation of assets reduces the
income people have available to spend, as dividends and pensions
linked to the stock market decline and falls in housing equity limit
withdrawals. The collapse in confidence in the financial sector led
to a credit crunch, with the resulting lack of access to credit, mean-
ing that some businesses went bankrupt, with knock-on effects on
people’s income. There is a rapid downward spiralling of the real
economy leading to recession and maybe to depression. While the
financial crisis started in the USA, and despite the significant varia-
tions between countries in the regulation of finance, the effects on
the real economy are spreading around the world. Table 11.1 shows
the declines in the USA, EU, Ireland, Sweden, and the UK in GDP,
stock market and rise in unemployment in 2008. The downturn in
the real economy created unemployment and poverty, thereby
deepening inequalities (because of the gaps between employed and
unemployed) unless radical policy interventions were made.
Pathways out of the crisis
There were a range of policy responses to the crisis, which depended
on political responses which varied over time and between coun-
tries. There are three main areas of policy development: the finan-
cial architecture; the rescue of financial institutions; and the response
to the emerging recession. First, the overall structure of the global
financial architecture has been challenged by the crisis and critics
have found it to be wanting. Several bodies set up processes to review
the global financial architecture and make proposals for reform,G
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including the UN’s Commission (Stiglitz 2009) and the G20 summits
(G20 2008). Issues concern the functioning of the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund and whether a new institution to
promote financial stability is needed; transparency and governance;
as well as tax havens and secret banking regimes. Second, there is
the immediate response to the collapse of financial institutions,
especially by states. A range of instruments has been tried including:
funds to bank in trouble supplied variously as loans, equity, and
insurance, and recapitalization and liquidity schemes. The implica-
tions have included full or partial nationalization of threatened insti-
tutions. There are issues as to the implications of the forms of the
funds, the nature of the conditionalities attached such as in relation
to lending criteria and revision of the remuneration of bankers so as
to reduce short-term incentives. Third, there are policy responses to
the recession and threatened depression in the real economy. Some
of these are explicitly stimulus packages to increase the flow of
funds through the economy, though not all countries accept such
a Keynesian approach. The funds have taken a variety of forms
including: tax cuts, increases in public works expenditure, and loans
to big companies. The implications of these stimulus packages for
different social groups and inequality are potentially highly varied
depending on who receives the funds. There is also a significant
issue in the extent to which the conditionalities are protectionist,
explicitly prioritizing the country’s own citizens or not.
Within each of these three areas of policy response, there are sig-
nificant variations. They vary significantly in relation to: governance,
distribution and scape-goating. The reforms to institutions entail a
Table 11.1 Economic recession 2008–2009: USA, EU, Eurozone, Sweden, UK,
Ireland
Share
GDP Q2 GDP Q4 price House
2008 2008 change on price
change change previous change
on on Unemployment Unemployment year Feb during
previous previous per cent per cent 2009, 2008,
quarter quarter June 2008 Dec 2008 per cent per cent
USA 0.70 −1.60 5.6 7.2 −44 −18
EU 6.9 7.4
Eurozone −0.25 −1.50
Ireland −0.61 6.0 8.2 −66 −10
Sweden −0.46 −2.40 5.8 6.9 −36 −13
UK −0.02 −1.53 5.5 6.1 (Oct) −31 −18
Data for GDP, unemployment and share prices: OECD (2009) OECD. StatExtracts http://stats.
oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?QueryName=251&QueryType=View&Lang=en (accessed 6 March 2009).
Data for house prices: Ireland (Finfacts Ireland 2009); Sweden (Sweden Price History 2008); UK
(BBC 2009); USA (Hopkins 2009).
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position on governance, as to whether they are going to be made
more transparent, accountable, and democratic. The changes might be
minimal, such as increased transparency, or more substantial, such as
ensuring a significant presence of women on decision-making boards.
The stimulus packages vary as to their distributional consequences:
whether the beneficiaries are richer or poorer, men or women, majori-
ties or minorities. The use of tax cuts tends to favour the better off
and men who pay more tax, and disadvantage the poor and women
who benefit significantly from state expenditures on welfare, health
and education. Spending on public works and bail outs to companies
will benefit those who are employed in these, for instance, more often
men if these are construction jobs. The conditions applied vary in the
extent to which they identify groups to blame or to protect: bankers,
foreign workers, the unemployed, or the poor. If bankers’ bonuses
are targeted then this is a class and gender redistribution taking
money away from rich men; if foreign workers, then it is often the
poor from minority nationalities and ethnicities who will suffer.
There are three potential pathways out of the crisis: neoliberalism
with minor reforms; social democracy and global justice; or nation-
alist protectionism.
Neoliberal. The neoliberal response to the financial crisis has usu-
ally been one of minor reforms in order to stabilize the financial sys-
tem within the context of a restatement of the principles of a free and
open global market economy (see G20 2008). In this perspective,
there is a need for slight adjustments rather than major changes. The
policy responses are thus a small increase in the regulation of and
degree of multilateralism in the global financial institutions; temporary
bail outs of banks that retain their autonomous decision making; and
modest if any stimulus packages. Financial institutions are considered
so important to the economy that they need to be rescued at almost
any price, including significant transfers of taxpayer funds to banks.
The freezing of the credit markets due to the existence of bad debts
is also to be remedied by the provision of taxpayers’ money. The
transfer from citizens to financiers at times of financial crisis is a com-
mon feature of neoliberal financial systems (Stiglitz 2002). Any trans-
fer of ownership of banks to the public is to be regretted and rectified
as soon as circumstances allow (for example, in the USA in 2008).
Financialization is not seen as a problem in principle; indeed its fur-
ther development is to be applauded (G20 2008; Greenspan 2008;
Shiller 2008.) This approach involves reforms to governance that con-
cern greater transparency rather than more substantial aspects of
democracy. There is little concern with distributional inequalities and
the bank bail outs often involve significant transfers from the majority
of the population to financiers.
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Social democracy. The social democratic response to the financial
crisis has usually been one of a call for substantial change in the finan-
cial architecture; to substantially increase public democratic control
over banks in exchange for state funds; and to put substantial funds
into stimulus packages so as to prevent the recession turning into a
global depression. The rescue of banks in times of financial crisis in
social democratic systems, such as in Sweden in the early 1990s,
involved the banks taking responsibility for their bad debts, not citizens
(Aslund 2009). Proposed reforms and regulations of the financial
architecture include: the abolition of the shadow banking system, so
that no financial transactions are outside of public scrutiny and regu-
lation; the abolition of tax havens and secret banking regimes by
which corporations and rich individuals avoid and evade taxation; the
severe regulation if not abolition of financial derivatives and the prac-
tice of financialization of the economy; the separation and support of
utility banking but not speculation; changing the governance of finan-
cial institutions, making them and their transactions transparent,
ensuring that boards of companies, banks and regulators include a
wide range of people, including a proper proportion of women (e.g.
quotas for women on Boards as in Norway); the reform of the global
financial architecture including the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund so that their aims include global justice; fair trade; the
introduction of the Tobin tax on currency transactions to slow down
speculation in currencies; promote public and mutual forms of own-
ership rather than privatization; take governmental control over part-
nationalized banks in order to secure more appropriate forms of
remuneration to bankers to reduce the incentive for short-term risk-
taking and develop appropriate policies for access to credit; reduce
the propensity for housing bubbles by increasing the proportion of
homes for social renting; ensure that the stimulus packages focus on
productive and sustainable investment rather than tax cuts and that
they disproportionately benefit the poor who are most vulnerable in
the downturn rather than the rich; expand alternatives to unemploy-
ment including education and jobs; provide a floor to the real econ-
omy through facilitating access to essentials and reduce financialization
and bubbles, such as social rented housing, allotments and free
school meals (George 2004; Stiglitz 2006; Murphy 2007; Attac 2008;
Krugman 2008; World Social Forum 2008).
Nationalist authoritarian protectionism. This focuses the blame
for the scarcity of resources in the recession following the finan-
cial crisis on foreigners or ethnic minorities. Various components
of this approach have emerged, especially populist blaming of for-
eign workers for taking jobs (e.g. UK 2009), the insertion of pro-
tectionist clauses into stimulus packages (e.g. USA 2009), and the
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national limitations to the bail outs for banks and companies
(Europe and US 2008). Responses to the recession/depression can be
led by states for the protection of their own populations at the expense
of citizens of other countries, pulling away from the principles and
practices of more open global processes. Historically, this response
has appeared in some countries to some economic recessions,
most notoriously in Germany in the 1930s. The approach to gov-
ernance is a demand for control to be re-centred in the country
rather than internationally, though with no necessary implications
for transparency and democracy. The implication for inequalities is
to privilege the national population to the detriment of those
defined as ‘other’, especially foreigners whether in that country
or abroad.
The three projects have implications for different forms of
inequalities and for global processes. The neoliberal approach is
likely to increase inequalities, as it moves resources from taxpay-
ing citizens to banks and financial institutions, away from the less
developed to the more developed countries of the world. The
nationalist protectionist approach is likely to increase inequalities
based on citizenship, nationality, and ethnicity. Only the social
democratic approach is likely to resist increasing inequalities,
though whether this applies to all inequalities depends upon the
specific policies introduced. States remain an important node in
democratic as well as authoritarian responses to economic events,
a focal point for attempts to change the financial architecture and
the structure of the economy. This is especially the case in the
nationalist-xenophobic responses, but is sometimes an element in
social democratic programmes to regulate finance capital.
However, de-globalization is not the only route to financial regu-
lation; indeed some forms of regulation of finance require global
cooperation.
The relative importance of these three potential pathways is sub-
ject to change. The outcome depends on struggle, resources and
the wider environment: who participates in the political discus-
sions and struggles; what alliances are built; how the issues get to
be framed; what resources are mobilized behind each position;
and how events intervene. They are embedded in projects, pro-
grammes and social formations at national, regional and global lev-
els with different resources for their promotion. There are planned
for 2009 a series of global meetings at which there will be competi-
tion for the hegemony of one or other view, including those of the
G20 and the UN’s Stiglitz Commission. The G20 includes Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South
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Korea, Turkey, the UK, The USA, and the EU (G20 2009). The
Commission established by the UN is intended to represent all the
countries of the world (Stiglitz 2009). The EU is striving to achieve
an internal cohesion over these issues, with the UK and some of the
new Member States in the east taking more neoliberal positions than
the old core of Germany and France (Traynor and Gow 2009). Key
to the outcome of these meetings will be the positions adopted by
the USA and the EU and the strength with which they are pro-
moted, though many other countries and global organizations are
making representations. The relative balance of power between
these two hegemons is key to whether the global pathway out of
the crisis takes a neoliberal or social democratic form.
Contesting Hegemons and the
Future of the World
The USA and the EU are contesting global hegemons with compet-
ing societalization projects. Rather than a unitary West or North there
are significant differences in the projects of these hegemons, with the
USA leading a neoliberal project and the EU adopting a more social
democratic one. The outcome of this contestation is having important
implications for all people in the world because of their power in
structuring the rules by which the world is governed. The balance of
power is currently in the favour of the USA, but a tipping point is
coming that will change this to the EU.
Which are the current and future
global hegemons?
Global hegemons are polities that have extended their dominance
beyond their territorial borders to affect the whole world (as is dis-
cussed in Chapter 4 on polities). Hegemony is established through
a mixture of coercion and consent, using multiple forms of power
drawn from the economy, polity, violence, and civil society.
The EU and the United States are the current contesting global
hegemons. There are further potential or would-be global hegemonic
projects that have not currently achieved such hegemonic power,
including Islamic jihadism (not Islam as a whole), China, Japan, and
the G77. Global hegemons are not new, nor ever permanent: the
British Empire once ruled over one quarter of the world.
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The USA and EU have different powers and potentials. In 2005
the EU was larger in population size than the USA: the EU27 at
486,616,440 is more than one and a half times larger than the USA
with 296,410,404 people. The EU has a slightly larger economy than
the USA: the GDP of the EU27 is $12,886,810m as compared with
$12,416,505m for the USA. The USA owns slightly more of the
world’s wealth than the EU: 33 per cent in the USA, 30 per cent in
Europe. Both the USA and the EU are influential in determining the
policies and personnel of the institutions of global financial gover-
nance, including the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, but the
USA is more powerful. It also has a larger military than the EU.
It spends 4.1 per cent of its GDP on the military as compared with
1.7 per cent by the EU (EMU), indeed spending more than twice as
much overall at $509,077m as compared with $219,076m for the EU
(Data for 2005; World Bank 2007b; Davies et al. 2008). European
countries and the USA are represented on the UN Security Council
and NATO, but the USA is more powerful.
China has the potential to become a global hegemon, but not yet.
It has the largest population in the world (1,304 million) making up
20 per cent of the world’s population. It also has the largest military
in the world, with 3.755 million people, though with a smaller bud-
get (2 per cent of its GDP, costing $174,534m) than that of the USA
(World Bank 2007b). Its market economy of $8,914,960m is smaller
than that of the EU or USA however, if it continues to grow at 8 per
cent a year (since 1975) as compared with 2 per cent of the USA and
EU, it might eventually have a larger GDP, though this date may be
significantly deferred as the USA is likely to continue to grow through
immigration and the EU through the accession of more countries.
China has 3 per cent of the world’s wealth, significantly less than that
of the USA or Europe. Historically, China has been a relatively self-
contained country politically, perhaps near to a nation-state, with
international engagements that are more regional (for example with
Korea and Iran) than global. However, this may be changing, for
example, in 2008 China hosted the Olympic Games. But at the
moment China is not a global hegemon, despite the size of its popu-
lation and army. If and when China seeks to restructure the global fit-
ness landscape to suit itself remains a question for the future,
especially for when the Chinese economy becomes more fully devel-
oped and its GDP becomes the world’s largest.
Islam is being increasingly confidently articulated, but with inter-
nal differences. There is economic power from oil, political power
through its states, and violence by its states and jihadists. It is a reli-
gion that is practised by many people in the world and it also acts
as a frame of reference for many. However, Islam is not politically
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cohesive and has many divisions and different forms. Its relationship
with states is highly varied and the use of religious Shari’a law to
govern intimacy is highly varied. There are also severe divisions
between jihadists and less theologically-minded leaders which are
especially acute in those Islamic countries with Western links, such
as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Huntington (1998) is wrong to suggest
that there is a civilizational divide between the West and Islam; Islam
has its own internal divisions as great as those in the West. This does
not mean that Islam does not act as a frame of reference to many,
but it does mean that it is not an effective global hegemon.
There are various further entities and alliances that operate at a
global level. One of these is the Catholic Church. As with Islam, this
organized religion has power through the countries in which it is
embedded, variously governs intimacy through its religious rulings,
and acts as a frame of reference to many. Historically it once acted as
a major division that drove group and state killings, from the burning
of heretics at the stake to the crusades, but this is not so today. It has
a presence at the UN not least because it has its own state, the Vatican,
through which it coordinates opposition to sexual and reproductive
freedoms for women. During the 1970s Japan was looked upon as an
emergent hegemon, but with the slowing of its rate of economic
growth since the bursting of its financial bubble, it is now better
thought of as a major regional leader and no longer a global model
for economic growth let alone a global hegemon. At the UN there are
various alliances between states: the largest here is the G77 alliance
of 130 developing countries that is active in protecting their interests
in global trade negotiations, but none of these are hegemonic.
Differences between the EU and
the USA
Globalization should not be equated with Westernization because
there is no single coherent practice of being Western. The USA and
the EU have significantly contrasting models despite sharing some
similarities: the USA is more neoliberal while the EU is more social
democratic. These differences between the two matter. There is a tip-
ping point coming between these two hegemons, with major conse-
quences for the nature of the global fitness landscape. The USA and
EU differ on each of the main framings of progress: economic devel-
opment; well-being; equality; and human rights. An explanation of
their differences requires bringing their divergent trajectories of
democratization and violence and the transformation of complex
inequalities into focus.
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The conventional view has been that the USA has higher economic
growth leading to higher income per capita (GDPpc) than in the EU
as a result of a neoliberal form of capitalism that frees the economy
from regulations and costs that might hinder growth. However,
while it does have higher income per person, it does not currently
have a faster rate of economic growth per person than the EU. The
source of these greater levels of income lies in the past at a time
when the USA did grow its economy more quickly than Europe’s.
In particular, the US economy grew while Europeans destroyed
their own economies through war, especially in 1914–1918 and
1939–1945. Different histories of violence are key to explaining
varying levels of economic development.
When other framings of progress are considered, the United
States does less well than the EU. Americans live slightly shorter
lives than citizens of the EU – around two years less on average
despite their higher income. The USA is more violent than the EU:
it has higher murder rates, locks up more criminals in prison,
spends more resources on law and order and the military, and goes
to war more frequently. It also has a narrower range of human
rights than the EU: it still uses the death penalty and sexual and
reproductive rights are less widespread. In addition, the USA has
more class and ethnic inequality than the EU.
Comparative trajectories of
development of the EU and the USA
The USA has fewer areas of premodern relations than the EU and
this is marked in gender relations, especially in the economy.
However, the significance of religion in the USA is an exception to
this. The transition of the gender regime from the domestic to the
public is further developed in the USA than the EU. There are sig-
nificant variations in the EU, with Sweden and the Nordic countries
at least matching the USA in the public nature of the gender regime.
The USA is more neoliberal and the EU more social democratic.
The USA has few regulations on employment and smaller state wel-
fare provision than the EU, in both class and gender relations.
The USA and EU, despite similar levels of economic development,
are very different. The EU has seen the development of social
democracy and its deepening by employed women, and changes in
the institutionalization of ethno-nation relations so as to prevent state
violence. The development of social democracy in Europe was asso-
ciated with the mass organization of labour in trade unions that was
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much less common in the USA. Its maintenance and transformation
in the context of a decline in the industries where this unionization
was most dense is due to the emergence and mobilization of
employed women as the new champions of social democracy, in the
context of polities that allow for the emergence of women as a polit-
ical force in democracy. The emergence of employed women as a
political constituency maintains and transforms the project of social
democracy in the EU. In the USA, despite similar levels of female
employment, the political system is less democratically open to their
participation, precluding a similar outcome to the EU. A critical turn-
ing point away from violence took place in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury in Europe but not the USA. In a Europe devastated by the
Holocaust and wars of nationalist militarism, the formation of the
European Union with the aim of preventing ever again a holocaust
against a minority and war between European states, constituted a
critical turning point in the violence nexus in Europe. A reduction in
the significance of ethno-national boundaries with the emergence of
a new transnational polity has led to the cessation of war between
those countries that are members of the European Union. The asso-
ciation between militarism and other forms of violence means that
there is less violence in the EU than the USA.
Tipping point
While currently the USA wins almost all of the contests with the EU
on the global stage, this will not last. A tipping point will come
when the EU overtakes the USA in power and global influence. The
EU is increasing in power relative to the USA. At some point, as the
EU grows in terms of its size, economy, and internal governmental
coherence, the EU will overtake the USA as the pre-eminent global
hegemon.
The EU is getting bigger as a consequence of enlargement through
the accession of countries from ever further east in Europe. The EU
started in 1957 with only six Member States (Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), and in 1973
this grew to nine (with the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the
UK). In 1981 this became ten (Greece), in 1986 this grew to 12
(Spain and Portugal), in 1995 to 15 (Austria, Finland, Sweden), in
2004 to 25 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and in 2007 to 27
(Bulgaria and Romania). It will grow further with the accession of
more countries in Eastern Europe: three are already formal candi-
dates (Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey), with several more
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(Albania, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and
Serbia) in discussions over membership. There are additional coun-
tries that are members of the Council of Europe, some of which
might be expected to seek membership at some point: these are
Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein,
Moldova, Norway, the Russian Federation, San Marino, Switzerland,
and the Ukraine.
The EU has invited all associated countries in Central and Eastern
Europe to join if and when they meet the conditions laid down.
Countries that join the EU are obliged to change their internal gov-
ernance so that they reach EU standards. Known as the Copenhagen
criteria and adopted in 1993, these require that in order to join the
EU a country must have achieved: a stability of institutions guaran-
teeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and
protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market econ-
omy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the Union; and the ability to take on the oblig-
ations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political,
economic, and monetary union. In 1995 an additional criterion was
added at the Madrid European Council – that a country must have
created the conditions for its integration through the adjustment of
its administrative and judicial structures, as well as the transposition
of all European Community legislation into national legislation.
These conditions mean that not only do candidates to being
Members of the EU have to adopt the entire legal corpus of the EU
(or ‘acquis’), but they must also have in place the democratic and
institutional mechanisms to effectively implement these laws and
their principles. For example, they must not merely adopt the laws
on equal treatment on grounds of gender, ethnicity, disability, religion/
faith, sexuality, and age, but must also create institutions to ensure
their implementation. During the history of the EU there has been
a stream of countries eager to join and willing to accept the condi-
tions. During the long process by which countries seek to become
candidates they must steadily bring their domestic laws into align-
ment with the EU.
The EU has long been larger in its population size than the USA.
In 2007 the EU population was 487 million as compared with 296
million in the USA, more than one and a half times as big. If the
three candidate countries (Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey) with a
combined population of 74,543,410 and the potential candidate
countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, and
Montenegro) with a combined population of 15,101,000 were to
join, then the EU population would increase to 576,260,850, nearly
double the size of the USA.
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The economy of the EU became larger than that of the USA in
2004, with the accession of ten more states. The EU27 GDP is
$12,886,810m, the USA’s stood at $12,416,505m in 2005. If the can-
didate countries (GDP $678,469m) and the potential candidate
countries (GDP $52,800m) were to join, the size of the EU econ-
omy would grow to $13,618,079m. At the moment not all members
of the EU are members of the Eurozone, but many are expected to
join as their economies develop and stabilize. At some point this
change in the relative size of the US and EU economies will con-
tribute to this tipping of the balance of power between the two
economies and their currencies of the dollar and the Euro. This will
have implications for the power balance within the bodies of global
financial governance, including the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO,
and G8.
The economy of the USA has been more badly affected than
most of the EU by the 2008 crisis in the financial system. Although
this financial crisis has global repercussions, it is centred in the
USA and created by the development of financial instruments and
institutions that operate outside of an effective regulatory frame-
work, now expressed in bad debts and collapsing financial bubbles
for instance in the housing market. In September 2008, the USA
planned to spend an estimated trillion dollars of tax proceeds from
its workers to pay off the bad debts accrued by its financial institu-
tions in order to avoid an even worse financial crisis. This crisis in
the financial sector will have an effect on the ‘real’ economy, drain-
ing resources and creating recession. Most European economies,
with some exceptions, are less exposed to this financial crisis and
its repercussions on the ‘real’ economy because of different policies
for the financial sector and the smaller development of financial
bubbles. The draining of real US resources to support a failing
finance system may further tilt the balance away from the USA
towards the EU.
The EU is less politically centralized and cohesive than the USA,
but this is changing as powers continue to stream from the Member
States to the EU. The process of integration and the centralization
of powers slowed for a short period after the over-reach on the pro-
posed Constitution, but it has not stopped and will not stop. Most
of the changes proposed for the Constitution were agreed via the
Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, including a Foreign Minister (High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy),
a less temporary President, and streamlined majority voting
(Council of Europe 2007a). The logic for further powers to move to
the EU level of political institutions is as strong now as it ever has
been. In particular, outward facing policy areas such as trade and
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foreign policy are very likely to become more cohesive, generating
a significantly greater capacity to act as a global hegemon.
The importance of the EU as a significant player on the global
stage in matters of economic policy is increasing. It is a major
trading bloc which gives it a presence in the context of geo-
politics (such as collective membership as the EU of the World
Trade Organization) and is able to command deference from
other polities for its actions (such as representing the interests of
all Member States of the EU in world trade discussions) (Leibfried
and Pierson 1995; Bornschier 1999; Held et al. 1999; Hettne 1999).
The EU and the USA are both influential in determining the policies
and personnel of the WTO, the IMF, and World Bank. As the size of
the EU economy continues to grow even larger than that of the USA,
it will become more significant relative to the USA. When the Euro
becomes larger than the dollar, further changes are to be expected.
The military is one area where the USA holds considerably more
power than the EU, both in the size and cohesion of the forces. The
EU does not yet have its own standing army, however there are
plans to develop the EU’s military and policing capacity, coherence,
and engagement. The EU increasingly articulates a common position
during international crises and has had a sustained foreign policy on
certain issues, for example, it financially supports the Palestinian
Authority. In 2003 the European Council adopted a European
Security Strategy, identifying key threats, terrorism, a proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and
organized crime (but not large-scale aggression) and agreeing how
to address them: a European Union that was more active, more
capable, and more coherent. The policies were to intervene in
regional conflicts and failed states, including the Balkans, especially
in the neighbourhood, including the resolution of the Arab/Israeli
conflict, and strong support for a multilateral international order led
by the UN. In 2004 there was the first deployment of the European
Union Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia, followed by the Congo and Chad.
In 2007 this move to greater coherence was considerably enhanced
by the Lisbon Treaty which created an EU Foreign Minister (High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)
for the first time (Council of the European Union 2007a). There must
be doubts as to whether the UK would have followed the USA into
the war in Iraq if the EU foreign policy capacity had been more
developed at that time. Further, as the EU grows in size and
resources, its participation in decision making within NATO and the
UN is likely to grow. The USA is currently overstretched militarily
and faces a failure to achieve its goals. This is likely to diminish its
capacity and willingness to enter into new armed conflicts, perhaps
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enhanced by democratic pressures. Thus, the greater power of the
USA in the domain of the military may become less overwhelming.
Further, it is unlikely that it would use direct force against the EU,
although this does not rule out disputes by proxy. This lesser
deployment of violence by the EU than the USA means that it wastes
fewer human and economic resources in death and destruction,
both in its external relations and the associated interpersonal, group,
and criminal justice system violence at home.
Once, the USA held the moral high ground on issues of freedom
and democracy, human rights, and equality. From its inception the
Constitution of the USA claimed that it championed democracy,
freedom of speech and religion, democracy, and equality before
the law; and from 1968, laws to rule out various forms of inequality
in employment; (despite many practical exceptions, such as
slavery). At one time, Europe was the home of hereditary mon-
archs, religious persecution, and the Holocaust. But today the
USA has squandered its leading position as a defender of freedom
and human rights. With its military action without UN endorse-
ment, its retention of the death penalty, its extreme inequalities in
ethnicity and class, its opposition to the extension of sexual and
reproductive rights to women, its denial of human rights and the
due process of law in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, and its
opposition to effective action on global climate change in the UN
conferences in Kyoto and Bali, the USA no longer has the basis
to effectively claim the moral high ground on human rights. Its
power in the world has become based more on coercion than con-
sent. However, it is possible that the election of Obama in 2008
might lead to a change in some of these policies. The EU has a
significant and effective presence at the UN on the promotion of
a human rights regime (even though it is not a legal entity within
the UN’s processes). For example, during the UN conferences on
women in Beijing in 1995 and the follow-up in 2005, the Member
States of the EU developed and presented a common position in
favour of the extension of women’s human rights, including their
sexual and reproductive rights, in opposition to an alliance of the
USA, the Vatican, and some Islamic countries (Moghadam 1996).
The EU has emerged as the champion of the extension of human
rights and their effective institutionalization and the leader on
global action against the catastrophic over-heating of the planet.
Both the EU and the USA hold significant sway outside of those
territories over which they have direct rule. This influence rests on
a mix of powers – economic, military, political, and civil societal.
There is both influence over specific countries and influence over
the governance of the global environment. In the case of the EU,
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several neighbouring European countries have adopted many EU
practices, especially but not only those countries that have ambi-
tions to become members of the EU. In the case of the USA several
countries have been coerced by military force, actual or threatened,
into changing their policies to suit the USA. In addition, both the USA
and EU have tremendous influence over the policies of bodies of
global governance, including those governing the economic fitness
landscape, which polities are accepted as sovereign, the legality of
specific forms of coercion and the human rights regime.
The tipping point in the balance of power between the EU and USA
on the world stage will happen. But it is not clear when. This depends
on changes in the EU – how quickly new states will join the EU, how
quickly new Member States convert their currencies into the Euro, how
rapidly the next steps on cohesion of internal governance can be taken.
It also depends on changes in the USA – whether it will continue with
its high violence route and military actions and how quickly its military
over-extension bites into its economic performance. In addition it
depends on the global environment – the actions of emerging powers
such as China, the re-emergence of Russia on the global stage, the
actions of jihadists, the extent and response to the crisis in the global
financial system, and the sustainability of the environment undergoing
global heating. It depends on the consequences of the financial crisis,
but these are caveats over timing; not over whether the tipping point
in the balance of power between the USA and EU will happen.
So what might be different? The neoliberal dominance of the
global financial institutions would be softened and reduced, with
consequences for developing countries as well as the developed
world. The liberalization of world trade in the WTO in the interests
of the USA would be slowed; the neoliberal conditions attached to
loans would be softened; safety would be given greater priority in
the development of risky science such as genetically modified
crops. On human rights, the EU would face less opposition in the
deepening of the human rights regime and its institutionalization in
the UN and other international bodies, from the International War
Crimes Tribunal to women’s rights to sexual and reproductive free-
doms. On the environment, the USA would lose some of its power
to obstruct the environmental agenda to prevent catastrophic cli-
mate change as a result of the emission of greenhouse gases from
the burning of fossil fuels, and UN treaties would be more likely to
be effective. The likelihood of wars led by the USA would reduce.
The EU could restrain its Member States from military adventures in
support of the USA and could strengthen the UN machinery of
committees and inspectors in support of the peaceful resolution of
conflicts. This would be a different global path.
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Introduction
Complex inequalities and global processes are a challenge to social
theory. In order to insert them into the heart of social theory a
series of changes is needed; in consequence new processes
become visible and alternative futures thinkable.
The purpose of this analysis is to understand the implications of
alternative forms of social change for progress. Rather than reject-
ing the notion of progress, it is better treated as a contested con-
cept. Four main progress projects were identified and investigated:
economic growth and development, equality, human rights, and
human development and well-being.
Neoliberalism is not inevitable. There are two main forms of
modernity in the global North – social democracy as well as neolib-
eralism. A key difference between them is the depth of democracy:
neoliberalism does not go beyond suffrage-democracy, while social
democracy has presence-democracy and a breadth of democracy. A
further difference in the varieties of modernity is in the extent of
inequality.
Each complex inequality is constituted by a regime of inequality with
ontological depth in each institutional domain of economy, polity, vio-
lence, and civil society. For example, the gender regime is not reducible
to family or culture, but is constituted in all of these domains. Within
each domain no one regime of inequality saturates its institutions, rather
multiple inequalities coexist and intersect in the same domain.
The conventional trilogy of economy, polity, and civil society is
extended with a fourth domain of violence. Violence is an institu-
tional domain, a set of coherently inter-related social practices. It is
essential to include violence as an institutional domain alongside the
others if complex inequalities other than class are to be understood,
12 Conclusions
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since violence by the majority on minoritized groups is part of the
constitution of these social relations.
The notion of a modern society as being constituted by a nation-
state is rejected. The domains of economy, polity, violence, and civil
society have different temporal and spatial reach; they do not
simply map onto each other in the way required by the conven-
tional concept of society. There are non-saturating and overlapping
regimes of inequality and institutional domains. There are processes
of societalization, but these will rarely reach completion in a ‘soci-
ety’ before another project intervenes.
Even the global North is no yet fully modern. Social relations are
not yet modern where there is no free wage labour; where the state
does not have a monopoly of legitimate violence in its territory; and
where there is not democracy. The modernization of the gender
regime is ongoing but this is rarely fully completed. During this gen-
der transformation there is the emergence of employed women as
a new political constituency, as the new champions of social
democracy. However, only where there are allies does this lead to
the practice of social democracy.
Globalization is not a unified force, rather it is constituted by diverse
global processes that include global flows of capital, trade, and people,
global financial and governance institutions, global hegemons, and global
civil societal waves. The concept of the global wave is an important
addition to the range of global processes. However, rather than eroding
national path dependent trajectories, global processes restructure
social processes.
Complexity theory is used in order to make the theoretical innova-
tions needed to address these challenges and to undertake the neces-
sary revisions to social theory. This involves rethinking and reworking
rather than rejecting the concept of a social system. This book is a rare
example of the application of complexity theory to empirical social
scientific analysis that is larger than specific organizations.
The Challenge of Complex
Inequalities and Globalization to
Social Theory
Progress
It is better to think of progress as a contested concept, rather than
to reject it because it does not have a universal meaning. DifferentG
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projects vigorously contest the shape of the social world informed
by their own understanding of progress. It is possible to discern
four major framings of progress that are important at a global level:
economic growth and development, equality, human rights, and
human development and well-being.
These goals were operationalized into quantitative indicators in
Chapter 9 and the performance of different countries was compared
and assessed.
The common assumption that neoliberalism is linked to faster
economic growth is wrong. The USA achieved its higher level of indi-
vidual income in the past when many European countries were
destroying each other in war, as was shown in Chapter 10. In the cur-
rent era, the rate of economic growth is almost exactly the same in the
neoliberal USA and the more social democratic EU. On other indica-
tors of progress (such as living a long life, human rights, and equality)
citizens of the EU do better than those in the USA. Social democracy is
a more effective path of development in delivering equality, human
rights, and human well-being than neoliberalism, while there is no sig-
nificant difference between them on the rate of economic growth.
Modernity and its varieties
Modernity does not take a single form, instead there are path-
dependent varieties of modernity. Some of the social arrangements that
are called a different modernity may be more properly understood as
premodern. This is especially the case in relation to gender relations.
Modernity in the economy entails free wage labour for all and no
forced or domestic labour. Free waged labour often occurs among
men of the dominant ethnic group before it does so for women or
less powerful ethnic groups. While women’s main livelihood is
based on domestic labour the economy is not yet modern. Likewise,
while there is slavery or feudalism among any minority ethnic or
other group, there is not yet modernity.
Modernity in the polity involves not only rationalization but also
democracy. Rationalization involves the replacement of governance by
superstition, religion, and by persons with ascribed characteristics with
that by secular and bureaucratic institutions. Contemporary conceptions
of modern governance not only involve the bureaucratic application of
rules and procedures but also democratic procedures. If a polity restricts
membership of governing bodies to those with ascribed characteristics,
such as ‘sex’ or ‘race’, it is not democratic and thus not modern.
Modernity requires a free civil society. This includes not only the
traditional notion of the practice of free association, but also personal
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autonomy and bodily integrity. This includes, for instance, the ability
to individually control fertility through contraception and abortion
and to have the expectation of the absence of physical or sexual
harassment or violation on the basis of ‘race’ or ‘sex’.
Modernity in the domain of violence was rarely commented upon
by the classical social theorists. The existence of widespread inter-
personal violence against women and minority ethnic and religious
groups in civil society that is not effectively criminalized means that
a state has not yet modernized so as to actually achieve a monop-
oly of legitimate violence in a given territory. Weber defined the
state as a body with a monopoly over legitimate violence over a
given territory, yet men’s violence against women is but little regu-
lated by the state, nor that by the dominant against minority ethnic
groups.
The practice of describing a country as modern if it is modern for
men of the dominant ethnicity should be rejected. Some regimes of
inequality may be modern while others are not. When gender is
brought into focus, we are not yet modern.
The (potentially) many varieties of modernity cluster into two major
forms in the global North: neoliberalism and social democracy (as
shown in Chapter 8). The key areas in which they differ are democ-
racy and inequality. While both have democracy, since these forms are
limited to modernity, it is much shallower in neoliberalism and much
deeper in social democracy. Neoliberalism is marked by high levels of
inequality, social democracy with lower levels of inequality.
In the economy, the distinction can be identified in the level of regu-
lation of employment and finance and the extent of state provision of
welfare: neoliberalism has little regulation and little state provision,
while social democracy has more regulation and more state provi-
sion. This can be further differentiated by regime of inequality: gen-
der equality forms are not reducible to those of class in either
regulation or state welfare provision.
In the polity, democracy is deeper in the social democratic than
neoliberal forms. In neoliberalism, democracy is little more than
suffrage-democracy; in social democracy, it extends to the presence
of women and minoritized groups in parliament and a wider range
of institutions to which it is applied as a form of governance.
The rate of violence is higher in neoliberal rather than social demo-
cratic countries, whether this is interpersonal, group, or state vio-
lence. The state apparatus to deploy violence is larger in a neoliberal
than a social democratic state, contradicting claims that neoliberal-
ism is linked to a smaller state. The more democratic the polity, the
more likely there are to be laws and practices to de-legitimate and
regulate violence from dominant to weaker social groups.G
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Civil societies are formally free in both neoliberal and social
democratic forms: in neoliberalism personal and intimate relations
are more likely to be commercialized and unequal, while in social
democracy they are more likely to be mutual and equal.
Complex inequalities
Theorizing the simultaneity of multiple complex inequalities has
challenged social theory. A tendency to prioritize one main axis
of inequality around class was confronted by the significance of
multiple inequalities. Postmodernism challenged modernist social
theory, offering a move from an assumed universalism to the
prioritization of difference. This unfortunate polarization can be
transcended using complexity theory.
Rather than dichotomizing equality and difference, these are better
recognized as usually entwined. The concept of complex inequalities
makes explicit the simultaneity of both inequality and difference in
social relations. Even class relations, which are usually presented as if
they are about inequalities of income, wealth, and power, can also
incorporate positively valued differences such as solidarity. This simul-
taneity is more obvious with gender and ethnic relations, where there
are often overt discussions as to the relationship between the compo-
nents of inequality and difference. In the case of gender relations there
is contestation as to whether the gender division of labour in which
women more frequently perform unpaid domestic care-work than
men constitutes a negatively valued inequality or a positively valued
difference. The concept of ‘complex inequalities’ does not resolve this
issue a priori, but keeps open the simultaneity of difference and
inequality and the often contested balance between them.
Multiple complex inequalities beyond class need to be main-
streamed into the centre of social theory, to move beyond their
development in relatively separate, segregated, specialist sub-fields.
Instead what is required is that the centre of social theory changes,
not merely that concepts of complex inequality are adjusted so that
they fit into an unchanged theoretical agenda. This is as much
adjustment by the mainstream as it is the renewal of the conceptu-
alization of complex inequalities – a two-way movement of mutual
adaptation, of the coevolution of complex systems of thought, and
not a one-way impact.
This requires the rethinking of core concepts and analytic strate-
gies. The definition of each of the institutional domains of economy,
polity, and civil society needs reconsideration so as to include more
adequately those aspects of concern to the wider range of complex
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inequalities; and violence needs to be included as a fourth institutional
domain. The economy includes unpaid domestic care-work as well
as the market economy; the polity includes organized religions and
the EU as well as states; civil society includes intimacy as well as
other forms of association. This analysis goes beyond humanism to
include bodies and technology in causal chains, not only human
agency. Each complex inequality needs to be theorized as a system
with ontological depth in economy, polity, violence, and civil soci-
ety, and at macro, meso, and micro levels: this is achieved in the
analyses of regimes of inequality. For example, gender may be per-
ceived as performance or experienced as identity but it is socially
constituted with ontological depth. Each institutional domain con-
tains multiple intersecting regimes of inequality. In order to theorize
the relationship between these systems the concept of social system
is rethought using the insights of complexity theory.
The inclusion of complex inequalities in addition to class makes a
difference to the explanation of social development, including the
critical turning points and tipping points that create divergent path
dependent trajectories of development. The balance of class forces
and alliances between them are not the only forces that are relevant,
also important are gender, ethnic, religious, and national projects. In
particular, and first, the transformation of the gender regime from a
domestic to a public form is creating a new constituency in employed
women who support and restructure the social democratic project.
Second, the non-alignment of nation and state in the context of the
search for the mythical nation-state, especially if compounded by eth-
nicity and religious divides, is a major cause of organized violence.
Third, some economic growth spurts have been associated with the
transformation of the gender regime and the employment of women
previously engaged in unpaid domestic care-work.
Regimes of inequality
Complex inequalities are systems of social relations and here are
named regimes of inequality. There are multiple coexisting and
intersecting regimes of inequality, including (but not only) those
of gender, class, and ethnicity. Each regime of inequality is non-
reducible to other regimes. At the points of intersection, there is
a mutual adaptation of these complex systems.
Too often the ontological depth of inequalities has been narrowed: to
identity, to performance, or to the economic. It may be expressed as
performance, and experienced as identity, or be constituted within
the economy, but it is more than that. Each regime has ontological
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depth, including the domains of economy, polity, violence, and
civil society, as well as micro, meso, and macro levels. Unless all
domains are included in a theorization of the constitution of each
inequality, the theoretical understanding of the inter-relationship
between the domains will fail. The theorization of an inequality as
primarily constituted in only one social domain leads to the failure to
theorize it elsewhere in the social, either to the neglect of gender, or
to an overly simplistic base-superstructure theorization that cannot
grasp the complexity and ubiquity of these relations.
The separate identification of both institutional and relational
forms of social relations is essential. Only when the distinction is
made is it possible to theorize adequately the simultaneity of mul-
tiple complex inequalities with full ontological depth.
Institutional domains: the addition
of violence
The mainstreaming of complex inequalities in addition to class
requires the reconfiguration of the concepts of economy, polity,
and civil society, and the addition of violence as a fourth institu-
tional domain.
A traditional definition of the economy is the system of relations,
institutions, and processes concerned with the production, con-
sumption, distribution, and circulation of goods and services to
support human life. However, in practice much work on the econ-
omy has narrowed the definition to the marketized or monetized
section of the economy. This narrowing is reversed here and the
concept of economy is developed and clarified so as to include
unpaid domestic work as well. This reconceptualization of the
economy allows for the inclusion of gendered divisions of labour
and the significance of the transformation of the gender regime in
which household production is replaced by paid employment
within the market or the state. This shift repositions those forms of
welfare that are care-work (such as childcare) as production, rather
than as luxuries or forms of redistribution.
The concept of the state is replaced by the broader concept of
polity so as to include not only states, but also nations, the EU, orga-
nized religions, empires, and hegemons. In addition, there is a need
to disaggregate the concept of the ‘nation-state’ into nations and
states, which overlap but are rarely co-terminus. This is not an argu-
ment that states are not important – they are, but they are not the
only form of polity. Each polity carries different ethnic, religious,
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and gender projects. Using the broader concept of polity allows for
a better analysis of the implications of religion, nation, and gender
within global processes. Polities overlap and contest each other’s
domains, so that any given territory is likely to be subject to several
competing and accommodating polities.
The concept of civil society is deployed to encompass phenom-
ena that are variously categorized as culture, discourse, and iden-
tity. It is preferred because it highlights the contestation over the
construction of meaning rather than consensus, and links to other
social domains. It includes all forms of association, including inti-
mate ones. The concept is developed beyond its Gramscian origins
in order to capture social practices associated with a wider range of
complex inequalities rather than class.
Violence is added to the traditional trilogy of economy, polity, and
civil society as a fourth institutional domain. Violence is especially
important in the constitution of non-class relations of inequality,
including gender, nation, and ethnicity. Violence takes interpersonal,
group, and state forms; it is deployed and regulated in different
ways with different outcomes. Violence constitutes a social system,
an institutional domain, rather than being merely a set of individual
behaviours or a tool used as an instrument by states.
Societalization rather than societies:
non-saturation of territory
There are neither fully globalized nor fully separate societies. Societies
as they have been traditionally understood in Sociology and the other
social sciences do not exist. Conventional conceptions of society
involve the coincidence of economy, polity, and culture in the same
territory, indeed that a modern society is a nation-state (Giddens 1984).
However, ethos and polis, culture and polity, rarely map onto each
other completely, notwithstanding nationalist aspirations in this regard
or sociological conceptions of ‘society’ and the ‘nation-state’. The
notion that a single culture, state, and economy map onto each other
in a one-to-one way in modern nation-states is a myth (Walby 2003).
Specific institutional domains and regimes of inequality do not sat-
urate their territory. Rather they overlap and are non-nested. Multiple
regimes of inequality coexist within each institutional domain.
There are different spatial and temporal reaches to the various
systems of economy, polity, violence, and civil society. This
means that systems may be bounded at a variety of spatial levels,
including the local (e.g. local labour markets or travel to work
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areas), country (e.g. welfare state), regional (e.g. EU regulation of
the Single European Market), or global (e.g. global financial gov-
ernance by a complex of bodies such as the IMF). For example,
in the European Union the legal regime regulating the market
economy is predominantly constituted at the level of the EU, while
the welfare regime is predominantly at the Member State level.
Rather than societies there are processes of societalization. This
process, often attempted, is rarely if ever completed. There are
attempts at homogenization, of making consistent the mapping of cul-
ture, religion, state, and economy, as in the idealized image of the
nation-state, but this is rarely achieved. There are many potential bases
or principles underpinning projects of societalization. These projects of
societalization take time. They are usually stopped by the development
of competing alternative projects of societalization before they achieve
completion. As a consequence there are few if any examples of a fully
completed society, with a full and exclusive mapping of economy,
nation, state, violence, and civil society. Attempts to create a society
around a consistent set of principles with sets of relations that are con-
sistent with each other and mutually reinforcing are not usually com-
pleted. The social processes swirl too fast; they are not stabilized.
While some societalization projects have been focused on the
development of a homogeneous system in one country, others
have had a much larger intent. In a global era, these include soci-
etalization projects that include the whole globe as their aspiration.
There are competing projects of globalization, seeking to create
and fill institutions with their own preferred forms of social rela-
tions. These include the contesting projects of the USA and EU
hegemons, as well as those centred on specific religious, ethnic,
and national projects, such as Catholicism and certain forms of
Islam. Globalization is a developing process that has not yet formed
a single system of economy, polity, violence, and civil society.
The concept of ‘society’ should be replaced by a focus on the
process of ‘societalization’, a process often begun but rarely fully
completed. This requires abandoning assumptions that polities sat-
urate a given territory. Rather they coexist and cross-cut each other,
in competition and cooperation, as they coevolve. The concept of
the nation-state should be abandoned except as a powerful myth
and replaced by separate concepts of nations and states. There are
degrees of societalization, not fully formed societies.
Global processes, including waves
There are many diverse global processes, not just one globalization.
These include: global flows of capital, trade, and people; global
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financial and governance institutions; global hegemons; and global
waves. These flows and institutional developments are uneven: there
is no single uniform process of globalization. Global processes are
not only economic and political but also involve violence and civil
societies. There are emergent forms of global civil societal practices,
but not the homogenization of culture.
Understanding global processes demands new ways of
thinking about space that avoid both the excesses of the de-
territorialization thesis and the denial of globalization, instead
developing new concepts to capture the nuanced ways in
which space is implicated in new forms of economies, polities,
violence, and civil societies. There is a restructuring rather than
an annihilation of space.
The changes are not simple one-way impacts, which may be suc-
cessfully or unsuccessfully resisted, but rather involve the coevolu-
tion of economies, polities, violence, and civil societies in an
uneven global fitness landscape.
There are no neatly bounded, hermetically sealed ‘societies’,
instead many inter-connections across national boundaries, at
regional and global levels, are usual rather than exceptional. This is
not as new as has been sometimes assumed, but nonetheless it is
taking new forms and gaining increased significance. Globalization
highlights the importance of challenging the conventional equation
of a ‘society’ with a ‘nation-state’.
Globalization should not be equated with the spread of neo-
liberal capitalism, nor modernity, nor Westernization. There are
competing projects of globalization, not least between the hege-
mons of the USA and the EU. Global processes are complex,
cross-cutting and sometimes contradictory, not only at an eco-
nomic level but also involving polities, violence, and civil society.
It is not enough to consider whether global processes have a ten-
dency to erode polities since there is a more diverse range of rela-
tionships between globalization and political entities, including
resistance to globalization, the creation of new polities, and most
importantly the development of contesting global hegemons.
Global processes are implicated in the restructuring of complex
inequalities: some increase while others decrease; all are restruc-
tured. Class relations have frequently become more unequal, while
complex gender transitions and interconnections lead to new
opportunities for some but not for others. Changes in ethnicities are
altogether more varied.
The distinctive nature of social connections in a global era
requires the development of new concepts. The concept of wave
is developed to address the simultaneous and unique temporal and
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spatial dimensions of the spread of civil societal and political ideas
and practice around the globe. The notion of wave captures the
way that this occurs as a movement of social energy that only
lightly touches institutions, parallel to the way that light moves as
a wave rather than as a particle. It also captures the sudden non-
linear escalation of energy within a wave through endogenous
processes. Global civil societal waves – including neoliberalism,
human rights, fundamentalisms and feminism – cross-cut national
trajectories of development.
Comparative paths of development:
employed women as the new
champions of social democracy
The differences between varieties of modernity are the consequence
of divergent paths of development into neoliberalism and social
democracy. Political economy is not the only nexus in which these
are locked-in, there is another in violence also. Violence, especially
but not only wars, is important in shaping paths of development,
not least for its much neglected implications for economic growth
and development.
Complex inequalities, not only class, are important in these tra-
jectories. The emergence of employed women as the new cham-
pions of social democracy has implications not only for gender
relations but also for class and other complex inequalities as well.
The critical turning points into different forms of modernity occur
at different times in different regimes of inequality; there is no
single moment. The temporality and sequencing of these events
matter: a longer rather than a shorter gap between groups in their
access to democracy has implications for the development of a
country as a whole.
Global processes are potentially a challenge to path dependent
trajectories embedded in particular countries. However, the distinc-
tions between varieties of modernity are not being eroded even
though they are being restructured. This is especially because of a
rapid spiralling of the effects of the emergence of employed women
as champions of social democracy where emergent forms of social
democracy are already established. The catalysing rather than damp-
ening of the coevolution of the modernization of these systems makes
a difference to their form.
The concepts of path dependency and critical turning points
derived from complexity theory are important in enabling an
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appropriate balance to be struck between general social theory and
an analysis of the particular.
Tipping points
There are tipping points between different paths of development.
These critical turning points have immense implications for patterns
of subsequent development of social relations. The struggles that
take place at these moments are constituted not only by class forces,
but also by those aligned with gender, ethnicity, and religion.
The financial and economic crisis of 2007–2009 may be a tipping
point away from neoliberalism, perhaps to social democracy and
global justice, but perhaps towards a more nationalist and protec-
tionist future. The contestation between the hegemons of the USA
and the EU is a key part of this moment, together with a wide range
of global actors. These hegemons carry different projects, pro-
grammes, and social formations: the USA more neoliberal, and the
EU, though less cohesively so, more social democratic. A tip in the
balance of power between these two hegemons would have
immense implications for the world.
Complexity theory
Complexity theory is used to solve difficulties in social theory so
as to address multiple complex inequalities and globalization; it
provides a toolbox for innovation. Theorizing multiple complex
systems of inequality requires new ways of thinking about social
systems in order to be able to conceptualize the relationship between
regimes of inequality and institutional domains. While Sociology
has had something of a hiatus in the use and development of the
concept of system, this has proceeded apace in other disciplines.
The concept of a social system should not be abandoned but instead
re-worked using the insights of complexity theory. Complexity
theory enables the development of a more flexible and nuanced
conception of systems that do not need to be presumed to return to
equilibrium in order to be theorized. Complex social systems do not
have only negative feedback loops but also positive ones that can
send systems accelerating and spiralling forward. The system/envi-
ronment distinction allows for the insight that regimes of inequality are
overlapping and do not saturate the territory that they are in. There is
neither a single universal form ofmodernity nor an infinite number of forms,
but rather clusters of path dependent developments. Globalization has
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not eroded the differences between social forms to create a single
social system, but is implicated in their restructuring. They are con-
nected not only by their processes of coevolution in a changing fit-
ness landscape, but also by global civil societal waves. Complexity
theory is needed to address change in a global era, to conceptualize
the critical turning points, tipping points, into path dependent and
not universal paths of development. There are non-linear global
waves, polities that catalyse or dampen, positive as well as negative
feedback.
It is important to re-work rather than reject the concept of system;
while it is important to utilize the concept of non-linearity, this does
not mean abandoning systematic explanatory analysis; only some
phenomena are non-linear. Social theory is situated in the tension
between universalism and particularism, foundationalism and rela-
tivism, and none of these extreme poles are sustainable. Complexity
theory allows us to transcend the dichotomy between modernism
and postmodernism in social theory.
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